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Preface 
“Mit einer ungeheuren und stolzen Gelassenheit leben; immer jenseits—. Seine Affekte, sein 
Für und Wider willkürlich haben und nicht haben, sich auf sie herablassen, für Stunden; sich 
auf sie setzen, wie auf Pferde, oft wie auf Esel: — man muss nämlich ihre Dummheit so gut 
wie ihr Feuer zu nützen wissen.” 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, 284 
 
In the introduction to her excellent book exploring the place of emotion in 
contemporary moral philosophy, Martha Nussbaum (2008) describes emotions as forces that 
“[…] shape the landscape of our mental and social lives (p. I)”, as “geological upheavals of 
thought (p. I)” that are “intelligent responses to the perception of value (p. II)”. While 
Nussbaum’s book is a great step forward in rehabilitating emotions as valuable contributors to 
rationality, it is notable that even she adopts a largely passive model of emotion. This view of 
emotions as states that come over us, that we are relatively passive “victims of”, that shape 
our lives and inform us of the do’s and don’ts of the world, has been the leitmotif for the 
intellectual exploration of emotion both historically and in modern times (Plamper, 2015). 
However, there is increasing evidence that this paradigm of passivity is, at least in some 
cases, mistaken. For one, we have a considerable degree of leeway in heeding the purported 
evolutionary wisdom of our emotions. Literally hundreds of studies have shown that the way 
we react to emotional events is, at least in part, dependent on how we choose to relate to them 
(see J. J. Gross, 2015a for a recent review). Moreover, evidence suggests that individuals not 
only react emotionally to events in the world, but seek out and use emotional reactions in an 
instrumental fashion in the service of goal achievement (Ford & Tamir, 2012; M. Y. Kim, 
Ford, Mauss, & Tamir, 2015; Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008). As such, it is increasingly 
apparent that we are not merely the recipients of the wisdom of emotions, but stand in an 
active dialectic relationship with them. Importantly, as Nietzsche proposed, evidence is 
increasingly showing that flexibility and fluency in choosing what emotional states to 
  Preface 
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experience might be a key factor not only in mental health, but in flourishing (Bonanno & 
Burton, 2013; Fredrickson, 2013; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). 
The current thesis investigates one important means by which one can influence what 
emotional states one experiences, namely the self-generation of emotional states based on 
endogenous sources of information. Such states range from the melancholia of reminiscence 
to the anticipation of future joys, and constitute important parts of our emotional lives 
(Solomon, 2003). Importantly, while such endogenously generated emotion can in some cases 
be sources of anguish, as seen in some pathological cases (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & 
Burgess, 2010; Cooney, Joormann, Eugène, Dennis, & Gotlib, 2010), they can also be elicited 
in a volitional fashion with relative ease: By guiding one’s thoughts to a cherished (or 
maligned) emotionally significant situation (past, future, or hypothetical), resulting in (under 
ideal circumstances) strong and vivid emotional experiences (Salas, Radovic, & Turnbull, 
2012). Such endogenously generated emotions afford us a means to self-induce and 
experience emotional states independently of the external world, and, potentially actively 
utilise emotion in the service of self-regulation (Fredrickson, 2013). 
Despite the ubiquity of endogenous emotions, comparatively little research has 
focused on how they come to be, much less how they can actively be used for self-regulation. 
The current thesis aimed to rectify this by investigating 1) the neural and behavioural means 
by which endogenous emotion is generated, and 2) how the capacity to generate such emotion 
can be used in an active way to deal with external emotional stressors.  
The investigation of how endogenous emotion generation occurs took two 
complimentary approaches: First, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in two 
large (N = 32/293) representative samples, the neural and behavioural foundations of 
endogenous emotion generation in the normal population was investigated. This was done 
using a newly developed paradigm that allowed naturalistic and nuanced measurement of 
optimal emotion generation. This was complemented by investigations of the structural and 
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functional neural signatures of endogenous emotion generation in a sample of long-term 
meditation practitioners. These practitioners had extensive experience in practices that pivot 
on the active generation of the positive emotional states of loving-kindness and compassion. 
Thus, they constituted a population of “experts” at endogenous emotion generation. Together, 
these approaches allowed the triangulation of the neural component process architecture 
supporting the volitional endogenous generation of emotion.  
Similarly, the question of how endogenous emotion generation can be used for 
emotional self-regulation was also investigated in both expert and normal populations. 
One of the key means by which endogenous emotion generation has been proposed to be of 
utility for self-regulation is by allowing the individual to buffer against negative stressors by 
self-inducing positive emotion. By investigating the neural correlates of using compassion 
meditation to regulate emotional reactions to negative stressors, the neural mechanisms and 
behavioural consequences of buffering against negative emotion could be investigated. Next, 
by investigating how individual differences in the ability to generate emotions was related to 
emotion regulation and coping styles in the normal population, it could be ascertained 
whether buffering, or other modes of emotion management, was associated with efficacy at 
self-generation of emotion. Thus, taken together, these findings provide an insight into the 
mechanisms by which endogenous emotion generation can be used for emotional self-
regulation.  
In the following an overview of the thesis is given. In Part I, the theoretical and 
empirical background for the current work is presented. In Chapter 1, the theoretical 
background for the current study is described, discussing the historical conception of emotion 
as passive states of mind, and how a significant counter-current in the continental, 
existentialist philosophical tradition has argued for a more active conceptualisation of 
emotion. Chapter 2 follows this up with a review of the extant behavioural and neuroscience 
literature on how endogenous emotion is generated, culminating in a working model of the 
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component process architecture of endogenous emotion generation that guided the current 
work. The chapter also discusses empirical work suggesting a role for endogenous emotion 
generation in coping and emotion regulation, culminating in a theoretical account of the 
potential mechanisms by which endogenous emotion generation can be used in the service of 
emotional self-regulation that guided the current investigations. This is followed by Part II, in 
which the empirical investigations that are the heart of the current thesis is presented. These 
studies are either published (H. G. Engen & Singer, 2015) or under review in peer-reviewed 
journals at the time of writing, and the current thesis reproduces these as submitted. As the 
paper format affords limited space for the discussion of methodological details, Chapter 3 
includes a detailed discussion of the experimental and analytical methods used, including an 
account of the development of the novel paradigm used to investigate endogenous emotion 
generation skills in a naturalistic fashion. Chapter 4 presents the results from this paradigm, in 
a study that sought to establish the component process neural architecture of emotion 
generation in a large, representative, population. Additionally, the study sought to distinguish 
general neural mechanisms from those supporting specific implementations of emotion 
generation, such as specific valences, or information modalities used. Chapter 5 sought to 
validate the candidate neural architecture described in Chapter 4 by investigating the 
functional neural correlates of loving-kindness meditation (a technique centrally involving the 
generation of positive emotion), and how expertise in this technique is reflected in 
morphological changes in cortical thickness. In the same expert meditation sample, Chapter 6 
reports the behavioural and neural effects of using compassion meditation to regulate 
emotional reactions to negative stressors, and how this compares to reappraisal, a “gold-
standard” emotion regulation strategy (Buhle et al., 2014; McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012a) 
that involves generating cognitive interpretations to change the emotional meaning of 
negative stressors. Thus, this chapter investigates the neural mechanisms supporting active 
efforts to regulate responses to negative external stressors using endogenous emotion 
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generation, and differentiates this from cognitive forms of emotion regulation. Finally, 
Chapter 7 investigates whether and how emotion generation skills relate to adaptive emotion 
management styles and trait tendency to experience positive or negative emotion in a subset 
(n = 288) of the sample investigated in Chapter 4. Part III summarises the current studies and 
discusses limitations, implications and future directions for this research. Chapter 8 provides 
an integrative discussion of the current findings relative to the working models proposed in 
Chapter 2, while Chapter 9 discusses the implications of the finding for our fundamental 
understanding of emotion and emotion regulation, as well as limitations of the current work 
and questions and directions for future work hinted at by the present findings.
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Part I: Theoretical and empirical 
foundation
1.1. Chapter overview 
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Chapter 1: Emotion as action: Philosophical 
background 
 
1.1. Chapter overview 
In this chapter, the philosophical and historical background for the current thesis is 
presented. Emotion has traditionally been thought of as being an adversary of rationality and 
either an impediment to self-regulation or something that itself needs to be regulated. There 
exists, however, a significant counter-current rooted in the continental tradition of philosophy, 
stating that emotions are not mere reactions, but constitute strategies by which we adapt to the 
external world. Importantly, it has been argued that emotion stemming from endogenous 
sources can be flexibly used in the service of goal achievement, and even counteract 
emotional reactions imparted on us by the external world.  
 
1.2. The adversary of rationality: Emotions in the history of philosophy 
“The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing”  
— Blaise Pascal 
 
As a subject of philosophy, emotions bear the dubious distinction of being both a 
perennial topic of inquiry and being almost universally dismissed as opposed to the very act 
of rational thinking. Frequently described as reactive and irrational, the emotions are 
traditionally thought of as harbingers of discord, perturbers of the soul and the enemies of 
harmony on both societal and individual levels (Nussbaum, 2008; Plamper, 2015). As such, it 
is perhaps not surprising that emotions have been a central topic of Western philosophy as far 
back as the pre-Socratics, perhaps most notably in the ethical teachings of the Stoics (Graver, 
2009). In large part, these teachings focus on how to use rationality to reign in, or control 
one’s emotional reactions (D. M. Gross, 2007a). Typical to this intellectual tradition is the 
assumption that emotions are occurrences over which we have no influence. This 
                                                           Chapter 1: Emotion as action: Philosophical background 
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understanding of has been highly influential in forming the modern understanding of 
emotions as more or less adaptive, evolutionarily imparted reactions to significant stimuli in 
the environment. For instance, as this model has it, exposure to stimuli or events that signify 
threat to the organism is likely to elicit an emotional reaction of fear, concomitant with 
behaviours (e.g. freezing), evaluations (e.g. “this is a horrible thing happening”) and 
physiological and cognitive reactions resulting in the organism being mobilised to deal with a 
given threat (J. J. Gross, Sheppes, & Urry, 2011; Ledoux, 1998). Importantly, these reactions 
are taken to occur in a reflexive manner, such that exposure to threat automatically elicits 
emotional behaviours, irrespective of what the goals of the individual might be. Thus, as our 
opening quote indicates, emotions are often thought as having the paradigmatic quality of 
occurring according to a logic — such as evolutionarily inherited survival concerns — that is 
inscrutable, impenetrable, and essentially uncontrollable to and by one’s rational mind. Aside 
from the potentially deleterious effects acting in affect can have, it was this reflexivity that 
made emotions inimical to ancient thinkers, on whose account emotional reactions are, in a 
very real way, in part losing mastery over oneself and becoming subject to rules not one’s 
own. 
Perhaps understandably then, systems raised in opposition to emotion have largely 
been focused on devising means by which self-governance can be upheld or regained through 
the application of rationality. Thus, Marcus Aurelius, a noted Stoic, advises that by “[g]et[ing] 
rid of the judgment; you are rid of the ‘I am hurt’; get rid of the ‘I am hurt,’ you are rid of the 
hurt itself” (Meditations, III, 16). Thus, by consciously, effortfully, altering one’s judgements 
through rational thoughts, one can mend oneself of irrational emotional reactions. Moreover, 
by cultivating thought and rational judgement, it is held that one can diffuse emotional 
reactions altogether, for, as Epictetus (another famous Stoic) maintained “[m]en are disturbed, 
not by things, but by the principles and notions which they form concerning things” 
(Enchiridion, 5). Thus, by effortfully training ourselves to see things as they truly are (which 
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is to say acceding only to the properties they have in themselves) we can avoid emotional 
reactions wholly. Importantly, even though emotion is here seen as the consequence of 
thought, it is seen as being a side-effect of faulty thinking. This leads us to impart importance 
to things and events that are, in fact, emotionally neutral. Thus, an optimally rational actor 
should not incur the vagaries of emotions and, in effect, be wholly in control of oneself in 
perfect equanimity.  
It is difficult to overstate how influential the notion of equanimity as an ideal for self-
control has been. The notion that control of emotions involves achieving a neutral, non-
emotional, rational state of mind was endorsed not only by the Stoics, but ran through most 
ancient Western systems proposing a means to achieve eudaimonion (e.g. Cynicism, 
Epicureanism, Peripateticism, Platonism, Pyrrhonism), and is arguably one of the central 
pillars of enlightenment in Buddhism (Lama & Paul Ekman, 2008). While there is increasing 
acknowledgement of the potential intelligence and benefits of emotions in affective science 
(Barrett, 2011; Damasio, 1994; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010; Nussbaum, 2008), this 
adversarial account of emotion is still highly influential and can be thought of as the standard 
model organising both philosophy and empirical research into both emotions, and emotion 
management (J. J. Gross, 2015b; 2015a; J. J. Gross & Barrett, 2011). 
 
1.3. Emotions as ways of interacting with the world 
 There is, however, a significant philosophical counter-current arguing for emotions 
being active means of engaging with the world. According to this model, emotions should not 
(exclusively) be thought of as reactions that should be avoided or suppressed, but occur in the 
context of, and, importantly, as an expression of our goals and intentions. On such an account 
emotion is not something that needs to be controlled by our rational faculties of thought, but 
rather are extensions and expressions of rationality. Importantly, if we take this model 
seriously, emotion control involves more than merely suppressing or negating the occurrence 
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of emotional reactions, but rather selecting when and what emotional experiences one has at 
any given time – i.e. that emotions can be actively recruited and employed to further self-
governance. In the following sections, three such accounts will be presented, as proposed by 
Descartes, Sartre, and Solomon, with the aim of demonstrating the means and mechanisms by 
which emotions are not something that happens to us, but entities we actively employ to self-
regulate. 
 
1.3.1. Cartesian emotion regulation 
“To arouse boldness and suppress fear in ourselves, it’s not enough to have a volition to do 
so. We have to set ourselves to think about the reasons, objects, or precedents which argue 
that the danger isn’t great, that there’s always more security in defence than in flight, that 
we’ll gain glory and joy if we conquer, and nothing but regret and shame if we flee—things 
like that. Our passions can’t be aroused or suppressed directly by the action of our will, but 
only indirectly by our representing to ourselves things that are usually joined with the passion 
we want to have or opposed to the one we want to fend off.”  
 Rene Descartes, Passions IV, 45 
 
In addition to being one of the great philosophers of mind and epistemology, 
Descartes formulated a comprehensive account of “the passions” or what we now recognise as 
emotions. Largely due to being perceived as espousing a strong dualism between emotion and 
cognition, Descartes has been the butt of much criticism in recent affective science. In 
particular, he has been read as stating that cognition can, and should, be in charge of 
emotional responses, and as such has been taken as being one of the strongest proponents of 
the dualistic adversarial account of emotion-cognition interaction. Evaluating this charge is 
beyond the scope of the current treatment (see e.g. Damasio, 1994; D. M. Gross, 2007a), but 
it is interesting to note that the Cartesian account of how one can go about controlling ones 
emotions appears not to follow an adversarial account, at least in as much as it refuses the 
possibility of volitionally influencing the course of one’s emotions by mere cognition. Rather, 
in the above quote, Descartes proposes that emotions can only be controlled by the counter
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generation of emotions through creating internal representations. This can be done either in 
order to achieve a goal or to counter ongoing emotions. While thoroughly supporting the 
notion that emotions are reflexive and following a specific trajectory, an implication of this 
view is that emotions can be used to achieve goals by the use of imagination to achieve what 
in modern parlance would be called an embodied representation of a given emotion. 
Following on this, Descartes makes apparent a distinction between exogenous emotions, that 
we can fend off, and endogenous emotions, that are more or less something we can control. 
This opens the intriguing possibility that a comprehensive account of emotion control needs 
to include the capacity to strategically self-generate emotional states both to motivate 
behaviour and to deal with emotional reactions to the external world. 
 
1.3.2. No exits, no excuses: Sartre on our responsibility for emotion 
“The existentialist does not believe in the power of passion. He will never regard a grand 
passion as a destructive torrent upon which a man is swept into uncertain actions as by fate, 
and which, therefore is an excuse for them. He thinks that man is responsible for his 
passion.”  
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism 
 
Jean-Paul Sartre can be thought of as having followed up this Cartesian model by 
extending it to all emotion, including that caused by happenings in the external world (Sartre, 
1939). Rather than thinking of emotion as something that happens to us, Sartre claimed that 
we are essentially responsible for our emotional reactions. Indeed, rather than calling them 
reactions, on Sartre’s view, emotions are strategies we (consciously or non-consciously) use 
to deal with the world (see also Frijda, 2007). Essentially arguing against the view that 
emotions simply happen to us, Sartre fundamentally changes the status of the emoter 
(possibly exempting pathology) to someone that is responsible for their emotional state. The 
crux of Sartre’s argument is that a view of emotions as passive is merely a vehicle for the 
“bad faith” (mauvaise foi) of referring to our emotional reactions as post-hoc excuses for 
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behaviours that at a later point in time turn out to be undesirable. As such, Sartre argues that 
all emotion occurs in the service of goal-achievement — in his view essentially ego-defence. 
Thus, while Sartre’s emotions are endogenously caused, the precise strategic end might be 
camouflaged from our conscious recognition. As such, the Sartrean view argues strongly that 
all emotion has endogenous causes. This is similar to the view that judgments determine 
emotion, but is taken further by emphasising that emotions are actions, that they in effect stem 
from our goals and thus should not be thought of as mere reactions to the external world. 
 
1.3.3. Robert Solomon on emotion as action 
“Our emotions do not render us passive but the very opposite; they are sometimes the engine 
of our behaviour and the actively chosen motivation of meaningful action.” 
Robert Solomon, On the Passivity of the Passions 
 
Following on Sartre, Robert Solomon expanded on the notion of responsibility to 
change the ontological status of emotions from happenings to actions, in as much as they are 
constituted by, and occur as consequence, of a series of volitional acts. Key to his argument is 
the observation that, at least in humans, emotions are extended processes rather than the 
circumscribed impulsive responses they are often portrayed as in philosophy and modern 
research. Indeed, in many cases emotions are in fact something that we actively pursue and 
cause to be in ourselves, and as such can only be thought of as volitional objects. Mirroring 
Descartes, he highlights that what he calls the “emergency paradigm of emotion” cannot 
account for the frequent occurrence of emotions that can only said to be products of our own 
cognitive processes. Thus we can, as Solomon suggests in striking verisimilitude to Descartes, 
“nurture” emotions by both rational argument (e.g. making oneself angry by “convincing” 
oneself that one has been slighted) and controlled and guided access of memories (e.g. at a 
funeral service, Solomon 2001, p. 202). Indeed, as he points out, the very distinction 
frequently drawn between having an emotion and thinking about that emotion is problematic, 
in as much as thinking about the justifications for one’s anger is part and parcel of that 
1.4. Harnessing fire: Endogenous emotion generation as a means of emotional self-regulation 
 
21 
 
emotion and thus tends to elicit the very emotional reaction under deliberation. Supporting 
this point, a large part of both modern clinical practice and traditional philosophical remedies 
for emotion (e.g. Stoicism and certain Buddhist practices) aims at fostering this meta-
cognitive distance, with the ultimate aim of enabling the individual to not only understand 
why they are experiencing emotions, but also to decide what emotions they can experience. 
Importantly, this line of reasoning suggests that emotions are not (just) reactions, but should 
also be thought of as states that we actively instil in ourselves to adapt to one`s context. 
 
1.3.4. Summary: Endogenous emotion as a means of self-regulation 
These three accounts together point to something that has largely been neglected in 
modern psychology: That emotions are not (exclusively) something that happen to us, but 
rather reactions that we bear responsibility for, that we possess some degree of control over, 
and that we actively use to regulate ourselves and our environments. Of special note are 
emotions stemming from endogenous sources, such as thoughts or memories, both because 
we are relatively better able to control their occurrence, but also because, as Descartes pointed 
out, we can actively use these to counter emotions stemming from external sources. 
Moreover, as Sartre and Solomon point out, such endogenous emotion can be used both to 
motivate oneself in pursuit of long-term goals, and can be strategies with which one adapts 
oneself to the world, and also a means of altering the external (particularly social) world. This 
raises the intriguing possibility that the capacity to self-generate emotional states based on 
endogenous sources of information might serve as tool for self-regulation. 
 
1.4. Harnessing fire: Endogenous emotion generation as a means of 
emotional self-regulation 
 Following on this way of thinking about emotion, the core proposition investigated in 
this thesis is that emotions are not simply something that occurs to us, but something that we 
enact and use to govern ourselves. Following Descartes, I specifically propose that emotions 
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can be actively used to control one’s emotional milieu via the expedient of generating 
emotions based on endogenous sources of information, such as our deliberations or memories. 
Moreover, I propose that this ability is a central aspect of self-regulation enabling one to deal 
with emotion both through increased fluency with emotional situations through simulation 
and also through the active use of emotion generation to deal with emotional stressors.  
The goal of the current thesis was to empirically investigate these hypotheses, using a 
combination of neuroimaging, psychophysiological and psychological methods. As 
endogenous emotion generation has received relatively little attention as a topic in its own 
right, the thesis has two main topics: First, it aims to develop and test a model of the neural 
and psychological component processes that support endogenous emotion generation. Second, 
based on this model, it seeks to explore how endogenous emotion generation skills can be 
utilised as a means of emotion regulation and coping. Preceding the empirical portion of the 
thesis (Chapters 4-7), the following chapter provides an overview of the current state of 
knowledge regarding the endogenous generation of emotion in psychology and affective 
neuroscience and develops the working behavioural and neural working model of endogenous 
emotion generation that guided the present research.
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Chapter 2: Endogenous generation of emotion 
 
2.1. Chapter overview 
This chapter presents an overview of the current state of knowledge on the behavioural 
and neural bases of endogenous emotion generation. Starting with a discussion of how to 
define and differentiate endogenous emotion generation from other related affective 
phenomena, the chapter reviews extant behavioural and neuroimaging work investigating how 
endogenous emotions are generated and what subjective, behavioural and physiological 
effects this has. This review culminates in a working neural component process model of 
endogenous emotion generation that guided the current research. Based on this model, the 
chapter next discusses how the self-generation of emotional states can enable emotional self-
management, proposing two distinct routes by which the endogenous generation of emotional 
states can be used for self-regulation. The chapter ends with a presentation of the hypotheses 
that guided the current work, and an overview of the empirical part of the thesis. 
 
2.2. Conceptualising endogenous emotion generation 
Unlike the generation of emotional reactions to exogenous cues, comparatively little 
work has focused on understanding endogenous emotion in their own right (Wilson-
Mendenhall, Barrett, & Barsalou, 2013). To my knowledge, there has hitherto been no 
attempts at integrating knowledge of how emotion is generated from endogenous sources of 
information into a mechanistic framework. The current section reviews behavioural, 
psychophysiological and neuroimaging evidence on self-generated emotional states, with the 
aim of developing a neural component process model of endogenous generation of emotion 
(EnGE). Starting off, the following provides the working operationalisation of endogenous 
emotion that guided this model development and how EnGE can be differentiated from other, 
related, topics.  
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2.2.1. Operationalisation and definitions 
To guide the following literature review and model development, I will here adopt an 
operationalisation of endogenously generated emotions as emotional states whose causes can 
be traced to an internal representation. I will refer to the process by which such emotional 
states come about as endogenous generation of emotion (EnGE; contrasted with exogenous 
generation of emotion (ExGE)). Examples of EnGE are when an emotion occurs due to a train 
of thought, memories, imagery or bodily interoception. An important aspect of endogenously 
generated emotions (and internal representations in general), is that these can be elicited both 
voluntarily and spontaneously. Thus, emotional states can be elicited by, for instance, goal-
directed recall of a given emotion-eliciting event in the past or future (Benoit, Szpunar, & 
Schacter, 2014; Fitzgerald et al., 2004), or through intrusive thoughts and rumination(Brewin 
et al., 2010; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008), or simply in the course of 
ordinary mind-wandering (Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, & Singer, 2013). Here I will focus on 
the voluntary component of EnGE in line with the goal of investigating its potential utility as 
a means of self-regulation, and because investigations of spontaneous EnGE is still in its 
infancy (but see Poerio, Totterdell, Emerson, & Miles, 2015b; Ruby et al., 2013). While this 
could be seen as a limitation of the current investigation  it should be noted that evidence 
suggests considerable overlap between the psychological and neural mechanisms and effects 
of voluntary and involuntary generation of mental content (Andrews-Hanna, 2012; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2015; Smallwood et al., 2013). Thus, it is likely that the conclusion 
drawn from the study of voluntary EnGE generalises, at least in mechanism, to spontaneous 
EnGE.   
Practically, the review is therefore limited to studies of self-induced emotion that 
relied either on non-emotional or minimally emotional stimuli, and therefore can be said to 
arise following processing of information endogenous to the individual. Moreover, given the 
objective of devising a general model of EnGE, the review focuses on investigations of non-
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pathological populations. Before proceeding with this, the following section discusses the 
differentiation of EnGE as here conceptualised and the related topics of exogenous emotion 
generation, emotion regulation, mood generation, and constructive memory.  
 
2.2.2. Differentiating endogenous emotion generation from related phenomena 
 
2.2.2.1. Exogenous emotion generation 
Based on the preceding operationalization, the relationship between exogenous 
(ExGE) and endogenous generation of emotion (EnGE) can now be discussed. On the surface, 
drawing this distinction is relatively simple, with endogenous emotions having causes internal 
to the individual, such as thoughts, memories, bodily sensations, or imagery. This contrasts 
with exogenously generated emotions, who in turn have a clear causal referent in the external 
world, such as an emotion-provoking situation or stimulus. Following on this, individual 
differences in ExGE tend to revolve around how one responds to external stimuli (Hamann, 
2004). This is of some importance, because it is probable that this is at best partially 
overlapping with the likely sources of individual differences in EnGE, which also involves 
variation in the ability to recall emotional information (Gollnisch & Averill, 1993; G. A. 
Miller et al., 1987) or the capacity to generate mental imagery (G. A. Miller et al., 1987; 
Zeman, Dewar, & Sala, 2015). Moreover, at least in the volitional case, EnGE abilities are 
also likely to be affected by individual differences in the ability to control such as mnemonic 
or ideational processes (Banich et al., 2009). Thus, while endogenous emotions can occur 
with seeming spontaneity, they are (excepting pathology) in some way dependent on 
cognitive processes that involve the directed generation of emotionally relevant narratives 
leading to autonoetic simulations of emotional states of affairs (Niedenthal, Winkielman, 
Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 2009; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013) 
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That said, the distinction between exogenously and endogenously generated emotions 
is fluid. For instance, in cases of severe anxiety, endogenous processes are arguably 
responsible for the generation and maintenance of the emotional state despite it having an 
external referent (Cha et al., 2016). On the other hand, external stimuli can sometimes entrain 
internal emotion generation processes, such as when reading a story with emotional qualities, 
where stimulus properties are not evocative of emotion outside of the narrative context it 
appears in. Moreover, recent meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies of emotion (Kober et al., 
2008; K. A. Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012), suggest that even 
processing of external stimuli to a large degree involves neural mechanisms supporting the 
generation of such simulations (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007). Thus, 
drawing a strict conceptual boundary between ExGE and EnGE might be impossible, 
requiring empirical delineation in terms of underlying processing. 
  
2.2.2.2. Emotion regulation 
Emotion regulation can be defined as a process in which on expends efforts to 
influence which emotions one has, the intensity of these emotions and/or how they are 
expressed (J. J. Gross, 2007b). Distinguishing emotion generation from emotion regulation is 
an important topic in affective science (J. J. Gross et al., 2011), that is heavily influenced by 
the fundamental theory of emotions one holds (J. J. Gross & Barrett, 2011). For instance, a 
basic emotion theorist can distinguish between the two with relative ease on account of 
having a stimulus-reaction model of emotion, meaning that emotion regulation simply 
involves managing the behavioural consequences of a given emotional reaction. Conversely, 
on a constructivist account, both emotion generation and emotion regulation involve changes 
in situation-by-organism meaning-making interaction (Barrett, 2014). Thus, separating the 
two becomes conceptually difficult as any act of emotion regulation can be construed of as an 
act generating a new emotional state (J. J. Gross et al., 2011). However, in the case of 
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exogenous emotion, one can, at least in principle, make a distinction between a) processes that 
are initiated by the occurrence of a given event or stimulus and b) those that act to modulate 
the trajectory of these processes (J. J. Gross et al., 2011). For endogenous emotion, no similar 
appeal to ontogeny can be made to differentiate events of generation from events of 
regulation. Rather, generation and regulation likely depend on overlapping processes that are 
essentially internal to the emoter. Moreover, as will be discussed below, it is possible that 
EnGE can at times be used as a means to regulate emotional reactions. Providing a 
comprehensive resolution to this topic is beyond the scope of the current investigation, and I 
therefore take a functional approach to distinguish the two in the following. Specifically, I 
propose that emotion generation occurs when an emotional feeling state is de novo where 
previously there subjectively was none. Conversely, emotion regulation occurs when ongoing 
subjectively experienced emotional states are somehow modulated. Thus, distinguishing the 
two on this, albeit simplified, account, is a matter of causality and time, and should not be 
construed of as a strict ontological divide as they are likely to be reliant on similar neural and 
psychological mechanisms involved in the construction of mental representations (Kober et 
al., 2008; K. A. Lindquist et al., 2012; K. A. Lindquist & Barrett, 2012). 
 
2.2.2.3: Mood generation 
Endogenous emotion also needs to be differentiated from the closely related construct 
of mood states. The usual means of differentiating mood and emotion is by stating that 
emotions are phasic responses to events, whereas mood states represent the tonic level of 
affect. Moreover, moods are usually thought of as being more diffuse both in terms of their 
expression, and duration, usually resulting in lower intensity “background” affective 
experiences that can last for a protracted period of time (R. J. Larsen, 2000). Another 
important difference is that moods usually are thought of as having no clear eliciting cause in 
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the environment (Magen & Gross, 2010). Together, these criteria make it fairly straight 
forward to differentiate moods from (exogenous) emotional reactions. 
In the case of endogenous emotion, however, this distinction is blurred. For one, while 
endogenous emotion can be thought of as phasic responses to internal processes, these 
processes themselves are likely extended in time, and embedded in the ongoing stream of 
consciousness (R. J. Larsen, 2000; Ruby et al., 2013). This means that the initiation and 
duration of endogenous emotional events are difficult to specify. Second, like moods, 
endogenous emotions are, by definition, not (directly) resultant on the perception of external 
events (R. J. Larsen, 2000). Thus, in one sense endogenous emotions are more similar to 
moods than exogenous emotions. Unlike moods, however, endogenous emotions, as we here 
define them, are clearly consequent on a specific internal representation, and, crucially, on the 
maintenance of this representation at the focus of attention. Thus, it is possible to generate a 
positive emotional state by thinking about good times past, despite being, at the moment, 
dysphoric (e.g. Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009; Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 
2006; Pictet, Coughtrey, Mathews, & Holmes, 2011). Moreover, while such EnGE might 
provide alleviation of a mood (as suggested by Descartes), this is effectively an act of 
regulation as it is here defined, such that the endogenous emotion overrides the mood, 
possibly only temporarily, with the mood state possibly reinstating itself once active EnGE 
efforts cease. Summarising, endogenous emotion can be thought of as occupying a middle 
ground between exogenous emotional reactions and mood states that are clear reactions to 
endogenous events, but whose effects are not pervasive outside of the context in which the 
reaction was elicited. 
 
2.2.2.4: Constructive memory 
At the core, all psychological processes involving the internal generation of 
representations are in some way reliant on constructive memory processes (Hassabis & 
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Maguire, 2007). Ranging from planning how to achieve one’s future goals to reminiscing 
about the distant past, similar psychological and neural mechanisms seem to be at the core of 
our abilities to generate simulations of the world (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; 
Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter et al., 2012; Spreng & Grady, 2010). As mentioned above, 
EnGE is likely to rely heavily on the ability to create such lifelike, autonoetic, first-person 
simulations, and is therefore likely to rely on constructive memory processes. One crucial 
difference, however, is that there is no inherent requirement for constructive memory to be 
embodied, i.e. that the simulations should result in a manifest physiological equivalence 
between the simulated state and the current state of the body. As the term suggests, simulation 
involves a distinction between the internal model of the world and what the world is actually 
like. Thus, there is inherently an analogous, or “as if” quality to these simulations. This does 
not necessarily pertain to EnGE which both by definition and in terms of subjective 
experience results in genuine, experienced emotional states (Salas et al., 2012). This is not to 
say that EnGE cannot be used for similar purposes as constructive memory, such as planning 
or mentally working through problems (past or future) that are pertinent to one’s goals, but 
that the key end product of the EnGE process is an experienced and embodied emotional state 
and not merely a cognitive or mnemonic representation of that state. As such, the notion of 
EnGE adopted here is related to the notion of embodied simulation frequently used in the 
literature on motor imagery (Gallese & Caruana, 2016). 
 
2.3. Characterising EnGE as a psychological phenomenon 
In this section, extant behavioural and psychophysiological investigations of EnGE are 
reviewed, with the aim of developing a characterisation of it as an empirical phenomenon and 
identifying the key features an account of EnGE must contain. 
The majority of our knowledge about EnGE comes from studies utilising endogenous 
emotion generation as a means to induce emotion. Typically, this type of experiment involves 
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participants being asked to generate emotional states either purely endogenously, by 
remembering past events or by imagining hypothetical scenarios (Damasio et al., 2000; 
Gemar, Kapur, Segal, Brown, & Houle, 1996; George, Ketter, Parekh, & Herscovitch, 1996; 
Holmes et al., 2006; Holmes & Mathews, 2005; Kimbrell et al., 1999; Liotti et al., 2000; 
Mayberg et al., 1999; Morina, Deeprose, Pusowski, Schmid, & Holmes, 2011; Pardo & 
Raichle, 1993; Salas et al., 2012; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013), or by being asked to up-
regulate emotional aspects of externally presented emotional stimuli (e.g. McRae, Misra, 
Prasad, Pereira, & Gross, 2012c; Ochsner et al., 2009b; Otto, Misra, Prasad, & McRae, 2014). 
As the latter approach is closer to the current definition of emotion regulation (cf. the 
distinction between generation and regulation drawn above), and because relatively few 
studies have used this methodology, the following will focus on studies where elicitation of 
emotional states relied minimally on stimulus properties.   
Overall, this literature suggests that EnGE-based emotion induction is highly effective 
and result in strongly experienced emotional states, particularly for positive emotions 
(Riquelme, Radovic, Castro, & Turnbull, 2015; Salas et al., 2012). Using this self-induction 
approach, successful EnGE has been reported using mental imagery (Holmes & Mathews, 
2005; 2010), narrative scripts of both impersonal (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013) and 
personal varieties (Salas et al., 2012), semantic narrative analysis (Holmes et al., 2006; Vrana, 
Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986), and auditory imagery (Beaty et al., 2013; Williamson et al., 2012). 
Interestingly, it appears that both autobiographical recall and immersion in hypothetical 
emotional events result in emotional reaction. This suggests that EnGE should not be 
conceptualised as simple recall of a previously experienced emotional state, but rather a 
simulation of a situation in which a given target emotion might occur, akin to general 
constructive memory abilities like episodic recall and prospection (Schacter & Addis, 2007). 
However, evidence suggest that this type of simulation goes beyond mere subjective appraisal 
and involves the activation of physiological markers similar to exogenously generated 
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emotions. Philippot, Chapelle, and Blairy (2002) demonstrated this in an experiment where 
they investigated the relationship between respiration rate and subjective experience of 
emotion. Participants were instructed to put themselves into different emotional states (joy, 
sadness, anger, and fear) by altering their respiration patterns, but were given no instruction as 
to what pattern of respiration might be associated with each emotional state. In addition to 
having marked subjective effects, this resulted in participants adopting respiration patterns 
matching those seen in previous studies of emotional arousal, and that were differentiable by 
type of emotion in question. In a second experiment, participants were surreptitiously induced 
to engage in these patterns of breathing. This resulted in increased subjective experience of 
the emotions associated with a given breathing pattern. Thus, bodily signals of emotion are 
not only concomitants of self-induced emotional states based on endogenous information (see 
also Fawver, Hass, Park, & Janelle, 2014; Kleinke, Peterson, & Rutledge, 1998; G. A. Miller 
et al., 1987), but in themselves can cause emotional states to come into being. This further 
means that a comprehensive account of EnGE should include means by which physiological 
signals can be used to generate emotion, either alone or in combination with other modalities 
(Gallese & Caruana, 2016; Niedenthal et al., 2009; Seth, 2013). Finally, in addition to being 
embodied, EnGE appears to have a clear influence on behaviour, such that, for instance, self-
generated emotional states can affect sport performance (Rathschlag & Memmert, 2014), or 
even impact on core-level motility, as is seen in the impact of EnGE on gait (Fawver et al., 
2014). 
Summarising, evidence demonstrates that EnGE should not be thought of as being a 
“cold” cognitive simulation of the facts and appraisals that surround a given emotion. Rather 
EnGE is an embodied phenomenon, resulting in emotional reactions with clear subjective and 
physiological outcomes. Thus, an account of EnGE needs to detail not only how emotional 
information is recalled, but also how this leads to emotional physiological reactions.  
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2.3.1. Individual differences in EnGE abilities 
Another aspect of EnGE that has been revealed in the self-induction literature is that 
individuals differ in their ability to self-generate emotions. Miller and colleagues (1987) 
investigated trait and behavioural markers of the capacity to generate emotional imagery. 
People with good imagery abilities generated stronger and more differentiated physiological 
signatures of emotional arousal when requested to envisage different emotional situations 
using the emotional script procedure. Conversely, people self-describing as bad imagers did 
not show this strong coupling between emotion scripts and physiological responses. 
Critically, there were no apparent differences between the good imagers and people self-
described as poor imagers on a number of personality and cognitive variables. Thus, a 
concomitant of good emotional imagery ability appears to be the ability to generate full-
fledged emotional reactions.  
One caveat to this is that the Miller study, like most other self-induction studies, only 
investigated individual differences in the capacity to use mental imagery to generate emotion. 
While there is extensive evidence that mental imagery and emotion might have a preferential 
relationship (Holmes & Mathews, 2005; 2010), no evidence to date exists mapping whether 
EnGE abilities are predicated exclusively on the capacity to engage in mental imagery. 
Conceivably, in the normal population, people can differ both in efficacy and implementation 
of EnGE, with some individuals, for instance, relying on musical imagery, semantic analysis 
or even bodily interoception to instigate the EnGE. Indeed, at least in cases of pathology, 
semantic analysis in the form of verbal rumination appears to become the predominant mode 
of EnGE employed (Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011) which could stem 
from decreased efficacy of EnGE based on visual imagery (Raune, MacLeod, & Holmes, 
2005; Stöber, 1998). Similarly, while evidence exists suggesting that mental imagery 
outperforms verbal semantic analysis in terms of both short term and long term self-induction 
effects (Holmes et al., 2006; Holmes & Mathews, 2005; Pictet et al., 2011; Vrana et al., 
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1986), it is not clear whether, for instance, combining multiple modalities of generation is 
more (or less) effective at generating different emotional states. These are important questions 
to answer, because they can provide information about the core mechanisms of EnGE and 
because they would provide guidance for how to optimise and individually adapt 
interventions aimed at training this skill which is the topic of our next section. 
 
2.3.2. Training EnGE 
An important aspect of the Miller (1987) study mentioned above is that even poor 
imagers got better with repeated testing, as indicated by both enhanced subjective emotional 
experience and in terms of their physiological responses. Thus, it appears that the capacity to 
self-generate emotions can be trained, at least in the case of EnGE using mental imagery. 
More evidence for this is provided by recent work by Emily Holmes and colleagues (Holmes 
et al., 2006; 2009; Pictet et al., 2011) showing both that EnGE can be trained, and that such 
training has carry-over effects on both affective and cognitive measures. Importantly, Holmes 
and colleagues have recently shown that training in positive imagery can provide lasting 
improvement in symptoms of depression (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Holmes et al., 2009; T. 
J. Lang, Blackwell, Harmer, Davison, & Holmes, 2011).  
Another line of evidence on the trainability of EnGE stems from research into the 
effects of loving-kindness (LKM) and compassion (CM) meditation. These techniques 
centrally involve training to instil in oneself a positive emotional state of benevolence, 
warmth, concern and motivation to help others through meditation (Fredrickson, 2013; Goetz, 
Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010; Salzberg, 2001; Singer & Klimecki, 2014) . Recently, a 
number of training studies have shown that even short-term training of LKM and CM is 
efficacious at increasing experienced positive affect both in the lab and in daily life (Zeng, 
Chiu, Wang, Oei, & Leung, 2015), as well as being associated with improvements on 
psychophysiological (Kok et al., 2013) and neural (Klimecki, Leiberg, Lamm, & Singer, 
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2013; Klimecki, Leiberg, Ricard, & Singer, 2014) markers of resilience. Central to these 
meditation practices is training how to engage in vivid mental imagery, the recitation of 
verbal mantras and increasing interoceptive awareness of the psychosomatic sensations 
(particularly warmth) associated with the emotional states of loving-kindness and compassion 
(Fredrickson, Cohn, Coffey, Pek, & Finkel, 2008; Jazaieri et al., 2012; Klimecki et al., 2013; 
2014; Leiberg, Klimecki, & Singer, 2011). Thus, LKM and CM training is a real-life example 
of a means by which EnGE can be trained, and also that such training can have marked 
benefits in terms of mental health (Fredrickson, 2013; Holmes et al., 2006; 2009). 
 
2.3.3. Summary: Conceptualising EnGE 
Summarising the extant behavioural investigations, it appears that EnGE is both 
something that individuals are capable of with relative ease, and that tends to elicit 
subjectively (Salas et al., 2012) and physiologically (G. A. Miller et al., 1987; Philippot et al., 
2002) potent emotional states. This demonstrates the supposition that EnGE should be 
thought of as generating de facto embodied emotional states. Further, evidence suggests that 
EnGE can be implemented using a variety of different information modalities, ranging from 
episodic imagery to interoception. While it appears that episodic/visual imagery of emotion 
might be most effective as a generation technique (Bergman & Craske, 2000; Holmes et al., 
2006), evidence also supports the efficacy of other modalities. Moreover, there appears to be 
considerable individual differences in EnGE, suggesting that individuals might vary in how 
they tend to implement EnGE, and how efficacious this implementation is.  
As such, the extant behavioural and psychophysiological evidence suggests EnGE 
results in emotional states with clear physiological and subjective concomitants. Therefore, a 
complete account of EnGE as a phenomenon needs to include explanations of how both these 
aspects are generated. Moreover, evidence that EnGE can be implemented based on a variety 
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of different information modalities, means that it needs to account for both modal and 
supramodal mechanisms of implementation.  
2.4. The neural architecture of EnGE 
In this section we make the shift from discussing the psychological mechanisms of 
EnGE to reviewing extant work on how these mechanisms are neurally implemented. In the 
main, research on the neural basis of emotion have followed behavioural and 
psychophysiological work relying heavily on (primarily visual) stimuli to elicit emotions. 
Indeed, it has been estimated that only 6% of previous neuroimaging studies have provided 
information on EnGE, primarily in the form of mental imagery (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 
2013), meaning our understanding of EnGE is in part limited by a lack of research. This 
problem is aggravated by the many different protocols used to elicit emotions in these few  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Neural networks of EnGE. A) Schematic of three large scale intrinsic connectivity networks 
(ICNs) (adapted from Laird et al., 2011; Seeley et al., 2007). B) Illustration of activations in the early PET 
studies made using GingerALE meta-analysis toolbox. NB: For illustration only as p < .05 uncorrected. Colour-
coded circles denote overlaps between ICNs and meta-analytic findings. 
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studies, as the proximate goal of ensuring the uniform elicitation of strong emotional states 
has lead researchers to use different stimuli, such as visual or auditory cues, to guide the 
generation process. Aside from epistemic concerns of whether such paradigms can be said to 
really rely on endogenous sources of information, the use of different information and 
instruction modalities makes it difficult to differentiate neural mechanisms supporting 
modality-specific implementation of EnGE from supramodal mechanisms supporting EnGE 
in general. This is a matter of some concern, since the majority of studies were performed on 
relatively small samples. Similarly, the goals of these studies have mainly been to investigate 
different neural effects of the outcomes of the generation process (i.e. of different emotional 
states), and have therefore not focused on identifying the neural mechanisms of emotion 
generation per se.  
One notable exception to this heterogeneity is a series of early positron emission 
tomography (PET) studies (Damasio et al., 2000; Gemar et al., 1996; George et al., 1996; 
Kimbrell et al., 1999; Liotti et al., 2000; Mayberg et al., 1999; Pardo & Raichle, 1993; 
Reiman et al., 1997) that investigated the neural signatures of volitional autobiographical 
recall of significant emotional experiences. As these studies were all performed using the 
same imaging modality, with comparable experimental protocols and sample sizes, these 
studies are amenable to aggregation via meta-analysis, though the low cumulative sample 
sizes of these studies (N = 122) means that findings should be taken as illustration more than 
statistical fact. When combined, these studies suggest EnGE is supported by at least three 
large scale neural networks (Figure 2.1):  
 
1)  The Default Mode Network (DMN; Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; 
Raichle & Snyder, 2007; green in Figure 2.1A)    including medial prefrontal, posterior 
cingulate/precuneus, and left temporoparietal regions. This network is known to play an 
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important task in different modes of constructive memory, requiring the internal generation of 
representations or simulations (Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009).  
2)  The extended Salience Network1 (SN; Seeley et al., 2007; red in Figure 2.1A)  
including most prominently insula and dorsal cingulate regions, in addition to subcortical 
(amygdala and basal ganglia) and brain-stem regions like the substantia nigra, ventral 
tegmental area and periaqueductal grey, known to support affective processing of both reward 
and punishment (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2013; Buhle et al., 2013).  
3) The Frontoparietal Control Network (FPCN; Brass, 2002; Cole et al., 2013; Laird et 
al., 2011; blue in Figure 2.1 A), including inferior and middle frontal gyri, and pre-
supplemental motor area, as well as posterior parietal regions not seen here. This network is 
involved in a wide range of cognitive control tasks, and it has been suggested that it serves a 
domain-general task implementation network based on work showing that the FPCN flexibly 
couples to other networks to facilitate goal achievement (Cole et al., 2013; Spreng, Stevens, 
Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010). 
Consistent with this three-network structure, Harrison and colleagues (Harrison et al., 
2008) reported an fMRI study investigating the difference in brain network connectivity 
during self-induction of sadness via autobiographical recall. Importantly, Harrison and 
colleagues used independent-component analysis of fMRI time-series, meaning that they 
could investigate modulations of connectivity within actual intrinsic connectivity networks. 
Of the five components thus identified, DMN, SN, and right and left FPCN all showed 
                                                
1 The cortical extent of this network is also variably known as, or overlaps with, the ventral attention network 
(Vossel, Geng, & Fink, 2014), the paralimbic network (Harrison et al., 2008; Kober et al., 2008), or the cingulo-
opercular network (Dosenbach, Fair, Cohen, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2008), and has in different ways been 
associated with the adaptation of behaviour to external demands. We here use the formulation of the network 
proposed by Seeley et al. (2007) as this explicitly includes subcortical and brain-stem regions and is in this 
configuration thought not only to detect, but also to support allostatic adaptation of the organism to emotional 
demands (Touroutoglou et al., 2016; Touroutoglou, Hollenbeck, Dickerson, & Barrett, 2012). 
 
                                                           Chapter 2: Endogenous generation of emotion 
38 
 
significantly increased functional connectivity during sad recall, suggestive of them forming 
distinct functional networks during EnGE. Finally, recent meta-analyses of the neuroimaging 
literature on (primarily exogenously elicited) emotion indicate that the neural basis of emotion 
clusters in distinct functional components (Kober et al., 2008; K. A. Lindquist et al., 2012). 
As is evident from comparing Figures 2.1 A and 2.2 there is considerable overlap between the 
activations reported in these early PET studies and those reported in these meta-analyses, one 
interesting exception being the lack of activation in regions corresponding to the visual 
association component (yellow in Figure 2.2) in the PET studies consistent with there being  
minimal exogenous stimulation in these experiments. 
 
Figure 2.2: Functional components of emotion generation. Groupings of neural regions shown to co-
activate in a recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of emotion. Adapted with permission from Kober 
et al. (2008). 
 
Before proceeding, the possibility should be mentioned that this account is inherently 
biased towards mnemonic forms of EnGE, as the early PET studies all involved forms of 
autobiographical recall as the basis for self-induction. Moreover, as the majority of the studies 
discussed investigated negative emotional states, it is unknown whether positive EnGE is 
supported by the same network. However, given the lack of neuroimaging studies 
investigating EnGE of other emotional states or induction modalities, the relative 
independence of the three networks in question (Laird et al., 2011; Yeo et al., 2011), and their 
role in the general neural reference space of emotion (Kober et al., 2008; K. A. Lindquist et 
al., 2012), the remainder of this chapter takes this three-network structure to guide the 
development of a working model of EnGE.  
 
 
Lateral paralimbic Core limbic Cognitive/Motor Medial Posterior Medial PFC Occipital/visual
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2.4.1. State characteristics determine neural implementation of EnGE 
A core lesson from the behavioural literature review above is that EnGE should be 
thought of as a constructive phenomenon, such that different components of emotion (e.g. 
imagery of emotional situations, semantic knowledge, bodily states) can all be used to self-
elicit emotional states. As the majority of research has focused on the elicitation of single 
emotional archetypes of e.g. sadness, fear, or joy, using single implementation modalities, 
little is known about how such construction is neurally implemented. One exception to this is 
a recent study by Wilson-Mendenhall and colleagues (2013), in which participants generated 
emotions by immersing themselves in affective scenarios that varied such that they either 
emphasised physical or social threat. Supporting the notion of EnGE as a process by which 
embodied emotional experiences are self-elicited, they found that the generation of both kinds 
of threat activated neural systems associated with action planning, consistent with the role of 
threat perception in facilitating behavioural resolution (Whalen, 1998). Moreover, they found 
that social threat primarily elicited activation of DMN regions, particularly mOFC and TPJ, 
consistent with the known role of these regions in social processing (Decety & Lamm, 2007; 
J. P. Mitchell, 2009; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Spreng et al., 2009). Conversely, physical threat 
elicited activation of attention networks, including both FPCN and dorsomedial portions of 
the SN. Activation of these attention networks is a known consequence of exposure to 
(particularly negative) emotional stimuli, and is thought to underlie the influences of emotion 
on goal-directed behaviour/processing. Similarly, Damasio and colleagues (2000; see also 
Fitzgerald et al., 2004) found that autobiographical recall of situations in which individuals 
experienced discrete emotional states (e.g. sadness or joy), differentially activated neural 
regions involved in somatic representation and modulation of homeostasis. This is consistent 
with EnGE eliciting bodily states congruent with those experienced in the original emotional 
situations.  
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Thus, dependent on the emotional state generated, EnGE appears to involve the 
recruitment of appropriate neural systems to construct and prepare the organism for dealing 
with the generated emotional state. While speculative at present, it is possible that the FPCN 
functions to support this coupling, given its role as a system of supramodal “flexible hubs” 
(Cole et al., 2013) that organises and coordinates activation in other networks in a task-
dependent manner. In addition to supporting a general embodied simulation account of EnGE 
(Niedenthal et al., 2009; Seth, 2013), this opens for the intriguing possibility that EnGE can 
be used to actively prepare the organism for events, emotional or otherwise, as we will discuss 
in more detail below when considering the potential role of EnGE as a means of emotion 
management. 
 
2.4.2. Temporal dynamics of EnGE networks 
If comparatively little data exists on the structural basis of EnGE, next to nothing is 
known about its dynamics. One exception to this is an fMRI study by Daselaar and colleagues 
(Daselaar et al., 2008), in which they investigated the neural time course of autobiographical 
memory retrieval, including memories with emotional qualities. Of particular interest for 
Daselaar et al. was investigating the neural regions involved in the retrieval and 
(re)construction of episodic memories, and their subsequent maintenance, elaboration and 
reliving as an episodic simulation of an autobiographical event. Daselaar et al. found that the 
initial recall and construction of autobiographical events was supported by activation of 
different regions from those supporting their subsequent elaboration and experience: Initial 
recall elicited activation in dorsal frontal regions, retrosplenial cortex and hippocampus, 
whereas elaboration of these memories activated ventrolateral prefrontal regions. These 
findings are largely consistent with research on constructive memory in general (Addis et al., 
2009; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007). Critically, Daselaar et al. found that the emotional 
intensity of recalled memories was only predicted by activation in the initial phase, centred on 
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aspects of the extended SN, including limbic regions and basal ganglia. Conversely, the 
vividness of these memories correlated with activation in the later elaboration period, centred 
on left VLPFC and PCC, both regions thought to be part of the DMN (Yeo et al., 2011). As 
such, this finding suggests that core affective qualities are imparted on endogenously 
generated experiences relatively early in the generation process, whereas their phenomenal 
qualities rely on extended processing. This could suggest that the core affective state serves to 
anchor the generation process, but it is still an open question whether this is the case outside 
of EnGE via episodic memory.   
Supporting the notion that EnGE in general is characterised by early generation of 
core affective properties, Suess and Rahman (2015) recently found that early stages of mental 
imagery of emotional facial expressions is highly similar to perceptual processing. Seuss and 
Rahman specifically investigated two event-related potential (ERPs) components known to be 
modulated by the emotional qualities of visual stimuli, the early posterior negativity (EPN) 
that occurs after 200-300 ms, and the late positive potential (LPP; Hajcak & Olvet, 2008) that 
has a posterior distribution and occurs after ~600 ms. Importantly, these components have 
been suggested to reflect different processes: The EPN is thought to reflect initial attentional 
orientation and discernment of core affective properties of stimuli (Citron, Weekes, & Ferstl, 
2013). Conversely, the LPP is thought to reflect extended processing of stimuli, ostensibly 
related to “fleshing out” the initial percept with information from long term memory (Hajcak 
& Olvet, 2008). When comparing perception with mental imagery of emotional faces, Suess 
and Rahman found no discernible differences in the EPN, but marked differences in 
distribution patterns for the LPP. While differences in temporal resolution between 
electroencephalography (EEG) and fMRI (milliseconds vs. seconds) and the spatial 
coarseness of ERP components means that care must be taken in interpreting these results, it 
is interesting to note that the early attentional orienting thought to be measured by the EPN 
corresponds closely to the sort of stimulus-driven attention that is thought to be instantiated 
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by the Salience Network (Seeley et al., 2007; Vossel et al., 2014). Conversely, extended 
construction of representations of the form LPP is thought to be associated with is most 
frequently attributed to Default Mode Network (for partially confirming evidence from 
combined EEG-fMRI see Liu, Huang, McGinnis-Deweese, Keil, & Ding, 2012; Schacter & 
Addis, 2007). Interestingly, Seuss and Rahman found that the LPP component during imagery 
had a clear midline distribution, with apparently distinct generators in the frontal and posterior 
aspects of the brain, consistent with the topography of the DMN.  
While again biased by the fact that these studies focused on forms of episodic 
imagery, this suggest that EnGE should be construed of as an extended process with at least 
two distinct stages related to the recall and subsequent maintenance and elaboration of the 
emotional state into a veridical internal experience, or simulation. Importantly, it appears that 
the coarse core affective qualities of the experience are imparted early in the EnGE process 
with subsequent processing elaborating on these (see Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 
2007a for an argument for this relationship holding for emotional experiences in general.). 
 
2.4.3. The role of amygdala in EnGE 
As a final aside it should be mentioned that the early PET studies discussed above did 
not report activation of the amygdala during EnGE. The amygdala is traditionally thought to 
be an essential part of the neural machinery of emotion processing (Canli et al., 2005; 
Ghashghaei & Barbas, 2002; Murray, 2007; Seymour & Dolan, 2008; Whalen, 1998), thought 
to be especially central in generating behavioural and physiological emotional reactions 
(Ochsner et al., 2009b). Moreover, it is well-established that the amygdala plays an important 
role in the formation of emotional memories, and it is thought to play a role in enabling the 
resilience of emotional memory to forgetting (Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015). Indeed, it has 
been suggested that the amygdala plays a key role in autobiographical memory by “infusing” 
recall with emotion and causing physiological reactions congruent with the originally 
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experienced state (Ally, Hussey, & Donahue, 2013; Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine, 2006) 2. 
It is possible that practical issues like low sample size, the precise emotional states 
investigated and/or the use of PET might have occluded amygdala activation in these early 
studies. A more interesting possibility, however, is that the amygdala might not play a similar 
core processing role in the elicitation of endogenous emotional states. Supporting this, extant 
evidence for the role of amygdala in emotion is primarily based on visual processing of 
stimuli (Dolan & Vuilleuimier, 2006), where it is thought to support the rapid allocation of 
attention to biologically relevant stimuli (Ohman, 2002; Ohman, Carlsson, Lundqvist, & 
Ingvar, 2007; Ohman, Soares, Juth, Lindström, & Esteves, 2012). Leaving aside the 
discussion of whether such amygdala-based modulation is automatic or not, it is notable that 
the amygdala is most strongly implicated in perceptual, most notably visual (Koelsch et al., 
2013; Whalen et al., 2004), modes of processing (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010). Thus, the 
absence of amygdala activation reported in these studies might reflect the relative lack of 
importance of the amygdala in generating emotional reactions based on endogenous 
information due to the lack of incoming stimuli. However, evidence also suggests that the 
amygdala might be important in attributing such endogenously generated information to the 
external world (McRae, Misra, Prasad, Pereira, & Gross, 2012c; Ochsner et al., 2009b). It 
should also be noted that more recent studies utilising fMRI have reported amygdala 
activation during both hypothetical (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013) and autobiographical 
EnGE (Daselaar et al., 2008), though both protocols did involve presenting participants with 
stimulus-cues meaning it is unclear whether amygdala activation was caused by stimulus 
processing or EnGE. Thus, the precise role of amygdala in EnGE is still an open question. 
 
                                                
2 However, recent meta-analyses did not find support for amygdala being involved in either general, or 
specifically emotional kinds of autobiographical memory (Martinelli, Sperduti, & Piolino, 2013). 
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2.5. Towards a working model of EnGE 
The core proposition of the current thesis is that EnGE should be construed of as a 
process in which constructive cognitive mechanisms are employed to generate representations 
of emotional qualia that result in embodied emotional experiences or simulations. These 
qualia can take multiple forms and include information in different modalities of information, 
ranging from full-fledged visual episodic simulations of experienced or hypothetical events 
(e.g. imagining an upcoming event as going good or bad), semantic representations (e.g. 
ruminating about one’s shortcomings), or bodily states (e.g. taking short, panicked breaths). 
As research into the effects of these modalities have been focused on finding the optimal 
means of self-inducing emotion, these modalities have largely been thought of as being 
mutually exclusive (e.g. Holmes et al., 2006). However, in as much as emotional experiences 
are rich and multi-modal phenomena (Barrett et al., 2007a), it is likely that EnGE as it is 
implemented naturally involves using multiple modalities. Moreover, as there is significant 
variation in the ability to generate emotion, it is likely that individuals differ in the degree to 
which they show affinity for – and efficacy with – different modalities.  
This section aims to synthesise the available evidence into a formal working model of 
EnGE as a psychological process, with special emphasis on specifying the constituent 
component processes supporting the generation of endogenous emotion and how these map 
onto the neural reference space (K. A. Lindquist et al., 2012) indicated by earlier studies. 
 
2.5.1. Psychological component processes of EnGE 
For it to be meaningful to speak of endogenous emotions, they need to have a core 
similarity to exogenous emotion in resulting in subjective feeling states, with the primary 
difference between the two being the means by which they are generated. As this seems to be 
the case (cf. section 2.2), it should be possible to adapt extant models of exogenous emotion 
generation to the endogenous case. Gross (J. J. Gross, 1998a; 2007b; 2015a) has proposed that 
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research on the generation of emotion could be summarised in what he called the modal 
model of emotion (Figure 2.3A). In this model, emotions are essentially reflex-like, short term 
adaptive reactions to external events with distinct coordinated effects on behaviour, cognition 
and physiology. Thus, emotions result on being in 1) an emotional situation (e.g. being 
exposed to a snake) that is 2) attended to and 3) appraised as being relevant to the ongoing 
goals of the individual. If these criteria are fulfilled, this then elicits an emotional response 
that aims at altering the situation so as to bring it closer in line with one’s ongoing goals 
(Carver & Scheier, 1998; Magen & Gross, 2010), thereby causing a change in the situation 
the individual is in. For exogenous stimuli this typically involves factors in the world such as 
being in an uncontrollable environment in the presence of a potential threat (e.g. being in the 
wild in the presence of a venomous snake). Conversely, being in a safe environment (e.g. 
being in a zoo and viewing a snake in a terrarium) would stop (or not initiate) the emotion 
generation process resulting in diffusion of the threat the stimulus can pose on account of it 
not being relevant to goal achievement at that point in time. A straight forward adaptation of 
this model would be to replace the eliciting situation with an internal representation of a 
situation (Figure 2.1B). Endogenous emotion generation would then involve setting up an 
internal model of the world, i.e. the generation of a psychologically relevant simulation, such 
as reminiscing about a previous situation in which an emotion occurred, or the generation of a 
narrative context in which to interpret a hypothetical event. This would in turn require the 
engagement of mechanisms related to directed search in memory for appropriate parameters 
and ultimately combining sources of information into a unified concept or simulation 
equivalent to the external situation (Schacter & Addis, 2007). As such, it is apparent that 
EnGE requires mechanisms of psychological construction of situated representations (Addis 
et al., 2009; K. A. Lindquist & Barrett, 2012; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Wilson-Mendenhall et 
al., 2013; Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, Simmons, & Barsalou, 2011). Thus, further 
modification to the emotion generation loop is required by specifying the means by which an  
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Figure 2.3: Models of emotion generation. A) The modal model of emotion generation as proposed by 
Gross (J. J. Gross, 2007b). B) The endogenous adaptation of the modal model, such that eliciting situations 
are contingent on internal processes. C) The elaborated component process model of endogenous emotion 
generation that guided the current research. 
 
internal emotionally-relevant representation is generated. Likely, this process occurs via a 
form of multimodal associative construction (Hassabis & Maguire, 2009), by which  
semantic, contextual and sensory (including interoceptive) information relevant to a given 
emotion representation is reactivated, retrieved into awareness and ultimately integrated into a 
complete emotional experience (see Figure 2.3C). This construction process can be triggered 
either incidentally in the course of ones stream of thought, or volitionally in the form of 
active, guided retrieval (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). In the latter cases, a top-down control 
system is likely involved guiding retrieval of modality-specific information (Wheeler, 
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Petersen, & Buckner, 2000), as well as entrainment of the representation formation process in 
the service of goal-achievement (Gerlach, Spreng, Madore, & Schacter, 2014; Spreng et al., 
2010).  
As for the subsequent steps of the emotion generation cascade, evidence provides 
some support for an analogy between the modal model and EnGE, with recent work showing 
that individuals are flexible in terms of what aspects of recalled emotional states they pay 
attention to and the appraisals they make about their own endogenously generated emotions. 
For instance, it has been shown repeatedly that the emotional consequence of recalling a past 
emotional incident depends on the objectives and mental stance of the individual to either go 
into the emotional state or attempt to abolish it (Denkova, Dolcos, & Dolcos, 2015; Kross & 
Ayduk, 2008; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005; Kross, Davidson, Weber, & Ochsner, 2009). 
Thus, at least for EnGE via autobiographical recall, it appears that it is in principle possible to 
draw a distinction between mechanisms supporting recall and episodic representation 
formation, and those enacting the affective consequences of those representations. An 
alternative could be that EnGE involves modulating first ones core affective bodily states 
(Russell, 2003; 2009), that then serves as an “anchor” for subsequent representation formation 
efforts, consistent with the previously discussed work by Daselaar and colleagues (2008), who 
found amygdala activation during initial recall of the core of emotional autobiographical 
memories but not during later elaboration of such memories. As of yet, evidence is not 
available to arbitrate between these two possibilities.  
Summarising, I propose that EnGE should be conceptualised as consisting of three 
main processes: 1) A multimodal associative representation process, 2) a process involved in 
the generation of physiological emotional responses, and in the case of volitional EnGE, 3) a 
control process supporting active retrieval of information from memory. In the following the 
possible neural mapping of this component process architecture is discussed, with reference to 
the three major intrinsic connectivity networks implicated in previous studies of EnGE.  
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2.5.2. The role of the Default Mode Network in internally generated cognition 
As previously discussed, a closely related topic to endogenously generated emotion is 
that of self-generated thought (SGT), consisting of episodic memories, streams of thought, 
and other qualia depending on internal sources of information(Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). 
Indeed, as we have shown previously, self-generated thought is often the precursor of 
emotional reactions (Ruby et al., 2013), meaning that drawing a clear distinction between the 
two is not trivial. As such, one would expect that EnGE and SGT share important features in 
terms of their neural implementation and, by extension, their psychological component 
processes. Consistent with this, there is a large degree of overlap between the reference space 
for EnGE presented previously (Figure 2.1B) and that thought to support SGT, with the most 
notable overlap being in the DMN and FPCN. Reviewing the literature on the neural bases of 
SGT, Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood and Spreng (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 
2014) discussed the plausible component processes instantiated by these networks, pointing 
out that DMN activation is reported across a wide range of tasks including theory of mind, 
reasoning, scene construction, mental imagery, episodic recall, prospection and perspective 
taking, and other psychological phenomena requiring the generation of internal 
representations (Addis et al., 2007; 2009; Gerlach et al., 2014; Schacter et al., 2012; Schacter 
& Addis, 2007; Spreng et al., 2009; 2010; Spreng & Grady, 2010). Interestingly, based on 
intrinsic connectivity and coactivation charachteristics, the DMN can be parcellated into 
distinct subcomponents (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010): A 
dorsal-medial system (blue in Figure 2.4, consisting of dorsomedial and lateral PFC, temporal 
lobes and temporoparietal junction) that is relatively independent from the medial-temporal 
subsystem (green in Figure 2.4, consisting of retrosplenial cortex, inferior temporal cortex and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex). These subsystems both interact with a core system centred 
around the anterior medial PFC, PCC and angular gyrus (yellow in Figure 2.4). When 
Andrews-Hanna et al. (see also Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010) investigated the associations of 
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these subsystems with different psychological terms using the NeuroSynth database (Yarkoni, 
Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011), they found evidence for functional 
 
 
  
Figure 2.4: Core- and subsystems of the DMN. Adapted with permission from (Andrews-Hanna et al., 
2010). Yellow = core DMN system to which both subsystems are copled. Blue = dorsal-medial subsystem. 
Green = medial-temporal subsystem. Subsystems are coupled to the core, but not each other. 
 
dissociation between these component: The dorsal medial subsystem was most closely 
associated with processes requiring conceptual processing and simulation formation. 
Conversely, the medial-temporal subsystem was associated with mnemonic processes, 
particularly those requiring scene formation or episodic simulations. Finally, the core system 
was found to be most closely related to self-referential and affective processes, consistent 
with the strong connectivity of anterior medial PFC to both limbic and subcortical regions 
involved in core affective processes and somatic regulation (Roy, Shohamy, & Wager, 2012), 
and the association of PCC with supramodal awareness (Leech & Sharp, 2014). Summarising, 
the DMN consists of at least three systems associated a) accessing memory, b) creating inner 
mental models based on these memories, and c) evaluating the self-relevance of these models. 
These are all essential processes for the generation of internal simulations and evaluation of 
past and future events, thought to be one of the major adaptive functions of self-generated 
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thought (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). As such, the DMN is a likely neural substrate for the 
multimodal representation formation process proposed to be involved in EnGE above. 
 
2.5.3. The Salience Network as a unique signature of EnGE 
If DMN supports the generation of representations supporting the experiential aspect 
of emotions, it is relatively far removed from neural regions supporting the perception and 
generation of the somatic aspects of emotions, which is rather contained in the extended 
Salience Network (Seeley et al., 2007). The SN is composed of structures in the brainstem, 
limbic system and paralimbic regions, like the insula, amygdala, periaqueductal grey (PAG), 
substantia nigra, and hypothalamus. In addition to there being extensive evidence connecting 
these structures to the experience of emotion (Kober et al., 2008; K. A. Lindquist et al., 2012; 
Vytal & Hamann, 2010), these structures are known to support interoception, pain processing, 
and motivational processes, as well as general hedonic processing (particularly amygdala and 
ventral striatum) and homeostatic regulation (particularly hypothalamus) (Berridge & 
Kringelbach, 2013; Buhle et al., 2013; Corradi-Dell’Acqua, Tusche, Vuilleumier, & Singer, 
2016; Craig, 2011; Damasio et al., 2000; Jabbi, Bastiaansen, & Keysers, 2008). These regions 
in concert are well suited for the generation of the physiological concomitants (i.e. bodily 
states) associated with emotional reactions. As such, it is possible that the SN supports the 
generation of core affective, somatic properties of endogenous emotional experiences, 
providing the embodiment of the simulation generated by the DMN. Thus, SN activation is 
potentially a signature of EnGE differentiating it from SGT, supporting the generation of 
embodied emotional reactions to endogenous information.  
 
2.5.4. The Frontoparietal Control Network and goal-directed control of memory 
Finally, FPCN activation as seen in the early PET studies could reflect active control 
of mnemonic processes. While the processes supported by the DMN are arguably sufficient 
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for the generation of internal representations, co-activation of DMN and FPCN is frequently 
reported (e.g. Gerlach et al., 2014; Spreng et al., 2010; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Spreng, 
Sepulcre, Turner, Stevens, & Schacter, 2013; Whitman, Metzak, Lavigne, & Woodward, 
2013), in tasks where participants are required to generate internal simulated representations 
in the service of attaining a specific goal, such as planning how to do something (Gerlach et 
al., 2014; Spreng et al., 2010; Spreng & Grady, 2010). Interestingly, FPCN and DMN 
coupling does not appear to occur when imagining the outcomes of such plans, suggesting 
that the FPCN is involved in structuring the generation process in terms of particular set-
points (Gerlach et al., 2014).  
Another, complementary, possibility is that FPCN serves to guide the retrieval of 
modality-specific information in line with its proposed role as a system of supramodal 
“flexible hubs” (Cole et al., 2013). Evidence suggests that modality-specific information is 
stored in modal sensory association cortices, and that vivid reconstruction of memories 
involves reactivation of similar neural systems involved in their initial processing (Wheeler et 
al., 2000). This process of reactivation is thought to be supported by the ventrolateral portion 
of the prefrontal cortex corresponding to the anterior IFG, particularly BA 45 and 47. The left 
IFG is variably reported to be part of the DMN (e.g. Yeo et al., 2011) and a part of the FPCN 
(e.g. Harrison et al., 2008; Laird et al., 2011), with evidence suggesting that IFG is not a part 
of the core functional modules of the DMN (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). Moreover, the IFG 
is a central nexus with intrinsic connectivity to both DMN and more central nodes of FPCN 
(Spreng et al., 2013). As such, the left IFG might serve as a junction through which DMN can 
be recruited in a goal directed representation generation (Spreng et al., 2010), a supposition 
supported by findings that the coupling between the FPCN, and particularly left IFG, and 
DMN is a predictor of creativity (Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, 2016; Beaty et al., 
2014). The role of IFG in the cognitive control of memory is well documented, and in 
particular the orbital part of the IFG that is implicated in the early PET studies appears to 
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support strategic mnemonic access to conceptual representations in service of goal 
achievement (Badre & Wagner, 2007). The left IFG is also heavily implicated in language 
function, encompassing in its posterior aspects Broca's area (Eickhoff et al., 2011), known to 
be central for language production. Interestingly, the anterior aspects of the IFG, including the 
orbital part appears to be particularly involved in semantic fluency tasks (S. Wagner, 
Sebastian, Lieb, Tüscher, & Tadić, 2014) that require the generation of words based on 
category membership. Thus, it could be that its involvement in EnGE as reported in these 
early studies reflects retrieval of memories based on valence category. Consistent with the 
flexible hub account of the FPCN (Cole et al., 2013), this could suggest that the role of FPCN 
in volitional EnGE is to facilitate activation of DMN in the service of goal achievement, 
combined with supporting the retrieval of information from modality-specific sensory 
cortices. 
 
2.5.5. A neural component process architecture of EnGE 
Summarising, the neural component process architecture proposed involves three 
major intrinsic connectivity networks, the DMN, SN and FPCN, working in concert to 
generate emotional states based on endogenous sources of information (see Figure 2.5). In this 
it is proposed that the DMN operates primarily in the service of retrieving and integrating 
information from long-term memory and generating simulations or representations 
corresponding to hypothetical or previously experienced emotional situations. The SN is 
hypothesised to be involved in the generation of core affective states rooted in physiological 
sensations. Finally, the FPCN coordinates activation of DMN and SN in the service of 
achieving the goal of self-inducing an emotional state, and potentially guiding memory search 
by coupling with and activating networks supporting of representations of modality-specific 
information. To the degree that this model holds, one would expect distinct aspects of 
emotion generation to correlate with each of these networks. Specifically, one would expect 
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the affective intensity of the experienced emotion to be associated with SN activation. 
Conversely, one would expect DMN activation to primarily reflect the type of retrieved 
information that constitutes the generated emotional experience. Finally, FPCN, subserving 
cognitive control of the representation construction process, should show consistent activation 
during effortful generation, as well as coupling to modality-specific sensory processing 
networks as a function of the specific representation being generated. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Neural component processes of EnGE. Hypothesised mapping of component processes to the 
three networks implicated in earlier PET studies of EnGE. 
 
2.6. EnGE as a means of emotion management 
In this section we move from the primarily theoretical question of how EnGE can 
occur in terms of psychological and neural mechanisms to the question of what utility EnGE 
might have. As we discussed in Chapter 1.3, one of the most intriguing aspects of EnGE is 
that it can allow us a measure of control over our emotional reactions. There are many ways 
by which one can manage one’s emotions. For instance, a number of means exist by which 
cognitive processes can be used to alter how or even if we process emotional information (J. J. 
Gross, 1998b; 2007b). There is also a large literature on the efficacy of different means of 
coping with emotional stressors (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). While the literature on emotion 
regulation tends to emphasise the momentary regulation of emotional reactions, the coping 
literature has a more long-term perspective, such as dealing with bereavement. This aside, 
there is considerable overlap between these two fields, such that, for instance, the use of 
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cognitive strategies to reinterpret events can both be used in a reactive, regulatory way and as 
a means of long-term coping (J. J. Gross, 2015a). In the following I will refer to the 
confluence of these two fields as emotion management, by which I mean the range of strategic 
(i.e. volitional) means that an individual can use to influence their present or future emotional 
states. 
It is increasingly becoming apparent that whether or not one reacts to external 
emotional stimuli can be regulated by a wide range of cognitive and behavioural strategies 
(Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012), some of which are remarkably simple. For instance, we 
recently showed that the preferential processing of affective stimuli (fearful and angry faces) 
can be eliminated by the simple expedient of focusing on the gender of the individual 
expressing the emotion rather than the emotional expression itself (H. G. Engen, Smallwood, 
& Singer, 2015). Roughly speaking such regulatory efforts can be grouped into efforts aimed 
at regulating emotion as it occurs and those aimed at predicting and preparing one to deal with 
potential future stressors (J. J. Gross, 1998a; 2007b; S. E. Taylor & Schneider, 1989). In the 
following, I will discuss evidence for how EnGE can be used in either of these capacities, and 
discuss how they can be conceptualised within arguably the dominant and most developed 
mechanistic framework of emotion management: the process model of emotion regulation (J. 
J. Gross, 1998b; 2015b). 
 
2.6.1. The process model of emotion regulation 
Emotion regulation and coping research has traditionally been focused on investigating 
the effects of different cognitive or behavioural strategies to deal with emotional stress as it 
occurs. One of the most influential taxonomies of such strategies is the process model of 
emotion regulation proposed by James Gross (J. J. Gross, 1998b Figure 2.5). This model is 
based on the modal model of emotion discussed in Chapter 2.4.1 (see Figure 2.3), classifying 
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different approaches to influencing the emotional reactions one has into different families of 
strategies based on where in the generation process they intervene (J. J. Gross, 2015a). 
Figure 2.6. The process model of emotion regulation, adapted from writings by James Gross (J. J. Gross, 
2007b; 2015a).  
 
Of these, strategies involving attentional deployment and cognitive change have received 
considerable attention in the literature, both because they have been shown to be highly 
effective, and because they have the potential to be translated into interventions for 
individuals with emotion regulation difficulties (Aldao, Jazaieri, Goldin, & Gross, 2014; 
Blechert et al., 2015). Such strategies involve actively adopting a different cognitive stance to 
the eliciting event, either by thinking differently about it as in the strategy of reappraisal 
(Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008; McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012a) or somehow 
reducing their importance by paying them less attention and distracting oneself (Dörfel et al., 
2014; Kanske, Heissler, Schönfelder, Bongers, & Wessa, 2011). Extensive research shows 
that such cognitive strategies can be effective means to control emotional reactions in many 
contexts (Webb et al., 2012), and are thought to gain their efficacy in large part from altering 
the preconditions for emotional reactions, particularly by blocking or altering the affective 
appraisals made about stimuli (J. J. Gross, 2007b). As such, these strategies are examples of 
high leverage strategies (Magen & Gross, 2010) that impact on early and highly influential 
components of the emotion generation cascade. Thus, if EnGE is an effective means of 
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emotion management, it is likely to impact on situational, attentional or cognitive processing 
components of the ExGE process. 
 
2.6.2. Positive EnGE as a reactive emotion management strategy 
A hallmark of EnGE is that it allows the individual to experience emotional states 
independently of the external environment. Recently, Barbara Fredrickson (Fredrickson, 
2013) suggested that the ability to self-generate positive emotions might be particularly 
important to increase resilience and improve well-being. This suggestion was based on 
substantial evidence showing that experiencing positive emotion is associated with a wide 
range of mental and physical health benefits (Catalino & Fredrickson, 2011; Fredrickson, 
2001; Fredrickson et al., 2008; Kok et al., 2013; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004), in the large 
related to enhancing physiological and mental self-regulation. Of particular interest for 
present purposes it has been found that emotionally resilient individuals actively seek out 
positive emotional experiences and show enhanced proficiency in generating positive 
interpretations of negative situations (Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004) consistent with them 
actively generating positive emotional states to “bounce back” when confronted with 
difficulties. Similarly, it has been found that individual differences in the accessibility of 
positive emotional memories these — especially in times of distress — is associated with trait 
resilience, even when controlling for average trait positivity (Philippe, Lecours, & Beaulieu-
Pelletier, 2009). Another line of evidence for the importance of positive emotion generation in 
mental health comes from the work of Emily Holmes and colleagues (Holmes et al., 2006; 
2009; Holmes & Mathews, 2005; Holmes, Blackwell, Burnett Heyes, Renner, & Raes, 2016; 
Morina et al., 2011). Holmes and colleagues have investigated the regulatory effects of 
positive mental imagery in both normal and clinical populations. Interestingly, decreased 
mental imagery and increased reliance on verbal descriptions when processing emotional 
material appears to be common sequela of depression (Bergman & Craske, 2000). It has been 
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argued that this shift might be causal in the ætiology of depression as it diminishes the 
capacity of the individual to deal with negative emotion (Stöber, 1998). Summarising the 
work by Holmes and colleagues, they have found 1) that individuals readily generate 
emotional reactions based on mental imagery 2) that the capacity to do so can be trained and 
3) that such training can work as a “cognitive vaccine” against affective maladies, even in 
ongoing depression. Similarly, Gulia Poerio and colleagues (Poerio, Totterdell, Emerson, & 
Miles, 2015a; 2015b) have shown that positive mind-wandering or day-dreaming can have 
beneficial effects, undoing the effects of externally induced negative affect, and being 
associated with increased positive affect and feelings of social connectedness. Finally, recent 
investigations suggest that a key beneficial effect of compassion and loving-kindness 
meditation (both centrally involving the generation of positive affective states) is enhanced 
resilience in the face of negative stressors (Fredrickson et al., 2008; Klimecki et al., 2013; 
Kok et al., 2013; Singer & Klimecki, 2014).  
Summarising these findings, it appears that positive EnGE is closely associated with 
emotional resilience and emotional well-being and that both directed and spontaneous modes 
of EnGE can have these effects. However, as of yet it is unclear what mechanisms might be 
underlying this effect. Returning to the process model of emotion generation, one possibility 
is that having access to self-generated positive emotions might enable one to distract oneself 
from negative situations. Distraction is known to be a highly effective emotion regulation 
strategy (Kanske et al., 2011; McRae et al., 2010; Sheppes & Gross, 2011) and is thought to 
enable emotion regulation by minimising attention allocated to processing emotional 
materials early in the emotion generation process (Sheppes & Gross, 2011; Thiruchselvam, 
Blechert, Sheppes, Rydstrom, & Gross, 2011). Possibly, positive EnGE abilities could enable 
one to self-generate alternate, more appetitive, objects of attention (see Feindler, Marriott, & 
Iwata, 1984; Smallwood, Brown, Baird, & Schooler, 2012). If such a distraction hypothesis 
was true one would expect that positive EnGE should result in diminished processing of 
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negative stimuli (c.f. Thiruchselvam et al., 2011). Moreover, to the degree that EnGE is an 
effective means of distraction, one could expect to see a correlation between EnGE abilities 
and trait use of distraction as a means to regulate emotion.  
Another possibility is that positive EnGE can cause changes in the interpretation of a 
stimulus by facilitating other emotion regulation processes. For instance, by self-generating a 
positive emotional state, it is possible that one can draw on the documented effects of positive 
emotional states to widen the scope of attention and flexibility of thought (Fredrickson & 
Branigan, 2005). This could potentially enable one to devise better adapted and more effective 
reappraisals of emotional stressors one is confronted with (Diedrich, Hofmann, Cuijpers, & 
Berking, 2016). Such reappraisal has been found to be a highly effective means of emotion 
regulation with extensive benefits both in terms of altering affect, and long term health 
benefits (Blechert et al., 2015; Buhle et al., 2014; Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000; McRae, 
Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012a). Facilitating the efficacy and occurrence of reappraisal would 
therefore be expected to enable the individual better to regulate their emotional states. If this 
facilitation hypothesis was true, one would expect that positive EnGE would lead to similar 
neural and behavioural consequences as reappraisal, and that EnGE abilities should be 
associated with trait usage of strategies that involve internally changing how one thinks about 
different situations.  
Finally, an intriguing possibility is that positive EnGE can work even earlier in the 
emotion generation process and constitute a means of situation modification, directly altering 
the emotional significance of a given event. While situation modification most commonly 
refers to behavioural means of altering the physical external situation, it should be noted that 
the emotional significance of a situation is a function not only of the state of the external 
world, but also of the state of the individual (J. J. Gross, 2015a). This, for instance, is seen 
when people chemically alter their mental states, where a common concomitant is altered 
perception of the emotional significance of situations. Another example of this can be seen in 
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affective congruence effects in which being in a certain mood state makes you more likely to 
notice and process stimuli of the same valence. Research shows that such affective 
congruency effects are highly prevalent and elicited by largely automatic means (Russell, 
2014). Unlike the previous hypotheses discussed, such regulatory effects might be better 
characterised as enhancing the ability to endure negative emotional by buffering with positive 
emotion than outright alteration of negative emotional states into neutrality or positivity. This 
might be particularly helpful in cases where the situation makes the down-regulation of 
negative affect difficult or suboptimal, such as in a caretaker setting where an empathic link is 
needed for optimal care (Manzano García & Ayala Calvo, 2012; Singer & Klimecki, 2014). 
Importantly, unlike distraction, if this was the mechanism of action one would not expect 
diminished processing of negative stimuli. Moreover, unlike the facilitation hypothesis, the 
buffering hypothesis would suggest that regulatory effects would be neurally and 
behaviourally supported primarily by increased positive emotion, and not improved ability to 
down-regulate negative emotions.  
Presently, insufficient evidence is available to arbitrate between these three 
hypotheses, though it should be noted that recent functional MRI evidence shows that 
engaging in positive emotion generation via compassion meditation does not appear to result 
in reduction of either neural correlates nor subjective experience of negative affect when 
confronted with adverse stimuli (Klimecki et al., 2013), suggesting that a distraction account 
might not be applicable. 
 
2.6.3. Emotion simulation as pre-emptive emotion management 
Hitherto, we have followed the literature, in describing emotion regulation and coping 
efforts as occurring as a consequence of an emotional stressor being present in the 
environment. However, as Taylor and Schneider (1989) pointed out, such a reactive account 
of emotion management ignores the panoply of behaviours and cognitions people engage in 
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pre-empting and preparing themselves for potential future stressors, where success involves 
the stressor not occurring. Thus, for instance, a person tasked with giving a talk can motivate 
themselves to extra preparation and rehearsal by envisaging the emotional consequences of 
not preparing, thereby avoiding the stressor altogether by making extra efforts to prepare. 
Conversely, by imagining the positive outcome of a given action it is possible to motivate 
oneself despite the mundaneness or aversiveness of that action (Oettingen & Mayer, 2002). 
As such, this notion of emotion management as reactive to external events overlooks one of 
the most distinctive features of human cognition: The capacity to simulate potential events in 
the service of problem solving and goal achievement (Schacter & Addis, 2007).  
In the context of emotion management, this capacity can enable both prediction of 
upcoming stressors and preparation for them by, for instance, adopting appropriate emotional 
states and mustering appropriate levels of arousal to deal with a situation (M. Y. Kim et al., 
2015; Tamir et al., 2008; S. E. Taylor & Schneider, 1989). The occurrence of such 
instrumental motives in emotion has recently been documented, and appears to be a highly 
effective and utilised means of self-regulation (Ford & Tamir, 2012; M. Y. Kim et al., 2015; 
Millgram, Joormann, Huppert, & Tamir, 2015; Tamir et al., 2008). EnGE might be 
particularly useful for this as it allows the individual to experience (through embodiment) the 
likely emotional outcomes of future events, thereby allowing the mobilisation of appropriate 
coping resources. Similarly, EnGE can be utilised to simulate possible alternate outcomes to 
future events, enabling one to select appropriate goals for emotion management efforts. 
Optimal goal-selection in a given the situation could be afforded by a simple simulation 
heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), by which goals are selected based on the ease by 
which they can be imagined. Thus, the ease with which an emotional state can be generated 
could serve as an indicator that emotion management of this kind can be achieved. Referring 
again to the process model of emotion regulation, this hypothetically means that EnGE can be 
used to enable situation selection, by predicting and diffusing stressors, as well as situation 
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modification, by altering the internal component of the situation to fit potential upcoming 
challenges, thereby enabling increased fluency in dealing with emotional stressors. 
 
2.6.4. Two routes of EnGE-based emotion management 
Summarising, I suggest that there exist at least two distinguishable routes by which 
EnGE can be used for emotion management: 1) By enabling the individual to generate, in 
particular positive, emotional experiences, in effect buffering them from negative vagaries of 
the environment, or 2) by allowing them to simulate scenarios including potential emotional 
states based on past experience, thereby enabling pre-emptive action to be taken and plans to 
be made that either enhance or decrease the likelihood of that state arising. Critically, while I 
propose that these two routes are dissociable, they are likely to work in concert, such that 
EnGE abilities would be associated with both reactive and prospective emotion management. 
 
2.7. Hypotheses and questions 
The current thesis has two overarching goals. First, it seeks to test the validity of the 
neural component process model of endogenous emotion generation proposed above. This 
was done using a combination of behavioural and neuroimaging methods were utilised to 
investigate different ways in which goal directed emotion generation can be implemented. By 
triangulating across different modes and methods of emotion generation the thesis aims to 
propose to establish a general neural architecture of EnGE. Informed by the enhanced 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms of EnGE the second focus of the thesis to 
explore the question of whether EnGE can be used as a means of emotion management. 
Specifically, potential benefits of emotion generation ability on trait markers of resilience and 
coping, and the relation of emotion generation to emotion regulation were investigated. In the 
following the specific hypotheses guiding the current research are presented, before an 
overview of the following empirical investigations is provided. 
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2.7.1. Hypothesis 1: A neural component process architecture of EnGE 
 The first part of this thesis provides test the neural component process architecture 
proposed above in Chapter 2.4 (see also Figure 2.5). Specifically, it is hypothesised that 
EnGE should be neurally implemented by the cooperation of three major intrinsic 
connectivity networks: The Default Mode Network (DMN), the Salience Network (SN), and 
the Frontoparietal Control Network (FPCN). These are hypothesised to implement dissociable 
psychological component processes supporting the endogenous generation of emotion. 
Specifically, DMN is hypothesised to implement the generation of representations of affective 
situations while the SN is hypothesised to coordinate the emotional responses to these. 
Finally, the FPCN is proposed to support the cognitive control of the representation 
generation process. Importantly, the FPCN is proposed both to support the representation 
generation process in general, and to support the retrieval of emotion-related information in 
modal association regions.  
 
2.7.2. Hypothesis 2: Neural plasticity of EnGE-architecture 
 To the degree that the above hypothesis holds, one would expect to see morphological 
changes in this network as a function of expertise in EnGE relative to a normal population. 
Moreover, to the degree that EnGE-expertise is an emergent skill distinguishable from its 
processual subcomponents, one would expect that such changes should centre around the 
components of the network that are most important for the coordination of component 
processes, here hypothesised to be supported by the FPCN.  
 
2.7.3: Hypothesis 3: Neural mechanisms of EnGE-based regulation  
In Chapter 2.5 two distinct means by which EnGE can be used for emotion 
management was proposed: 1) A reactive mode, by which positive emotional states can be 
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generated in response to external stressors and 2) a pre-emptive mode, allowing the individual 
predict and prepare for upcoming stressors. In the current thesis, the neural bases of the 
reactive form of emotion management is investigated. Based on the current review, one would 
expect that efforts to use EnGE to regulate one’s emotional reactions should rely on a similar 
neural architecture to that proposed in hypotheses 1 and 2. Moreover, by comparing the neural 
bases of EnGE-based emotion regulation efforts with other emotion regulation techniques it 
should be possible to determine the mechanism by which any observed regulatory effects 
occur. Chapter 2.5.2 further proposed three potential mechanisms for reactive EnGE-based 
emotion regulation: distraction, facilitation, and buffering. In the context of a negative 
stressor, the distraction and facilitation accounts would both predict increased positive affect 
with a concomitant decrease in negative affect. However, the accounts diverge in terms of 
neural effects with the distraction account predicting the involvement of EnGE circuits alone, 
and the facilitation hypothesis predicting involvement of EnGE circuits in conjunction with 
those supporting other forms of emotion regulation. Finally, the buffering account diverges 
from the two preceding by proposing that EnGE-based regulatory efforts should primarily 
enhance the ability to endure negative stressors, meaning that it should result in increased 
positive emotion without, necessarily, a concomitant drop in negative emotion.  
 
2.7.4: Hypothesis 4: EnGE influences trait emotion and emotion management 
To the degree that EnGE is an efficacious emotion regulation technique one would 
expect to see evidence of this in its relationship with indices of adaptive emotion management 
and trait affect. Specifically, if the reactive mode is efficacious, one would expect EnGE 
abilities to be associated with usage of emotion-focused emotion management. Conversely, if 
the pre-emptive mode is efficacious, one would expect a relationship between EnGE abilities 
and instrumental emotion management styles, that emphasise taking pre-emptive action to 
diffuse the impact of emotional events. Additionally, if EnGE facilitates adaptive emotion 
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management as is here proposed, one would expect to that individual differences in EnGE 
abilities mediate the relationship between adaptive emotion management and trait affect. 
 
2.8: Overview of dissertation 
The empirical body of work (Chapters 4-7) in this thesis is published or is under 
review in peer-reviewed journals. As the article format does not allow sufficient space for in-
depth discussion of the methods used, Chapter 3 provides an overview of the different 
experimental methods employed, and discusses how they can be utilised to answer the 
questions posed above.  
The focus of Chapters 4 and 5 was to investigate what neural processes support the 
generation of endogenous emotion. In Chapter 4, a large scale study investigating the neural 
component structure of EnGE is reported. This study focused on establishing the neural 
architecture of EnGE, differentiating implementation-specific mechanisms from those 
supporting EnGE in general. Chapter 5 presents a study in which the effects of long-term 
practice of volitional emotion generation via loving-kindness and compassion meditation on 
brain structure was investigated. To the degree that our neural component process model 
holds, one would expect that such experts show structural changes in these networks. 
Together, these chapters enabled testing of the proposed component process architecture of 
EnGE both in terms of functional activation and long-term brain change. 
 
 In Chapters 6 and 7 the thesis shifts to the question of the utility of EnGE. Chapter 6 
investigates the feasibility of using EnGE as an emotion regulation strategy when confronted 
with an external stressor and the neural mechanisms supporting such regulatory effects, by 
investigating the behavioural and neural consequences of using compassion-meditation to 
down-regulate emotional reactions to negative film clips. Further, this was compared with 
emotion regulation implemented using reappraisal, allowing a differential test how EnGE-
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based regulation occurs in light of the process model of emotion regulation. Finally, Chapter 7 
investigates whether and how trait abilities to generate positive and negative emotion predicts 
trait affectivity and emotion management styles, as measured by self-report. This allowed 
investigation of the relative importance of general or valence-specific EnGE abilities for 
different forms of emotion management, and also to directly test whether EnGE causally 
mediated the relationship between emotion management styles and trait affect. 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
 
3.1. Chapter overview 
This Chapter provides an overview of the methods employed in the studies reported in 
Chapters 4-7 and how they relate to the central research questions. The first goal of the thesis 
was to establish the neural mechanisms supporting endogenous emotion generation. This was 
done in two experiments investigating 1) how endogenous emotion generation is implemented 
in the normal population (Chapter 4) and 2) how expertise in emotion generation has long 
term effects on brain architecture (Chapter 5). The second goal was to investigate how EnGE 
can be used as a mechanism for emotion management. This was done by 1) the neural 
mechanism of emotion regulation using compassion meditation in a population of expert 
meditators (Chapter 6) and 2) establishing how emotion generation abilities correlate with 
trait affect and emotion management style in the normal population (Chapter 7). In this 
Chapter an overview of the methods used in these investigations is given, starting with a 
description of the two samples, followed by presentations of the experiments utilised and the 
measures and analytical approach taken. 
 
3.2. Overview of the empirical body of work 
The empirical body of work in this thesis is either published (Chapter 7; H. G. Engen 
& Singer, 2015) or is currently under review (Chapters 4-6). Chapters 4-7 consist of the 
article manuscripts as they have been submitted. As the article format does not allow 
sufficient space for in-depth discussion of the methods used, the present chapter provides an 
overview of the different experimental methods employed, and discusses how they can be 
utilised to answer the questions posed above. 
In the current thesis two complimentary approaches were taken to map the neural and 
behavioural mechanisms of EnGE: First, Chapter 4 investigated how volitional EnGE was 
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implemented in the normal population, using a newly developed, naturalistic fMRI paradigm 
(known as the RAGE, described in more detail below) in two independent representative 
samples (N=32 and 293). This paradigm enabled the investigation of how EnGE is neurally 
implemented in the normal population and provided ample power to test our component 
process model in Chapter 4. The larger of these two samples stemmed from a large-scale 
longitudinal mental training study (the ReSource Project). As part of this project participants 
completed an extensive battery of trait measures of socio-affective skills. In Chapter 7, this 
was used to investigate whether EnGE abilities predicted trait affectivity, emotion regulation 
and coping styles in the normal population.  
Second, the neural and behavioural correlates of EnGE expertise were investigated. 
This was accomplished by investigating the morphological differences in brain structure in a 
sample of meditators with extensive experience in loving-kindness and compassion 
meditation (N = 17). As discussed in Chapter 2.3.2, a central aspect of these meditation 
practices is the active self-generation of positive emotional states. Thus, by comparing 
practitioners to a matched sample of normal controls, we could in Chapter 5 investigate the 
structural brain bases of EnGE expertise. The aim of this study was to verify our results from 
the normal population, the reasoning being that long-term practice in emotion generation 
should lead to durable changes in our putative emotion generation networks. Finally, as 
compassion meditation centrally involves dealing with the suffering of others, we could in 
Chapter 6 directly test whether the generation of positive, compassionate affect could be used 
as a reactive emotion management strategy to deal with exogenous stressors as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Moreover, by comparing the neural and behavioural outcomes of compassion 
relative to the well-described emotion regulation strategy of reappraisal we could directly test 
whether any observed regulatory effects were consistent with the distraction, facilitation or 
buffering hypotheses of EnGE based emotion regulation proposed in Chapter 2. To begin, the 
following section provides a detailed presentation of the two samples under investigation. 
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3.3. Samples 
3.3.1. The ReSource Project 
Chapters 4 and 7 are based on data from a newly developed functional magnetic 
resonance imaging paradigm (the Regulation and Generation of Emotion; the RAGE, see 
below), as it was it was implemented in the ReSource Project (Singer et al., 2016)— a large 
scale longitudinal mental training project, the baseline data of which are reported in the 
current thesis. Utilising the large, representative sample gathered in the ReSource Project 
allowed for the investigation of endogenous generation of emotion as it naturalistically occurs 
in terms of behavioural and neural implementation. Out of a total sample of 332 recruited for 
the ReSource Project, 305 participants completed the RAGE. In Chapter 4, a further 12 
participants were excluded due to data quality issues leaving a final sample of 293 (170 
female, mean age = 40.4, range: 20-55, SD = 9.3). Furthermore, as a step in the development 
of the paradigm used, a demographically matching sample of 32 (15 female, mean age = 30.3, 
range 21-51, SD = 9) underwent the procedure, allowing us to provide within-study 
replication of our findings. Finally, as the ReSource study included extensive psychometric 
assessment, we were additionally able to investigate the degree to which endogenous emotion 
generation abilities are associated with beneficial — or pernicious — affect and coping styles, 
A further 5 participants had incomplete questionnaire data, leading to a sample of 288 in 
Chapter 7 (168 female, mean age = 40.42, range: 20-55, SD = 9.29). 
 
3.3.2: Long-term meditation practitioner study 
Chapters 5 and 6 are based on data acquired in the context of a project investigating 
expert, long-term practitioners (LTMs; N = 17; 5 women; 45-62 years, mean ± SD age = 56 ± 
5 years) of loving-kindness (LKM) and compassion meditation (CM), together with a control 
group matched on age and sex (5 women; 46-63 years, mean ± SD age = 54 ± 6 years), 
education level (LTM: mean ± SD years of education = 14 ± 3 years; Controls: 14 ± 3 years) 
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and IQ (103.6 ± 20.0 vs. 102.4 ± 28.5; assessed using Raven’s Progressive Matrices). 
Moreover, participants and controls had equivalent affective status, reporting similar, 
subclinical symptoms of depression and anxiety (Beck's Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 
1996); mean ± SD in LTM: 5.9 ± 3.9; controls: 6.6 ± 7.0; p > 0.7; Spielberger Trait Anxiety 
Scale, (Spielberger et al., 1983) mean ± SD in LTM: 37.3 ± 9.9; controls: 37.0 ± 9.1; p > 0.7). 
As reviewed in Chapter 2.3.2, this family of meditation techniques is characterised by the 
active generation of positive emotions of caring and compassion in a meditative setting, 
making them an “in-the-wild” example of endogenous emotion generation. A strong test of 
our component process model of EnGE would be to find evidence of structural plasticity 
within the relevant networks in people who have trained EnGE. Given the, on average 
~40,000 hours of practice our sample reported in these techniques, this allowed us to 
investigate the effects of emotion generation expertise in terms of long-term brain plasticity, 
investigating whether extensive practice in EnGE resulted in structural changes in our 
putative generation network. Chapter 5 investigates whether there is evidence of brain 
plasticity as a function of emotion generation expertise, by investigating cortical thickness 
changes in practitioners compared to the group of matched controls. Chapter 6 is focused on a 
subsample (n=15) of practitioners (5 women; age range=45-62 years, age mean = 56.1 
SD=4.6 years) who further completed a task designed to investigate how EnGE abilities in the 
form of compassion meditation can be used to regulate emotional reactions to exogenous 
negative stimuli.  
 
3.4. Experimental methods 
As the study of EnGE as a process in its own right is a relatively underdeveloped 
topic, its investigation required the adaptation or development of new experimental methods. 
The rationale guiding these experiments and their development is provided in this section, as 
well as an account of how their design allowed us to address our core hypotheses. 
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3.4.1. Regulation and Generation of Emotion: The RAGE paradigm 
Based on our considerations in Chapter 2, we developed the Regulation And 
Generation of Emotion (RAGE) task (see Figure 3.1) as a means to sample EnGE abilities as 
they naturalistically occur in a normal population. Based on pilot data where participants were 
allowed participants full freedom in how to generate positive and negative emotional states, it 
was found that participants tended to gravitate towards using multiple modalities and that 
these primarily included variants of episodic imagery (i.e. mentally envisaging a narrative), 
semantic analysis (i.e. thinking about a situation in terms of words), bodily interoception (i.e. 
focusing on different bodily sensations associated with emotions) and auditory imagery (i.e. 
mentally recalling emotion-evoking music or the timbre of voices). Replicating previous 
research, participants reported both that they could generate emotions with relative ease 
(Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013), and that the emotional states thus generated were 
subjectively experienced as real emotional states (Riquelme et al., 2015; Salas et al., 2012). 
The aim of the main experiment was to retain as naturalistic a measure as possible, such that 
we could measure EnGE abilities as they occur in the normal population in terms of evoked 
subjective affect, while at the same time retaining experimental control such that meaningful 
neural and psychophysiological measurements could be performed. As such, participants were 
permitted to generate emotions in whichever way they themselves felt would elicit the most 
robust emotional states. Further, they were allowed to generate either high or low arousal 
exemplars of positive and negative emotion. We opted for a short-epoch design inspired by 
extant studies of extended emotion regulation and emotion generation processes (Goldin et 
al., 2008; 2005). This short epoch design was chosen as it would allow us to differentiate 
processes based on their temporal activation patterns, in accord with our neural component- 
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Figure 3.1. The RAGE paradigm. Schematic overview of the complete experimental procedure for the 
RAGE paradigm.  
 
process model. The epoch was split into a Generation phase, in which participants generated 
positive or negative emotions, and a Modulation phase, where participants either maintained 
their generated state or down-regulated it, again using whichever method they best saw fit. 
Importantly, this allowed us to differentiate systems involved in the initial generation of the 
emotional state from those involved in the elaborated representation and maintenance of these 
states over the course of time.  
Previous work on EnGE has reported response to depictions of hypothetical scenarios 
(Oosterwijk et al., 2012; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011; 2013) or autobiographical 
memories (George et al., 1996; Liotti et al., 2000; e.g. Mayberg et al., 1999). As the goal of 
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these studies were primarily to investigate the neural correlates of the emotional states thus 
elicited, they depended to different degrees on the presentation of a short-form version of the 
target scenarios via verbal cues or auditory short-form versions of the scenarios. This means 
that the results from these studies potentially conflate processing of external information with 
processes central to EnGE as we conceptualise it here, particularly pertaining to goal-directed 
retrieval of information from long term memory. To avoid these problems, we opted for a 
purely cue-based approach in EnGE abilities. In different contexts, such cue-based paradigms 
have been used in the past to investigate the endogenous processing of emotional information 
(Singer et al., 2004; e.g. 2006) and tends to provide robust and circumscribed estimates of the 
neural mechanisms supporting internal mental processes (see e.g. Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 
2011). 
A problem with this cue-based approach is that one runs the risk of losing 
experimental control by not having an external referent (e.g. a visual stimulus) entraining 
processing between individuals. To counteract this, participants completed a supervised 
computerised training session prior to entering the scanner. First, to ensure that participants 
all generated similar emotional states, they underwent a multimodal emotion induction in 
which high and low arousal, positive and negative emotional states (as well as a neutral, 
baseline state) were induced using normed affective material, including musical clips, images 
and verbal descriptions of the target emotional states and their bodily concomitants. In 
addition to ensuring similar representations of the goal emotional states, this induction was 
designed to match the primary four modalities reported used in our piloting (i.e. auditory 
imagery, episodic imagery, semantic analysis, and bodily interoception). Following induction, 
participants selected whether they generated high or low arousal exemplars of positive and 
negative emotion, in addition to how they generated them by selecting one or more of the four 
modalities to use in combination, or self-define a means, based on how they themselves were 
best able to generate their elected target states, as determined by three practice trials. Thus, 
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the approach taken was to keep the target emotional states as constant as possible between 
participants, but allow them to elect the methods by which to achieve them, ensuring optimal 
implementation across individuals. Moreover, by having individuals generate both positive 
and negative states we could for the first time distinguish individual differences in EnGE 
abilities per se from the ability to generate specific emotional states — of importance for 
distinguishing between the buffering and fluency hypotheses of EnGE-based emotion 
regulation in Chapter 7. 
The self-selection of generation methods also served two important functions by of 
allowing the answering of important questions not addressed in previous literature: First, it 
allowed the differentiation of neural systems supporting the implementation of EnGE reliant 
on modality-specific information (e.g. using episodic imagery or semantic analysis) from 
those supporting the elaboration of subjective experience of EnGE itself, i.e. in a modality-
independent manner. This is of particular importance as it allows a means of differentiating 
component processes supporting the generation of core affect from those supporting their 
conceptualisation (i.e. their interpretation). Second, and in accordance with the goal of 
naturalistic measurement of EnGE abilities, allowing individuals to utilise their optimal EnGE 
approaches enabled us to investigate trait EnGE abilities in an objective fashion. This is 
important because previous studies have been limited to investigating either EnGE via a 
single modality (most often episodic imagery), or have investigated the efficacies of different 
modalities (e.g. episodic imagery vs semantic analysis as in Bergman & Craske, 2000; 
Holmes et al., 2006). However, EnGE as it naturalistically occurs is likely to be multi modally 
implemented, much like imagination or general cognition (Barsalou, 2008). As such, 
individual differences in usage of a given modality (e.g. semantic analysis) might not 
adequately capture EnGE abilities in general, or conceal non-linear effects of combining 
modalities. By allowing participants to freely combine modalities to whichever degree they 
felt most efficacious this question could be addressed. 
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Finally, the RAGE allowed the differentiation between circuits supporting the de novo 
generation of emotional states and those supporting their subsequent modulation or down-
regulation. Participants trained down-regulation using one or more of six different emotion 
regulation tactics derived from the literature (Reappraisal, Distancing, Distraction, Relaxation, 
Clearing, Acceptance) or a self-defined alternative. Participants were instructed to use the 
technique or combination of techniques to whichever degree they found was the most 
efficacious for both valences, as determined by a set of the trials in which participants both 
generated and regulated their emotional states. Moreover, by including partial trials (Ollinger, 
Shulman, & Corbetta, 2001) where the Modulation phase was omitted, the neural signatures 
of active maintenance of emotional states could be differentiated from those associated with 
either volitional down-regulation of those states or natural decay (see Figure 3.2). Together, 
this design allowed testing of the neural component process architecture proposed in Chapter 
2, by investigating the activation dynamics of networks using a similar procedure to that 
successful used in the study of the neural processes supporting constructive memory (Addis et 
al., 2007; 2009; Daselaar et al., 2008).  
Summarising, the RAGE affords the investigation of individual differences in EnGE 
abilities by allowing individuals optimal implementation. Additionally, the paradigm allows 
the investigation of implementation methods in terms of both absolute efficacy and potential 
combinatorial effects, as well as allowing the differentiation of modality-specific from core 
emotion generation systems in the brain. Finally, by having participants both generate and 
regulate endogenous emotion it was possible to differentiate neural systems specifically 
related to the generation of emotion from those supporting general emotion control. In the 
current thesis data from RAGE was used to 1) investigate the neural mechanisms supporting 
EnGE (Chapter 4) and 2) investigate whether EnGE abilities were predictive of emotion 
management styles and trait affect (Chapter 7). The latter allowed the testing of the fourth 
hypothesis proposed in Chapter 2, that EnGE should be related with trait differences in 
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emotion management skills and, importantly, mediate the relationship between these skills 
and trait affect. 
 
3.4.2. “State-fMRI” of loving-kindness meditation 
The second hypothesis of this thesis is that there should be discernible structural 
changes of the proposed EnGE-network in individuals with expertise in the self-generation of 
emotion. In Chapter 5, the neural correlates of EnGE-expertise were explored, by 
investigating the overlaps between cortical thickness in the sample of LKM and CM (see 
Chapter 2.3.2) experts relative to a control group. Importantly, previous work has shown that 
LKM training reliably improves experienced positive affect, but that this is increase is reliant 
on persistent engagement in LKM (Cohn & Fredrickson, 2010; Fredrickson et al., 2008). As 
such, LKM appears to directly result in the generation of positive affective states. Moreover, 
LKM is a highly standardised technique such that LKM-based emotion elicitation is likely to 
progress in a similar manner across individuals. This means that it is a good candidate for 
elucidating the neural mechanisms supporting expertise in EnGE. To ensure that any findings 
were specific to LKM, a multi-modal approach was adopted, comparing the cortical thickness 
changes with results from a functional MRI investigation based on resting state methodology. 
In a typical resting state fMRI experiment (rs-fMRI) participants are scanned without any 
particular task and are simply requested to either rest while fixating on a cross or with eyes 
closed. By investigating either the time-series or amplitude of low frequency fluctuations of 
voxels in the brain, an extensive literature (Buckner et al., 2008; Raichle & Snyder, 2007) 
shows that while doing this, the brain tends to enter a discrete state characterised by 
engagement of the Default Mode Network mentioned in Chapter 2 (Buckner, Krienen, & Yeo, 
2013). While traditionally conceived of as a “task-negative” or “off” mode of the brain, recent 
evidence strongly suggests that this activation pattern is characteristic of the state of mind-
wandering or self-generated thought (Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; 
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Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). As such, the resting state of the brain is more properly thought 
of as an active, generative cognitive state that, importantly, appears to be distinguishable from 
mental states imparted by meditation (Mrazek, Franklin, Phillips, Baird, & Schooler, 2013). 
At the same time there is increased interest in investigating the neural bases of discrete brain 
states, with evidence suggesting that such states are supported by the large scale coupling and 
co-activation of networks supporting the function of said brain state (C. D. Gilbert & Sigman, 
2007; Milazzo et al., 2016). Thus, in Chapter 5 activation in the resting state was contrasted 
with that occurring when our sample of LTMs engaged in LKM, reasoning that this should 
reveal neural activation specifically related to the generation of positive affect, rendering 
novel insight into the neural bases of the state of EnGE. Specifically, as we contrasted the 
generation of LKM with the resting state—which itself involves generation of cognitive 
material—findings should engage primarily the neural substrates of generating an emotional 
state of loving kindness. Moreover, as the main topic of Chapter 5 was to investigate how 
expertise in emotion state generation using meditation influenced brain morphology, this 
allowed us to differentiate effects structural alterations specific to LKM from those reflecting 
general long-term meditation practice. 
 
3.4.3. EnGE as a means to counter with exogenous stressors 
The third hypothesis of the thesis is twofold, stating 1) that using EnGE in response to 
external stressors is a viable means of emotion regulation, and 2) that such emotion generation 
should rely on largely the same neural network as described above. In chapter 6, this is tested 
by investigating the neural and behavioural correlates of using compassion meditation (CM) 
to regulate emotional reactions in response to negative external stimuli. A major difference 
between LKM and CM is that CM involves both the generation of a state of loving-kindness 
and the application of that state to a specific person in the world that is in a state of suffering 
(Goetz et al., 2010). As such, compassion meditation can be thought of as a means by which 
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emotions can be regulated in response to negative events in the world, particularly events 
social in nature. This is of some importance as recent evidence suggests that standard emotion 
regulation techniques can result in emotional bluntness or callousness (Cameron & Payne, 
2011), suggesting that they might not be particularly well suited to dealing with emotional 
situations where empathy is required (Singer & Klimecki, 2014). Critically, CM involves the 
active generation of positive affect meaning that it is an apt model technique for testing the 
buffering hypothesis of EnGE based emotion management. 
Chapter 6 investigates the efficacy of CM to regulate emotional reactions to negative 
socio-affective film stimuli depicting people in distress was tested. The paradigm employed 
was modelled on a previously published emotion regulation paradigm optimised for 
investigating the temporal dynamics of neural processes supporting different emotion 
regulation strategies (Goldin et al., 2008; see Figure 3.3). Using a slow event-related design, 
participants were presented with negative film stimuli previously shown to elicit strong 
negative affect (Klimecki et al., 2014), with matched neutral film clips serving as an induction 
check. Participants were instructed to either passively view the film clips or use CM to 
regulate their emotional reactions, allowing a contrast between the conditions to reveal the 
neural signatures of using EnGE as a means of dealing with negative environmental stressors. 
Additionally, participants regulated their emotional reactions using positive Reappraisal, an 
emotion regulation strategy that involves the active generation of alternate interpretations 
(appraisals) of emotional stimuli, thereby altering their emotional meaning (Blechert et al., 
2015; Buhle et al., 2014; J. J. Gross, 2015b; McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012a) . In addition 
to being a high leverage strategy, Reappraisal is the most thoroughly investigated strategy of 
the emotion-regulation literature and can be thought of as a “gold-standard” against which the 
efficacy of other strategies can be gauged (Blechert et al., 2015; Buhle et al., 2014; Goldin et 
al., 2008; J. J. Gross, 2007b). Critically, positive reappraisal and CM involve engaging with 
negative stimuli in markedly different ways: Reappraisal involves inhibiting a prepotent and 
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immediately given negative interpretation and replacing it with a positive interpretation 
(Blechert et al., 2015; Buhle et al., 2014; Goldin et al., 2008; J. J. Gross, 1998a; Wager, 
Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner, 2008). CM, conversely, has no inhibitory 
component (at least conceptually), but rather the pivots on the de novo generation of a 
positive emotional state that is then applied to the object of negative affect (Singer & 
Klimecki, 2014). Thus, reappraisal and compassion should be similar in their reliance on 
generation materials, but differ in terms of both experienced affect, with CM resulting in more 
mixed emotional states, and concomitant neural consequences. Importantly, evidence already 
exists on how reappraisal differs from different types of emotion regulation using distraction 
(Dörfel et al., 2014; Kanske et al., 2011; McRae et al., 2010) in terms of both behavioural 
outcomes and neural bases, allowing one to infer to what degree CM-based meditation is 
similar to either of these techniques. Overall, this paradigm allowed us to identify which of 
the three possible mechanisms of reactive EnGE-based emotion management (discussed in 
Chapter 2, 2.7.2) best characterised CM. 
 
3.5. Methods and analyses 
To test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2, a variety of measures were used, 
spanning from questionnaire measurements of trait affective styles to measures of the 
thickness of the cerebral cortex. Here I provide an overview of the methods used, the 
analytical approaches taken and the rationale guiding their use vis-a-vis testing the core 
hypotheses of the thesis. 
 
3.5.1. Assessing the neural architecture of EnGE 
In the experiments described herein three main approaches were taken to investigate 
the neural mechanisms supporting EnGE: 1) Measurements were performed of what neural 
regions are activated during EnGE relative to neutral baselines suggesting that they encode 
  Chapter 3: Methods 
 
 
80 
 
different processes, 2) network-focused methods were used to investigate how different neural 
regions correlate during EnGE, and 3) how expertise and long-term practice of EnGE is 
associated with changes in the structure of the brain. Of these, the first two rely on functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) which measures neural activity via the proxy of 
hemodynamics, while the latter relies on measuring the relative quantities of protons in 
different tissue types. In the following I will provide an overview of the methods employed in 
each of the three domains. 
 
3.5.1.1. Activation-based fMRI 
The measurement of neural activation via the proxy of hemodynamics using fMRI is a 
cornerstone technique in modern cognitive and affective neuroscience, allowing the 
measurement of fluctuations of neural activation by proxy of measuring changes in blood-
oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signals in the brain (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & 
Oeltermann, 2001), with millimetric accuracy. As such, the BOLD signal is a cumulative 
signal, measuring the mass activity of neurons, with the guiding assumption being that 
increased neural activation results in increased metabolic demands, and consequently larger 
BOLD signals. Importantly, BOLD is not an absolute measure of neural activity, since even 
inactive neurons utilise oxygen for their maintenance. Temporally, the resolution of the fMRI 
signal is limited by two sources: First, it is an indirect measure of cardiovascular effects 
resultant on neural activity signals are temporally shifted by ~4-6 seconds in normal 
individuals and extend over a period of about 20 seconds following the onset of a stimulus 
(Handwerker, Ollinger, & D'Esposito, 2004). Second, a brain-wide acquisition of this signal 
usually takes around 2 seconds, which limits the sampling rate of this signal at any given 
point in the brain. As such, fMRI as a method is best used to investigate neural processes that 
extend over time. Similarly, by investigating how signal in voxels co-varied with usage of 
3.5. Methods and analyses 
 
81 
 
different generation modalities, we could identify regions whose activation likely supported 
implementation of modality usage. 
In the current thesis activation patterns were investigated in three different ways. First, 
differential BOLD signals in brain regions as a function of experimental conditions were 
investigated. This is the mainstay approach for fMRI-based cognitive neuroscience, and 
involves convolving a design matrix with a canonical hemodynamic response function 
(Friston, 1995). This allows the parcellation of an fMRI time-series into events, allowing the 
differentiation of discrete phases of an experiment in terms of the BOLD signal at each voxel. 
Importantly, this allows estimation parameters of signal strength in different conditions. Next, 
basic cognitive subtraction logic can be applied, in which brain-wide signal in a baseline 
measurement is subtracted from the signal apparent in an experimental condition of interest to 
reveal brain regions that encode, or are sensitive to, the process in question. For instance, in 
Chapter 7, participants were presented with negative and neutral videos. By subtracting the 
BOLD signal in the negative condition from the neutral condition, brain regions that 
responded stronger to specifically emotional content in videos could be identified. Moreover, 
by investigating modulations of the activation strength by subjective report, we could identify 
brain regions that parametrically varied as a function of the intensity of experienced emotional 
states, consistent with them supporting the generation core affective aspects of emotional 
experiences (see e.g. Heinzel et al., 2005). 
One limitation of this approach is that it is inherently tied to an experimental design 
and thus cannot be used to address questions of brain activity during different cognitive states, 
that typically have a longer extent than e.g. a few seconds. Moreover, the reliance on a design 
matrix to parcellate fMRI time series in the above approach means that it is not well-suited to 
explore the neural bases of states that are not particularly amenable to translation into an 
experimental task, such as self-induction of meditative states. In Chapter 5, this was 
circumvented by investigation of the amplitude of low frequency fluctuations (ALFF; Yang et 
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al., 2007; Zou et al., 2008) of fMRI signal during the meditation state of loving-kindness. 
ALFF is a spectral method that quantifies the degree to which a given brain region shows 
evidence of slow fluctuations (0.01-0.08 Hz) of BOLD signal. While traditionally applied as 
an individual difference measure of resting state activation, ALFF has been shown to vary 
within-person as a function of stimulation (Jao et al., 2013; Yan et al., 2009) and the content 
of thoughts during task-free scanning (Gorgolewski et al., 2014; Kühn, Vanderhasselt, De 
Raedt, & Gallinat, 2012), suggesting that it is also sensitive to changes in activation 
corresponding to cognitive states. By contrasting ALFF during LKM with that of a normal 
resting state, the neural basis of a sustained state of EnGE could be investigated. Moreover, as 
the resting state is itself generative (as discussed in Chapter 2) and is frequently loaded with 
affective material (Gorgolewski et al., 2014) this contrast should allow us to identify neural 
systems specifically involved in the controlled generation of emotional states. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, masking logic was used to provide a nuanced test of dynamic 
hypotheses regarding the component processes supporting EnGE. Masking is, in effect, a 
simple logical procedure, enabling one to identify conjunctions and disjunctions of neural 
activations as a function of condition. As previously mentioned, the standard approach to 
mapping activations involves convolving a design matrix with an HRF. This means that any 
reported activation is, in effect, a measure of the relative fit of the empirical fluctuations in the 
signal to the predicted HRF given processing occurring at a given point in time. While this is 
unproblematic in the context of simple stimulus-response type processes, this means that 
extended, multi-component processes like the one proposed for EnGE will be blurred into one 
activation map. One way of getting around this is by having the design matrix include 
multiple regressors at different points of the process. We specifically propose that there is a 
differentiation between processes involved in the initial generation and subsequent 
elaboration of emotional experiences. Based on previous work (Addis et al., 2007; 2009; 
Daselaar et al., 2008) we therefore modelled the first 10 seconds and the subsequent 5 seconds 
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of our 15 second trial separately. Second, our design included several conditions that we 
expected to differentially engage component processes, allowing us to parcel out activation 
associated with different processes (see Chapter 4 for more detail). 
 
3.5.1.2. Network-based fMRI 
A different way of approaching the question of how function is reflected in brain 
dynamics is to investigate modulations of correlations between different regions as a function 
of conditions. This is of particular relevance for the current work as we specifically propose 
that different component processes are instantiated by different functional networks. We 
investigated this in Chapter 4 using complementary data-driven and model-based approaches.  
Constrained principal components analysis (Woodward et al., 2006) is multivariate 
method that draws on the fact that any given fMRI measurement has several thousands (in our 
case ~30000) time series measurements, one for each voxel. By using PCA, it is possible to 
lump these voxels together into components that are highly intercorrelated (Friston, Frith, 
Liddle, & Frackowiak, 1993) and thus are formally known as functionally connected 
networks (Friston, 2004), that tend to activate in a coordinated fashion. By constraining the 
investigated time series to e.g. the period following a task-instruction, it is thus possible to 
identify networks that are of special relevance to a given task. Importantly, the resultant 
networks are formed by their different dynamics during different conditions and not intrinsic 
connectivity, meaning that spatially overlapping, task-relevant functional units composed of 
multiple networks can be identified (Woodward et al., 2006; Woodward, Feredoes, Metzak, 
Takane, & Manoach, 2013). This is of special importance here, given our hypothesis that 
FPCN coordinates activation of both DMN and SN. 
While CPCA can be used to provide insight the dynamic functional organization of a 
given task based on its condition structure, it is silent about how between-subject variance in 
implementation of a task is reflected in brain networks. To get at this, we used whole-brain 
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mediation analyses (Wager et al., 2008) to identify brain networks supporting usage of a 
given modality to generate emotion, by performing a whole-brain search for voxels that 
mediated the relationship between activation of a region and self-reported modality usage (i.e. 
a mediation of a correlation between brain activity and behaviour). This analysis had two 
goals: First, we wanted to investigate the neural networks supporting implementation of each 
modality, seeking support for our notion of the embodiment of EnGE. Second, we sought to 
identify networks shared by all modalities, as these most likely support general EnGE 
processes such as representation or controlled retrieval, in line with our hypothesised 
component process structure. 
 
3.5.1.3. Cortical thickness 
Finally, Chapter 5 investigated how EnGE expertise was related to structural plasticity 
of cortical grey matter. This was done by measuring the thickness of the grey matter sheath of 
the previously described sample of LKM and CM experts and how it differed from that of 
matched controls. Cortical thickness is a sensitive proxy for total grey matter in a given region 
(Hutton, Draganski, Ashburner, & Weiskopf, 2009), with grey matter concentrations 
consistently showing expertise and training effects (Draganski & May, 2008). Thus, the 
involvement of a region in a given process can be inferred from changes in cortical thickness 
of that region with training. In lieu of a proper longitudinal design training EnGE abilities, we 
opted for an expert approach and dissociated meditation-general effects from LKM-specific 
changes using the “state”-fMRI method described above. Given that the meditators tested 
were specifically experts in meditation methods requiring EnGE, we therefore expected to 
find structural differences in the neural reference space for EnGE described in Chapter 2, 
possibly most centrally involving regions involved in the volitional initiation and shielding of 
mental states, i.e. the FPCN (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). 
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3.5.2. Psychophysiological measurement of embodied emotion 
As discussed, the component process model proposed in Chapter 2 presupposes that 
EnGE results in embodied simulations of emotion states that are largely similar in terms of 
physiological reactions to emotional states elicited by external events. To verify this, we 
investigated the relationship between EnGE and galvanic skin responses (GSR) concurrent 
with the RAGE scanner session, acquired using two Ag-Cl electrodes attached to the left 
index and middle fingers. Using Continuous Decomposition Analyses as implemented in the 
LedaLab toolbox (Benedek & Kaernbach, 2010a), we could distinguish phasic changes in 
GSR reflective of e.g. stimulus processing, from longer-duration trial-wise fluctuations in skin 
conductance levels (SCL). SCL is a commonly used (Kreibig, 2010) and highly reliable (El-
Sheikh, 2007) measure of autonomic arousal, with evidence suggesting that SCLs are elevated 
as a function of increasing experienced emotional intensity (J. J. Gross, 1998a; Levenson, 
2014; Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005), at least in exogenously elicited 
emotional states. Observing a relationship between subjective ratings and SCL would 
therefore suggest that EnGE as implemented by our design had both subjective and 
physiological consequences, consistent with EnGE producing embodied simulations of 
emotional states and not merely cognitive representations of emotional situations. 
 
3.5.3. Assessing the role of EnGE in trait affect and emotion management 
As part of the ReSource study, participants completed a comprehensive package of 
questionnaires measuring a range of social and affective traits, including self-report measures 
of self-regulation capacities and trait tendency to use different emotion regulation and coping 
strategies, as well as several measures of affective styles and tendency to experience positive 
and negative emotional states in daily life. In Chapter 7 we utilised these measurements to 
investigate how individual differences in the capacity to generate emotion in the RAGE 
paradigm correlated with individual differences in trait affectivity and emotion management 
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styles. This allowed a test of the hypothesis that EnGE can be actively used as a means of 
emotion management.  Drawing on the multivariate nature of our data, we took a latent 
variable approach, and combined all relevant scales for trait affect and, separately, emotion 
regulation, self-regulation and coping technique usage using principal components analysis 
(PCA). The resultant components (see Chapter 7 for more detail) can thus be taken as 
reflecting overall trait affect and tendency to utilise different families of emotion 
management. Taking the degree to which each participant loaded on each of these 
dimensions, we thus devised composite individual difference scores that were not biased by 
any particular formulation in any particular questionnaire, and thus likely constitute a measure 
of actual, self-experienced, affective style. Importantly, by having separate factors for trait 
affect and emotion management, we could validate our factors by establishing that loadings 
on emotion management style correlated in the expected fashion with trait affect. 
A major problem to investigating the relationship between EnGE and emotion 
management styles is that the capacity to generate emotions are construably associated overall 
trait affect. Thus, a happy person might be more adept at generation of positive emotional 
states just because they are happy. Moreover, it is a known fact that trait affect is associated 
with usage of specific adaptive emotion management styles, meaning that any correlation 
observed could be simply because emotion management improves affect that in turn improves 
EnGE. We tackled this problem in two ways: First, we investigated both average and relative 
ability to generate both positive and negative emotion. Importantly, while investigating one of 
these parameters, we controlled for the other meaning that any relationships observed were 
specific to general or valence-specific EnGE abilities. Second, we adopted a causal mediation 
modelling approach, directly testing whether EnGE-abilities mediated the observed 
relationship between different kinds of adaptive (and maladaptive) emotion management 
styles and trait affect. This allowed us to investigate whether EnGE abilities showed evidence 
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of being part of the mechanism supporting the beneficial (or detrimental) impact of emotion 
management style on trait affect. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
The approach taken in this thesis is inherently multi-modal and multi-method in line 
with the stated goal of testing a comprehensive neural component process model of EnGE, as 
well as investigating the consequences of EnGE abilities for emotion management and well-
being. the following four chapters, the manuscripts for the empirical investigations as they are 
published (Chapter 7; H. G. Engen & Singer, 2015) or currently under review in peer-
reviewed journals are presented, whereupon Chapter 8 provides a summary and discussion of 
this work in terms of our hypotheses  and Chapter 9 discusses limitations, implications and 
future directions for the current work. 
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Chapter 4: The neural component-process 
architecture of endogenously generated emotion3 
 
Haakon G. Engen, Philipp Kanske, & Tania Singer 
4.1. Abstract 
 Despite the ubiquity of endogenous emotions and their role in both resilience and 
pathology, the processes supporting their generation are largely unknown. We propose a 
neural component process model of endogenous generation of emotion (EnGE) and test it in 
two fMRI experiments (N = 32/293) where participants generated and regulated positive and 
negative emotions based on internal representations, using self-chosen generation methods. 
EnGE activated nodes of Salience (SN), Default Mode (DMN), and Frontoparietal Control 
(FPCN) Networks. Component processes implemented by these networks were established by 
investigating their functional associations, activation dynamics and integration. SN activation 
correlated with subjective affect, with midbrain nodes exclusively distinguishing between 
positive and negative affect intensity, and dynamics consistent with it supporting the initial 
generation of core affect. Dorsomedial DMN, together with ventral anterior insula, formed a 
pathway supporting multiple generation methods, with dynamics suggesting it is involved in 
the experiential representation of emotion. Finally, both SN and DMN coupled to left frontal 
portions of the FPCN which correlated with both subjective affect and representation 
formation, consistent with FPCN supporting the executive coordination of the generation 
process. These results support a component process mapping of EnGE onto major neural 
networks, providing a foundation for research into endogenous emotion in normal, 
pathological, and optimal function.  
                                                
3 3 The current chapter is presently under review, and the final, published version, might show discrepancies 
from the present version. Presented here is the revision of the manuscript as of 24.06.2016. 
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4.2. Introduction 
 From melancholic reminiscence to joyful anticipation, we frequently experience 
emotions caused by internal mental processes, such as thoughts and memories (Killingsworth 
& Gilbert, 2010). Such endogenous emotion is described as richer and more intense than 
emotion elicited by external events (Salas et al., 2012), and is known to play an important role 
in affective psychopathology, such as depression (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008)and anxiety 
(Freeston, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1996). There is also evidence that the endogenous generation 
of positive emotional states can used as an effective means to regulate emotional reactions to 
external events (Engen and Singer 2015). Moreover, the trait tendency to do this is a predictor 
of psychological resilience (Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004). Thus, understanding the 
psychological and neural mechanisms of endogenous generation of emotion (EnGE) can yield 
important insight into normal, pathological, and even optimal emotional function. 
 Despite this, research into EnGE has been limited, stemming mainly from behavioural 
studies using EnGE as a method to induce emotional states. This research shows that EnGE 
can be occasioned by multiple information-processing modalities, including mental imagery 
and semantic analysis of emotional information (Vrana et al., 1986), interoception of bodily 
signals (Philippot et al., 2002)or recall of episodic autobiographical memories (Mayberg et al. 
1999). It has also been shown that EnGE can effectively occur when individuals immerse 
themselves in hypothetical scenarios (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013).This latter finding 
demonstrates the theoretically important point that EnGE is not limited to reinstantiation of 
previously experienced emotional situations, but can also simulate states appropriate for novel 
contexts. Indeed, emotions are frequently elicited by spontaneous cognition about future 
events (Ruby et al., 2013), suggesting that an important use of EnGE is predicting the 
affective relevance of hypothetical future scenarios (Baumgartner, Pieters, & Bagozzi, 2008). 
While these studies were not focused at exploring EnGE as a process in its own right, they 
show that multiple means (e.g. different strategies or different information modalities) can be 
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used to generate emotional states, dependent on the representational content of the target 
emotional experience. Mirroring recent constructivist theories of emotion (Barrett & Wilson-
Mendenhall, 2014; Russell, 2014), this suggests that a comprehensive account of EnGE needs 
to distinguish between 1) processes supporting the generation of the hedonic or core affective 
quality of an endogenous emotional experience from 2) processes supporting the formation of 
representations of the context to which this affective state applies (or stems from). 
Importantly, this opens for the possibility that the two are mechanistically distinct, with neural 
systems supporting the generation of affective qualities being differentiable from those 
supporting the generation of elaborated experiential representations.  
 Presently, neuroimaging studies of EnGE using comparable protocols are limited, 
making evaluation of this hypothesis difficult. One exception is a series of early PET 
experiments in which participants generated emotional states by volitionally recalling 
significant emotional experiences (Damasio et al., 2000; Gemar et al., 1996; George et al., 
1996; Kimbrell et al., 1999; Liotti et al., 2000; Mayberg et al., 1999; Pardo & Raichle, 1993; 
Reiman et al., 1997). Considered in aggregate (see Appendix: Figure A2.1.1), these studies 
implicate three large scale functional networks in EnGE: 1) The Default Mode Network 
(DMN; Raichle & Snyder, 2007), including ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), left temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and hippocampus (HC), 
2) the extended Salience Network (SN; Seeley et al., 2007)including anterior insula (AI), 
dorsomedial PFC (dmPFC), and structures in basal ganglia and midbrain and 3) The 
Frontoparietal Control Network  (Laird et al., 2011; FPCN; Spreng et al., 2010; 2013) centred 
on lateral and dorsomedial prefrontal, and inferior parietal cortices. There is a notable overlap 
between this putative neural architecture and that known to support the construction of mental 
representations in general: DMN is associated with numerous forms of psychological 
processes involving simulation based on endogenous information (Spreng et al., 2009), and 
appears to be involved in the integration of information about a given topic into detailed 
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episodic representations/simulations. Interestingly, DMN does not appear to support the initial 
generation of the representational core that these details pertain to (Addis et al., 2007). Rather, 
this initial generation is thought to involve the direct activation of domain-specific and task-
relevant networks (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007)In the context of emotion, the SN is a likely 
candidate such a network. Composed of cortical (AI, dorsal ACC), limbic (amygdala (AMY), 
ventral striatum (VS)), and midbrain structures (periaqueductal grey (PAG), substantia 
nigra/ventral tegmentum (SN/VTA)), the SN is closely associated with the generation of core 
affect and homeostatic regulation (K. A. Lindquist & Barrett, 2012; Seeley et al., 2007). 
Interestingly, DMN and SN appear to be intrinsically anti-correlated (Buckner et al., 2013; 
Spreng et al., 2013), strengthening the claim that they support dissociable component 
processes in EnGE. This anti-correlation also suggests the need for an intermediary network 
coordinates and maintains activation of the SN and DMN, pointing to the need for executive 
processes to coordinate and maintain the generation process. Possibly, the FPCN supports this 
role as it is known to support adaptive cognitive control in general (Cole et al., 2013). FPCN 
is known to interface with SN (Dosenbach et al., 2008), affording a pathway by which core 
affective states can be generated in a goal-directed fashion. Similarly, FPCN and DMN are 
known to couple during goal-directed internal mentation (Spreng et al., 2010) and to be 
implicated in the domain-general control of retrieval processes important for representation 
formation (Badre & Wagner, 2007). 
 To the degree that this functional process architecture holds, an interesting question is 
how these processes interact over the course of a given EnGE event. Addis and colleagues 
(Addis et al., 2007; 2009; see also Daselaar et al., 2008) have shown that the construction of 
endogenous simulations of events involves distinct generation and elaboration phases, with 
the initial phase involving retrieval of the core semantic features of the representation and the 
subsequent elaboration phase involving the elaboration of the core information in question 
with details about the specific event, supported by the DMN. If this model holds for EnGE, 
                                                               Chapter 4: The neural component-process architecture of EnGE 
92 
 
one would expect involvement of SN primarily in the early stages of process, corresponding 
to core affect serving as a semantic anchor for later elaboration efforts. Plausibly, however, 
the opposite could be true, such that generation involves setting up representations of 
emotional situations, which in turn elicit core affective states (Kross et al., 2009).  
 The objective of the current study was to investigate this and to establish a 
comprehensive neural component process architecture for EnGE. Based on the above 
considerations we expected EnGE to be neurally implemented by DMN, SN, and FPCN. Each 
of these networks were hypothesised to support separable component processes of EnGE. 
Specifically, we suggest that SN supports the generation of core affective states that serve as a 
guide for the formation of detailed representations via processes instantiated in the DMN, 
resulting in an emotional experience. Finally, we propose that FPCN supports the executive 
maintenance and coordination of the generation process, coupling with both SN and DMN. 
Importantly, as we propose they form the functional core of EnGE, we expect that these 
networks should partake in EnGE irrespective of the hedonic quality of the emotional state or 
the precise means or modality used to generate it. We tested this model in two experiments (N 
= 32 and N = 293) with a newly developed paradigm aimed at maximizing ecological validity 
and generalizability of EnGE. To ensure that participants generated comparable emotional 
states, they were anchored using a multimodal emotion induction procedure prior to scanning. 
This procedure elicited multiple markers of emotional states (semantic, visual, auditory, and 
bodily) prior to scanning, avoiding artificially biasing participants’ implementation towards 
particular information modalities. In order to maximise ecological validity and task 
compliance, participants were instructed to implement EnGE as they experienced most 
efficacious. Thus, in Experiment 1 participants were given complete freedom in how they 
generated emotions, while in Experiment 2 they were allowed to combine four generation 
modalities (Semantic Analysis, Episodic and Auditory Imagery, and Bodily Interoception; i.e. 
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the endogenous analogues to the modalities used in the induction procedure), in whichever 
way they found most effective. 
 Participants then completed a cue-based fMRI paradigm (Figure 4.1 A). Trials 
consisted of a Generation phase and a Modulation phase. In the Generation phase, participants 
used their self-selected techniques to generate positive and negative emotional states, or 
actively attempted to remain neutral. Thus, we could distinguish the neural correlates of 
general emotion generation from those supporting generation of particular implementations of 
generation. In the subsequent Modulation phase, participants maintained this state (Maintain 
condition), actively suppressed it (Regulate condition), or simply ceased their generation 
efforts (Cease condition; Experiment 1 only). This approach enabled us to dissociate neural 
systems supporting different component processes based on their activation profiles. Finally, 
participants provided ratings of their affective states following each trial, allowing 
identification of the neural correlates of generation success. 
 
4.3. Methods 
4.3.1. Participants 
For Experiment 1, 32 participants were recruited from an in-house participant data-
base (15 female, mean age = 30.3, range 21-51, SD = 9). For Experiment 2, participants were 
recruited in the context of the large-scale longitudinal ReSource Project (see Appendix: 
A1.1.1 ReSource eligibility criteria for details on recruitment). Baseline data from this study 
were used. 332 participants were recruited for the ReSource Project, with 305 participants 
completing the current paradigm. Of these, 5 participants were excluded on account of 
missing auxiliary data (post-scan questionnaire, structural MRI) and technical difficulties. 4 
participants reported difficulties (e.g. nausea or sleepiness) during the scanning session and 
were dropped from analysis. From the sample of 296 with complete data, a further 3 
participants were removed due to aberrant behavioural report and/or unacceptable data quality 
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after preprocessing (> 1 voxel movement, > 5% corrupted time points, design VIF > 2), 
leaving a final sample of 293 (170 female, mean age = 40.4, range: 20-55, SD = 9.3). All 
participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. The study was approved by the 
Research Ethics Committees of the University of Leipzig (number 376/12-ff) and the 
Humboldt University in Berlin (numbers 2013-02, 2013-29, and 2014-10). All participants 
gave written informed consent, were paid for their participation, and were debriefed after the 
study was completed. 
 
4.3.2. Experimental procedure 
 
Figure 4.1: Experimental task, behaviour and psychophysiological validation. A) Schematic of a single trial. 
B) Subjective ratings of affect in Experiment 1.  C) Subjective ratings of affect for Experiment 2.  D) Main 
effect of Condition on skin conductance levels (SCL) in a subset (N = 244) of participants in Experiment 2. 
Error-bars = within-subject standard errors (Loftus & Masson, 1994). *: p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
 
Before scanning, participants underwent an automated training procedure (see 
Appendix: A1.1.2 Training procedurefor details), including a multimodal emotion induction 
aimed at minimising between-participant variance in implemented emotional states. In 
Experiment 2, participants were also instructed in the use of four generation modalities 
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(Semantic, Episodic, Auditory, Bodily), and instructed to select to which degree they to use 
each in the following experiment according to their own preferences. Additionally, 
participants were shown a number of neutral stimuli (e.g. pictures of scenery) and instructed 
to actively attain the sort of neutral emotional state depicted in the Neutral and Regulation 
conditions (see below).  After the scanning session, participants were debriefed. In 
Experiment 1 verbal debriefing was done with an experimenter. In Experiment 2 participants 
reported the degree to which they used each of the generation modalities using a 9 point 
Likert scale.  
 
Each trial (Figure 4.1 A) started with a 4-6s white fixation cross indicating the start of 
trial. Then a 10s Generation phase was entered, in which subjects were shown a colored 
symbol indicating which emotional state to generate (Red minus = Negative, Green 
plus=Positive, Blue 0=Neutral).  This was followed by a 5s Modulation phase where 
participants either maintained the generation of the emotional state or down-regulated it so as 
to attain a neutral emotional state. In the Maintain condition the instruction symbol remained 
the same as in the Generation phase. In the Regulation condition, the symbol changed to a 
blue 0. Finally, in Experiment 1 we included a partial-trial condition where the instruction cue 
changed to a fixation cross (Cease condition; Experiment 1 only). For the Neutral condition 
the symbol did not change, but remained a blue 0. Thus, Experiment 1 consisted of a total of 7 
different conditions (Maintain Positive/Negative, Regulate Positive/Negative, Cease 
Positive/Negative and Neutral). Experiment 2 omitted the Cease condition and thus had a total 
of 5 conditions. Experiment 1 had two runs of 5 trials per condition (35 per run), while 
Experiment 2 had a single run of 10 trials per condition (50 total). Condition sequence was 
pseudo-randomised, ensuring no direct repetitions of conditions occurred. Finally, a 5s 
fixation cross was presented followed by a 5s presentation of a continuous Visual Analogue 
rating Scale ranging from “Extremely negative” via “Neutral” to “Extremely positive” (range 
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+/- 251 from the neutral point (0)). Initial cursor position was jittered randomly around the 
Neutral point. Participants responded using a button box and the right hand index and middle 
finger. Participants were instructed to report their affective state as it was at the moment of 
report. Stimuli were back-projected using a mirror setup. Task setup was identical in both 
experiments, except for the omission of the Cease condition in Experiment 2 due to time 
constraints.  
 
4.3.3. MRI acquisition 
For both experiments, MRI data was acquired on a 3T Siemens Verio Scanner 
(Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) using a 32-channel head-coil.  High-
resolution structural images were acquired using a T1-weighted 3D-MPRAGE sequence (TR 
= 2300ms, TE = 2.98ms, TI = 900ms, flip angle = 7°, iPat = 2; 176 sagittal slices, FOV = 
256mm, matrix size = 240×256, 1^3 mm voxels; total acquisition time = 5.10 minutes). For 
the functional imaging, we employed a T2*-weighted gradient EPI sequence that minimised 
distortions in medial orbital and anterior temporal regions (TR = 2000ms, TE = 27ms, flip 
angle = 90°, iPat = 2; 37 slices tilted ~30° from the AC/PC axial plane, FOV = 210 mm, 
matrix size = 70×70, 33 mm voxels, 1mm gap). For Experiment 2 we acquired B0 field maps 
using a double-echo gradient-recalled sequence with matching dimensions to the EPI images 
(TR = 517 ms, TE = 4.92 and 7.38 ms). 
 
4.3.4. fMRI preprocessing 
Preprocessing was performed using a combination of SPM12 (r6225) functions and 
the ArtRepair toolbox (Mazaika, Whitfield, & Cooper, 2005) running on Matlab 2013b. 
Functional images were realigned (Experiment 1) or realigned and unwarped to additionally 
correct for distortion using B0 field maps (Experiment 2). ArtRepair procedures were then 
employed, including slice wise artefact detection and repair using interpolation (art_slice; 5% 
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cutoff), time series diagnostics (art_global) identifying and repairing via interpolation 
volumes showing large global intensity fluctuation (> 1.3 %), volume-by-volume movement 
exceeding 0.5 mm and overall movement (> 3mm), and despiking with a 5% signal change 
cut-off (art_despike). T1 structural images were registered to the mean realigned volume and 
segmented. Using DARTEL (Ashburner, 2007) procedures,  functional images were 
normalised and smoothed with an isotropic kernel of 8mm FWHM. 
 
4.3.5. 1st level fMRI analyses 
Individual-level models included separate sets of regressors for the Generation and 
Modulation phase. For the Generation phase, 3 regressors were specified corresponding to the 
emotional target (Positive, Negative, Neutral) of the trial. For the Modulation phase, separate 
regressors were specified for each condition. Thus, the model in Experiment 1 included an 
additional 7 regressors (Valence (Positive and Negative) * Modulation (Maintain, Cease and 
Regulate) + Neutral), while the model in Experiment 2, where the Cease condition was 
omitted included an additional 5 regressors. Regressors were convolved with canonical HRF 
functions with a 10s (Generation) or 5s (Modulation) duration, as well as regressors 
specifying parametric modulations by trial-wise subjective affect ratings. An additional 
regressor was specified for the Rating period. Movement parameters derived from the 
realignment step (6 regressors), their derivatives and squared values were added (24 
regressors). Potential physiological confounds were controlled for by adding four additional 
regressors reflecting volume-wise mean signal from white matter and CSF, global signal, and 
highest-variance voxel time-course. Finally, the models included parametric modulation 
regressors coding for trial-wise ratings for all regressors of interest. 
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4.3.6. 2nd level analyses fMRI analyses 
All 2nd level GLM analyses were conducted using robust regression (Wager et al. 
2005), with covariates of no interest coding elected arousal level, age and gender. 2nd level 
models for Experiment 2 additionally included regressors coding self-reported generation 
modality usage (4 regressors) as continuous covariates. 
All results were corrected for multiple comparisons using cluster extent Family Wise 
Error Rate (FWEc) correction at an alpha of p<.05, unless otherwise indicated. Cluster extents 
were estimated using Monte Carlo simulation and estimated intrinsic smoothness 
(3DClustSim and 3DFWHMx from the AFNI package (Forman et al. 1995)), as implemented 
in the NeuroElf package. Note that peak-forming thresholds were adapted for Experiment 1 
(p<.001) and 2 (p<.00005) to account for differences in sample size. Correlational and 
mediation results also used a less strict peak threshold of p<.0005. 
All analyses were masked with a grey matter template derived from the DARTEL 
created template, thresholded at 95% grey matter probability, supplemented by a hand-drawn 
masks of brainstem nuclei due to poor differentiation of white from grey matter in these 
regions. 
 
4.3.7. Constrained principal component analysis 
In Experiment 2, we adopted a data-driven approach using constrained principal 
components analysis (CPCA; see Woodward et al., 2013 for details) of fMRI time series 
using the CPCA-fMRI package (www.nitrc.org/projects/fmricpca). CPCA analysis of fMRI 
data is a multivariate method that involves a singular value decomposition of BOLD time 
series to identify functional networks followed by an estimation of BOLD change in each 
network over peristimulus time as a function of experimental condition. Here we used finite 
impulse response (FIR) modelling to identify task-specific functional connectivity networks 
based on the 15 bins (i.e. 30 seconds, allowing for hemodynamic lag) following the onset of 
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the generation cue. Importantly, using a FIR model allows hemodynamic response (HDR) 
profiles to be identified for each component separately, allowing the identification of task-
relevant functional connectivity networks with dissociable temporal profiles. Finally, CPCA 
provides HDR estimates at the individual level, allowing the resultant predictor weights to be 
used to explore the correlates of individual differences in component activation. 
4.3.8. Mediation analyses 
To differentiate components of the generation network involved in generation using a 
specific modality from components involved in generation in general, we followed previous 
work aimed at identifying the large scale networks supporting emotion regulation 
performance via mediation modelling (Denny, Ochsner, Weber, & Wager, 2014). First, 
regions whose activation during generation of emotion (relative to neutral) was identified 
using robust regression. Mediation Effect Parametric Mapping (MEPM) as implemented in 
the M3 mediation toolbox (Wager et al., 2008) was used to investigate modality specific and 
modality general pathways of emotion generation. We performed a whole-brain search for 
voxels whose activity during emotion generation (relative to the neutral baseline) showing a 
relationship with reported use of a given modality that was mediated by the activity in regions 
independently correlated with usage of that modality in a robust regression model. Statistics 
were assessed using the bootstrapping approach implemented in the M3 toolbox (10,000 
samples). 
 
4.3.9. Analysis overview 
The first objective of our analyses was to establish the overall neural architecture of 
EnGE. To achieve this, we first sought to establish the validity of our experiment by 
investigating subjective and physiological indices of emotional states. Next, we contrasted 
combined positive and negative EnGE with the neutral baseline, thereby identifying the 
overall neural basis of EnGE. We next sought to test the component process mapping 
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proposed in the introduction in two ways: First, based on the data from Experiment 1, we 
enacted a contrast-based decomposition, based on a model of the activation dynamics 
expected for each of the component processes. To complement this, we next performed a 
data-driven decomposition of the data from Experiment 2 using CPCA, to identify the 
functional networks central in EnGE. Together, the results from these three analyses allowed 
a description of the overall network and functional subcomponents supporting EnGE in 
general. Following on this, the second objective of the analyses was to differentiate general 
EnGE networks from those supporting specific implementations of EnGE, such as the 
generation of a particular valence, or using a specific modality. By investigating how 
subjective ratings for positive and negative generation parametrically modulated signal, we 
could differentiate regions activated in a valence-specific manner from those supporting 
specifically the generation of positive and negative emotional states. Finally, by investigating 
the correlation of activation with reported usage of different modalities, we could identify 
specific regions supporting modality-specific implementation, and, using mediation analysis, 
identify the networks supporting EnGE modality usage. Moreover, by comparing these 
networks we could differentiate parts of these networks supporting specific modalities from 
those supporting EnGE in general. 
 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Behavioural and psychophysiological validation 
 Our first objective was to validate our experimental design, using a combination of 
behavioural and psychophysiological measures to ascertain that participants were able to 
generate and regulate emotional states as measured by subjective and objective markers of 
emotional arousal.  
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Experiment 1 t-value 
   (df = 31) 
Comparison Positive Negative 
Maintain vs Neutral 11.25*** -10.50*** 
Cease vs Neutral 10.94*** -9.50*** 
Cease vs Maintain -3.27**  2.43*   
Regulate vs Maintain -7.79*** 6.88*** 
Cease vs Regulate 6.96*** -6.08*** 
     
Experiment 2 t-value 
   (df = 292) 
Comparison Positive Negative 
Maintain vs Neutral 27.24*** -27.94*** 
Regulate vs Maintain -19.44*** 20.69*** 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001 
  
Table 4.1: Comparison of self-reported experienced affect.  
Descriptives are reported in Figure 4.1 
 Post-trial ratings were analysed using paired t tests, reported in Table 4.1. Fig 4.1 B 
shows subjective ratings in each condition for Experiment 1. Relative to the Neutral baseline 
condition, increased reports of corresponding affect were observed for both Maintain and  
Cease conditions. The Cease condition also showed significantly higher ratings for both 
positive and negative affect compared to their respective Maintain conditions. Finally,  
regulation resulted in decreased ratings for both positive and negative emotion relative to the 
respective Maintain conditions. Figure 4.1 C shows subjective ratings as function of condition 
for Experiment 2. Relative to the neutral baseline condition, increased reports of 
corresponding affect were observed for both positive and negative Maintain conditions. 
Regulation conditions also showed decreased ratings for both positive and negative affect, 
relative to their respective Maintain conditions. These results demonstrate that participants 
were subjectively able to generate and regulate endogenous emotional states of both positive 
and negative valence in both experiments. Importantly, they also show that, while a generated 
emotional states decay without active maintenance, they remain subjectively significant for at 
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least a short time following generation, consistent with the representation of the emotional 
state persisting even without active generation efforts. 
 We next sought to establish whether participants’ generation efforts also elicited 
objective emotional arousal responses. To this end, we concurrently assessed elicited skin 
conductance levels (SCL) in Experiment 2 (see Appendix: A.1.1.3. Psychophysiological Data 
Acquisition and Preprocessing). 225 recordings had acceptable data quality, and were used to 
investigate the impact of generation instructions on objective measures of emotional arousal, 
as well as their interaction with subjective ratings. As SCL is the most frequently reported 
measure in investigations of exogenously induced emotional states (Kreibig, 2010), an 
interaction would suggest that the elicited states can be construed of as bona fide emotional 
states and that behavioural ratings can be taken as proxy for emotional arousal. Using linear 
mixed modeling of trial-wise SCL responses during the Generation period, we predicted the 
trial-wise log-transformed estimates of skin conductance level measured in microsiemens 
(µS) using a subject-level random intercept model. The model further included a factorial 
fixed effect for condition (Generate Positive, Generate Negative, Neutral) and a continuous 
fixed covariate for scaled trial-wise ratings of subjective affect. To control for potential 
learning/fatigue effects, trial number was entered as a nuisance covariate (for more detail on 
the effect of fatigue in the current experiment, please see Appendix: A1.1.5. Assessing the 
effect of fatigue on emotion generation). This analysis revealed a main effect of Condition 
[F(2, 11012.639)= 3.155, P < 0.05], Rating [F(1, 11013.700)= 4.625, p < 0.05], as well as a 
Condition*Rating interaction [F(2, 11014.119)= 17.815, p < 0.001]. Bonferroni corrected t 
tests (Figure 4.1 D) were performed to clarify the main effect of Condition, showing that, 
relative to the neutral [mean = 1.205, SE =.0.32] baseline condition, higher SCL levels were 
observed for both negative [mean = 1.267, SD =.032; paired t test: t(224) =4.44, p < 0.001] 
and positive [mean = 1.268, SD= .032; paired t test: t(224) =5, p < 0.001] emotion generation 
conditions. Closer investigation of the Condition*Rating interaction showed that it consisted 
4.4. Results 
 
 
103 
 
of a significant difference in the slopes of the rating effect between negative and positive 
generation [t(8770.515) = 5.63, p <.0001]. Specifically, SCL had a negative relationship with 
ratings [t(4278.64)=-3.71, p <.001] during negative generation, and a positive relationship 
[t(4278.64)=4.16, p <.001] during positive generation. Corresponding to the bipolar scale 
used (see Figure 4.1A), this shows that SCL levels increased with stronger affect ratings for 
both positive and negative emotion (Figure 4.1E). These results show that participants were 
capable of generating both positive and negative emotional states, as measured by both 
subjective and objective indices of emotional arousal, and these indices were correlated, such 
that behavioural report corresponded to objective physiological arousal. 
 Finally, we sought to explore what kind of emotional states participants elected to 
generate. Thus, during debriefing, participants in Experiment 2 were asked whether they 
generated high or low arousal exemplars of positive and negative emotional states after the 
experiment. 39% of participants reported generating high arousal positive emotional states, 
like joy or happiness, with the complementary 61% generating low arousal positive emotion 
like calmness or caring. Similarly, 29% of participants reported generating high arousal 
negative emotions like fear or anger, while 71% reported generating low arousal states like 
sadness or melancholia. All subsequent analyses in Experiment 2 control for this between-
subject variance. 
 
4.4.2. Exploring the neural architecture of EnGE 
Our next objective was to establish whether our hypothesised three-network 
architecture of EnGE was in evidence. To identify the neural correlates of emotion generation 
we contrasted the combined Generation and Maintenance periods for both positive and 
negative affect generation with the Neutral baseline condition, with one sample t tests 
performed using robust regression (Wager, Keller, Lacey, & Jonides, 2005). For Experiment 
1, a primary cluster-forming threshold of p < .001, T > 3.38 was used. In Experiment 2, a 
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more stringent threshold of p < .00005, T > 3.95 was used for the primary contrasts to balance 
increased power. Using Monte-Carlo simulation (Forman et al., 1995), cluster thresholds were 
determined to be k > 40 and k > 10, respectively, for FWEc α < .05.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Core networks of endogenous emotion generation A) Regions activated in Experiment 1 for the 
Generation conditions (Positive and Negative Generate & Maintain) relative to the Neutral condition. B) 
Equivalent contrast for Experiment 2. 
 
 In Experiment 1 (Figure 4.2A, Appendix: Table A3.1.1) we observed activation in core 
nodes of the DMN (vmPFC, PCC, left TPJ, left middle temporal gyrus (MTG) and 
hippocampus), and SN (AI, dmPFC, including presupplemental motor area (pre-SMA) and 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC)). Activation was also observed in nodes of the SN 
most closely associated with hedonic processing (VS, SN/VTA), as well as cerebellar 
regions. Deactivations were observed in right FPCN, in addition to inferior temporal gyrus 
(ITG) and superior occipital gyrus. In Experiment 2 (Figure 4.2B, Appendix: Table A3.1.1) we 
observed activation and deactivation patterns substantially similar to Experiment 1, albeit 
markedly stronger, consistent with the increased power in Experiment 2 (N = 293). Additional 
activation was observed in the frontal portions of the left FPCN (bilateral inferior (IFG) and 
middle (MFG) frontal gyri). Stronger activations were observed in midbrain, including both 
SN/VTA and PAG, as well as hypothalamus, thalamus, basal ganglia, and ventral AI. Again, 
deactivations centred on right FPCN and occipital regions. 
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These results replicate the PET studies discussed in the introduction, and support our 
contention that the DMN, SN, and FPCN key are components in the neural architecture 
supporting EnGE. They also expand on them demonstrating that this relationship holds for 
EnGE as it is freely implemented in the population. Finally, they suggest that EnGE 
additionally involves the active suppression of right frontoparietal and occipital regions, 
explainable by the known deactivation of these regions in internally focused processing 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). 
 
4.4.3. Model-based component process mapping 
 Differentiating the generation from the elaboration of endogenous states into detailed 
representations is commonly done by having participants report the moment they subjectively 
experience to have completed the generation process (i.e. retrieval of core semantic 
information about an event), and begin the process of elaborated mental simulation by adding 
details about the context (e.g. Addis et al., 2007; 2009)In the context of EnGE, achieving a 
similar subjective differentiation is difficult, since emotional experiences are inherently 
situated in a context (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011; 2013). We therefore took a model-
based decomposition approach to test our component process structure. We reasoned that the 
10 second Generation period of each trial should include activation of all constituent 
component processes (i.e. generation, elaboration, and maintenance), and that regions 
supporting these processes should be distinguishable by their activation dynamics in different 
conditions during the Modulation phase. By masking out activation attributable to either 
maintenance or elaboration from the 10 second Generation period, one should therefore be 
left with regions specifically involved in generation. 
 Specifically, we hypothesised that regions supporting the initial generation of the 
affective state should show early and phasic activation corresponding to their involvement in 
the generation of the affective core of the experiences. Importantly, they should also be 
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largely unaffected by modulation efforts, as such efforts should target the neural substrates of 
representation of the emotional experience rather than those involved in generation.  
Conversely, regions supporting the elaborated representation of emotional experiences should 
be affected by modulation efforts, and be mainly activated in the later part of the trial. 
Moreover, given that emotional experiences tend to persist over time (Buchanan, 2007; 
Verduyn, Delvaux, Van Coillie, Tuerlinckx, & Van Mechelen, 2009), it should be possible to 
dissociate the neural substrates of elaborated mental simulation, from those supporting the 
active maintenance of the generation process. We did this by contrasting activation in the 
Cease condition with the Maintenance condition (in the Modulation phase only). Figure 4.3 A 
schematically illustrates the hypothesised activation dynamics for each component as a  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Model-based differentiation of EnGE networks. Results from the CPCA analysis showing the two 
components that predicted endogenous emotion generation ability, their dynamics and correlation with 
generation efficacy. A) The primary component, composed mainly of FPCN and DMN regions. B) The 
secondary component, composed mainly of FPCN and SN nodes. C) Conjunction of A and B, showing regions 
partaking in both task-relevant components. 
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function of condition. For these analyses alone we used a more lenient threshold of p<.005 
(uncorrected), k>10, due to the lower power of the component contrasts. 
 To begin, component contrasts were calculated according to our process dynamic logic 
(see Appendix: Figure A2.1.2; Table A3.1.2). The Generate>Neutral contrast for the 
Generation period defined the neural reference space for EnGE overall (Appendix: Figure 
A2.1.2 A). Regions involved in the elaborated representation of emotional experiences were 
identified by contrasting the average of the Cease and Maintain conditions with the Regulate 
condition (Appendix: Figure A2.1.2 B). This was done because both Cease and Maintain 
conditions were associated with elevated subjective emotional experiences relative to both 
Neutral and Regulate conditions (Figure 4.1 B). We opted to use the Regulate rather than the 
Neutral condition since the Regulate condition actively suppresses emotional representations. 
Finally, regions involved in effortful maintenance of EnGE was identified by the 
Maintain>Cease contrast (Appendix: Figure A2.1.2 C). Next, the maintenance and 
representation contrasts were inclusively masked with the Generate>Neutral contrast to 
ensure that all activations were associated with EnGE. To ensure orthogonality of 
maintenance and representation maps, these were mutually masked (overlapping regions are 
reported in Appendix: Figure A2.1.2 D). Maintenance activation was primarily seen in pre-
SMA, left IFG and premotor cortex – all known nodes of FCPN –  in addition to fusiform 
gyrus and subgenual ACC. Representation processes were centred on nodes of DMN, 
including mOFC, PCC, left TPJ and MTG, in addition to bilateral AMY, NACC and left 
ventral AI. Finally, the Generate>Neutral contrast was exclusively masked with both 
maintenance and representation process contrasts, leaving exclusively activation not 
attributable to either of the two. This centred on dorsal AI and dACC, midbrain, and parts of 
ventral striatum, all known nodes of SN, in addition to hippocampus and temporal pole. 
 As a final step, we verified that our approach indeed identified regions with 
appropriate temporal dynamics by extracting FIR-fitted time courses using MarsBar for select 
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regions in each contrast. This revealed strong correspondence between observed and 
hypothesised dynamics (Figure 4.3 C). 
 These results conform to our hypotheses, showing that EnGE is supported by at least 
three separable component processes, and that these roughly overlap with each of the three 
core intrinsic networks observed in our main contrasts. Specifically, FPCN, appears primarily 
to support the active maintenance of generation efforts, while DMN primarily supports the 
representation of the generated states as evidenced by it being the primary target for down-
regulation, as well as it remaining active even in the absence of generation efforts. Finally, the 
cortical and midbrain aspects of SN selectively responded in manner consistent with being 
involved initial generation of emotional states. Interestingly, we found that several regions in 
the limbic subcomponent of the SN (vAI, AMY and NACC) responded in a manner consistent 
with them supporting elaborated representations, suggesting that midbrain and limbic 
components of SN differ in their functional contribution to EnGE. 
 
4.4.4. Functional significance and dynamic integration of EnGE networks 
 Having found evidence consistent with our hypothesised component process mapping, 
our next step was to a) establish the functional significance of these networks and b) 
investigate their dynamic interaction during EnGE. To address this we used constrained 
principal components analysis (CPCA; Lavigne, Metzak, & Woodward, 2015; Woodward et 
al., 2013) in our larger sample in Experiment 2. Briefly, CPCA is a data-driven multivariate 
method that combines multiple regression with PCA analysis to identify component of 
mutually correlating voxels, i.e. functional networks, involved in a task based on their specific 
task-related activation dynamics (see Experimental Procedure for detail). As CPCA provides 
individual-level estimates of activation of each network component, we could identify 
networks specifically predicting individual-differences in EnGE efficacy, thereby establishing 
both their involvement, and their functional significance. Finally, as CPCA does not enforce 
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spatial orthogonality on components it allows the identification of regions partaking in 
multiple network components with differing temporal dynamics, as would be expected if, as 
hypothesised, FPCN coupled to both SN and DMN.  
 Eigenvalue plots indicated that 6 components should be extracted using the scree 
criterion. To differentiate components supporting general task processes (e.g. sensory 
processing, motor responses) from those specifically supporting EnGE, we calculated the 
component-specific AUC of loadings in the task window (4-22 s post stimulus; allowing for 
4-6 s hemodynamic lag) for the Maintain condition, subtracting the Neutral baseline. This 
yielded individual-level estimates of overall component activation during EnGE, that were 
orthogonalised and entered into a multiple regression model predicting individual differences 
in self-reported generation success (i.e. average affect ratings in the Maintain condition only).  
 Individual differences in component activation explained a significant amount of 
variance in generation success [F(6,286) = 3.124, p < .01, R² = .062], with two components 
directly predicting generation success. To interpret these, loading maps were thresholded at 
the dominant 10% of component loadings with k > 30 (Lavigne et al., 2015). The first 
component [β = .153, t(292) = 2.675, p < .01; Figure 4.4A] included central nodes of the 
DMN (vmPFC, PCC, left TPJ) and FPCN (bilateral BA47, BA45, MFG, and PMC), as well 
as VS (NACC, caudate) dorsal ACC, SMA/pre-SMA, mid cingulate cortex (MCC), bilateral 
STG/TRANS, left MTG and right somatosensory cortex, similar to the Representation 
network identified above. This similarity extended to activation dynamics, showing both early 
and sustained activation in the Modulation phase for the Maintain condition, and evidence of 
suppression in the Regulate condition. The second component [β = .146, t(292) = 2.574, p = 
.01; Figure 4.4B] included cortical nodes of SN (bilateral AI, pre-SMA) as well as portions of 
the FPCN (bilateral BA 47, left BA45, angular gyrus, and MFG), plus thalamus, occipital 
cortex and superior cerebellum. Dynamics closely resembled the Generation network 
identified above, with no observed difference between Maintain and Regulate conditions.  
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Figure 4.4: Dynamic differentiation and integration of EnGE networks. Results from the CPCA 
analysis showing the two components that predicted endogenous emotion generation ability, their dynamics 
and correlation with generation efficacy. A) The primary component, composed mainly of FPCN and DMN 
regions. B) The secondary component, composed mainly of FPCN and SN nodes. C) Conjunction of A and 
B, showing regions partaking in both task-relevant components. 
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Conjoining the individually thresholded component maps (Figure 4.4C; Appendix: Table 
A3.1.4), we found that left lateral FPCN regions (IFG, BA 45/45, MFG), as well as pre-SMA 
and dACC were part of both components, in addition to thalamus and retrosplenial cortex. 
Notably, this closely overlaps with the Maintenance network identified in our model-based 
analyses. These results expand on our model-based approach above, establishing the unique 
functional significance of our three candidate networks in EnGE. Further, they demonstrate 
that FPCN coupled with both SN and DMN, while these did not show evidence of coupling, 
supporting the hypothesis that FPCN coordinates activation of these two networks during 
EnGE. 
 
4.4.5. Identifying the neural basis of core affect generation 
Having found evidence for both the functional significance and dissociability of our 
putative EnGE networks, we next sought to establish neural implementation of core affect 
generation and representation formation. In post-scan debriefing, the participants in 
Experiment 2 reported higher success at generating positive than negative emotions. To avoid 
biasing results by potential effort or success effects, we therefore combined positive and 
negative valence conditions, and instead focused on trial-wise parametric modulation of 
contrast signal as a function of ratings. Using robust regression, we performed one sample t-
tests on parametric modulation maps separately for positive and negative trials, averaging 
across all conditions involving emotion generation for both Generation and Modulation 
periods (Appendix: Table A3.1.5). To differentiate regions supporting emotion generation 
success in general from valence-specific regions, we conjoined the resulting FWEc 
thresholded maps (Figure 4.5). 
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Figure 4.5: Neural correlates of core affect. Regions parametrically modulated by subjective ratings of 
affect in Experiment 2. Green and blue regions respectively show modulation in positive and negative 
conditions exclusively. Red coloured showed parametric modulation in both positive and negative 
conditions. Results are averaged across all emotional conditions for both Generation and Modulation phases. 
 
In Experiment 1, this revealed valence-general modulation in the basal ganglia, 
including putamen and caudate body, while positive ratings uniquely modulated caudate 
head/nucleus accumbens (NACC), and negative ratings uniquely modulated left dorsal 
anterior insula and pre-SMA. In Experiment 2, valence-general modulation was more 
extensive, including left frontal portions of the FPCN, particularly inferior (IFG) and middle 
frontal gyri (MFG), as well as key nodes of the SN (dorsal AI, dorsal ACC, and pre-SMA) in 
addition to thalamus. Valence specific modulation of activation was observed in caudate 
head/NACC and SN/VTA for positive affect ratings, while modulation of deactivation was 
observed in occipital and right lateralised frontal regions overlapping with the deactivated 
regions reported in the main contrast. Negative affect ratings modulated activation in right 
dorsal anterior insula and periaqueductal grey. These results show that activation levels of 
FPCN and SN support successful emotion generation. Moreover, midbrain portions of the SN 
were shown to be recruited in a valence-specific fashion, consistent with the known 
association of these regions with domain general hedonic processing (Buhle et al., 2013; 
Kringelbach & Berridge, 2009). This supports our hypothesis that SN is particularly important 
for the generation of the affective core of EnGE. Further, in line with our CPCA analysis, we 
find that frontal FPCN supports a general role in the generation of core affective states, 
possibly associated with the initiation of the generation process. 
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4.4.6. Pathways of representation formation 
Figure 4.6: Pathways of modality-specific and general representation usage. Results from robust regression 
and mediation analyses of Experiment 2, differentiating general neural networks supporting emotion generation 
from modality specific instances. A) The mediation model used to perform a whole brain search for predictors 
(X) of reported modality usage (Y), that were mediated by activation in regions correlated with reported modality 
usage (M; reported in panel C and Appendix: Table A3.1.6). B) Reported usage of the four modalities in post-
scan questionnaires. C) Regions correlated with modality usage. D) Mutually exclusively masked mediation 
maps, showing pathways uniquely supporting usage of each emotion generation modality. E) Conjunction of the 
three modality-specific pathways, showing the regions common to all three modalities. 
 
Finally, we sought to identify the neural bases of representation formation. To this end, 
participants in Experiment 2 were constrained to use four specific generation modalities: 1) 
Semantic Analysis, involving the use of verbalised thoughts affective thoughts 2) Episodic 
Imagery, involving the generation of visual emotional imagery, 3) Auditory Imagery, 
involving the generation of affective soundscapes and 4) Bodily Interoception, involving 
focus on and interpretation of bodily signatures of emotional states (for precise instructions, 
                                                               Chapter 4: The neural component-process architecture of EnGE 
114 
 
see Appendix: A1.1.4. Generation strategy descriptions) These modalities corresponded to our 
multimodal induction procedure, ensuring participants were equally primed to using each of 
them. Moreover, these modalities have clear analogues in daily life (e.g. thinking self-
deprecating thoughts (semantic), remembering or anticipating an emotional event (episodic), 
humming a sad song (auditory), or noticing a dry mouth and racing heart when making a 
presentation (bodily)). Finally, participants were allowed to freely combine these modalities in 
whichever way they found best enabled them to generate emotional states. These four 
modalities can be combined to different degrees in an intuitive fashion (e.g. internal affective 
monologue combined with a concrete emotional episode where a specific song was playing) 
ensuring variance in the combinations utilised by participants.After scanning participants 
were requested to report to what degree they used each of these modalities on a 1-9 Likert 
scale. Overall usage (irrespective of combination) was determined by taking the sum total of 
these reports and proportionally comparing them (Figure 4.6B). This showed that the Episodic 
modality was the most used (40%), followed by Semantic (24%), Bodily (21%), and Auditory 
(15%). Entering the degree to which each participant reported using each modality as 
covariates in our main robust regression analysis (Generate & Maintain > Neutral), we could 
identify the neural correlates of modality usage (Figure 4.6C). Due to the noisy nature of self-
report we used a more lenient cluster-forming threshold of p < .0005, T > 3.32 (k > 42, FWEc 
p < .05, reported in Appendix: Table A3.1.6). This revealed that use of the Semantic modality 
was correlated with activation of the left MTG, corresponding to the inferior border of 
Wernicke’s area, as well as a region in the left DLPFC. Use of the Episodic modality was 
correlated with signal in the anterior superior PCC, a region known to be a part of the 
mnemonic subsystem of the DMN (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). Use of Bodily modality was 
correlated with signal in bilateral dorsal and mid-AI, a region known as interoceptive cortex 
representing bodily-signals (Craig, 2011). As no significant correlations were found for the 
Auditory modality, we did not explore this further. 
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 We next identified the extended neural pathways by which these regions influenced 
the generation network as a whole using mediation analysis (Denny et al., 2014; Wager et al., 
2008). Specifically, we implemented a mediation model (Figure 4.6A) performing a whole-
brain search for voxels where the relationship between their Generate>Neutral contrast value 
and reported modality usage was mediated by the contrast values in the modality-specific 
regions identified above. Thus, these analyses identify voxels whose relationship with 
modality usage is mediated by activation of the modality specific regions, suggesting that they 
are part of the functional pathway by which that modality is implemented. For each analysis, 
reported usage of all other modalities were entered as covariates. To identify unique pathways 
for each modality mediation maps were thresholded at Z > 3.25, p < .005, k > 30, and masked 
exclusively with the maps for the remaining two modalities, revealing exclusive modality-
specific pathways (Figure 4.6D; Appendix: Table A3.1.7). The Semantic pathway included left 
BA45 and BA22/35, approximating Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas respectively, left temporal 
pole and premotor regions, and dorsal ACC and anterior PCC, closely corresponding to the 
extended semantic system described in a recent meta-analysis (Binder, Desai, Graves, & 
Conant, 2009). The Episodic pathway included the majority of the DMN, including VMPFC, 
PCC, left MTG and HC, bilateral angular gyrus, ventral AI and left IFG, as well as subgenual 
ACC extending into ventral striatum, caudate and pallidum. Finally, the Bodily pathway 
included regions involved in body representation, including right posterior insula (Craig, 
2011), bilateral fusiform body area and left extrastriate body area (J. C. Taylor, Wiggett, & 
Downing, 2007), in addition to MCC and PC, perigenual ACC and bilateral dorsolateral PFC, 
including premotor cortices. 
To identify modality-independent pathways, we conjoined the thresholded maps, 
revealing a shared pathway (Figure 4.6E; Appendix: Table A3.1.7) overlapping with the 
Representation network identified above including the ventral AI and portions of the 
dorsomedial subsystem of the DMN (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010), and a substantial portion 
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of the FPCN (bilateral IFG and MTG, left angular gyrus, MCC), as well as posterior insula. 
Thus, our findings support our hypothesis that DMN, together with vAI, support 
representation formation in cooperation with FPCN. Importantly, the Generation network was 
not involved in either general nor modality-specific pathways, supporting the hypothesised 
distinction between representation formation and core affect generation.  
 
4.5. Discussion 
We hypothesised that the endogenous generation of emotion (EnGE) involves the 
cooperation of three core functional networks: the saliency network (SN), the Default Mode 
Network (DMN) and the fronto-parietal control network (FPCN), respectively supporting core 
affect generation, episodic representation, and executive maintenance of emotional states. In 
two independent samples we found that EnGE activations centred on our three candidate 
networks. Decomposing these networks based on hypothesised activation profiles of 
component processes, we found support for our process-network mapping, showing that 
cortical and midbrain SN primarily contributed in the initial stages of the generation process 
and were unaffected by subsequent modulation efforts. Activation of cortical (dorsal AI, pre-
SMA) and limbic (basal ganglia) nodes of SN were modulated by subjective experience of 
both positive and negative emotion, while midbrain nodes of SN showed valence-specific 
modulation, with PAG tracking with negative affect and SN/VTA tracking with positive 
affect. Overall, this is strongly supportive of the SN primarily supporting the initial generation 
of core affect in EnGE.  
Conversely, activation of DMN was observed in all conditions where participants 
reported elevated affect, also after active generation had ceased, and was deactivated when 
participants suppressed their emotional states. Notably, this pattern was not exclusive to 
DMN, but was also observed for limbic regions (AMY, NACC) heavily implicated in 
affective processing (K. A. Lindquist et al., 2012), and ventral AI, known to be associated 
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with the intensity of emotional experience (Touroutoglou et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
dorsomedial DMN, together with ventral AI was found to be part of a general network 
supporting elaboration of core affect into detailed emotional experiences.  Overall, this 
supports our hypothesis that the DMN plays a central role in the representational component 
of EnGE, expanding on it by showing that key affective regions partake in this process, which 
is a likely signature of the emotional nature of the representations in question. 
 We also found that left lateral and dorsomedial portions of FPCN together with 
inferior and posterior middle temporal gyri, uniquely activated during extended generation 
efforts. The FPCN was also found to be unique in being part of both components found to 
predict generation success in our data-driven decomposition analysis, coupling with both 
DMN and SN, consistent with it coordinating activation of these networks. Supporting this, 
left lateral frontal FPCN activation was found to predict trial-wise generation success and also 
to partake in the core, modality-independent pathway supporting representation formation. 
Thus, left lateral FPCN appears important for both the initiation and maintenance of EnGE, 
coherent with the known role of this region in the cognitive control of other internal 
processes, like memory retrieval and working memory (Badre & Wagner, 2007). In summary, 
our findings suggest that EnGE is a dynamic process in which left FPCN engages cortical and 
midbrain portions of the SN to establish a hedonic core affective state. Concurrently, FPCN 
couples to DMN, key limbic and insular regions, and regions supporting specific 
representational content, enabling the elaboration of the core affective state into an emotional 
experience.  
 It is notable that our findings show a large degree of overlap of with recent meta-
analytical models of the neural bases of emotion derived from experiments using mainly 
exogenous (typically pictorial) stimuli (Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-
Moreau, & Barrett, 2012). Based on clustering of co-activation patterns, Kober et al. (2008) 
described 6 functional networks supporting emotion processing. Interestingly, though the 
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precise functional clustering differs somewhat, the current data suggests the involvement of at 
least 5 of these clusters, suggesting a large degree of overlap between the neural bases of 
exogenous and endogenous emotion. Indeed, the one component primarily distinguishing the 
Kober et al. findings from the current results primarily include occipital regions known to be 
involved primarily in visual processing – as one would expect given the lack of emotionally 
relevant stimuli in the current experiment. As such, our findings suggest that the neural 
architecture of emotional processing is largely similar across induction modalities. 
 However, despite the similarity in overall architecture, the current results do suggest 
that EnGE might involve different functional roles for specific structures. This is most notable 
in the case of amygdala and basal ganglia. It is commonly assumed that these support 
generation of core affect, i.e. the qualities of valence and arousal that form the emotional 
foundation of experiences (Lindquist & Barrett, 2012). While the observation in the current 
data that basal ganglia activity is correlated with the intensity of both positive and negative 
subjective affect could be taken in support of such a relationship for emotional arousal, 
valence generation appears to be centered in midbrain regions, consistent with their known 
role in reward (SN/VTA; Berridge & Kringelbach, 2013) and aversion (PAG; Buhle et al., 
2013). In our data, limbic structures like amygdala and nucleus accumbens appear instead to 
support the extended representation of emotional states, and thus are more closely linked to 
the experience than the generation of emotion. While this could be specific to endogenous 
emotions, we note that a recent meta-analysis of mainly exogenous emotion generation 
experiments did not find evidence for valence-specific processing in limbic regions 
(Lindquist, Satpute, Wager, Weber, & Barrett, 2016).   
  A natural question our findings raise is whether they are applicable to endogenous 
emotions that are not actively generated, but occur spontaneously. While ultimately an 
empirical question, extant evidence from the study of spontaneous mental activity in general 
suggests that this also is supported by the coupling of FPCN, DMN and mnemonic regions 
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(Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009), in a manner similar to what we 
observe. However, while the general architecture is similar, one could expect that spontaneous 
EnGE might show different dynamics. For one, while we find evidence that core affective 
states are elicited concurrently with representations when EnGE is volitionally initiated, in 
spontaneous EnGE the representation is likely to be a dynamic process in which occasionally 
affectively salient constellations appear. One possibility is that SN is then triggered via its 
dmPFC node, known to be associated with monitoring ongoing cognitive processes 
(Dosenbach et al., 2008).  
Another interesting aspect of our findings is the similarity of the neural networks 
supporting EnGE to those supporting emotion regulation. Reappraisal, one of the most closely 
investigated and efficacious regulation strategies in the current literature, consistently shows 
activation in FPCN and, in particular, the same regions of the left lateral frontal cortex we 
found to be at the functional core of EnGE (Buhle et al., 2014). This region has also been 
implicated in a prefrontal-subcortical pathway predicting the capacity to regulate emotion 
using reappraisal (Wager et al., 2008), and is thought to play a key role in the cognitive 
control of memory (Badre & Wagner, 2007). Interestingly, a study comparing a variety of 
cognitive emotion regulation strategies showed that Reappraisal uniquely activated the left 
FPCN (Dörfel et al., 2014). This could relate to Reappraisal requiring the active generation of 
new emotional meaning, and thus indicate that Reappraisal partly depends on the capacity to 
endogenously generate emotion. Dörfel and colleagues also showed that right FPCN appears 
to form a core regulation network utilised across strategies, thought to implement inhibitory 
processes. We found that these regions were strongly deactivated during EnGE. This could 
point to a neural basis for distinguishing between the regulation and generation of emotion, an 
important issue in current emotion theory (J. J. Gross & Barrett, 2011). A corollary to this is 
whether emotion generation can itself be used as an emotion regulation technique. Recent 
work in our lab (H. G. Engen & Singer, 2015) suggests so, showing that meditation-based 
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generation of compassion can be used to actively regulate emotional responses to external 
stimuli, and is associated with activation of largely the same network we describe here. 
Importantly, no activation was observable in the right FPCN in that study, suggesting that this 
constituted a non-inhibitory type of regulation. Though it is unknown whether this generalises 
to other generation-techniques, this suggests that regulation based on counter-generation of 
emotion should be considered distinct from inhibitory strategies. The current findings appear 
to support this, showing that EnGE in general appears to, if anything, involve the deactivation 
of right FPCN. This is of potential practical importance, as it points to the possibility of 
developing interventions aimed at enhancing emotion generation ability, which could 
facilitate coping in individuals who are unable to utilise inhibitory strategies due to either 
circumstance or pathology. 
 
4.5.1. Limitations 
 The large scale of the current data required the use of a relatively compressed 
paradigm, that could have skewed the results. For one, as we used a fixed length for the 
Generation phase, it is possible that some of the effects seen are attributable to anticipation of 
the next phase of the experiment. Future studies could avoid this by including a variable 
length generation phase akin to that used in previous studies of constructive memory (Addis 
et al. 2009). A potential limitation of our design is that we only used a single symbol (a blue 
0) to denote that participants should aim to achieve a neutral emotional state. While piloting 
indicated that using a single cue was less confusing for participants than having separate 
regulation cues, it is possible that this could have lead to conflation between the neutral and 
regulation conditions. Another limitation of the paradigm was that we had no clear indications 
of the precise discrete emotions the participants generated or how these fluctuated over the 
course of task-implementation, as a function of e.g. fatigue or habituation. Future studies 
could investigate this by performing more detailed analysis of trial-wise contents of generated 
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states, which could provide more information about the differences between emotional states 
in terms of their neural underpinnings. Similarly, a more fine-grained analysis of trial-wise 
variation could provide valuable insight into potential fluctuations of generation strategies 
during repeated emotion generation, which could provide valuable insight into the relative 
efficacies of generation modalities. This would also be a possible way of minimizing potential 
confounds stemming from fatigue/habituation like we observed here. Moreover, acquiring 
more details on the specific scenarios used during EnGE (i.e. whether they are past or future 
related, or whether they involved specific emotional states), would allow for more nuanced 
modelling of how information about emotion is stored, retrieved, and combined in the 
construction of emotional experiences.
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Chapter 5: Structural brain changes associated with 
expertise in loving-kindness meditation4  
Boris Bernhardt*, Haakon G. Engen*, Leon Skottnik, Matthieu Ricard, & Tania Singer 
5.1. Abstract 
Previous work has established that expertise in attention and interoception-based 
meditation is associated with morphological changes in fronto-polar, insular, and cingulate 
regions. However, it is unclear if these effects generalise to forms of meditation involving the 
active generation of affective states, such as loving-kindness meditation (LKM). We 
investigated this in a group of long-term meditation practitioners (LTMs, mean ± SD 40 ± 9k 
hours of practice, primarily in loving-kindness and compassion meditation). Compared to 
meditation-naïve controls, LTMs showed increased thickness of fronto-polar and fronto-
insular cortices, partially conforming with previous findings. To identify LKM-specific 
changes, findings were complemented by fMRI analysis, showing amplitude increases in low-
frequency fluctuations during a LKM session relative to non-meditative rest in our LTMs in 
multiple prefrontal and insular regions bilaterally. Importantly, functional and structural 
findings overlapped, particularly in the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior insula, 
suggesting that these regions play a central role in the generation of emotional states. 
Interestingly, these regions are not usually implicated in meditation, but previously associated 
with both general generative cognition and intensity of emotional experiences. Our results 
suggest that brain plasticity of meditation expertise may be specific to practice, motivating 
future, more nuanced investigations into the effects of specific meditation practices. 
 
                                                
4 The current chapter is presently under review, and the final, published version, might show discrepancies from 
the present version. Presented here is the submitted manuscript of 21.04.2016. * = authors contributed equally 
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5.2. Introduction 
There has been a long-standing interest in the neurosciences to study brain plasticity 
(Cotman & Berchtold, 2002; Kolb, Gibb, & Robinson, 2003; Poldrack, 2000). Plasticity can 
occur across multiple time scales, from short-term to long-term, and at the level of structural 
networks. In humans, most previous studies addressing structural plasticity  have focused on 
training or expertise effects on motor, sensory, or memory functions(Draganski et al., 2004; 
Taubert, Lohmann, Margulies, Villringer, & Ragert, 2011). In addition to validating training 
protocols, evidence of morphological plasticity allows nuanced insight into the central brain 
regions supporting different psychological processes and groups of individuals. Recently, 
there has been an increasing interest in the study of plasticity effects of mental training via 
meditation. Meta-analysis suggests that meditation training indeed has measurable effects on 
brain structure: In a recent meta-analysis(Fox et al., 2014), Fox and colleagues overviewed 
morphometric findings in 21 studies, collectively assessing more than 300 practitioners across 
different traditions, finding evidence for consistent grey matter changes in brain regions 
associated with executive attention, planning and interoception, such as the dorsal anterior 
cingulate (dACC), frontopolar (FP) cortex, and insula(Fox et al., 2014). As the studies 
reviewed in the Fox analysis includes both longitudinal investigations into plasticity as a 
function of training and cross-sectional studies this could suggest that ACC, FP, and insula 
are central in engendering meditative states.  
 It has been argued that there are several different families of meditation practice 
(Dahl, Lutz, & Davidson, 2015), each emphasising and relying on different cognitive 
processes. Importantly, the majority of the studies of brain plasticity and meditation have 
focused on an attentional family of practices (e.g. mindfulness meditation or Vipassana with 
their focus on paying attention breath). Thus, it is unclear whether these regions also support 
other meditation practices. For instance, a so-called constructive meditation practice is 
characterised by relying less on attention control and interoception and more on the active 
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construction of cognitive and affective states. One example of such a practice is loving-
kindness (LKM) and compassion meditation (CM), that centrally involves the generation of 
positive affective states. Behavioural and autonomic research has suggested that the training 
of LKM and CM may be associated with increases in prosocial behaviour (Leiberg et al., 
2011; Weng et al., 2013) and vagal tone as a proxy of physical health (Kok et al., 2013). It has 
been suggested that LKM training may increase positive affect when an individual is 
confronted with another’s suffering, associated with a wish to alleviate this suffering (Singer 
& Klimecki, 2014). Using longitudinal fMRI, our group recently assessed short-term 
functional alterations after the training of loving-kindness and compassion in meditation-
naïve participants (Klimecki et al., 2013; 2014). Individuals undergoing compassion training 
showed increased activations in subcortical networks, together with the medial orbitofrontal 
cortex (mOFC) relative to a group that trained spatial memory (Klimecki et al., 2013).  In a 
follow-up study, the authors observed increased activations in perigenual and subgenual 
cingulate cortex (pgACC/sgACC), insula, as well as brainstem nuclei including substantia 
nigra and ventral tegmental area in individuals that underwent compassion training (Klimecki 
et al., 2014). Thus, these findings suggest that LKM and CM may have markedly different 
neural substrates from the attentional family, as reported by Fox et al. (2014). On the other 
hand, other studies have implicated insula and cingulate/prefrontal cortices as possible 
functional substrates for CM (Lutz, Brefczynski-Lewis, Johnstone, & Davidson, 2008; Lutz, 
Greischar, Perlman, & Davidson, 2009), consistent with the Fox et al. meta-analysis. One 
possible reconciliation of these findings is that LKM and CM rely on both family-specific 
functions supporting the generation of affective states and suprafamiliar mechanisms related 
to meditation in general, possibly supporting general attentional function. 
 In this study, we tested this possibility by investigating structural changes in a sample 
of long-term meditators (LTMs), with extensive experience and preference for specifically 
LKM and CM meditation (mean ± SD = 40 ± 9k hours of prior practice). As meditation 
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practice is heterogeneous, this could bias investigations to pick up meditation-general effects. 
We therefore aimed to maximise the homogeneity of our sample by recruiting them only from 
a specific school of practice (the Nyingma school of Tibetan Buddhism), and who had 
participated in at least one three-year-long retreat in the same centre with the same teachers. 
Thus, by comparing the LTMs with matched, meditation-naïve controls, we could evaluate 
overall cortical thickness changes associated with expertise in meditation in general, and 
LKM and CM in particular. To differentiate these changes, we investigated the functional 
expression of LKM by investigating low-frequency amplitude fluctuations while our 
participants were meditating with that of a non-meditative resting-state. Functional amplitude 
increases during loving-kindness relative to non-meditative rest were mapped onto cortical 
surface models and overlap analyses with regions of cortical thickness changes were carried 
out, allowing us to identify regions that showed consistent increases in thickness, and were 
functionally involved in the generation of LKM. 
 
5.3. Materials and methods 
5.3.1. Sample  
Participants were tested between November 2011 and March 2013. We studied a 
cohort of 17 long-term meditators (LTM; 5 women; 45-62 years, mean ± SD age = 56 ± 5 
years).  All meditators were adepts of the Nyingma tradition of Tibetan Buddhism (one of the 
schools focussing on the cultivation of loving-kindness, altruism, and compassion). 
Participants were included only if they had previously participated in a full-time meditation 
retreat of at least 3 years, which all carried out at the Songsen Chanteloube Retreat Center in 
Dordogne, France. LTMs reported having practiced meditation for an estimated total of 40k ± 
9k hours (10k-62k hours) before our study, and to practice LKM and CM on a daily basis.  
 LTMs were compared to 15 healthy controls without prior meditation experience, 
recruited through advertisement. Controls were matched for age and sex (5 women; 46-63 
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years, mean ± SD age = 54 ± 6 years), as well as education level (LTM: mean ± SD years of 
education = 14 ± 3 years; Controls: 14 ± 3 years). We assessed the IQ of all participants using 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, 2000). LTMs and controls did not differ with respect to 
IQ (103.6 ± 20.0 vs. 102.4 ± 28.5). Furthermore, LTMs and controls scored similar on the 
Beck's Depression Inventory [BDI-2; (Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996); mean ± SD in 
LTM: 5.9 ± 3.9; controls: 6.6 ± 7.0; p > 0.7;] and the Spielberger Trait Anxiety Scale [STAI-
T; (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, & Vagg, 1983); mean ± SD in LTM: 37.3 ± 9.9; Controls: 
37.0 ± 9.1; p > 0.7]. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of 
Leipzig and was carried out in compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants 
gave written informed consent, were paid for their participation, and were debriefed after the 
study. 
 
5.3.2. Structural MRI  
5.3.2.1 Acquisition parameters 
Structural MRI data were acquired on a Siemens Verio scanner (Siemens Medical 
Systems, Erlangen, Germany) using a 32-channel head coil. Images were acquired using a T1-
weighted 3D-MPRAGE sequence (repetition time [TR] = 2300ms, echo time [TE] = 2.98ms, 
flip angle = 7°, 176 sagittal slices, field of view [FOV] = 240×256 mm2, matrix = 240×256, 
1×1×1 mm3 voxels). 
 
5.3.2.2. Cortical thickness measurements.   
FreeSurfer (5.0.0; http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu) was used to generate cortical 
surface models and to measure cortical thickness on T1-weighted images. Previous work has 
validated FreeSurfer by comparing it with histological analysis (Rosas et al., 2002) and 
manual measurements (Kuperberg et al., 2003). Processing steps have been described in detail 
elsewhere  (Dale, Fischl, & Sereno, 1999; Fischl, Sereno, & Dale, 1999; Han et al., 2006). 
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Following surface extraction, sulcal and gyral features across individuals were aligned to an 
average spherical representation that allows for accurate matching of cortical thickness 
measurement locations among participants. The entire cortex in each participant was visually 
inspected and a single rater manually corrected segmentation inaccuracies (LS). For whole-
brain analysis, thickness data were smoothed using a 15 mm full-with-at-half-maximum 
surface-based Gaussian kernel. Surface-based smoothing reduces measurement noise while 
preserving the capacity for anatomical localization, as it respects cortical topology (Lerch, 
2004). 
 
5.3.3. Functional MRI  
5.3.3.1. Paradigms 
We analysed two fMRI sessions that were each seven minutes long. Participants were 
instructed to lie still in the scanner with open eyes, and to fixate a white cross in the centre of 
a black screen. Session A was a meditation-free resting-state run, where participants 
instructed to not think about anything in particular and to not meditate. Session B was a 
loving-kindness meditation session, similar to previous work (Klimecki et al., 2013; Kok et 
al., 2013; Lutz et al., 2008; Ricard, 2006; Salzberg, 2001). The specific instructions the LTMs 
implemented for the LKM session was: “In this condition, we want you to cultivate loving-
kindness, ‘Metta’ in Pali. Altruistic love, loving-kindness or, more simple, warm-heartedness, 
is the wish that others be happy and well. How to generate and cultivate that state of mind? 
The easiest way is to begin by bringing to the mind someone who is very dear to us, someone 
for whom this feeling of affection arises effortlessly and spontaneously. Imagine that a young 
child approaches you and gives you a look that is joyous, confident, and full of innocence. 
You stroke his head, look at him with tenderness, and take him in your arms. You feel a sense 
of unconditional benevolence and love. Let yourself be entirely pervaded by this love that 
wishes only for his well-being. Then cultivate, sustain, and nourish this feeling of loving-
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kindness. When it declines, revive it. Think repeatedly, ‘May that person be safe, may that 
person be healthy, may that person find happiness and flourish in life’. You could also choose 
someone else toward whom you feel great tenderness and deep gratitude. Wish with all your 
heart that this person will find happiness and be well. “ 
 Participants also performed an open-presence meditation Session C; this session was, 
however, not the focus of the current work and will be reported elsewhere. Sessions A, B, and 
C were presented in a counterbalanced order across subjects, and participants were allowed to 
rest between them for 1-2 minutes and to prepare themselves for the next session. As a check 
on the differentiability of the LKM and resting states, informal qualitative debriefing was 
performed after each scan, with participants reporting both subjective success in achieving a 
state of LKM in the scanner, and no difficulties with refraining from meditation in the resting 
state scan.  
 
5.3.3.2. Acquisition parameters   
Functional MRI data were acquired on the same scanner as the functional signals 
using a 12-channel head-coil. We recorded fMRI time-series using T2*-weighted gradient 
EPI sequence (TR = 2000ms, TE = 27ms, flip angle = 90°, 37 slices tilted at approximately 
30° from an axial orientation, FOV = 210×210 mm2, matrix = 70×70, 3×3×3 mm3 voxels, 1 
mm gap; 210 volumes per session). Data were available for all participants except one LTM.  
 
5.3.3.3. Preprocessing  
Processing was based on DPARSF/REST for Matlab [http://www.restfmri.net  (Chao-
Gan & Yu-Feng, 2010; Song et al., 2011)]. We discarded the first 5 volumes to ensure steady-
state magnetization, performed slice-time correction, motion correction and realignment, and 
co-registered functional time series to the corresponding T1-weighted MRI. Images 
underwent DARTEL-based segmentation and registration, followed by nuisance covariate 
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regression to remove effects of average WM and CSF signal, as well as 6 motion parameters 
(3 translations and 3 rotations). To increase the robustness against motion confounds, we 
included a scrubbing(Power, Barnes, Snyder, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2012). In brief, we 
modelled time-points with a frame-wise displacement > 0.5mm, together with one time-point 
before and one after each such time-point, as separate regressors during covariate correction. 
Time-series were band-pass filtered (0.01-0.08 Hz). We computed the amplitude of low 
frequency functional fluctuations in this frequency band, a marker of overall local functional 
activation. The amplitude of low frequency functional fluctuations has been suggested as a 
means to unveil regional functional changes in task-free paradigms (Zang et al., 2007; Z. 
Zhang et al., 2010). Moreover, the marker has been shown to differentiate between eyes open 
and eyes closed conditions (Yang et al., 2007)and to relate to the contents of thoughts in the 
resting state (Gorgolewski et al., 2014), suggesting that it provides a measure of the activation 
patterns supporting different brain states. Amplitude measures were z-scored within the brain 
mask of each participant prior to analysis.  
 
5.3.3.4: Surface mapping.  
Using a boundary-based registration, we mapped functional time-series to cortical surface 
models (Greve & Fischl, 2009). Like the cortical thickness data, functional data were 
registered to a surface-based template based on cortical folding patterns and smoothed on 
tessellated surfaces.  
 
5.3.4. Statistical analysis  
As in previous work (Bernhardt, Klimecki, Leiberg, & Singer, 2014), analysis was 
performed using SurfStat for Matlab(Worsley et al., 2009). Prior to analysis, we statistically 
corrected for effects of age and sex on thickness.  
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5.3.4.1. Cortical thickness comparisons.  
 We carried out a surface-based comparison of thickness between LTMs and 
controls, using Student’s t-tests at each cortical point. In regions of findings, statistical 
group comparisons were complemented by individual analysis that provides prevalence 
estimates in LTMs for markedly different thickness relative to controls.  
 
5.3.4.2. Functional analysis.  
We applied random effects models to compare differences in amplitude between 
loving-kindness and resting-state conditions within LTMs.  
 
5.3.4.3: Correction for multiple comparisons.  
Surface-based structural and functional findings results were controlled at pFWE < 0.05 
(height threshold t = 2.1), using random-field theory for non-isotropic images.  
 
5.4. Results 
5.4.1. Cortical thickness increases in LTMs: surface-based findings 
Surface-based analysis revealed increased cortical thickness in LTMs compared to 
controls in a right prefrontal cluster encompassing fronto-polar cortex and left ventrolateral 
(peak MNI-coordinate x/y/z = 24/60/2; cluster-wise pFWE < 0.05) as well as fronto-insular 
cortices (peak MNI-coordinate x/y/z = -29/24/4; cluster-wise pFWE = 0.05, Figure 5.1). There 
were no significant cortical thickness decreases in LTMs.  
 
5.4.2. Loving-kindness related amplitude increases in LTMs  
Comparing state-related differences in LTMs, we observed greater within-subject increases in 
LTMs when comparing loving-kindness meditation to non-meditative rest in medial and 
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anterior prefrontal regions (peak MNI x/y/z = -30/17/-22; pFWE < 0.05), while amplitude in 
posterior regions decreased (Figure 5.2) 
 
Figure 5.1: Cortical thickness increases in LTMs relative to controls: surface-based findings. 
Significant increases after multiple comparisons correction at a cluster-level of pFWE < 0.05 are surrounded 
by bold black outlines. 
 
5.4.3. Overlap of functional and structural findings 
Overlaying FWE-corrected structural and functional findings (Figure 5.3), we observed 
overlaps in orbito-frontal/ inferior prefrontal regions (centroid coordinates MNI x/y/z = -
41/41/-6, x/y/z = -46/32/-11) as well as anterior orbitofrontal/ventral anterior insular regions 
(centroid coordinate MNI x/y/z = -28/20/-11).  
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Figure 5.2: Functional amplitude correlates of loving-kindness meditation. Changes in functional 
amplitude during loving-kindness meditation relative to non-meditative rest in LTMs. Increases/decreases 
after multiple comparisons correction at a cluster-level of pFWE < 0.05 are shown in red/blue. 
 
5.5. Discussion  
Our overall goal was to differentiate meditation-general effects from those specifically 
involved in loving-kindness meditation (LKM). We tested a homogenous group of long-term 
meditation practitioners (LTMs), who have practiced in developing compassion, loving-
kindness, and altruism for many years prior to our study; this group was compared with an 
age- and sex-matched meditation-naïve control group. Our multi-method neuroimaging 
approach assessed morphological brain differences in LTMs compared to controls and 
subsequently evaluated whether these were functionally involved in loving-kindness 
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meditation, aiming to differentiate LKM-specific morphological changes from those 
associated with general meditation practice. 
 
Figure 5.3: Overlap of structural and functional findings. Overlap analysis between structural and 
functional findings, showing overlap centred on left IFG and ventral anterior insula. 
 
 Cortical thickness analysis was chosen to evaluate differences in brain structure 
between LTMs and novices in vivo (Fischl & Dale, 2000). While this technique does not 
allow for the study of subcortical changes, it provides an anatomical meaningful marker of 
grey matter variations in the cortical mantle. Using an unconstrained surface-based approach, 
we observed thickness increases in LTMs relative to novices in a right-lateralised fronto-polar 
cluster as well as a left lateralised cluster ranging from ventrolateral prefrontal regions into 
anterior insula. These effects are consistent with those reported by Fox et al. (2014) in a 
recent meta-analysis of studies into the structural bases of meditation training in mainly 
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attentional meditation family practices (Dahl et al., 2015). Moreover, a previous study by 
Lazar and colleagues has suggested trends for increased thickness in participants with 
experience in insight meditation in the anterior insula (Lazar et al., 2005). A more recent 
study complemented these findings, by showing increased cortical folding complexity in the 
anterior insula in a group of meditators that followed different meditative practices, such as 
samata and Vipassana meditation (Luders et al., 2012). Interestingly, the anterior insula is 
heavily implicated in interoception (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012; Craig, 2009; Zaki, Davis, & 
Ochsner, 2012) and attentional processing (Nelson et al., 2010; Sridharan, Levitin, & Menon, 
2008), suggesting the increases we observe here might reflect general effects of meditation 
practice involving attentional function. The Fox et al. meta-analyses also found evidence for 
grey matter alteration in frontopolar cortex (Fox et al., 2014), corresponding closely to our 
finding of thickness in the same region. Frontopolar cortex is thought to support higher-order 
integrative cognition related to metacognitive awareness, a skill that is heavily emphasised in 
all meditation practices (Dahl et al., 2015).  
 In the current assessment, structural MRI findings were complemented by a surface-
based functional analysis of the amplitude of low-frequency fluctuations, a previously 
proposed local functional marker (Zang et al., 2007), during a LKM session relative to non-
meditative rest. Although the majority of previous task-free fMRI studies have focused on 
time-series correlations between regions to study inter-regional connectivity, recent 
methodological work has proposed several markers that probe local functional characteristics 
of a given region (Song et al., 2011; Zuo et al., 2010). LTMs showed increases when 
engaging in loving-kindness practice in regions overlapping with a network previously shown 
to undergo functional plasticity after compassion training (Klimecki et al., 2013; 2014). 
Specifically, our analysis showed amplitude increases during LKM in portions of anterior and 
medial ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, medial and lateral OFC, together with sgACC/pgACC 
and insular subregions. Importantly, we also observed an overlap between our structural and 
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functional findings in the left ventrolateral PFC approximating BA 45/47. Thus, this region 
appears to play a central role in both acute and long-term implementations of LKM. While its 
precise function is still a subject of debate, this region has been implicated in processes 
requiring the internal generation of information and has been proposed to support controlled 
retrieval processes (Badre & Wagner, 2007). This is in line with its frequent involvement in 
emotion regulation, particularly forms of emotion regulation requiring the active generation of 
alternate meanings of emotional stimuli, such as cognitive reappraisal (Buhle et al., 2014; 
Wager et al., 2008). In a recent study (H. G. Engen & Singer, 2015), we found that a similar 
region was one of few areas showing activation during regulation of negative emotion using 
positive reappraisal and compassion mediation, suggesting the left IFG might be particularly 
important for the generation of emotional states. Interestingly, we also observed overlap of 
functional and structural findings in the ventral AI. While most commonly thought to have a 
similar function as the dorsal AI, recent work suggests that these regions partake in 
dissociable large-scale intrinsic connectivity networks that serve different aspects of orienting 
towards salient stimuli (Touroutoglou et al., 2012), with the dorsal AI being more closely 
related to attentional function while the ventral AI supports the generation of emotional 
experiences. Thus, our data could suggest that ventrolateral PFC/inferior frontal gyrus and 
ventral AI cooperate in the volitional generation of affective states and, potentially, 
meditation practices requiring the construction of affective states in general.  
 
5.5.1. Limitations and conclusions 
To circumvent high challenges and costs related to performing longitudinal studies 
that would directly probe causal effects of meditation training, the current work heuristically 
employed a cross-sectional comparison between practitioners and controls. Cross-sectional 
inference cannot rule a combination of selection (i.e. individuals like our LTMs are attracted 
to meditation), attrition (i.e. individuals like our LTMs are likely to continue meditating), 
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lifestyle (i.e., long-term meditation may be associated with different lifestyle choices), and 
plasticity (i.e., training indeed changed the brain in LTMs) driving our results. We assessed 
meditators with a mean of 40k hours of practice in life and participation in at least one three-
year retreat in the same centre, all of them having specifically focused on cultivating socio-
affective skills. While these criteria offered the opportunity to study a homogenous sample of 
long-term meditation practitioners, they have in effect restricted our analysis to older 
participants. Although possible age confounds in the current study were addressed by the use 
of age-matched controls as well as statistical corrections for age-effects, the inclusion criteria 
may have hampered generalizability given the narrow age range investigated. Moreover, the 
stringent inclusion criteria limited our sample size, which might have reduced statistical 
power to detect subtle structural changes. 
Our findings may have implications for the general understanding of the brain basis of 
both constructive meditation practices and meditation in general, suggesting that the structural 
consequences of meditation training include both practice-specific and meditation-general 
processes that need to be dissociated in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of how 
meditation training engenders long-term changes in brain structure. Additionally, our findings 
suggest that care must be taken to dissociate functional and structural markers of plasticity, as 
demonstrated by the relatively circumscribed overlap between the structural changes we 
identified and the extended functional network found to support LKM state implementation. 
As such, our findings motivate future longitudinal studies that may directly address the 
causality between mental training, brain changes, and markers of affect and prosociality.   
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Chapter 6: Compassion-based emotion regulation 
up-regulates experienced positive affect and 
associated neural networks5 
Haakon G. Engen, & Tania Singer 
6.1. Abstract 
Emotion regulation research has primarily focused on techniques that attenuate or 
modulate the impact of emotional stimuli. Recent evidence suggests that this mode regulation 
can be problematic in the context of regulation of emotion elicited by the suffering of others, 
resulting in reduced emotional connectedness. Here we investigated the effects of an 
alternative emotion regulation technique based on the up-regulation of positive affect via 
Compassion-meditation on experiential and neural affective responses to depictions of 
individuals in distress, and compared these with the established emotion regulation strategy of 
Reappraisal. Using fMRI, we scanned 15 expert practitioners of Compassion-meditation 
either passively viewing, or using Compassion-meditation or Reappraisal to modulate their 
emotional reactions to film clips depicting people in distress. Both strategies effectively, but 
differentially regulated experienced affect, with Compassion primarily increasing positive 
and Reappraisal primarily decreasing negative affect. Imaging results showed that 
Compassion, relative to both passive-viewing and Reappraisal increased activation in regions 
involved in affiliation, positive affect and reward processing including ventral striatum and 
medial OFC. This network was shown to be active prior to stimulus presentation, suggesting 
that the regulatory mechanism of Compassion is the stimulus-independent endogenous 
generation of positive affect. 
                                                
5  This chapter has previously been published as Engen, H. G., & Singer, T. (2015). 
Compassion-based emotion regulation up regulates experienced positive affect and 
associated neural networks. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 10, 1291–1301. 
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6.2. Introduction 
Research has demonstrated that exposure to others’ pain elicits negative affective 
responses on both an experiential and physiological level (Lamm et al., 2011). Consequently, 
being confronted with the suffering of others can be a potent source of personal distress. 
Prolonged exposure to suffering can therefore have deleterious mental health effects. This is 
seen in the high stress levels and burnout rates often reported for professionals tasked with 
caring for suffering individuals, such as physicians (Shanafelt et al., 2012) and nurses 
(Adriaenssens, De Gucht, & Maes, 2014). With this in mind, identifying effective emotion 
regulation strategies that can be employed to promote resilience for exposure to others’ 
suffering is potentially of great help both for the individual and society at large. 
One particularly effective strategy for regulating negative emotional responses involves the 
cognitive generation of alternate interpretations of an emotional event, thereby modulating 
their emotional meaning and impact (McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012a). This strategy, most 
frequently called Reappraisal, has been shown to be effective across a wide range of different 
emotional stimuli and contexts (J. J. Gross, 2007b). Furthermore, trait use of Reappraisal is a 
predictor of psychological well-being and resilience (McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 
2012b; Min, Yu, Lee, & Chae, 2013). As such, Reappraisal is as a strong candidate for an 
effective means of coping with exposure to the suffering of others. However, recent research 
has identified a potentially problematic side effect of using Reappraisal to regulate ones 
affective reactions to the suffering of others: Cameron & Payne (2011) demonstrated that 
Reappraisal can lead to decreased concern and willingness to help, especially when multiple 
individuals are suffering, and when helping is costly. One explanation for this is that 
Reappraisal involves discounting negative information as it is perceived, and substituting a 
more positive interpretation. While an effective panacea for personal distress, this mechanism 
in effect disconnects the Reappraiser from the communicated affective experience when 
  Chapter 6: Compassion-based emotion regulation 
140 
 
applied to stimuli signalling others’ suffering. Thus, Reappraisal might not be the optimal 
strategy in contexts where an inter-individual emotional connection is required. 
 One promising way to supplement traditional emotion regulation strategies is the use 
of meditation techniques. In the context of suffering, one particularly promising technique is 
Compassion-meditation. The emotional state of compassion6 can be defined as the emotion 
one experiences when feeling concern for another's suffering and desiring to enhance that 
individual's welfare (Goetz et al., 2010). Training in Compassion-meditation aims at enabling 
the individual to volitionally generate states of compassion, allowing them to encounter the 
suffering of others while maintaining a positive emotional state of benevolence, warmth and 
concern and a motivation to help (Klimecki et al., 2013; Kok et al., 2013; Lutz et al., 2008). 
Concretely, Compassion-meditation involves the initial generation of an emotional state of 
loving-kindness through directed imagery emphasising positive emotional qualities of 
warmth, care and other-related concern. Once this emotional state is achieved it can then be 
applied to the suffering of others, turning the initial state of loving-kindness into one of 
compassion (Singer & Klimecki, 2014). Behavioural research has shown that short-term 
training of Loving-Kindness and Compassion is associated with increases in daily positive 
affect (Kok et al., 2013), prosocial behaviour (Leiberg et al., 2011; Weng et al., 2013), 
resilience (Fredrickson et al., 2008), and empathy (Mascaro, Rilling, Negi, & Raison, 2013). 
Speaking to its potential efficacy as an explicit regulation strategy, Compassion training has 
been shown to alter the emotional experience of the individual when confronted with the 
suffering of others, by specifically increasing positive affect related to experiences of warmth 
and concern (Klimecki et al., 2013; 2014).  
                                                
6 In the following ”compassion” refers to the emotional state, while the capitalised ”Compassion” refers to the 
specific meditation technique employed in the current study. 
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Interestingly, the neural mechanisms supporting Compassion appear to be markedly 
different from those reported for Reappraisal. Increases in positive affect through 
Compassion-training have been shown to be paralleled by an increase in brain regions 
associated with reward and affiliation, such as the ventral striatum (VS) including nucleus 
accumbens (NACC) and medial orbitofrontal (mOFC), perigenual anterior cingulate (pgACC) 
and mid-insular cortices (Klimecki et al., 2013; 2014). In contrast, Reappraisal has 
consistently been associated with activation of regions involved in selective attention, conflict 
monitoring and cognitive control, including dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC), ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (vlPFC), dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC) and supramarginal gyrus/temporoparietal 
junction (SMG/TPJ) (Buhle et al., 2014; Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012). As such, the 
neural implementation of Compassion and Reappraisal appears to mirror their conceptual 
differences, in that Compassion involves the volitional endogenous generation of an 
emotional and motivational state rather than alteration of exogenously triggered states through 
cognitive control and self-regulation, as seen in Reappraisal. These qualities suggest the 
appropriateness of Compassion as a regulation strategy in contexts where emotional 
connection is important since it does not involve the alteration of one’s emotional reactions to 
stressors directly, but rather the counter-generation of a positive affective state.  
In the current study, we tested this hypothesis by investigating how explicit 
employment of Compassion as an emotion regulation strategy modulates both subjective and 
neural reactions to emotional stimuli depicting individuals in distress, and how this compares 
to the modulatory effects of Reappraisal. From previous work (Klimecki et al., 2013; 2014) 
we know that the default response pattern to such stimuli is negative affect, presumably 
stemming from empathic distress reactions (see also Condon & Barrett, 2013), and that 
training is needed in order to generate loving-kindness and compassion when confronted with 
others’ suffering. We therefore recruited a cohort of expert Compassion meditators who had 
undergone extensive instruction in a Buddhist tradition focusing on altruism and compassion. 
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Further, all meditators had participated in at least one 3-year full-time retreat at the same 
institution, in which they practiced these techniques and underwent instruction by the same 
teachers. This ensured homogenous and expert implementation of Compassion allowing us to 
describe the workings of the technique at its optimum.  
We tested our hypotheses specifically in the context of negative emotion caused by 
exposure to the suffering of others by adapting the Socio-affective Video Task (SoVT; 
(Klimecki et al., 2014). This task has previously been successfully used in previous 
Compassion research, and is optimised to elicit extended negative affect of a social nature. 
We adapted the SoVT to an emotion-regulation setting by including explicit instructions for 
the participants to modulate their emotional reactions to the film clips, yielding a design 
similar to previous studies aimed at differentiating emotion regulation strategies (e.g. Goldin 
et al., 2008).  
We hypothesised that Compassion and Reappraisal should be differentiable in terms 
of their effects on experienced affect. Provided that Compassion involves the direct 
generation of positive affect, we expected it to be particularly effective at increasing positive 
affect. Conversely, as Reappraisal involves re-interpreting the negative aspects of external 
emotion eliciting stimuli, we expected this to be more effective at decreasing negative affect. 
Neurally, we expected Compassion to rely less on lateral prefrontal regions thought to be 
important in top-down cognitive regulation of emotion (Buhle et al., 2014). Rather, we 
expected Compassion to engage networks known to be associated with affiliation and positive 
affect in general, including basal ganglia and VS/NACC, mOFC, sgACC/pgACC, and mid-
insula (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2013; Kringelbach & Berridge, 2009; Rangel & Hare, 2010; 
Schultz, 2006; Strathearn, Fonagy, Amico, & Montague, 2009; Vrtička, Andersson, 
Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2008). Following our hypothesis that Compassion 
centrally involves the endogenous generation of positive affect, we expected to find evidence 
of activation of this network independently of stimulus presentation. Mirroring our 
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behavioural hypotheses, we expected that Compassion and Reappraisal would be 
differentiable in terms of their impact on core affective processing regions such as the 
amygdala and VS/NACC. As the regulation of affect through Reappraisal has been shown to 
be particularly noticeable by its influence on the amygdala (Buhle et al., 2014), we expected 
lower levels of amygdala activation during Reappraisal than Compassion. Conversely, given 
the focus of Compassion the generation of positive affect we expected to see higher activation 
of NACC/VS, a key region in positive affect, during Compassion relative to Reappraisal.  
 
6.2. Methods 
6.2.1. Participants  
In total 18 long term practitioners of meditation in the Nyingma tradition of Tibetan 
Buddhism were recruited. This tradition is known for specifically focusing on the cultivation 
of loving-kindness, altruism, and compassion.  Participants were included only if they had 
participated in a full-time meditation retreat of at least 3 years at the Songsen Chanteloube 
retreat centre in Dordogne, France. Of these 15 (5 Women; age range = 45-62 years, age 
mean ± SD = 56.1 ± 4.6 years) completed the current experiment. All participants were 
Western European Caucasians. Meditation experience was assessed through semi-structured 
interviews, showing an estimated cumulative total of 40k ± 9k hours of meditation (range = 
10k-62k hours). Written and informed consent was obtained from all participants. The study 
was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Leipzig and was carried out in 
compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave written informed consent, 
were economically compensated, and debriefed after the study was completed. 
 
6.2.2. MRI acquisition 
Structural MRI data were acquired on a 3T Siemens Verio Scanner (Siemens Medical 
Systems, Erlangen, Germany) using a 32-channel head-coil. High-resolution structural images 
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were acquired using a T1-weighted 3D-MPRAGE sequence (TR = 2300ms, TE = 2.98ms, TI 
= 900ms, flip angle = 7°, iPat = 2; 176 sagittal slices, FOV = 256mm, matrix size = 240×256, 
1^3 mm voxels; total acquisition time = 5.10 minutes). Functional volumes were collected 
using a 12-channel head-coil. We employed a T2*-weighted gradient EPI sequence that was 
optimised (Nichols, Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 2006) to minimise distortions in 
medial orbital and anterior temporal regions (TR = 2000ms, TE = 27ms, flip angle = 90°, iPat 
= 2; 37 slices tilted at ~30° from the AC/PC axial plane, FOV = 210 mm, matrix size = 
70×70, 33 mm voxels, 1mm gap; 700 volumes per session).  
 
6.2.3. Stimuli  
The stimuli were short film clips (10-12 seconds in length; 40 negative and 20 neutral 
stimuli) taken from the previously validated SoVT stimulus set (for details see Klimecki et al., 
2013). The negative film clips depicted people in distress, such as scenes from documentaries 
and newscasts of e.g. starving children, crying mothers, or hospitalised individuals. The 
matched neutral film clips depicted similar individuals in non-distressing situations doing 
everyday activities. The stimuli were back-projected using a mirror setup. Eyesight was 
corrected using goggles where appropriate. 
 
6.2.4. Procedure 
Prior to testing, subjects were sent short written descriptions of each of the conditions 
that they were requested to read and reflect upon. Immediately prior to scanning subjects were 
reminded of this text before they underwent a guided training session. In this session the 
different strategies were explained and discussed before the subjects performed a training 
session of 6 trials, allowing them to experience and practice each strategy employed in the 
experiment (Watch- Neutral, Watch- Negative, Reappraisal, Compassion, Distraction and 
Open-Presence). The Distraction and Open-Presence conditions will be the focus of another 
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forthcoming paper and do not figure in the current study. Subjects were instructed to start 
implementing the strategies immediately upon receipt of instruction. To ensure homogeneity 
in strategy execution, subjects were asked to describe each strategy in their own words prior 
to the start of training and to describe in detail exactly how they implemented the strategy 
after each practice trial, with misunderstandings corrected when apparent. For the 
Compassion condition subjects were asked to employ their Compassion-meditation technique, 
so as to generate a warm feeling of positive affect and caring towards the individuals depicted 
in the film. For Reappraisal, subjects were asked to reinterpret the clips by thinking about 
what was occurring in a way in which the narrative ended more positive than was 
immediately apparent, i.e. to employ a Reappraisal technique with positive emphasis (cf. 
Wager et al., 2008). We chose to use positive Reappraisal to ensure comparability of with  
 
Figure 6.1: Trial structure and behavioural results. A) Schematic of a single trial. While being scanned, 
subjects were first instructed which strategy to employ, then they viewed a 10-12 second film clip while 
employing the strategy, whereupon they rated their experienced positive and negative affect on two serially 
presented scales. B) Behavioural results of experienced affect in each of the 4 conditions. Compassion was 
associated with significantly higher positive affect than all other conditions, while Reappraisal was 
associated with significantly higher positive affect than the Watch-Negative condition. Both compassion and 
Reappraisal decreased negative affect, though Reappraisal did so significantly more. ** = p < .01, *** = p < 
.001. All p-values Bonferroni corrected. 
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Compassion in terms of regulatory goal. For the Watch conditions, subjects were asked to 
respond naturally without trying to alter their reactions.  
The subjects underwent two sessions of scanning. Emotion regulation strategies 
(Reappraisal & Distraction) and meditation techniques (Compassion & Open-Presence) were 
implemented in separate sessions. Each session consisted of 4 conditions (Session A: 
[Reappraisal, Distraction, Watch-Negative, Watch-Neutral], Session B: [Compassion, Open-
Presence, Watch-Negative, Watch-Neutral]). 10 trials of each condition were performed in 
each session for a total of 40 trials. Stimulus and session order were counterbalanced across 
subjects. Within each session condition order was pseudo-randomised with the constraint that 
no more than 2 consecutive iterations of any condition could occur. Each trial (see Figure 1a) 
consisted of 1) 10 second instruction, 2) 10-12 second film clip presentation, 3) 10 second 
rating of experienced positive emotion, 4) 10 second rating of experienced negative emotion 
and 5) 5 second fixation cross. Ratings were given using a button box to move a cursor on a 
600-point visual analogue scale (VAS) ranging from “Not at all” to “Extremely”. Subjects 
were instructed to rate their affect as it was at the moment of report rather than how they 
remembered it to be during the film clip. 
 
6.2.5. fMRI preprocessing 
Preprocessing was done using SPM8 (r5236, Wellcome Trust) and included slice time 
correction, combined realignment and field-map based unwarping, DARTEL-based 
normalization (Ashburner, 2007) and smoothing with an isotropic Gaussian kernel with 
FWHM of 8mm. As controlled breathing is a key component of meditation, we accounted for 
potential respiratory artefacts and confounds by despiking the data using the ArtRepair 
toolbox (version 4, http://cibsr.stanford.edu/tools/human-brain-project/artrepair-
software.html) and removing the run-specific global signal for each voxel (P. M. Macey, 
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Macey, Kumar, & Harper, 2004) in line with previous work (e.g. Farb, Segal, & Anderson, 
2013) 
 
6.2.6. fMRI analysis 
To ensure robustness of the analyses in the face of potential differences in temporal 
dynamics of the conditions, a Finite Impulse Response (FIR) deconvolution approach was 
used. Single subject models included both runs, and included regressors coding the onset of 
instruction in each trial and the following fourteen 2s time bins for each condition. Separate, 
non-orthogonalised parametric regressors for positive and negative affect ratings were 
included, as well as 7 nuisance regressors coding movement and linear temporal trend. 
Models were high-pass filtered at 0.005 Hz and temporal autocorrelations were modelled 
using an AR(1) process. Group repeated-measures analyses were performed using GLMFlex 
(http://mrtools.mgh.harvard.edu/) and constrained to voxels within a grey matter mask 
derived from the MNI-projected DARTEL-generated template, created using the optimised 
thresholding algorithm included in the Masking toolbox (Ridgway et al., 2009). Inference was 
performed on truncated AUC estimates of BOLD signal, with separate t-contrasts performed 
for the Preparation (0-10 seconds) and Implementation (10-22 seconds) phases of the trial. 
Multiple comparisons were controlled for using cluster-level FWE correction at α < .05 (T > 
3.36, p = .001, k > 30) as determined by AFNI’s Alphasim Monte Carlo simulation method. 
Cortical surface renderings were created using NeuroElf, while subcortical renderings were 
made using scripts provided by Tor Wager and colleagues (available at 
http://wagerlab.colorado.edu/tools). Anatomical labels were determined using a combination 
of the TD client implemented in NeuroElf, the Anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005) and 
stereotactic atlases (Duvernoy, 1999; Duvernoy, Cattin, & Risold, 2013; Naidich et al., 2009). 
ROI analyses were done using the MarsBar toolbox (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net). 
To test our a priori hypotheses that Reappraisal and Compassion should differ in terms of 
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their temporal profiles and their effects on the neural substrates of positive and negative 
affect, we focused our analyses on subregions of the nucleus accumbens/ventral striatum and 
amygdala in which activation varied as a function of reported positive and negative affect, 
respectively (see Appendix: Supplemental methods A1.2.1 for details on the ROI selection 
procedure). 
 
6.3. Results 
6.3.1. Behavioural results 
 Figure 6.1 B shows the differences in subjective ratings as a function of employed 
strategy. Positive and negative emotion ratings were analysed separately using linear mixed 
modelling (LMM) as implemented in SPSS 21, with Condition (Compassion, Reappraisal, 
Watch-Negative, Watch-Neutral) as a fixed effect and subject-level random intercepts. This 
revealed a significant main effect of Condition for both Positive (F(3, 882) = 26.66, p < .001) 
and Negative (F(3, 882) = 176.10, p < .001) ratings. Post-hoc comparisons were corrected for 
multiple comparisons using the sequential Bonferroni method. These revealed that the 
Negative-Watch condition elicited significantly more negative (µ = 191.19, SE = 8.47), t(882) 
= 22.58, p < .001) and significantly less positive (µ = -54.74, SE = 9.71), t(882) = -5.64, p < 
.001) affect than the Neutral-Watch condition, demonstrating successful emotion induction. 
Further comparisons revealed that both Compassion and Reappraisal decreased negative 
(Compassion: (µ = -56.13, SE = 10.37), t(882) = -5.41, p < .001); Reappraisal: (µ = -54.74, 
SE = 9.71), t(882) = -5.64, p < .001) and increased positive affect (Compassion: µ = 101, SE 
= 11,89, t(882) = 8.50, p < .001; Reappraisal: µ = -96.82,  SE = 10.37), t(882) = -9.43, p < 
.001) relative to the Negative-Watch condition, demonstrating their efficacy at regulating 
affective states. Importantly, direct comparison of Compassion and Reappraisal revealed that 
Compassion was associated with significantly higher positive affect (µ = 50.29, SE = 13.73), 
t(882) = 3.66, p < .005) while Reappraisal was associated with significantly lower negative 
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affect (µ = -54.74,  SE = 9.71), t(882) = -5.64, p < .001). Furthermore only Compassion 
increased positive affect above the Watch- Neutral condition (Compassion: µ = 46.28, SE = 
11.89), t(882) = 3.89, p <.001; Reappraisal: µ = -4.01, SE = 11.89), t(882) = -0.34, p > .1) 
supporting the notion that Compassion is uniquely associated with an increase of positive 
affect, whereas Reappraisal occasioned a return to baseline positive affect. 
 
6.3.2. fMRI results 
6.3.2.1. Validation contrasts 
 In order to establish the efficacy of the emotion induction procedure used and the 
comparability of the Reappraisal implementation to previous work, several validation 
contrasts were performed (Reappraisal> Watch-Negative, Watch-Negative>Watch-Neutral). 
These contrasts are reported in Appendix: Tables A3.2.1 and A3.2.2. The Watch-
Negative>Watch-Neutral contrast served as a validation contrast for successful emotion 
induction, and showed increased activation of core affective processing regions such as 
amygdala and insula, in addition to widespread activation of regions associated with both 
cognitive and perceptual components of affect. The Reappraisal>Watch-Negative contrast 
served to validate the implementation of Reappraisal in the current study and establish 
comparability to previous studies. This revealed a pattern of results closely resembling 
previous work (see e.g. Buhle et al., 2014; Goldin et al., 2008), including fronto-parietal 
activation and deactivation of amygdala (Appendix: Figure A2.2.1, Table A3.2.1). 
 
6.3.2.2. Compassion vs. Watch- Negative  
The contrast of Compassion over Watch-Negative assessed the neural correlates of the 
active employment of Compassion when preparing for and actively implementing 
Compassion to regulate one’s affective response to negative stimuli. Results from these 
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contrasts are reported in Table 6.1. As we had no specific hypotheses regarding deactivations 
these were not interpreted, but are reported in Appendix: Table A3.2.3.  
In the preparation phase (Figure 6.2A), activations were observed laterally in frontal 
regions, including middle frontal gyrus (MFG) and triangular/orbital junction of the inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG), supplementary motor area (SMA), as well as superior and inferior parietal 
lobules. Medially, activations were observed in frontopolar and medial orbitofrontal cortex 
(mOFC) and ventromedial PFC (vmPFC), peri- and subgenual ACC (pgACC/sgACC) and 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). Subcortical activations were observed in pulvinar and 
medial nuclei of the thalamus, hypothalamus, ventral striatum, superior and inferior parietal 
lobules. Additionally, large portions of the cerebellum were activated.
 
Figure 6.2: Compassion-related activation. Results from the whole brain contrast of Compassion> Watch-
negative presented separately for the Preparation and Implementation phases. All results thresholded at 
FWEc α < .05 as determined by AFNI’s Alphasim (p < .001, extent threshold = 30 voxels). 
 
In the Implementation phase (Figure 6.2B), substantial activations were observed in 
medial PFC, including vmPFC and mOFC, as well as genual ACC and SMA. Left 
dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal activations were again observed, including middle 
and superior frontal gyri (SFG), as well as the orbital portion of the triangular and orbital IFG. 
Further activations were observed in SMG/TPJ and posterior cingulate, as well as middle and 
inferior temporal gyri, and portions of the cerebellum. Subcortical activations were observed 
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in VS including NACC, globus pallidus, caudate, putamen, hypothalamus, and superficial 
portions of the right amygdala.  
 
6.3.2.3. Compassion vs. Reappraisal 
 The direct contrast of Compassion and Reappraisal over the course of the Preparation 
and Implementation phases was performed to identify differences in the neural underpinnings 
of Compassion and Reappraisal, as well as their temporal dynamics. The results from these 
contrasts are reported in Table 6.2. In the Preparation phase (Figure 6.3A), higher activation 
was found for the Compassion condition primarily in medial frontal regions, including 
vmPFC/gyrus rectus, pgACC, sgACC, dorsal ACC/SMA, precuneus. Additional activations  
Region Side 
 Extent t  t  MNI     
(voxel) (max) (avg)  x     y      z Label/BA 
Compassion>        
Watch-Negative       
       
Preparation phase       
 Precuneus  L 313 9.44 3.90  -12  -70   51   7 
 Precuneus  L 161 9.44 4.20  -12  -70   51  7 
 Superior Parietal Lobule  L 77 5.98 3.78  -33  -70   44  7 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  L 31 4.43 2.96  -39  -46   39  19 
Cerebellum L 1164 8.66 4.21   -6  -67  -11    Declive 
Cerebellum L 161 8.66 4.92   -6  -67  -11   Declive 
Cerebellum R 138 8.30 4.84    6  -73  -26   Pyramis 
Cerebellum R 151 6.94 4.30   25  -74  -15   Declive 
Cerebellum L 129 6.26 4.25  -19  -64  -15   Declive 
Cerebellum R 57 6.93 4.28   41  -76  -40   Inferior Semi-Lunar  
Cerebellum R 119 6.56 4.12   38  -66  -20   Declive 
Cerebellum R 92 6.36 4.30   20  -83  -29   Tuber 
Cerebellum R 86 5.56 3.85   12  -81  -14   Declive 
Cerebellum L 51 5.06 3.38  -10  -84  -11   Lingual Gyrus  
Cerebellum R 46 4.98 3.63   46  -67  -28   Tuber 
Cerebellum L 39 4.78 3.12  -23  -84  -14  Declive 
Cerebellum L 45 4.65 3.34  -45  -70  -22   Declive 
Thalamus L 93 8.12 3.86    0  -27    2   Pulvinar 
 Thalamus  L 38 8.12 4.45    0  -27    2  Pulvinar 
 Thalamus  L 31 5.66 3.46    0  -14   12  Lateral-Dorsal 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L 58 6.70 4.20 -42 30 -15 47 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  R 107 6.87 3.55    3    8   60   6 
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 Superior Frontal Gyrus  R 34 6.87 3.71    3    8   60  6 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  L 53 5.27 3.31   -8    0   67  6 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 50 6.87 3.89  -53   12    1   45 
 Precentral Gyrus  L 50 6.50 3.51  -19  -23   71   6 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  L 55 6.43 3.90  -61  -20   -9   21 
 Posterior Cingulate  L 51 6.43 3.90    0  -38   22    Posterior Cingulate  
 Precentral Gyrus  R 65 6.03 3.73   60    0    7    Precentral Gyrus  
 Orbital Gyrus  L 264 5.91 3.68    0   39  -20   11 
 Orbital Gyrus  L 68 5.91 3.81    0   39  -20  11 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 46 5.77 3.94  -12   58    9  10 
 Anterior Cingulate  L 58 5.17 3.37    0   32   -2  24 
Medial Frontal Gyrus R 39 4.94 3.34    4   52   -2  10 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L 53 5.21 3.41  -53   10   33   9 
 Caudate  L 77 4.88 3.42    0    4    1   Head 
       
Implementation phase       
 Anterior Cingulate  L 1651 10.59 4.40   -4   54   -2   10 
 Anterior Cingulate  L 125 10.59 5.80   -4   54   -2  10 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 130 10.00 5.93  -12   55    9  10 
 Anterior Cingulate  L 103 6.74 4.91   -6   26   -3  24 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 47 6.62 3.95  -25   45  -11  11 
 Anterior Cingulate  R 171 6.59 4.62    4   31  -10  32 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L 48 6.31 4.39  -24   33   -9  47 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  L 36 6.77 4.29  -25   57   -1  10 
 Anterior Cingulate  R 97 6.71 4.11   11   33    9  32 
 Lentiform Nucleus  L 74 6.67 4.27  -16   13    2  Putamen  
Ventral Striatum L 58 6.47 3.97  -13   13   -6  Nucleus Accumbens 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  R 45 6.43 4.29   15   54    1  10 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 99 6.33 4.16  -29   41   20  10 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 126 6.26 4.19   -8   42   16  9 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  R 96 6.08 3.88   12   44   19  9 
 Caudate  L 61 5.75 4.29  -16   23    3  Caudate  
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  R 38 5.50 4.06    8   55   15  10 
 Lentiform Nucleus  L 47 5.46 3.62  -23    5   19  Putamen  
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 33 5.45 3.72  -35   42   10  10 
Hypothalamus R 64 5.17 3.47    6   -3   -3  Anterior 
 Caudate  R 38 4.87 3.37   13   20    8  Caudate Body 
 Anterior Cingulate  L 34 4.75 3.58   -7   33    9  24 
Cerebellum R 1466 9.98 4.43   36  -47  -29    Culmen 
Cerebellum R 88 9.98 5.42   36  -47  -29   Culmen 
Cerebellum R 120 8.94 5.21   45  -64  -28   Tuber 
Cerebellum R 99 8.84 4.55    6  -73  -26   Pyramis 
Cerebellum L 127 8.44 5.07    0  -64  -26   Pyramis 
Cerebellum R 84 6.36 4.57    6  -53  -23  
 Anterior 
LobeDentate 
Cerebellum R 63 6.22 4.83   26  -81  -30   Tuber 
Cerebellum R 158 6.99 4.75   28  -65  -23   Uvula 
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Cerebellum L 87 6.49 4.27   -6  -68   -9   Culmen 
Cerebellum R 115 6.27 4.76   19  -71  -30   Pyramis 
Cerebellum R 68 6.25 3.92   14  -54  -43   Cerebellar Tonsil  
Cerebellum R 39 5.91 3.49   20  -34  -19   Culmen 
Cerebellum R 54 5.90 4.26   25  -77  -15   Declive 
Cerebellum L 70 5.45 3.54  -13  -42  -34   Cerebellar Tonsil  
Cerebellum L 37 5.19 3.17  -22  -31  -17   Culmen  
Cerebellum R 60 5.15 4.01   33  -77  -39   Inferior Semi-Lunar  
Cerebellum L 71 5.13 3.73   -5  -48  -34   Cerebellar Tonsil 
Cerebellum L 60 4.87 3.41  -18  -64  -17   Declive 
Cerebellum L 35 4.47 3.27  -17  -48  -19   Culmen 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L 81 8.90 3.77  -32   18  -17   47 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L 32 6.64 4.34  -48   23   -8  47 
 Precentral Gyrus  L 357 6.82 3.67  -19  -23   71   4 
 Precentral Gyrus  L 103 6.82 3.97  -19  -23   71  4 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  R 55 6.43 3.99    7    5   61  6 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 50 5.85 3.46  -24    2   60  6 
 Precentral Gyrus  L 33 5.56 3.48  -20  -18   62  6 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 58 5.31 3.65   -8   -3   55  6 
 Precuneus  L 73 6.61 3.08  -15  -70   51   7 
 Precuneus  L 42 6.61 3.28  -15  -70   51  7 
 Precuneus  L 31 4.28 2.81  -12  -53   58  7 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 238 6.51 4.00  -49    2   40   6 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 209 6.51 4.12  -49    2   40  6 
 Posterior Cingulate  L 120 6.40 3.69   -3  -42   19   29 
 Posterior Cingulate  L 70 6.40 4.02   -3  -42   19  29 
 Precuneus  L 50 4.45 3.23    0  -56   30  7 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  L 73 6.14 3.70  -59   -8   -6   21 
Cerebellum L 90 5.57 3.68  -37  -57  -23    Culmen 
Cerebellum L 53 5.57 3.62  -37  -57  -23   Culmen 
Cerebellum L 37 5.30 3.78  -42  -67  -23   Tuber 
 Supramarginal Gyrus  L 173 5.39 3.47  -53  -52   23   40 
 Precentral Gyrus  L 61 5.31 3.35  -44    6   11   44 
 Precentral Gyrus  L 45 5.31 3.47  -44    6   11  44 
Table 6.1: Brain regions activated during Compassion relative to Watch-Negative. Cluster maxima are 
reported in bold. Local maxima (italicised) denote subclusters within a cluster found to be not connected to 
the already considered (central) mass in a higher-values-first watershed searching algorithm implemented in 
NeuroElf (i.e. the splitclustercoords function). Multiple comparisons were controlled for using cluster-level 
FWE correction at α < .05 (T > 3.36, p = .001, k > 30) as determined by AFNI’s Alphasim Monte Carlo 
simulation method. For consistency, subclusters smaller than the respective cluster thresholds are not 
reported. 
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Figure 6.3: Differential activation of Compassion and Reappraisal. Results from the whole brain 
contrast of Compassion>Reappraisal and Reappraisal>Compassion presented separately for the Preparation 
and Implementation phases. Red-scaled blobs denote regions of significantly higher activation during 
Compassion than Reappraisal, while blue-scaled blobs denote regions with higher activation during 
Reappraisal than Compassion. All results thresholded at FWEc α < .05 as determined by AFNI’s Alphasim 
(p < .001, extent threshold = 30 voxels). 
 
were observed in bilateral superior temporal gyrus (STG) and right IFG/operculum ranging 
into mid-insula. In contrast, higher activation for the Reappraisal condition was found in 
posterior and polar middle temporal gyrus (MTG), posterior cingulate/precuneus and 
cerebellum. 
For the Implementation phase (Figure 6.3B), increased activation was found for the 
Compassion condition in medial PFC, including vmPFC, mOFC, sgACC, pgACC, 
frontopolar cortex, bilateral SMA and mid-cingulate. Laterally, activations were observed in 
bilateral operculum/ mid- insula, STG, precuneus and right fusiform gyrus. Subcortically, 
activations were observed in NACC/VS, bilateral amygdala, hypothalamus, caudate, globus 
pallidus, putamen, right hippocampus and ventral anterior portions of the thalamus. For 
Reappraisal, increased activation was observed in dorsolateral PFC, including bilateral MFG 
and left IFG, pre-SMA/medial SFG, right SMG/TPJ, right anterior MTG/STG and left 
posterior MTG, left calcarine gyrus and cerebellum. 
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Region Side 
 Extent t  t  MNI     
(voxel) (max) (avg)  x     y      z Label/BA 
Compassion> Reappraisal       
       
Preparation phase       
 Rectal Gyrus  R 702 11.79 4.47   11   32  -21    11 
 Rectal Gyrus  R 173 11.79 5.52   11   32  -21   11 
Superior Orbital Gyrus L 91 9.20 4.45  -13   30  -20   11 
Superior Medial Gyrus L 143 6.95 4.34   -4   52    4   10 
 Anterior Cingulate  R 149 6.44 4.04    4   32   -8   32 
Middle Orbital Gyrus L 79 6.09 3.97  -21   41  -16   11  
SMA R 237 8.47 4.04    3    8   58    6  
SMA R 55 8.47 4.71    3    8   58   6  
Superior Medial Gyrus L 57 6.58 4.19    0   52   26   9  
Superior Medial Gyrus L 54 5.67 3.67   -4   40   43   8 
 Precuneus  L 302 6.43 4.37   -3  -70   42    7 
 Precuneus  L 192 6.43 4.57   -3  -70   42   7 
Precuneus L 66 6.67 4.35    0  -44   59   5 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  R 150 6.97 4.01   60    0    4    22 
       
Implementation phase       
 Rectal Gyrus  R 2631 11.04 4.32   11   32  -21    11 
 Rectal Gyrus  R 181 11.04 5.84   11   32  -21   11 
Superior Orbital Gyrus L 102 9.94 5.55  -13   30  -20   11 
 Anterior Cingulate  R 212 8.95 5.61    4   32   -8   32 
 Anterior Cingulate  R 153 8.05 4.75    4   41   -1   32 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  R 101 6.61 4.51   60    0    4   22 
Postcentral Gyrus R 86 6.12 3.83   43  -14   32   3A 
Superior Medial Gyrus L 163 6.05 4.81  -11   55    4   10  
 Claustrum  L 160 6.04 4.44  -23   22    3   Claustrum  
Superior Orbital Gyrus L 119 6.90 4.40  -14   44  -18   11  
Rolandic Operculum R 78 6.90 3.96   54  -12   13   43  
 Anterior Cingulate  R 94 5.94 4.00    7   27    5   24  
 Insula  R 107 5.90 4.08   41   11   -2   13  
 Thalamus  R 64 5.73 3.73   24  -31   11  Pulvinar  
 Lentiform Nucleus  L 106 5.73 3.65  -19    5   12  Putamen  
 Anterior Cingulate  R 107 5.61 4.07   18   41    0   10  
Anterior Cingulate L 74 5.51 3.88  -22   43    3   10  
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  R 47 5.38 3.86   50   10   -4   22 
 Anterior Cingulate  L 84 5.17 4.00   -3   27    7   24  
 Lentiform Nucleus  R 53 5.10 3.36   23    6   15  Putamen  
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  R 52 5.05 3.42   22   54   -1   10  
 Claustrum  R 51 4.36 3.56   27   25    3   Claustrum  
 Thalamus  L 96 8.01 4.34   -3   -8    2   Ventral Anterior  
 Thalamus  L 73 8.01 4.71   -3   -8    2  Ventral Anterior  
 Precentral Gyrus  L 93 6.60 3.63  -22  -23   68    6/4 
Fusiform Gyrus R 175 6.49 3.67   29  -33  -17   Fusiform Gyrus 
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Fusiform Gyrus R 58 6.49 3.99   29  -33  -17  Fusiform Gyrus 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  L 421 6.26 3.95  -49    4   -4    22  
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  L 86 6.26 4.11  -49    4   -4   22  
Rolandic Operculum L 112 6.17 4.22  -54    0    4   22 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 73 6.11 4.05  -47    6    6   44 
Amygdala  L 47 5.29 3.73  -22    1  -15  Superficial 
Insula L 47 4.05 3.21  -35    1    3  Mid 
 Precuneus  L 220 5.93 3.58   -6  -56   52    7 
 Precuneus  L 153 5.93 3.67   -6  -56   52   7 
 Cingulate Gyrus  L 88 5.47 3.63  -22  -43   26    31  
 Cingulate Gyrus  L 77 5.47 3.64  -22  -43   26   31  
       
Reappraisal>Compassion       
       
Preparation phase       
Cerebellum R 1099 9.24 4.46   11  -40  -46    Cerebellar Tonsil  
Cerebellum R 111 9.24 5.15   11  -40  -46   Cerebellar Tonsil  
Cerebellum L 92 6.97 4.93   -2  -54  -51   Cerebellar Tonsil  
Cerebellum L 49 6.86 6.06  -10  -43  -48   Cerebellar Tonsil  
Brainstem R 137 6.36 4.88    1  -35  -37  Medulla 
Cerebellum R 116 6.28 4.29   12  -70  -37  
 Inferior Semi-
Lunar Lobule 
Cerebellum L 63 6.12 4.74  -15  -40  -39   Cerebellar Tonsil 
Cerebellum R 124 6.47 4.59    6  -62  -26   Nodule 
Cerebellum L 92 6.11 4.35  -16  -52  -49   Cerebellar Tonsil  
Cerebellum R 60 4.92 3.65   16  -42  -29   Anterior Lobe 
Cerebellum L 170 4.86 3.69  -10  -54  -31   Cerebellar Tonsil 
Cerebellum R 55 4.54 3.64   23  -58  -51   Cerebellar Tonsil 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  R 92 5.89 3.81   49    0  -17    21  
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L 95 5.37 3.50  -38   36    3    46  
 Posterior Cingulate  L 99 4.89 3.44   -9  -47    8    29  
       
Implementation phase       
Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 136 6.83 4.26  -51   25   25    45/44 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R 93 6.20 4.26   49   25   20    45 
Cerebellum L 232 6.07 3.99  -20  -78  -37   
 Inferior Semi-
Lunar  
Cerebellum L 60 6.07 4.72  -20  -78  -37  
 Inferior Semi-
Lunar  
Cerebellum L 72 5.52 3.73  -20  -81  -26   Uvula 
Cerebellum L 67 5.22 3.74  -26  -70  -33   Pyramis 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  L 245 6.97 3.94  -53  -34   -2    39 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  L 61 6.97 4.42  -53  -34   -2   39 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  L 63 5.79 4.00  -58  -57    7   21  
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  L 55 5.23 3.62  -60  -43    3   22 
 Medial Temporal Gyrus  R 133 6.68 4.20   53    5  -16    21  
Calcarine Gyrus L 95 6.66 3.77   -3  -57    4    17 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L 123 6.61 4.13  -45   49   -3    45 
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Superior Medial Gyrus L 90 5.47 3.88   -4   26   39    8 
Angular Gyrus R 117 5.07 3.59   56  -58   24    39  
Table 6.2. Brain regions differentially activated in Compassion and Reappraisal. Cluster maxima are 
reported in bold. Local maxima (italicised) denote subclusters within a cluster found to be not connected to 
the already considered (central) mass in a higher-values-first watershed searching algorithm implemented in 
NeuroElf (i.e. the splitclustercoords function). Multiple comparisons were controlled for using cluster-level 
FWE correction at α < .05 (T > 3.36, p = .001, k > 30) as determined by AFNI’s Alphasim Monte Carlo 
simulation method. For consistency, subclusters smaller than the respective cluster thresholds are not 
reported. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Dynamics of compassion-based emotion regulation. Event related time-courses in amygdala 
and NACC/VS ROIs for Compassion (red) and Reappraisal (blue), subtracted from their respective Watch-
Negative baselines. Shaded areas denote within-subject standard errors (Loftus & Masson, 1994). Time 
points where shaded area does not overlap the abscissa denote significant effects relative to Watch-Negative 
baseline. Time courses are plotted relative to actual timing of experiment and have been interpolated for 
presentation purposes only. 
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6.3.3.4. Temporal Dynamics of Compassion and Reappraisal in Regions tracking Subjective 
Affect 
To test our hypotheses that Reappraisal and Compassion would differ in terms of dynamics of 
core affective regions, we extracted the condition-wise time courses of regions in the 
NACC/VS and amygdala associated with trial-wise reported positive and negative affect (see 
Figure 6.4). First, we established the efficacy of Reappraisal and Compassion in modulating 
activity in these regions by submitting the extracted time series for these conditions and their 
respective Watch-Negative baselines to LMM analysis. Analyses were shifted to allow for 
hemodynamic lag by excluding the three first time points, corresponding to the 0-4 seconds 
following Instruction onset. The remaining time points were averaged for the Preparation (5 
time points, 6-16 seconds following Instruction onset) and Implementation (6 time points, 16-
28 seconds following Instruction onset) phases. Separate models were fitted for each 
technique and region, consisting of fixed factors for Condition (2 levels;  
Reappraisal/Compassion, Watch-Negative) and Period (2 levels; Preparation, Implementation) 
with subject-level random intercepts. For the Compassion condition, these analyses revealed a 
main effect of Condition in both VS/NAC (F(1, 312) = 10.52, p < .001) and amygdala (F(1, 
312) = 4.50, p <.05) ROIs. Follow-up T-tests showed that this effect consisted of higher signal 
in the VS/NAC (t(312) = 3.32, p =< .001) and lower signal t(342) = -2.17, p =< .05) in the 
amygdala ROIs relative to the Watch-Negative condition. For the Reappraisal condition, only 
a main effect of Condition in the amygdala (F(1, 312) = 28.83, p < .001) ROI was observed. 
Follow-up T-tests showing these effects consisted of lower signal overall in the amygdala 
(t(312) = -5.4, p =< .001) in Reappraisal relative to the Watch-Negative condition. Thus, while 
both Compassion and Reappraisal was shown to decrease activation of amygdala relative to 
Watch-Negative, only Compassion was shown to increase activation of VS/NAC.  
To enable direct comparison of modulatory effects, we subtracted their respective 
Watch-Negative baselines from the Compassion and Reappraisal time-courses and submitted 
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these to LMM analysis separately for each region using the same model as above. Figures 4a 
and 4b show time series of this subtraction for the NACC/VS and amygdala ROIs, 
respectively. For the VS/NAC, this revealed a main effect of Condition, (F(1, 312) = 11.16, p 
< .001) as well as a Condition*Period interaction effect (F(1, 312) = 3.96, p < .05). For the 
amygdala, only a main effect of Condition was observed (F(1, 312) = 5.84, p < .05). Follow-
up T-tests revealed that these effects consisted of higher signal in the VS/NAC for 
Compassion relative to Reappraisal specifically during the Implementation period 
(Preparation: t(134) = 3.79, p =< .0001; Implementation: t(164) = 0.97, p => .1 ), and overall 
lower signal in the amygdala for Reappraisal than Compassion (t(312) = -2.42, p =< .05).  
In summary, these results show that Compassion and Reappraisal are differentiable in 
terms of their modulatory effects on the neural correlates of subjective positive (VS/NAC) 
and negative (amygdala) affect.  
 
6.4. Discussion 
 In this study we sought to identify the subjective and neuronal signatures of 
Compassion-meditation when employed to regulate emotional reactions to depictions of 
others’ suffering and compare the mechanisms and effects of Compassion to those of the 
established emotion regulation strategy of Reappraisal. Behaviourally, we expected that the 
main regulatory effect of Compassion should be increased positive affect, reflecting the direct 
generation of positive affect hypothesised to underlie its regulatory effects. This in 
contradistinction to Reappraisal, which we expected to have a more pronounced effect on 
negative affect on account of its focus on altering the affective meaning of the stimuli. 
Neurally, we expected to find evidence of increased activation of core positive affect regions 
during Compassion. Further, consistent with our hypothesis that the regulatory mechanism of 
Compassion is the endogenous generation of positive affect we expected engagement of this 
network independent of stimulus presentation. This effect should also be distinguishable from 
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the modulatory mechanisms of Reappraisal, as Compassion to a lesser degree should down-
regulate core negative affective regions, and not engage cognitive control regions shown to be 
important in regulating negative affect. 
 On the subjective level, we found that Compassion was associated with increased 
positive affect relative to Watch-Neutral, Watch-Negative and Reappraisal. Thus, 
Compassion was more effective at increasing positive affect than Reappraisal. Importantly, 
unlike Reappraisal, Compassion occasioned an increase of positive affect relative to baseline 
levels of positivity (Watch-Neutral). Mirroring these behavioural effects, our fMRI analyses 
revealed that Compassion, relative to both Watch-Negative and Reappraisal, was associated 
with increased activation in subcortical structures associated with positive affect such as 
ventral striatum/NACC and globus pallidus as well as midline cortical structures such as 
vmPFC, rgACC and pgACC (Figures 6.2 and 6.3). These regions have all previously been 
associated with positive affect, motivation and reward (Kringelbach & Berridge, 2009; Rangel 
& Hare, 2010; Schultz, 2010), and affiliation (Strathearn et al., 2009; Vrtička et al., 2008). 
Overall, these results are consistent with previous findings (Klimecki et al., 2013; 2014), 
demonstrating that Compassion is an effective regulation strategy and that a key mechanism 
underlying these regulatory effects is the engagement of neural systems associated with 
positive affect. 
This interpretation is strengthened by the direct comparison between Reappraisal and 
Compassion: In line with previous work (Buhle et al., 2014), Reappraisal was characterised 
by activation of a fronto-parietal network, including ventral and dorsal PFC, dACC, and 
TPJ/SMG, regions known to be associated with cognitive control, attention regulation and 
working memory (Ochsner et al., 2012). Contrary to this, Compassion was shown to rely 
primarily on activation of the aforementioned medial and subcortical systems, with the 
strongest differentiation observable in mOFC and VS/NACC (Figure 6.3). Additionally, 
Compassion was shown to specifically increase activation in bilateral mid-insula, a region 
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previously associated with specifically affiliative types of positive affect, such as maternal 
love (“The neural correlates of maternal and romantic love.,” 2004b). These different 
activation patterns appear to reflect the conceptual difference between Reappraisal and 
Compassion: Reappraisal involves the employment of cognitive control to modulate affective 
influences, whereas Compassion involves the generation of positive affect, without altering 
the processing of negative stimuli. In line with this, we found differential effects of 
Compassion and Reappraisal in regions specifically tracking experienced positive 
(VS/NACC) and negative (amygdala) affect: Compassion showed evidence for increased 
activation of VS/NACC compared to both Reappraisal and passive-viewing. Critically, this 
modulation was apparent prior stimulus presentation consistent with Compassion involving 
the endogenous generation of positive affect in a stimulus-independent fashion. Furthermore, 
Compassion was associated with overall higher amygdala activity than Reappraisal, 
suggesting that Compassion to a lesser degree modulated the primary affective processing of 
the negative stimulus material. Overall, these findings are in line with a view that the 
underlying mechanism of Compassion-based emotion regulation is the volitional and 
stimulus-independent engagement of neural systems supporting the endogenous generation of 
positive affect.  
Our findings are largely consistent with earlier work on short-term effects of 
Compassion training by Klimecki and colleagues (Klimecki et al., 2013; 2014). However, 
unlike these studies, we found that Compassion had a small but significant regulatory effect 
on subjectively experienced negative affect. One possible explanation for this difference is the 
level of experience between the expert practitioners in our study and those subjects tested in 
the Klimecki studies, which had only one week of practice in Compassion. It is possible that 
extensive experience in Compassion affords a concomitant decrease in negative affect. 
Another, complementary, possibility is that these differences stem from the current design 
explicitly instructing participants to generate Compassion prior to exposure to the stimuli. It 
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could be that proactive generation of Compassion is particularly effective at dampening 
negative affect, presumably by providing a buffer of positive affect (Garland et al., 2010). The 
current design does not allow a direct test of this hypothesis, but future research could address 
this by comparing differences in Compassion efficacy as a function of whether it is generated 
proactively or reactively, as this has been shown to be an important determinant of the 
efficacy of other regulation strategies (Sheppes & Gross, 2011). 
 The capacity to be employed independently of specific stimuli and an underlying 
mechanism not involving attenuation or alteration of negative emotional responses potentially 
affords Compassion some unique advantages as an emotion regulation strategy. In the context 
of others’ suffering, Compassion affords maintenance of an empathic connection while 
counteracting empathic distress (Singer & Klimecki, 2014). Thus, employment of 
Compassion as a regulation strategy could avoid of the decreased sensitivity and empathy 
reported when employing cognitive emotion regulation strategies to cope with others’ 
suffering (Cameron & Payne, 2011). Furthermore, Compassion has been shown to be 
associated with an increase in prosocial motivation and helping (Leiberg et al., 2011; Weng et 
al., 2013) suggesting an additional beneficial effect if used as coping strategy in helping 
professions as it would not only increase resilience but also increase their willingness to assist 
individuals in need. 
 
6.4.1. Conclusion 
 In this study we showed that Compassion can be employed as an effective emotion 
regulation strategy outside of its traditional meditative context, and that both experientially 
and neurally it is associated with the endogenous generation of positive affect. While the 
generalizability of our findings, especially with regards to the relative efficacy of Reappraisal 
and Compassion, is limited by the fact that our subjects had extensive experience in 
generating Compassion, recent work demonstrates that it is possible to elicit similar neural 
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and behavioural effects to what we observe here with short-term training (Klimecki et al., 
2014; Leiberg et al., 2011; Weng et al., 2013). This suggests that Compassion might be an 
effective means to promote resilience to others’ suffering also in the general population while 
at the same time promoting emotional connectedness and pro-sociality. 
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Chapter 7: Choosing how to feel: Endogenous 
emotion generation abilities mediate the relationship 
between trait affectivity and emotion management 
style7 
Haakon G. Engen, Philipp Kanske, & Tania Singer 
 
7.1. Abstract 
Interventional research suggests that training the ability to self-generate emotion can 
have substantial mental health benefits, yet little is known about this ability in the normal 
population. We investigated individual differences in implementation of emotion generation 
and the association of this ability with trait affect and emotion management styles. In a novel 
task, participants (N = 288) generated positive, negative and neutral emotion using four 
primary modalities of emotional states (Semantic Analysis, Episodic Imagery, Auditory 
Imagery, Bodily Interoception) using self-chosen combinations optimising generation 
efficacy. Subjective report and psychophysiological indices of emotional arousal indicated 
participants successfully generated both positive and negative emotional states. While 
Episodic Imagery was the most preferred and efficacious modality, usage of all modalities 
except Auditory Imagery was effective, suggesting participants adopted idiosyncratically 
optimal means of implementation. Taking task performance as a measure of individual 
differences in emotion generation ability, we next investigated the relationship between 
emotion generation, trait affect, and emotion management styles. Using an extensive battery 
of questionnaires, we established composite measures of individual differences in trait affect 
and adaptive (Emotion-focused, Instrumental) and maladaptive emotion management, as 
defined by their correlations with trait affect. Both overall emotion generation ability and 
relative efficacy (positive vs. negative) emotion generation were positively correlated with 
                                                
7 The current chapter is presently under review, and the final, published version, might show discrepancies from 
the present version. Presented here is the submitted manuscript of 17.04.2016. 
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trait affect and Instrumental emotion management. Relative ability additionally correlated 
with Emotion-focused emotion management. However, only general generation abilities were 
found to causally mediate the relationship between emotion management and trait affect, 
suggesting that emotion generation abilities enable flexible adaptation to emotional stressors 
in a problem-focused manner. 
 
7.2. Introduction 
Emotions are often thought of as reactions to events in the world. However, emotional 
states are often caused by our own thoughts and memories without clear reference to external 
events. Recent evidence suggests that this ability to generate emotional states based on 
endogenous information can be used in strategic manner to facilitate self-regulation. For 
instance, it has recently been shown that different types of positive imagery can be used 
strategically to counteract both negative emotional reactions to external affairs and internally 
maintained mood states in both normal and clinical populations (H. G. Engen & Singer, 2015; 
2016; Holmes et al., 2006; 2009; Poerio, Totterdell, Emerson, & Miles, 2015a). Moreover, it 
appears that an important aspect of resilience is the capacity to volitionally generate positive 
emotional states (Fredrickson, 2013; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004). As such, the ability to 
self-generate emotional states appears to serve an important self-regulatory function with 
tangible mental health benefits.  
Despite this very little is known about how EnGE abilities vary in the population. For 
one, as extant research on emotion generation has largely been interventional, it has focused 
on teaching individuals to generate emotions using episodic mental imagery (Holmes et al., 
2009; Poerio, Totterdell, Emerson, & Miles, 2015a), on account of the attested efficacy of this 
modality in the generation of emotion (Holmes & Mathews, 2005). However, evidence 
suggests that emotional reactions can be generated in a volitional fashion using numerous 
different information modalities, including semantic analysis (Bergman & Craske, 2000; 
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Holmes et al., 2006), auditory imagery (Williamson et al., 2012) and bodily signals (Philippot 
et al., 2002). Indeed, given the multifaceted nature of emotional experiences (Barrett et al., 
2007a), with clear semantic, imaginal and bodily concomitants it appears likely that 
naturalistic emotion generation involves combining multiple information modalities to create 
an embodied emotional states (Niedenthal et al., 2009). Thus, for instance, a given instance of 
a self-generated emotion is likely to include both thoughts and bodily sensations that might 
occur in combination with imagery, but is not necessarily tied to imagery as in e.g. rumination 
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). One important hitherto unanswered question is therefore to 
what degree different methods of are utilised by the normal population, and, relatedly, 
whether particular generation methods or combinations thereof are particularly efficacious 
means of emotion generation. In addition to having important implications for future 
interventional research, this could potentially offer insight into how different approaches to 
generating emotion might be associated with adaptive or maladaptive affective styles.  
The interventional focus of extant research has also left open questions regarding the 
mechanism supporting potential beneficial effects of emotion generation abilities. Naturally, 
given the focus of these studies on counteracting negative affect, participants were not trained 
in generating negative emotion, but rather were taught techniques to increase positive 
emotion. While evidence strongly supports the efficacy of such interventions (Fredrickson, 
2013; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Holmes et al., 2009; 2016) several questions are 
unanswered important about the mechanism by which emotion generation improves mental 
health outcomes. Most frequently assumed, one possibility is that emotion generation can 
allow individuals to experience positive emotions even in the absence of external appetitive 
stimuli, in effect acting as a counter to negative and stressful external stimuli (H. G. Engen & 
Singer, 2015; Singer & Klimecki, 2014). If this buffering hypothesis is correct, one would 
expect that specifically positive emotion generation would be associated with beneficial affect 
traits, like use of beneficial coping and reduced negative affect. Conversely, the capacity to 
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generate negative emotional states might predispose one to experience more negative affect, 
and maladaptive emotion management. Another possibility is that emotion generation abilities 
can enhance the capacity to deal with emotions through increased emotional complexity and 
differentiation between different emotional states. Thus, by allowing one to accurately 
simulate past and future emotional events (Baumgartner et al., 2008; S. E. Taylor & 
Schneider, 1989), emotion generation skills can be utilised in the service of instrumental and 
problem-focused emotion management. According to such a flexibility hypothesis overall 
emotion generation ability should be associated with beneficial emotional traits, irrespective 
of valence, and might particularly be helpful in enabling strategic and instrumental efforts to 
manage ones emotional states (Kashdan, Barrett, & McKnight, 2015).  
The current study had two goals: First, we sought to describe how endogenous 
emotion generation is implemented in the normal population, with a special emphasis on 
investigating the relationship between modality usage and individual differences in emotion 
generation efficacy. Second, we sought to investigate the relationship between generation 
efficacy and aspects of emotional mental health, particularly trait affectivity and means of 
emotion management, operationalised here as the trait tendency to use different coping or 
emotion regulation techniques. This allowed us to directly test the buffering and flexibility 
hypotheses proposed above. We did this using a newly developed task aimed at gauging 
individual differences in emotion generation abilities. After an automatised training 
procedure, participants (N = 288) self-generated positive and negative emotional states using 
one or more of four modalities (Episodic Imagery, Semantic Analysis, Auditory Imagery, and 
Bodily Interoception) in whichever combination and relative degree they believed would 
facilitate successful emotion generation. Concurrently, participants’ skin conductance levels 
were recorded. Thus, this design allowed an objectively validated assay of individual 
differences in the ability to self-generate emotional states. Thus, by investigating the 
relationship between generation efficacy and modality usage, we could establish the relative 
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efficacies of specific modalities or combinations of modalities. Further, participants 
completed an extensive battery of questionnaires gauging their trait affectivity and coping 
styles, enabling the investigation of how emotion generation was associated with affectivity 
and coping styles, allowing us to directly test the buffering and flexibility hypotheses 
suggested above. Specifically, if the buffering hypothesis was correct we expected that the 
differential capacity for generating positive to negative emotion would predict adaptive 
coping and trait positivity. If the flexibility hypothesis was correct we would conversely 
expect to find no valence effects, but rather that emotion generation on average would predict 
beneficial emotional traits. 
 
7.3. Methods 
7.3.1. Participants 
Data was acquired in the context of an fMRI study, the neural data of which will be 
reported elsewhere. Participants were recruited in the context of the large-scale longitudinal 
ReSource Project (for details see Singer et al., 2016), with baseline data being used for the 
present study. Eligibility was determined using a screening procedure including SCID-I and II 
interviews performed by trained clinical psychologists, ensuring no ongoing mental health 
issues, and no life-time occurrence of psychotic or bipolar disorders, substance dependence, 
or any Axis-II disorders. Out of a recruited sample of 332, 305 participants completed the 
current paradigm. 5 participants were excluded on account of missing data and technical 
difficulties. 4 participants reported difficulties (e.g. nausea or sleepiness) during the 
experiment, and a further 3 participants were removed due to aberrant behaviour suggestive of 
task non-compliance, such as having low or no variance in behavioural ratings between 
conditions and trials. Finally, 5 participants had incomplete questionnaire data, leaving a final 
sample of 288 (168 female, mean age = 40.42, range: 20-55, SD = 9.29). The study was 
approved by the Research Ethics Committees of the University of Leipzig (number 376/12-ff) 
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and the Humboldt University in Berlin (numbers 2013-02, 2013-29, and 2014-10) and was 
carried out in compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave written 
informed consent and were debriefed and paid after the study was completed. 
 
7.3.2. Training procedure 
Before the experiment, participants underwent a supervised automated training session 
with two distinct portions. First, participants underwent a multimodal affect induction 
procedure that provided examples of high and low arousal positive and negative emotion. 
These inductions insured that participants had homogenous representations of the target 
emotional states. Second, participants were introduced to four different means of emotion 
generation using one of four information processing modalities (Episodic Imagery, Semantic 
Analysis, Auditory Imagery, and Bodily Sensations). In addition to corresponding to the 
induction procedure, these modalities were elected as they have been shown in previous 
literature to be effective means of self-inducing emotion (Mayberg et al., 1999; Philippot et 
al., 2002; Vrana et al., 1986; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013).  
Participants freely chose a modality or combination of modalities to generate 
emotions, and were also given the option to use self-formulated generation methods. 
Participants then trained generating positive and negative emotional states and were instructed 
to utilise the modality or combination of modalities that they experienced to best allow them 
to generate emotions in the main experiment. Further details of the procedure are reported in 
the Appendix: Supplemental Methods A1.3.1. 
7.3.3. Experimental procedure 
Each trial was split into a Generation phase, where the target emotion was elicited, and 
a Modulation phase, where the elicited emotion was either Maintained or Regulated. Here we 
focus on the Maintain conditions while the Regulation component will be reported elsewhere. 
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Figure 7.1: Trail structure, behavioural validation and modality usage. A) Schematic representation of 
the experiment. After an automatised procedure where participants trained and selected how to generate 
emotional states, participants were asked to generate positive, negative and neutral states.  Each trial started 
with a fixation cross (4-6 s.). Participants were then presented with cues indicating what emotional state to 
generate (green plus-sign = generate positive, red minus-sign = generate negative, blue zero = generate 
neutral) for 10 seconds. For the emotional conditions, the cue then either changed to a blue zero indicating 
that participants should down-regulate their generated states or remained the same as in the generation phase 
indicating that they should maintain the emotional state for another 5 seconds. Only this maintain-condition 
was the topic of the current study. This was followed by a 5 second fixation cue, and a 5 second bipolar 
subjective affect rating. B) Effect of generation instructions on subjectively reported affect. C) Modality 
usage reported by participants to generate emotions. D) Reported combinations of modalities as a function 
of number of modalities participants reported using. 
 
 
In the Neutral condition, participants were instructed to actively maintain a neutral state of 
mind. The order of conditions was pseudo-randomised with no more than two condition 
repetitions. 
 
  A trial (Figure 7.1A) started with a 4-6 second white fixation cross followed by a 10 
second Inception phase, in which subjects were shown a cue indicating which emotional state 
to generate (Red minus = Negative, Green plus = Positive, Blue zero = Neutral). In the 
emotional conditions a 5 second Modulation phase followed in which the instruction symbol 
remained the same (Maintain condition) or changed to a blue 0 indicating that subjects should 
down-regulate the emotional state they were in (Regulate condition). After a 5 second fixation 
cross, a 5 second Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) ranging from “Extremely negative” via 
“Neutral” to “Extremely positive” (range: +/- 250 from the neutral point (0)) was presented. 
7.3. Methods 
 
171 
 
Initial cursor position was jittered randomly (range: +/- 100 points relative to the Neutral 
point). Responses were given using the right hand index and middle finger. Participants were 
instructed to report their affective state as it was at the moment of report. Stimuli were back-
projected in the MRI scanner using a mirror setup. Eyesight was corrected using goggles 
where appropriate. 
 After the experiment, participants were requested to report what modalities they used 
and to which degree they used them using 9-point Likert scales anchored with “Not used at 
all” and “Used a great deal”). Participants were also given the opportunity to specify that they 
used “Other” (i.e. self-defined) modalities, by describing them in a text box and giving a 
Likert-score for how much they used them.  
7.3.4. Assessing trait affectivity and emotion management styles 
 In the context of the ReSource study, participants completed an extensive package of 
questionnaires measuring a range of socio-affective and cognitive traits (Singer et al., 2016). 
Important for present purposes, this package included multiple measures of the tendency to 
experience positive and negative emotions, as well as measures of the tendency to use 
different emotion regulation and coping strategies, and engage in effortful self-regulation. In 
the following we refer to this as trait affectivity and emotion management style, respectively. 
In order to have stable and comprehensive estimates of trait affectivity and emotion 
management styles, we submitted the relevant scales to separate principal component analyses 
(PCAs; varimax rotation; see Appendix: Supplemental methods A1.3.2-3, Figures A2.3.1-2 
and Table A3.3.1-2 for more detail on scale selection, analyses and interpretation of PCA 
components). Individual loadings on the resultant components were used as our individual 
difference measures for further analysis. 
 For trait affectivity, we included all scales including questions regarding self-
experienced positive and negative affect. Thus, we included the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (Krohne, Egloff, & Kohlmann, 1996), the Types of Positive Affect Scale (P. Gilbert 
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et al., 2008), the Beck’s Depression Inventory II (Hautzinger, Keller, Kühner, & Beck, 2009), 
the trait form of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, & 
Spielberger, 1981), the negative and positive affect subscales of the NEO Five Factor 
Inventory (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 2008) and the negative affect and extraversion subscales of 
the Adult Temperament Questionnaire (Wiltink, Vogelsang, & Beutel, 2006). For emotion 
management, we included all scales measuring the tendencies to use different forms of coping 
or emotion regulation strategies, and the tendency to exercise self-control. This included the 
Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Loch, Hiller, & Witthöft, 2011); Brief COPE 
Inventory (Knoll, Rieckmann, & Schwarzer, 2005), Emotion Regulation of Self and Others 
(Niven, Totterdell, Stride, & Holman, 2011), and the effortful control subscale of the Adult 
Temperament Questionnaire. For trait affectivity, our analyses revealed a single component 
with scales measuring positive trait affect loading negatively and scales measuring negative 
trait affect loading positively (Appendix: Figure A2.3.1A, and Table A3.3.1). For ease of 
interpretation loadings were inverted for subsequent analyses, such that positive loadings 
reflect more trait positivity and vice versa. For emotion management styles, our analyses 
revealed three components (Appendix: Figure A2.3.1B). Component 1 accounted for 17.9% 
variance, with items measuring primarily the tendency to cognitively transform negative 
emotional situations to improve mood. Component 2 accounted 
 
Figure 7.2: Correlation of trait affect and emotion management style. Scatterplots of the relationships 
between the composite scores calculated for average and relative trait-specific generation ability and the 
PCA components measuring trait affectivity (see Appendix: Table A3.3.1) and emotion management styles 
(see Appendix: Table A3.3.2). Relationship between the three emotion management styles and trait 
affectivity.  Lines indicate linear regression lines of best fit and are provided for reference only. See Table 
7.2 for corresponding correlation analyses. 
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for 12.11% variance, with loadings on items measuring the tendency to blame oneself, 
ruminate, catastrophise and other maladaptive tendencies resulting in mood worsening. 
Component 3 accounted for 8.61% variance with loadings on items measuring the tendency to 
take a problem-focused and instrumental approach to emotional stressors by seeking support, 
planning, and actively refocus efforts to improve mood. We labelled these components as 
Emotion-focused, Maladaptive and Instrumental means of emotion management. Importantly, 
these components showed an appropriate correlation structure (see Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2), 
such that individual tendencies to use Emotion-focused and Instrumental management styles 
positively correlated with trait affect. More specifically, these emotion management styles 
were associated with more positive and less negative affect. Conversely, Maladaptive usage 
negatively correlated with trait affect being was associated with less positive and more 
negative affect. 
 
7.3.5. Psychophysiological data acquisition and pre-processing 
 Skin conductance responses were recorded during scanning using a BrainVision setup 
(BrainAmp ExG MR; Brain Products, Munich, Germany). Ag/AgCl electrodes with applied 
isotonic electrode paste as a conductance medium were attached to the index and middle 
finger of the left hand for each subject. The acquired data was filtered using a Butterworth 
0.15 Hz low-pass filter of order 3 using custom MATLAB scripts. Time- courses were then 
visually inspected, excluding data-sets where overall data quality was poor (e.g. showing 
evidence of scanner artefacts after filtering or lack of variance for the entire time series). Of 
the 288 datasets included in this study, 215 also passed these criteria. The remaining data was 
analysed using the Ledalab toolbox (www.ledalab.de). The data was downsampled to 250 Hz, 
and continuous decomposition analysis (Benedek & Kaernbach, 2010b) was performed to 
create estimates of condition specific phasic (due to e.g. changing stimuli) and tonic (due to 
e.g. changing emotional arousal) skin conductance responses. Here, tonic skin conductance 
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levels (SCLs) were used as a measure of emotional arousal as this is the most frequently 
reported skin-conductance metric of emotional arousal (Kreibig, 2010).   
 
7.4. Results 
7.4.1. Validation and operationalization of emotion generation efficacy 
 Post-trial subjective ratings were analysed using paired t tests of the average reported 
affect in each condition (see Figure 7.1B). Relative to the neutral (mean = 7.49, SD = 19.11) 
baseline condition, increased affect was observed for both positive (mean = 82.86, SD = 
49.00; paired t(287) = 27.78, p < 0.001, CI (95%) = 69.83/80.90) and negative (mean = -
72.95, SD = 49.20; paired t(287) = -27.74, p < 0.001, CI (95%) = -87.15/-74.73) Maintain 
conditions.  
 We next sought to establish whether these generated emotions resulted in changes in 
psychophysiological measures of emotional arousal. We additionally investigated whether 
condition-specific correlation between ratings and SCL existed, as this would show that 
behavioural ratings can be taken as proxy for emotional arousal. To this end, trial-level linear 
mixed modelling of the Generation period was performed, predicting log-transformed 
estimates of SCL. The model included subject-level random intercepts, condition (Positive, 
Negative, Neutral) as a categorical fixed effect and trial-wise subjective ratings of affect as a 
continuous fixed effect. To control for potential learning/fatigue effects, trial number was 
entered as a nuisance covariate. Our analysis revealed a main effect of 
Condition(F(2,6224.38) = 3.77, p < .05, and an interaction between Condition and Ratings 
(F(2, 6227.00) = 14.07, p < .001). Breaking this interaction down by condition, we found that 
Ratings predicted SCL in the Positive (t(1937.99) = 4.63, p < .001, CI(95) = -.020/.049) and 
Negative (t(1938.06) = -3.16, p < .01, CI(95) = -.037/-.009) conditions, but not the Neutral 
condition (t(1937.67) = 1.43, CI(95) = -.004/.025). Considering the bipolar rating scale used, 
this shows that SCL increased with affect ratings for both positive and negative emotion, 
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demonstrating that participants were capable of generating both subjective and physiological 
concomitants of positive and negative emotional states.  
 Having validated ratings as a proxy for emotional arousal, we generated composite 
efficacy scores for the remaining analyses based on the average ratings a participants had 
within each condition (Generate Positive, Generate Negative, Generate Neutral; see also 
Figure 7.1B). Average generation efficacy was calculated as ((Generate Positive + Generate 
Negative)/2 – Generate Neutral). Thus, a high loading on this score corresponds to reporting 
higher affect in both positive and negative conditions. Conversely, to investigate the effects of 
valence-specific generation efficacy we calculated a relative efficacy score as (Generate 
Positive - Generate Negative). Accordingly, a high positive score on this variable would 
correspond to high efficacy in generating positive relative to negative emotion and a high 
negative score high efficacy in generating negative relative to positive emotion.  
 
7.4.2. Characterising the preference structure of emotion generation modalities 
Next, we sought to establish whether our participants implemented emotion generation 
in an optimal manner by investigating their reported preferential use of modalities. 14 
participants reported using “other” modalities. On closer inspection all except one of the 
participants’ descriptions closely matched our primary modalities and so were included in the 
primary scores by averaging (see Appendix: Table A3.3.3). The final participant reported 
using several of the primary modalities to a large degree and so their “Other” score was 
ignored. To control for individual differences in rating tendency we calculated the proportion 
of reported usage of each modality relative to the sum total of usage reports. Reported 
modality usage is shown in Figure 7.1C, showing that Episodic Imagery was the most used 
(47.71%), followed by Semantic Imagery (22.72%), Bodily Interoception (18.95%) and 
Auditory Imagery (10.62%). 
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Next, we sought to establish the degree to which participants reported combining these 
modalities, and how they were combined. Usage of a given strategy was operationalised as 
giving a response other than “Did not use at all”. Results (Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1D) showed 
that the majority of participants reported using two or more modalities, with the largest 
proportion combining three modalities. The dominant combination involved the using 
Episodic Imagery together with other modalities, suggesting that, while our participants 
tended to a multimodal implementation, this primarily involves using other modalities to 
supplement Episodic Imagery. 
 
Table 7.1: Combinations of modalities. Usage and proportional composition of modality combinations as 
a function of number of modalities reported used. Number of participants reporting using each combination 
of modalities reported in the N column, whereas the self-reported degree to which each modality was used 
on average is reported in the Proportional Composition columns. 
 
 
7.4.3. Efficacy of emotion generation modalities 
Next we investigated the efficacy of these modalities by specifying two multiple 
regression models predicting average and relative generation efficacy (controlling for the 
respective other), including scaled self-reported modality usage scores as continuous, 
interacting predictors. Age and gender were included as nuisance covariates.  
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Average generation efficacy was significantly predicted by reported usage of Episodic 
Imagery (b = 10.79, t(269) = 3.87, p < .001, F(1,269) = 15.01, Partial Eta2 = .053), Semantic 
Analysis (b = 7.45, t(269) = 2.36, p =<.05, F(1, 269) = 5.59, Partial Eta2 = .020) and Bodily 
Interoception (b = 7.81, t(269) = 2.49, p =< .05, F(1, 269) = 7.19, Partial Eta2 = .023), with no 
significant interactions (see Figure 7.3A). As the effect of Episodic Imagery was considerably 
larger than Semantic Analysis and Bodily Interoception, we used the multcomp R package to 
statistically contrast the parameters. Results indicated no significant difference between any 
of the combinations of modalities. When repeated for relative efficacy, no significant effects 
were observed (see Figure 7.3B). Thus, usage of all modalities except for Auditory Imagery 
predicted more effective emotion generation in general, but did not show evidence of being 
beneficial or detrimental for the generation of specific valences.  
 
Figure 7.3: Relationship between modalities and generation efficacy. Plots of beta-estimates from 
multiple regression models investigating the effect of modality usage on emotion generation efficacy. A) 
Relationship between modality usage and average emotion generation efficacy. B) Relationship between 
modality usage and the relative ability to generate positive and negative emotion. Error bars denote +/- SE. * 
=< .05, ** =< .01, *** =< .001 
 
7.4.4. Emotion generation efficacy, trait affect and emotion management styles 
 We next sought to investigate the relationship between individual differences in 
emotion generation efficacy and trait affect and emotion management styles. Using the R 
package ppcor (S. Kim, 2015), we calculated non-parametric (Spearman) partial correlations 
between average and relative generation efficacy and loadings on the components described 
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above, controlling for age and gender. Scatterplots of these comparisons are reported in 
Appendix: Figure A2.3.2, while Bonferroni-corrected results are reported in Table 7.2. Both 
absolute generation ability (Appendix: A2.3.2A), and relative ability to generate positive 
versus negative emotion (Appendix: A2.3.2C) was positively correlated with trait affect. 
Further, average generation efficacy was specifically correlated with usage of Instrumental 
emotion management (Appendix: A2.3.2B), whereas relative generation ability correlated 
with use of Emotion-focused and Instrumental emotion management (Appendix: A2.3.2D). 
Thus, while both average generation efficacy and the relative capacity to generate positive 
emotion were associated with trait affectivity and usage of Instrumental emotion 
management, only relative emotion generation ability was correlated with use of Emotion-
focused emotion management styles. 
 
Average 
Generation 
Ability 
Relative 
Generation  
Ability 
Trait  
Affect 
Relative Generation 
Ability -0.03 1   
Trait affect 0.18*** 0.12** 1 
Emotion-focused 0.063 0.14*** 0.261*** 
Maladaptive  -0.02 0.01 -0.527*** 
Instrumental  0.128** 0.12** 0.219*** 
 
Table 7.2: Relationship between emotion generation and affective style. Bonferroni corrected non-
parametric partial Spearman correlations (controlling for age and gender) between the composite generation 
efficacy scores for average and relative generation ability, and the single trait affect component and the three 
emotion management components revealed by our PCA analyses. See also Appendix: Figure A2.3.2 for 
scatterplots of these relationships. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001 
 
7.4.5. Mediation analyses 
 Our final analyses sought to establish whether emotion generation abilities mediated 
the relationship between emotion management and trait affect using the mediation R toolbox 
(Tingley, Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, & Imai, 2014) to perform nonparametric causal 
mediation analyses with bootstrapped confidence intervals (10000 samples). If such mediation 
was in evidence, it would suggest that emotion generation skills are part of the mechanism by 
which (adaptive) emotion management influences trait affect. 
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Models were specified based on our correlation analyses (Table 7.2), investigating 
mediation of the relationship between Instrumental management style and trait affectivity 
both average and relative generation efficacy, and relationship between Emotion-focused 
management style and trait affectivity for relative generation efficacy only. In each model the 
other efficacy composite, age and gender were entered as covariates. This revealed that 
average generation efficacy partially mediated the relationship between instrumental emotion 
management and trait affect (Figure 7.4A), while no mediation was observed for valence-
specific generation (Figures 7.4B and 7.4C). Thus, our results suggest that average, but not 
valence-specific, generation ability is part of the mechanism by which Instrumental emotion 
management improves trait affect. 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Depiction of the causal mediation models tested. A) Mediation model showing that average 
generation efficacy partially mediates the relationship between instrumental emotion management styles and 
trait affectivity (9.18% of effect mediated). B) Mediation model showing that relative emotion generation 
efficacy does not mediate the relationship between emotion-focused management styles and trait affectivity.  
C) Mediation model showing that relative emotion generation efficacy does not mediate the relationship 
between instrumental emotion management styles and trait affectivity. 
 
7.5. Discussion 
 The objective of the current study was twofold: First, we sought to describe how 
emotion generation is implemented in a naturalistic fashion in the normal population, with 
special emphasis on establishing the relative efficacy of different information modalities. 
Second, we wanted to test two competing hypotheses about emotion generation efficacy: the 
buffering hypothesis proposing that enhanced ability to generate positive emotion facilitates 
increased trait positivity and emotion management skills and the flexibility hypothesis 
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proposing that emotion generation in general enhances emotion management and thereby 
enhances trait positivity. We tested these hypotheses using a newly developed, minimally 
constrained paradigm where participants self-generated positive and negative emotion using 
one or more of four information modalities (Episodic Imagery, Semantic Analysis, Auditory 
Imagery, Bodily Interoception), and a comprehensive questionnaire-based assessment of trait 
affectivity and emotion management styles.  
 Overall, we found that participants were able to successfully generate both positive 
and negative emotional states, as indicated by both subjective report and physiological 
measures of emotional arousal. We found that participants freely used all four of the 
modalities we suggested in combination to achieve these states. Moreover, despite being free 
to use other modalities according to their own preferences, participant report did not indicate 
usage of modalities not captured by the four primaries, suggesting our results adequately 
capture the space of endogenous emotion generation modalities. Overall, and in line with 
previous research, we found that Episodic Imagery was the most frequently used modality 
(47.71%) followed by Semantic Analysis (22.72%), Bodily Interoception (18.95%), and 
Auditory Imagery (10.62%). In line with our expectations, the vast majority of participants 
reported using a combination of modalities to generate emotion. This most frequently took the 
form of using other modalities in adjunct to Episodic Imagery (see Table 7.1 and Figure 
7.1D), with Semantic Analysis and Bodily Interoception being used in approximately equal 
measure. Despite this we did not find that any combination of modalities outperformed others, 
with Semantic Analysis, Episodic Imagery and Bodily Interoception usage all having 
comparable, significant, effects on generation efficacy. This suggests that proficiency with a 
given modality was reflected in better emotion generation abilities. The relative inefficacy and 
lack of use of the Auditory Imagery modality could be possibly be attributed to the loud 
scanner environment the generation occurred in. That aside, these results support our 
contention that participants used the modalities that they were the most adept at using, 
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meaning our experiment can be taken as reflecting individual differences in emotion 
generation abilities.  
 Investigating the relationship these abilities have with measures of emotion 
management style and trait affectivity, we found that both general emotion generation ability 
and the relative ability to generate positive over negative emotion were positively correlated 
with trait affect and beneficial emotion management styles. However, only general emotion 
generation ability was found to causally mediate the effect of emotion management styles on 
trait affect, suggesting that the relative ability to generate positive or negative affect is an 
outcome of trait affect and adaptive coping and does not partake in the mechanism by which 
adaptive emotion management facilitates mental health. Overall, our findings support the 
flexibility hypothesis of the mental health benefits of emotion generation, showing that the 
capacity to generate emotions in general supports the means by which adaptive, instrumental 
emotion management promotes positive affective tone. While the precise mechanism by 
which emotion generation abilities do this is a topic for future research, one possibility is that 
they enable the embodied episodic simulation of the emotional outcomes of future events (S. 
E. Taylor & Schneider, 1989), thereby enabling one to flexibly plan and adapt ones behaviour 
to negative and facilitate positive emotional events (Kappes, Singmann, & Oettingen, 2012; 
Kashdan et al., 2015; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010).  
 In addition to their theoretical importance, our findings inform the ongoing 
development of interventions aimed at harnessing different modes of emotion generation to 
facilitate emotional self-regulation, suggesting that these interventions should be aimed at the 
generation of both positive and negative emotion, and that there are multiple means by which 
generation can be implemented. This contrasts with current research that tends to highlight the 
ability to generate of positive emotion as a means to improve mental health (H. G. Engen & 
Singer, 2015; Holmes et al., 2006; e.g. Poerio, Totterdell, Emerson, & Miles, 2015a). Implicit 
in these studies is a buffering hypothesis, along the lines that increasing access to positive 
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emotion will undo negative emotion. Our results that relative emotion generation abilities do 
not mediate the relationship between trait affect and emotion management styles could be 
taken as evidence against such a buffering account. However, it should be remembered here 
that the current results pertain to the normal, untrained individual. In support of this, recent 
evidence suggests that in the normal population beneficial effects of positive emotion 
generation are phasic, and can, indeed, be deleterious to mental health over time if they are 
divorced from behaviours aimed at achieving the eliciting end-state (Oettingen, Mayer, & 
Portnow, 2016). Thus, while valence-specific emotion generation abilities might not enable an 
untrained individual to manage their emotions, this might be made possible with training 
(Fredrickson, 2013). 
 Speaking to how to train emotion generation, while the vast majority of extant 
research has focused on Episodic Imagery (Murphy et al., 2015), our results suggest that 
focusing interventions based on Episodic Imagery alone might not be optimal for everyone. 
Indeed, we found that, while Episodic Imagery was the most frequently used, the large 
majority of participants spontaneously combined Episodic Imagery with other modalities 
when instructed to optimally generate emotions. This is interesting because it appears that a 
sequela of major affective disorders like anxiety and depression is impaired ability to engage 
in Episodic Imagery (Morina et al., 2011). Possibly, this can be counteracted by devising 
interventions that emphasise the use of supporting modalities to enable flexible generation of 
emotions in both pathology and normal function. 
 
7.5.1. Conclusion 
 In this study we provided evidence that endogenous emotion generation enables 
emotion management, causally mediating the relationship between trait affect and specifically 
instrumental means of dealing with negative affect. Importantly, evidence suggests that this 
ability is related to individual differences in the flexibility of emotion management rather than 
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an increased ability to create endogenous buffers against exogenous stressors, possibly related 
to the capacity to simulate and thereby predict future affective states. As such, endogenous 
emotion generation appears to be an important part of emotional self-regulation that should be 
a focus of future studies.  
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Chapter 8: Summary and discussion 
 
8.1. Chapter overview 
The two goals of this thesis was 1) to explore the mechanisms supporting the 
endogenous generation of emotion and 2) how these can be used for emotion management. 
Pursuing the first goal, Chapters 4 and 5 explored the neural bases of EnGE. Chapter 4 sought 
to establish the neural component process architecture of EnGE in two large representative 
samples, using a novel paradigm that enabled dissociation of general from implementation-
specific neural mechanisms. Chapter 5 sought to verify this architecture by investigating 
morphological differences in a sample of long term meditators with expertise in EnGE-based 
practices. Pursuing the second goal, Chapters 6 and 7 investigated the functional 
consequences of EnGE as an emotion management technique. Chapter 6 investigated the 
neural mechanisms of using EnGE-based meditation techniques for to regulate emotional 
reactions to external stressors in a population of expert meditators. Chapter 7 widened the 
scope of investigation and explored how EnGE-abilites in general are associated with emotion 
management and trait affect in the normal population. In the following, the results from these 
studies are summarised starting with a characterisation of the phenomenon of EnGE as the 
current studies reveal it, followed by an account of what the findings suggest about how 
EnGE can be used as a means of emotion management. 
 
8.2. Characterising endogenous emotion generation 
8.2.1. Behaviour and psychophysiology 
In the working model outlined in Chapter 2, it was proposed that EnGE should be 
conceptualised as an embodied phenomenon, resulting (when successfully implemented) in 
emotional reactions with subjective and physiological responses similar to those concomitant 
exogenously generated emotions. Overall, results showed that participants were capable of 
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self-generating strong emotional states, as measured by self-report in the RAGE paradigm 
(Chapters 4 and 7; Figure 4.1). Moreover, a significant relationship was found between 
reported affect and psychophysiological responses, such that ratings of positive or negative 
affect were associated with higher skin conductance levels (SCL). Given the known 
association between emotional arousal and SCL (Kreibig, 2010) this both validates the 
experimental approach taken, and supports the operationalisation offered in Chapter 2.2 in 
which EnGE was defined as a process by which embodied emotional experiences are elicited. 
 
8.2.2. Naturalistic EnGE: Implementation forms and efficacy 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, the vast majority of research on the efficacy of EnGE 
has focused on mental imagery, with only a few comparative studies investigating the relative 
efficacy of mental imagery versus e.g. semantic analysis as a means of self-induction. 
Summarising, this research (see Holmes & Pictet, 2013 for a recent review) has found that 
mental imagery appears to be the most efficacious technique for generation of both positive 
and negative emotion. Conversely, approaches using semantic analysis apparently leads to 
paradoxical effects, such as attempts at generating positive emotion resulting in mood 
decreases (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). In support of this, the current results show that 
analogue of mental imagery (i.e. episodic imagery) was the most frequently reported of the 
four modality-options participants reported using in the RAGE (Chapter 7, see Figure 7.1). 
However, unlike previous studies, participants were allowed to freely combine different 
modalities, with the objective of gaining a more naturalistic measure of how different 
modalities might be combined. When investigating the proportional combinations of 
modalities, (Chapter 7, Figure 7.1D, Table 7.1) it was found that the overwhelming majority 
of participants reported using combinations of modalities to generate emotion. While episodic 
imagery was clearly the most preferred modality overall, both semantic analysis and bodily 
interoception were frequently used in conjunction with it (see Table 7.1). Thus, it appears that 
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using multiple modalities constitutes the standard approach to generating emotion in the 
normal population. Moreover, considerable variation was observed in which and to what 
degree participants combined modalities, likely reflecting individual differences in the ability 
to access information from different modalities. This source of variability is important to 
consider in future work investigating EnGE, in particular for interventional research where 
populations might have decreased ability to use given modalities (e.g. depression tends to 
decrease the ability to engage in mental imagery Bergman & Craske, 2000) such that training 
in other modalities might enable circumvention or compensation for deficits. This conclusion 
is strengthened when considering the relative efficacy of strategies: The current findings 
suggest that, while imagery is the most effective means of generating emotion, both semantic 
analysis and bodily interoception can be used to self-induce emotional states effectively. 
Indeed, when combined with the fact that participants spontaneously chose to combine 
modalities when given the option, this suggests that effective emotion generation is best 
afforded by combining multiple streams of information. This is in line with the 
operationalisation proposed in Chapter 2 of EnGE as a process by which rich, multi-modal, 
embodied representations of emotional events are constructed. While imagery of course is 
central to this by allowing one to imagine emotional scenarios, both bodily indicators of 
emotion (G. A. Miller et al., 1987) and different semantic appraisals (Kross et al., 2005; 2009; 
Kross & Ayduk, 2008) impact on the emotional consequence of such imagery. Thus, 
combining modalities is likely to result in more vividly experienced emotional states, 
explaining the current findings. 
 
8.2.3: The neural component-process architecture of EnGE 
In Chapter 2, a working model of EnGE was proposed in which EnGE is supported by 
the cooperation of three major intrinsic connectivity networks, the Default Mode (DMN), 
Salience (SN) and Frontoparietal Control Networks (FPCN). Based on an analysis of the 
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psychological mechanisms likely involved in EnGE, it was proposed that these networks 
implement distinct component processes during EnGE. Specifically, it was proposed that SN 
was a candidate network for the generation of core affective states. DMN was proposed 
supporting the generation of internal representations of the conceptual context that gives 
meaning to these core affective states, resulting in emotional experiences that can be 
characterised as embodied simulations. Finally, FPCN was proposed to serve a particular role 
in volitional EnGE, supporting both controlled retrieval processes and supporting goal-
directed coordination of SN and DMN. In Chapter 4, this model was tested in two fMRI 
experiments using the same paradigm (the RAGE). Overall, it was found that EnGE of both 
positive and negative emotional states (relative to maintaining a neutral state) was associated 
with activation of nodes of the three intrinsic connectivity networks proposed (Figure 8.1).  
In two separate experiments in Chapters 5 and 6, replication of these findings were 
sought by investigating the neural correlates of loving kindness and compassion meditation – 
two meditation techniques that both are known to centrally involve active generation of, 
specifically positive, affect (Klimecki et al., 2013; 2014). As such, this allowed the 
investigation of a “naturally occurring” technique by which to train emotion generation. 
Importantly, participants in these studies were expert, long term meditators that had  
 
Figure 8.1: The main functional neuroimaging findings from the current series of experiments. A) 
Results from Chapter 4, showing the contrast of Generate > Neutral. B) Results from Chapter 5, showing 
increases in amplitude of low-frequency fluctuations during loving-kindness meditation relative to rest. C) 
Results from Chapter 6, showing the contrast Compassion-meditation > Watch-Negative. For details see 
respective chapters. All results FWEc < .05.  
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specialised in loving-kindness and compassion meditation, allowing us to investigate the 
effects of emotion generation expertise on brain morphology. Summarising, the results from 
these two studies showed a great deal of overlap with the results described above. Loving-
kindness meditation was associated with increased activation of left ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex, including inferior frontal gyrus, overlapping with the FPCN nodes reported above. 
Further, activation of perigenual, frontopolar and ventromedial prefrontal cortices was 
observed, corresponding closely to the frontal portion of the DMN. Evidence was also found 
that compassion meditation was associated with increased activation of several nodes of the 
extended Salience Network, including anterior insula and several subcortical regions, 
including parts of the basal ganglia (most notably ventral striatum and nucleus accumbens). 
Thus, these studies suggest that loving-kindness and compassion meditation has a similar 
neural implementation to endogenous emotion generation as observed in Chapter 4, 
supporting the contention that these regions implement core component processes of 
volitional emotion generation. Importantly, Chapter 6 demonstrated that this was the case also 
when participants were employing emotion generation to cope with external stimuli, meaning 
that the engagement of this network generalises outside of purely self-focused generation 
contexts. 
Using both model-based and data-driven analysis approaches, the distinct component 
processes supported by these networks were probed: Model-based decomposition of time-
series (Figure 4.3) indicated that the initial generation of emotional states was associated with 
activation of the SN, while the representation of such emotional states was associated with 
activation of DMN, together with ventral AI and core limbic structures. FPCN nodes, centred 
on pre-SMA and left-lateralised. Finally, left lateralised nodes of the Frontoparietal Control 
Network, in particular the triangular and orbital portions of the inferior frontal gyrus, middle 
frontal gyrus and the pre-supplementary motor area had activation dynamics consistent with 
them supporting the maintenance of the emotion generation process. Complementary data-
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driven network-centric analyses showed that FPCN partook in two distinct functional 
components predictive of EnGE-success. Interestingly, in addition to FPCN, these two 
components consisted of nodes of (primarily cortical) SN and DMN (together with limbic 
structures) respectively. Thus, these findings suggest FPCN coordinates activation of these 
networks EnGE, and thus plays a part in implementing both core affect generation and 
representation formation component processes. When viewed in the context of the finding that 
FPCN appears to be centrally involved in the effortful maintenance of EnGE, this suggests 
that the FPCN supports EnGE by maintaining generated emotional states over time. 
Interestingly, Chapter 5 found evidence of cortical thickening in the IFG portion of this 
network in long-term meditators with expertise in practices requiring the endogenous 
generation of emotion (Figure 5.1). This thickness increase overlapped with the functional 
activations supporting the state of loving-kindness meditation, and differs from structural 
changes frequently reported for kinds of meditation less reliant on the generation of internal 
representations (Fox et al., 2014). Thus, extensive training in the generation of emotional 
states appears to alter brain morphology in the left IFG, consistent with this region playing a 
key role in EnGE. Summarising, the current results support the hypothesised three-process, 
three-network model of EnGE, albeit with a number of discrepancies with respect to the exact 
regions found to be involved, and how they functionally interact. These are discussed in detail 
below. 
 
8.2.4. Neural mechanisms of valence-specific EnGE 
In addition to establishing the overall neural architecture of EnGE, Chapter 4 explored 
the neural correlates of the generation of different valences. This was done by investigating 
parametric modulations of BOLD signal by subjective reports following each trial (see Figure 
4.5). Overall, there was a remarkable overlap between regions correlating with positive and 
negative affect, most notably in the frontal portions of the left FPCN (IFG, MFG and pre-
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SMA) and SN (dorsal AI, dorsal ACC, basal ganglia, thalamus). This finding is consistent 
with recent work showing that cortical and limbic representations of emotion are mainly 
bivalent (K. A. Lindquist, Satpute, Wager, Weber, & Barrett, 2016). Thus, it appears that the 
generation of subjective states of positive and negative emotion largely relies on the same 
neural mechanisms.  
However, a clear dissociation between positive and negative emotion was observed, 
centred on the brainstem: Positive emotion ratings correlated with activation of ventral 
aspects of the mesencephalon corresponding to the substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area 
(SN/VTA). Conversely, negative emotion ratings correlated with dorsal aspects of the 
mesencephalon, corresponding to the periaqueductal grey. Interestingly, these regions are 
perhaps the evolutionarily oldest structures known to be associated with hedonic experiences 
(Berridge & Kringelbach, 2013). For instance, the SN/VTA is heavily implicated in reward 
processing, and is known to be the originator of the dopamine-based reward circuit (Fields, 
Hjelmstad, Margolis, & Nicola, 2007). Important for present purposes, the integrity of this 
reward circuit is associated with trait differences in anhedonia, or the inability to experience 
positive emotion (Alcaro, Huber, & Panksepp, 2007; J. Keller et al., 2013), consistent with it 
being involved in the generation of the positive core of endogenous affective experiences. The 
PAG, conversely, is involved in the processing of negative reinforcers ranging from painful 
stimulation (Roy et al., 2014) to negative emotion (Satpute et al., 2013). Indeed, a recent 
study (Buhle et al., 2013) found that the PAG was a convergence zone for the experience of 
both pain and negative emotion elicited by negative picture viewing. This is consistent with 
the present findings, suggesting that recruitment of the PAG is involved in the generation of 
core affective qualities of endogenous negative emotional states. While usually overshadowed 
by the amygdala in the human literature on the neural bases of negative affect, it should be 
noted that the PAG features heavily in animal models of motivation and affect (Behbehani, 
1995; Panksepp, 2004). Importantly, the connectivity patterns (Coulombe, Erpelding, Kucyi, 
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& Davis, 2016; Tomasi & Volkow, 2014) of the SN/VTA and PAG are consistent with the 
current observations, with both regions showing intrinsic functional connectivity with insula, 
basal ganglia and dorsomedial prefrontal – all regions found to show bivalent correlations 
with subjective experience in the current results.  
Interestingly, it does not appear that these midbrain regions are functionally connected 
to FPCN. This suggests a model in which frontal FPCN engages (particularly cortical) SN in 
order to enact the generation of valenced, core affective states that in turn are generated in 
mesencephalon. In support of this model, CPCA results (Figure 4.4) suggest that cortical and 
thalamic SN, but not mesencephalon, form a functional network. The precise causal chain of 
this influence is unclear however, with both dorsal ACC (Beckmann, Johansen-Berg, & 
Rushworth, 2009) and insula (Cauda et al., 2011) being intrinsically connected to the frontal 
nodes of the FPCN observed, meaning that FPCN could be enacting these effects via both 
dorsal and ventral routes. Future work could adopt a model-based effective connectivity 
approach, using e.g. dynamic causal modelling to investigate this (Cha et al., 2016).  
At this point, the possibility should be mentioned that the correlations reported here 
might resolve into distinct subregions coding for positive and negative valences if data was 
acquired with higher resolution. For instance, evidence suggests that, while the nucleus 
accumbens (NACC) is involved in the processing of both reward and aversion, there is a 
distinct topography to this, such that anterior NACC supports rewards and posterior NACC 
supports aversion processing (see Berridge & Kringelbach, 2015 for a review). Unfortunately, 
the current investigations do not have sufficient spatial resolution to resolve subcomponents 
of the NACC, so valence specificity at a higher level than mesencephalon cannot be ruled out. 
Similarly, as the current results are based on univariate methods (specifically parametric 
modulation of region activation), it cannot be ruled out that there are differential, multivariate 
activation patterns supporting positive and negative emotion generation. However, even if this 
were the case this would not invalidate the general conclusion from the current work that 
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EnGE engages even deep and evolutionarily old circuits known to subserve the generation of 
core affective sensations. This strongly suggests that volitionally generated endogenous 
emotions should be considered “real emotions”, on line with both spontaneous endogenous 
and exogenously elicited emotional reactions.  
On a theoretical level, it should be noted that this finding diverges from the process 
model of EnGE proposed in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.3), where control processes were proposed to 
support recall of modality-specific information and the multimodal associative construction 
process, in line with previous work on self-generated thought and planning (Gerlach et al., 
2014; Spreng et al., 2010). On this model, one would expect control networks (i.e. the FCPN) 
to primarily interact with systems supporting the generation of representations (supported by 
the DMN), which in turn would couple to systems supporting the generation of core affect 
(supported by the SN). While the current results do support a role of the FPCN in both 
representation formation and recall of modality-specific information (see Chapter 8.2.5), 
FPCN activation both scales with subjective affect intensity and forms a functional 
subcomponent with the SN. This is consistent with FPCN initialising both the generation of 
core affective states and representation generation. Seemingly, this finding is at odds with the 
modal model of emotion generation (see Figure 2.3 A; J. J. Gross, 2007b), where emotional 
reactions are posited to stem from appraisal of affectively relevant situations. It does, 
however, cohere with what is predicted from a constructivist account of emotion generation 
(Barrett, 2011), which posits that emotional experiences occur when feelings of physical 
changes in the body are interpreted by relating them to conceptual knowledge about the world 
(i.e. situation). On this model, EnGE could not occur without coordinated generation of both 
sensations of the bodily concomitants of emotions, as well as the formation of a 
representational context in which these sensations are made meaningful. Thus, the co-
activation of, respectively, SN and DMN, with FPCN could plausibly reflect this generation 
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process, with the SN-FPCN subcomponent generating the core affective states of emotions, 
while FPCN-DMN supports the (goal-directed) generation of simulations.  
 
8.2.5. Supramodal and modality-specific neural systems of EnGE 
Supporting this account, evidence overall supported a role of DMN nodes in 
specifically the formation of elaborated representations. Reported usage of modalities was 
correlated with activation in largely domain-relevant regions (see Figure 4.6): Semantic 
analysis usage correlated with activation of regions overlapping with the proposed semantic 
system, including Wernicke's area and premotor cortex (Binder et al., 2009). Conversely, 
episodic imagery usage correlated with activation of the retrosplenial cortex/posterior 
cingulate cortex, known to be involved in episodic retrieval processes (Andrews-Hanna et al., 
2010). Finally, bodily interoception usage correlated with activation of bilateral anterior 
insulae, known to be involved in a wide range of interoceptive processes (Craig, 2002; Seth, 
2013; Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009).  
Next, regions were identified whose relationship with reported usage was mediated by 
activation of these regions. As this is essentially a correlational method, this analysis allowed 
us to identify the extended functional connectivity networks supporting modality usage. As 
above, the networks thus identified were largely consistent with expectations: Semantic 
analysis was supported by large components of the extended semantic system (Binder et al., 
2009), including Broca's area (BA44), a region known to be essential for generative aspects of 
language. Episodic imagery was found to most centrally be supported by precuneus/anterior 
PCC and ventromedial/orbitofrontal regions overlapping with the medial-temporal subsystem 
of the DMN, most closely associated with episodic retrieval and mental imagery (Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2010; 2014; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007). Finally, 
bodily interoception was supported by a more constrained network, but centrally including 1) 
posterior insula, thought to correspond to primary interoceptive cortex (Craig, 2002), and 2) 
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extrastriate and fusiform body areas, known to support representations of bodies and body 
parts (Lamm & Decety, 2008; J. C. Taylor et al., 2007). 
In addition to these modality-specific networks, a supramodal pathway (Figure 4.6C) 
was identified. This pathway included key nodes of the DMN, including dorsomedial PFC 
and middle temporal gyrus ranging into the temporal pole. Additionally, the pathway included 
key nodes of the FPCN, including bilateral IFG, and left lateral MFG and premotor cortex, as 
well as components of the SN, including ventral anterior insula and portions of the caudate 
and pallidum of the basal ganglia. The fact that this pathway supported multimodal 
implementation suggests that it is at the functional core of EnGE. Interestingly, this pathway 
to a large degree overlaps with the dorsal-medial subsystem of the DMN, known to have close 
associations with domain-general integration of endogenous information into internal 
simulations (Andrews-Hanna, 2012). Moreover, the FPCN nodes partaking in this pathway 
roughly correspond to the inferior frontal junction, known to be involved in a wide range of 
self-control processes (Brass & Eickhoff, 2016), and the pars triangularis (BA 45) and 
opercularis (BA 47) portions of the inferior frontal gyrus. Interestingly, these two regions are 
thought to be central to the cognitive control of mnemonic retrieval (Badre & Wagner, 2007), 
particularly if such retrieval is based on semantic cues (Thompson, Henshall, & Jefferies, 
2016). Notably, there was a marked overlap between these components and those found to 
predict individual ratings of emotional intensity (discussed above in Chapter 8.2.4), 
suggesting that ventrolateral FPCN supports the controlled retrieval of information relevant to 
the emotional target state, which is then used to construct detailed simulations of emotional 
states, presumably supported by the dorsal-medial DMN. Supporting this interpretation, 
constrained principal components analysis of the EnGE process revealed that the same ventral 
and dorsolateral components of the FPCN partook in two functional components whose 
activation predicted generation success (see Figure 4.4). Importantly, in the remainder, these 
components consisted of regions largely overlapping with the DMN and the SN, respectively. 
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Overall, these findings strongly suggest that the left frontal FPCN is pivotal in organising the 
EnGE process, engaging both core affective regions, domain-general systems involved in the 
generation of representations, and modality-specific networks, in line with the degree to 
which the generated representations rely on different sources of information.  
 
8.2.6. The role of limbic structures in EnGE 
In the working model presented in Chapter 2, it was proposed that the extended 
Salience Network (SN) worked in unison to elicit core affective states. One of the more 
unexpected findings in the current thesis was evidence that two key structures of the extended 
SN, the amygdala (AMY) and NACC appeared to not be involved in the initial generation 
phase of EnGE, but rather in its extended representation (see Figures 4.3, 4.4). Based on 
extensive evidence regarding the important role of these structures in the generation of 
emotional reactions (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2013; Kober et al., 2008; K. A. Lindquist et al., 
2016; K. A. Lindquist & Barrett, 2012; Wager et al., 2008) the involvement of these limbic 
structures were primarily thought to be in the generation of affective responses. Activation 
patterns of these regions were not consistent with them supporting the generation of core 
affective qualities of endogenous emotions, but rather suggested they were involved in the 
elaboration of these states into emotional experiences (see Figure 4.3). Moreover, data-driven 
multivariate network analysis of the EnGE process revealed that AMY and NACC formed a 
functional component with DMN and not SN (see Figure 4.4), a finding that is surprising 
given their intrinsic connectivity patterns of these regions (Menon & Uddin, 2010; Seeley et 
al., 2007). Overall, this suggests that AMY and NACC supports relatively higher-order 
processes related to the experience of emotion in EnGE, and not the generation of hedonic 
states as originally expected. 
As previously mentioned, recent constructivist models of emotion generation (K. A. 
Lindquist & Barrett, 2008; e.g. Russell, 2014), propose that the experience of an emotional 
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state only occurs when core affective sensations are interpreted relative to the context the 
individual finds itself in. This act of contextualization is thought to be supported mainly by 
the DMN (K. A. Lindquist et al., 2012), supported by constructive memory processes 
(Schacter et al., 2012; Schacter & Addis, 2007) known to be instantiated in the DMN. Their 
activation during EnGE could thus reflect a role of NACC and AMY in guided search for 
affective memory traces in service of elaborating core affective states, in turn produced by the 
activation of mesencephalic structures and more posterior parts of the basal ganglia by 
cortical SN. Supporting this interpretation, animal models suggest that interaction of AMY 
and NACC plays an important role in the encoding and consolidation of emotional memories 
(LaLumiere, LaLumiere, Nawar, & McGaugh, 2005; Roozendaal et al., 2009; Setlow, 
Roozendaal, & McGaugh, 2008). Moreover, both NACC and AMY are known to play a key 
role in effecting behaviours based on instrumental learning (Albertin, Mulder, Tabuchi, 
Zugaro, & Wiener, 2000; Balleine & Killcross, 2006; Corbit, Corbit, & Balleine, 2005; Corbit 
et al., 2001), a process that critically involves linking stimuli to affective responses via the 
intermediary of internal representations of causal relationships.  
 
8.2.7. The role of anterior insula in EnGE 
However, fractionation of the cortical portion of the SN was also observed, with an 
apparent dissociation in evidence between the ventral and dorsal portions of the anterior 
insula (AI), with dorsal AI apparently supporting the initial generation of core affect (as 
reviewed in Chapter 8.2.4), and the ventral AI forming a part of the supramodal pathway 
(described in Chapter 8.2.5), together with limbic structures and DMN in support of 
experience representation (see Figure 4.6). Interestingly, this differentiation mimics recent a 
recent study reporting that dorsal and ventral AI are functionally dissociable, and that the 
connectivity strength of this region with other components of the SN (notably hypothalamus, 
basal ganglia and perigenual ACC) is predictive of individual differences in the vividness of 
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emotional experiences (Touroutoglou et al., 2012). Conversely, the dorsal AI connected to 
posterior regions of dACC, overlapping with the pre-SMA and MFG and IFG, roughly 
corresponding to the portions of the FPCN found to support the executive maintenance of 
EnGE in the current work. Moreover, connectivity strength of this subnetwork predicted 
performance on the Trail Making Test (TMT; Reitan, 1958), a frequently used measure of 
processing speed and cognitive flexibility. Interestingly, it appears that the TMT is sensitive 
to individual differences in the capacity to implement and shield task sets in a top-down 
manner (Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000; Kortte, Horner, & Windham, 2002; Sanchez-Cubillo et 
al., 2009). Thus, these findings hint at a functional organisation by which the FPCN entrains 
dorsal AI, which in turn implements the attentional set guiding the EnGE process. Ventral AI, 
conversely, appears more closely involved in the contextualization of this core affect and 
experience of emotion proper, in line with the proposed role of the anterior insula in 
generating experience states (Craig, 2002; 2011). Supporting this interpretation, Chapter 5 
demonstrated that LKM expertise was associated with increased cortical thickness of both 
dorsal and ventral portions of the AI. However, only ventral AI overlapped with the 
functional activation pattern supporting LKM, suggesting it is a unique structural correlate of 
EnGE expertise, together with left IFG. Moreover, dorsal AI is frequently reported as a 
structural correlate of meditation practice in general (Fox et al., 2014), suggesting its 
involvement here might reflect general effects of meditation related to the volitional 
regulation of attention, in line with the known role of the dorsal AI in attention regulation 
(Dosenbach et al., 2006).  
One problem with this account is that ventral AI is thought to partake in a network 
supporting core affective processing in general (Touroutoglou et al., 2012). Contrary to this 
dorsal, but not ventral, AI is correlated with intensity of generated emotional experiences and 
co-activates with mesencephalic structures. Moreover, unlike Touroutoglou and colleagues, 
the current data indicated that dorsal AI and genual ACC co-activate and form functional 
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network during EnGE suggesting that dorsal AI still serves important affective functions for 
generating emotional reactions to internal experiences. Supporting this notion, it has been 
found that dorsal and ventral AI have subtly different functions in risk processing, with dorsal 
AI activation being involved in the prediction of risk, whereas the ventral AI is involved in 
processing prediction errors (Preuschoff et al., 2008). Important for present purposes, risk 
prediction centrally involves simulating the future outcomes of behaviours and estimating 
their hedonic value, while prediction error involves evaluating the situation based on one’s 
expectations. Importantly, both of these can be thought of as affective states, but differ 
critically in their reliance on internal and external sources of information: Risk prediction 
involves the projection of potential future affective outcomes (i.e. potential gain or loss). 
Prediction error involves integrating internal and external information to form an evaluation, 
frequently resulting in an affective state (Jensen et al., 2007). Finally, the intrinsic 
connectivity of mesencephalon, found in the current work to be associated with the generation 
of core affective states, appears to be centred on dorsal aspects of the AI (Coulombe et al., 
2016; Tomasi & Volkow, 2014). This could suggest that the dorsal AI is central in generating 
core affective states based on internal representations or goals, while ventral AI is involved in 
generating the reaction to these states, i.e. the emotional experiences proper.  
 
8.2.8. Disinhibition as a possible component process of EnGE 
Unexpectedly, strong lateralisation effects were observed in Chapter 4, with emotion 
generation ostensibly involving the activation of left and deactivation of right FPCN, together 
with a collection of regions known to partake in the dorsal attention and visual networks. The 
latter finding can be explained by reference to the fact that the dorsal attention network most 
frequently is associated with attention to the external world, whereas endogenous emotion 
generation by its very nature requires attention to be directed internally, away from the 
outside world. Supporting this interpretation, this pattern of deactivation was not apparent 
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when compassion meditation based emotion generation was used as an emotion regulation 
strategy (Chapter 6), where attention is required towards the external world. However, a 
similar explanation cannot as readily be offered for the FPCN effects, as these were also in 
evidence here. Similar activations have frequently been reported in previous studies (Liotti et 
al., 2000; Mayberg et al., 1999). Interestingly, unlike most large scale intrinsic networks, 
there is evidence for the functional independence of left and right frontoparietal networks 
(Harrison et al., 2008; Laird et al., 2011; K. L. Ray et al., 2013). Moreover, right, but not left, 
frontoparietal networks are traditionally thought to be closely related to a specific form of 
cognitive control pertaining to response monitoring and inhibition (Aron, Robbins, & 
Poldrack, 2014). Conversely, as previously discussed, left frontoparietal control regions 
(particularly in the ventrolateral aspect found to be central here) is more closely related to 
modes of control involving e.g. cognitive control of memory (Badre & Wagner, 2007), 
semantics (Noonan, Jefferies, Visser, & Lambon Ralph, 2013), verbal fluency (Costafreda et 
al., 2006) and other processes that require active efforts to construct representations of 
meaning based on internal information. While speculative, it is possible that the lateralisation 
differences might reflect the conceptual divide between inhibition and generation as general 
modes of processing. 
Three points of evidence in the current data support this conclusion: First, when 
participants were requested to down-regulate their endogenously generated emotions in 
Chapter 4, right frontoparietal regions went from being deactivated relative to baseline to 
becoming strongly activated, suggestive of right frontoparietal regions supporting the 
suppression of existing emotional states. Second, Chapter 6 showed that use of reappraisal 
lead to higher activation of bilateral frontoparietal networks relative to the watch-negative 
baseline, but only the right frontoparietal component when contrasted with compassion. This 
is important because one can think of reappraisal as requiring two distinct component 
processes in order to effect the transformation of the one emotional meaning of a stimulus into 
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another: 1) inhibiting extant meaning and 2) the active generation of a new interpretation 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2008). Recent evidence suggests that left ventrolateral prefrontal 
activation is both robust (Buhle et al., 2014) and unique to reappraisal as an emotion 
regulation strategy (Dörfel et al., 2014). Conversely, while right FPCN activation is also 
frequently reported in reappraisal (Buhle et al., 2014) at large and it appears to be a core 
network of emotion regulation in general (Dörfel et al., 2014), consistent with a general role 
of the right FPCN as a suppressor of emotional information. Supporting this, deactivation of 
right FPCN was observed compared to both reappraisal and passively viewing neutral videos 
(cf. Tables 6.1-2). Importantly, this deactivation was observed independently of external 
stimulation (i.e. in the preparation phase, see Appendix: Table A3.2.3, Figure 6.1), suggesting 
it plays a key role in the generation of the state of compassion itself. Thus, it appears that 
EnGE involves activation of left ventrolateral PFC (VLPFC) with complimentary deactivation 
of right VLPFC and that this balance is inverted when the objective is suppressing already 
existing emotions. Thus, one possibility is that they involve some sort of “disinhibition” 
process, by which emotional information is allowed to take place in working memory 
(Mayberg et al., 1999). Future studies could investigate this by e.g. performing a principled 
comparison of the neural systems supporting the generation of states that are matched in 
content with the exception of emotional content, using e.g. a guided imagery approach (e.g. 
Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013). 
 
8.2.9. Summary: Endogenously constructing emotional states 
The neural component process architecture indicated by the current findings largely 
cohere with the proposed working model, demonstrating that EnGE is implemented by 
activation of the extended Salience Network, both core and dorsomedial subsystems of the 
Default Mode Network (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010), and left lateralised Frontoparietal 
Control Network across a variety of implementations and for both positive and negative target 
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states. Moreover, findings suggest that these networks implement dissociable processes in 
EnGE. In particular, evidence was found for a neural distinction between processes of core 
affect generation (centred on the Salience Network), and processes supporting the integration 
of this core affective state with memories and conceptual knowledge to create a full-fledged 
emotional experience (centred on the Default Mode Network, but supported by limbic 
structures and ventral portions of the insula). As such, the current findings are compatible 
with recent constructivist account of the component processes of emotion (Barrett, 2014) and 
their neural implementation (Kober et al., 2008; K. A. Lindquist et al., 2012).  
 
8.3. EnGE-based emotion management 
The second goal of the thesis was to investigate the utility of EnGE as a means of 
emotion management. Specifically, it was hypothesised that positive EnGE could be used as a 
means to manage emotional reactions to negative stressors and that this should be supported 
by engagement of the same neural mechanisms as described above. As little work exists on 
the regulatory mechanism of reactive EnGE-based emotion management, three differential 
hypotheses were proposed: 1) distraction (Dörfel et al., 2014; Kanske et al., 2011; McRae et 
al., 2010), by which EnGE-based emotion management should result in decreased negative 
and increased positive emotion, 2) facilitation (Diedrich et al., 2016), which would have 
similar subjective outcomes, but additional engagement of other emotion regulation circuits, 
and 3) buffering, by which increased positive emotion would enhance the ability to endure 
negative emotion, leading primarily to increased positive affect, and little impact on negative 
emotion. Chapter 6 tested this by investigating the neural and behavioural effects of using 
compassion meditation to modulate emotional responses to negative stimuli. As compassion 
meditation centrally involves the generation of positive affect, this served as an experimental 
analogy to the situation described above. The practitioners also regulated their emotions using 
reappraisal, a widely investigated effective cognitive emotion regulation strategy that is 
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recognised as being highly effective (Ochsner & Gross, 2008) and to be neurally 
representative for emotion regulation techniques that involve altering one’s emotional 
reactions (Dörfel et al., 2014). Importantly, as reappraisal involves the active generation of 
mental content in the form of alternate interpretations of emotion-eliciting stimuli (Ochsner & 
Gross, 2008), it is comparable to compassion in that they both require active effort and 
reference to the eliciting stimulus (Mascaro et al., 2013). Further, to avoid confounding 
potential regulatory effects with differences in regulatory goals, participants were instructed 
in positive reappraisal, where the objective is to regulate emotional reactions to negative 
stimuli by generating a positive interpretation. Thus, the critical conceptual difference 
between compassion and reappraisal as it was here implemented is their reliance on de novo 
generation of emotion versus changing how one processes emotion-eliciting stimuli. As such, 
Chapter 6 provided a direct test of the reactive-mode of EnGE-based emotion management 
discussed in Chapter 2.8.5, and investigated how this neurally and behaviourally is 
comparable to forms of cognitive emotion regulation. 
 
8.3.1. Subjective effects of EnGE-based emotion regulation 
The current results speak against the active mechanism of EnGE-based regulation 
being either inhibition or facilitation of transformation of already existing emotional states, 
since the involvement of such mechanisms would predict alterations to emotional state being 
regulated: Compassion was associated with both decreased negative affect and increased 
positive affect. Moreover, the increase in positive affect being considerably more pronounced 
than the decrease of negative affect, though the latter decrease was, indeed, significant. The 
subjective regulatory effect of positive reappraisal, conversely, was characterised by a 
reduction of negative affect, following the literature at large (e.g. Wager et al., 2008). Thus, 
the regulatory effect of compassion appears to have been brought about by the counter 
generation of positive affect. This had the effect enabling mixed subjective feeling state (J. T. 
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Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001) whereby both ongoing negative and de novo generated 
positive emotional states coexist, leading to a reduction of experienced negative affect. As 
such, the supposition that emotion generation can be used as an affect-based regulation 
strategy was supported. Moreover, evidence suggests that the means of regulation are 
markedly different from that observed in even closely related cognitive strategies, such as 
positive reappraisal.  
 
8.3.2. Neural bases of EnGE-based emotion management 
Chapter 6 also investigated the neural bases of this difference. Overall, the behavioural 
findings were mirrored by neural dynamics: Compassion selectively increased activation of 
neural correlates of subjective positive affect (notably nucleus accumbens), and reappraisal 
decreased activation in neural correlates of subjectively negative affect (notably amygdala). 
Moreover, clear dissociation was apparent in the overall activation patterns associated with 
these techniques with reappraisal activations centring on frontoparietal regions shown to 
support general implementation of emotion regulation across strategies (Dörfel et al., 2014). 
Conversely, compassion activations were centred on the representative (medial prefrontal) 
and core affective (insula, basal ganglia, pre-supplementary motor area) subsystems of the 
EnGE architecture proposed above (see Figure 6.2).  
These findings demonstrate the feasibility of using endogenous emotion generation as 
an emotion management technique. Furthermore, they show that the behavioural 
consequences and neural mechanisms supporting the regulatory effects of generation-based 
regulation are clearly dissociable from other forms of emotion regulation, including the 
closely comparable strategy of positive cognitive reappraisal.  
Returning to the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2, the behavioural and neural results 
from Chapter 6 are consistent with a buffering account of reactive EnGE-based emotion 
management (discussed in Chapter 2.5.2), whereby emotion generation facilitates affective 
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well-being by allowing one to spontaneously elicit positive emotional states (Fredrickson, 
2013), in effect allowing one to maintain a positive hedonic balance and buffer against 
negative stressors.  
 
8.3.3. The role of the subgenual anterior cingulate in EnGE-based regulation 
One thing that it left unclear in Chapter 6 is the precise mechanism by which such 
buffering occurs. Interestingly, Chapter 6 saw robust activation of the subgenual ACC, which 
further was one of the main differences between compassion-related activations and those 
observed for EnGE in general (compare Figures 8.1A and C). The subgenual ACC has long 
been implicated in emotion regulation research, with dense connections to regions involved in 
core affect and physiological regulation, such as the amygdala, hypothalamus, insula and 
brainstem. This connectivity is thought to enable the subgenual ACC to regulate affective 
responses at a deep level, and importantly to support contextual or implicit modes of 
regulation that occur outside of explicit awareness and intention to regulate (Etkin, Egner, 
Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006; M. L. Phillips, Ladouceur, & Drevets, 2008; Stein et al., 
2007). The subgenual ACC, or more specifically imbalance of relative subgenual ACC and 
amygdala activation (Mayberg et al., 1999) is thought to be a neural substrate of severe forms 
of treatment-resistant depression (Mayberg et al., 2005). Evidence shows that correcting this 
imbalance through deep brain stimulation of the subgenual ACC results in marked betterment 
of symptoms (Mayberg et al., 2005), suggesting that the subgenual ACC, and by extension 
implicit emotion regulation in general, plays a central role in maintaining healthy hedonic 
balance. In line with its role in treatment-resistant depression, such implicit emotion 
regulation is largely thought to be trait-like and relatively hard-wired (Gyurak, Gross, & 
Etkin, 2011), a notion supported by the absence of subgenual ACC activation in evidence for 
explicit, strategic modes of emotion regulation (Buhle et al., 2014; Dörfel et al., 2014). Thus, 
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a potentially unique benefit of EnGE abilities is that they enable one to volitionally engage 
implicit emotion regulation mechanisms.  
A central function of the subgenual ACC appears to be resolution of conflicts between 
the immediate evaluation of a stimulus and a contextualised understanding of them, be they 
due to stimulus properties making a task difficult (Etkin et al., 2006; Ochsner, Hughes, 
Robertson, Cooper, & Gabrieli, 2009a), dynamic changes in the environment (Mobbs et al., 
2007), evolving experience with a stimulus (Schiller, Levy, Niv, LeDoux, & Phelps, 2008), or 
even internal motivational states (Nili, Goldberg, Weizman, & Dudai, 2010). The study by 
Nili and colleagues is perhaps most relevant for present purposes, showing that ventral 
cingulate is associated with the ability to overcome fear. However, much as in the current 
study, this effect was not driven by decreases in negative affect. Rather, overcoming appeared 
to involve the decoupling of the experience of negative affect from physiological indices of 
distress. Thus, subgenual ACC appears to support the overcoming of immediate reactions to 
stimuli in the service of goal-attainment. Possibly, by eliciting a positive emotional state, one  
in effect forces a re-evaluation of negative stressors, enabling access to a more flexible 
behavioural repertoire (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005).  
While speculative, this observation could provide a neural mechanism for the efficacy 
of EnGE-based interventions for depression (Holmes et al., 2006; 2009; 2016), suggesting 
that EnGE-based interventions could have analogous effects to deep-brain stimulation of 
subgenual ACC (Mayberg et al., 2005). It should be noted that while I here champion the idea 
that subgenual ACC implements specifically regulatory functions, that an alternate hypothesis 
is that subgenual ACC supports the generation of emotional states directly. Supporting this, 
Chapter 5 found that loving-kindness meditation alone, without external stressors, also 
activated subgenual ACC (See Figure 8.1B). As the samples of Chapters 5 and 6 were experts 
in EnGE, it is possible that training, and especially training in CM and LKM, could enable 
one to recruit subgenual ACC in the service of emotion generation, unlike the representative 
8.3. EnGE-based emotion management 
 
207 
 
samples in Chapter 4. Speaking against this, no evidence of cortical thickness increases in 
subgenual ACC was found in Chapter 5. Thus, deciding between these two hypotheses is 
ultimately a topic for future longitudinal research into the neural bases of EnGE-training. 
 
8.3.4. EnGE as a mediator of trait affect and emotion management abilities 
Having established that EnGE-based emotion management could be used for reactive 
emotion management in EnGE-experts, the final topic of the thesis was to establish whether 
this was also the case in the normal population. Specifically, it was proposed that EnGE-based 
emotion management could take one of two forms: 1) reactive, like that explored in Chapter 
6, based on the generation of positive emotion in response to negative stressors, and 2) a 
proactive form, associated with the ability to predict and pre-emptively adapt to potential 
emotional stressors before they occur. It was reasoned that, to the degree that either of these 
accounts were correct, one would expect to see a relationship between EnGE-abilities and 
usage of reactive, emotion-focused or pro-active, instrumental emotion management 
techniques. Importantly, if EnGE- abilities are indeed used for emotion management in the 
population at large, one would expect them to mediate the known relationship between 
adaptive emotion management and trait affect. 
Chapter 7 addressed this hypothesis by investigating the relationship between 
endogenous emotion generation abilities and trait affect and emotion management styles. 
Emotion generation abilities were operationalised as the degree to which participants reported 
being able to generate emotions in the RAGE paradigm (also used in Chapter 4). Generation 
abilities were found to be predictive of adaptive coping skills and trait affectivity in a large, 
representative sample. Specifically, the capacity to generate emotions in general (irrespective 
of valence) was associated with both trait positivity and the tendency to use problem-focused 
coping skills (see Table 7.2). Moreover, the capacity to generate emotions was found to 
mediate the relationship between coping skills and trait affect, suggesting that instrumental 
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emotion management is facilitated by the capacity to generate emotional states. Possibly this 
could be because of an increased ability to simulate potential emotional states in the future, or 
what was termed pre-emptive, simulation-based emotion management in Chapter 2.5.3. 
However, despite the documented efficacy of reactive, buffering-based, EnGE 
emotion management in Chapter 6 (discussed above), limited support was found for the 
spontaneous occurrence of this in the normal population. If this was the case, one would 
expect that the ability to specifically generate positive emotional states would be predictive of 
mental health. While the relative ability to generate positive emotion was associated with 
usage of emotion-focused forms of emotion management, and increased positive trait affect, 
relative emotion generation skills did not mediate the relationship between emotion 
management and trait affect. This suggests that the capacity to generate specifically positive 
emotion might be an outcome of beneficial affective styles, rather than being causal in 
facilitating them. 
In summary, in the normal population, the ability to generate emotion appears to be 
causal in adaptive emotional functioning by enabling individuals to adopt instrumental 
emotion management techniques. The fact that no clear valence effects were observed could 
suggest that this effect is driven in large by domain-general abilities, such as the capacity to 
form internal representations. This explanation is supported by the extant neuroimaging 
findings, showing a significant degree of overlap between the neural regions supporting EnGE 
and those supporting a range of mental simulation phenomena most notably in the dorsal 
medial subnetwork of the DMN, as discussed above. An important question for future 
research is to what degree individual differences in the component processes of EnGE (i.e. 
core affect generation, representation abilities, executive maintenance or, as discussed above, 
inhibition) predict emotion management styles.  
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8.3.5. Summary: The utility of emotion generation 
Chapter 2 proposed two complementary means by which EnGE could facilitate 
adaptive emotion management. On the one hand, EnGE could be used in an acute manner to 
generate (primarily positive) emotional states, thereby buffering against and diffusing the 
impact of negative events. On the other, EnGE could enable one to accurately simulate future 
emotional events, thereby enabling one to take pre-emptive action to diffuse the impact of 
negative events and increase the likelihood of the occurrence of positive events. In the studies 
presented here, evidence was found for both these hypotheses, showing that EnGE is both an 
effective means of dealing with negative stressors as they occur (Chapter 6) and that the 
capacity to engage in EnGE enables one to engage in instrumental forms of emotion 
management. One caveat to these findings is that trait-level EnGE abilities in a normal 
population did not appear to support reactive, emotion-focused forms of emotion 
management. This is in line with extensive research showing that the ability to engage in 
positive fantasising alone appears to be maladaptive in the long run (Oettingen et al., 2016; 
Oettingen & Mayer, 2002), unless the thus generated positive fantasies are contrasted with the 
actual reality of one’s situation (Oettingen et al., 2009). Interestingly, a key feature of 
compassion and loving-kindness meditation is that these practices not only involve generating 
an emotional state of warmth and caring, but also of the motivation to alleviate suffering and 
to enable other individuals to experience positive emotional states (Singer & Klimecki, 2014). 
Thus, as the sample in Chapter 6 were experts in EnGE, it is possible that engaging in 
buffering-forms of regulation might require some training. 
8.4. Conclusion 
The overarching motivation for this series of studies was to highlight the often 
overlooked aspect of emotions as volitional entities that we actively enlist to govern 
ourselves. Supporting this view, we found that individuals are readily able to generate in 
themselves both positive and negative emotional states, and that the implementation thereof is 
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highly idiosyncratic, and involves the combination of multiple sources of emotion-related 
information. Moreover, this ability is robustly supported by a neural architecture closely 
related to the generation of vivid mental simulations and the regulation of physiological 
states. This suggests that endogenous generation of emotion results in de facto embodied 
simulations of emotional states (Gallese & Caruana, 2016). Thus, the capacity to volitionally 
generate emotional states based on endogenous information appears to be a highly complex, 
constructive mental act, related one of the pinnacles of human cognition: the capacity to 
create and manipulate models of the external world in lieu of actual experience to enable 
adaptive behaviour. Supporting this, evidence suggests that the ability to generate emotional 
states is mechanistically related to the ability to predict and pre-emptively manage emotional 
states. However, as Descartes suggested, we also find that this ability can be used to substitute 
or counteract external stressors with more appetitive positive emotional states, enabling one to 
achieve one’s goals and endure negative stressors. Such resilience does, however, appear to 
require some cultivation, suggesting that training is required to unlock the true self-regulatory 
potential of endogenous emotion generation.
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Chapter 9: Limitations, implications, and future 
directions 
 
9.1. Chapter overview 
In this final chapter, I provide a critical view on the current results, highlighting 
limitations of the current findings and how future research can address these shortcomings. 
Based on these caveats, the implications of the current findings are discussed in terms of how 
they inform affective science, emotion theory, and emotion regulation research. Finally, an 
outlook is provided, discussing how the current findings can evolve into and inform theory in 
affective science and other fields of inquiry. 
 
9.2. Limitations 
9.2.1. Is naturalistic EnGE volitional? 
This work was guided by an operationalisation of EnGE as an emotional reaction that 
comes into being based on endogenous sources of information (see Chapter 2.2). However, 
due to the constraints of the experimental method, the investigation was forced to limit this 
further by only investigating EnGE as it was volitionally implemented. While this is 
fundamentally in agreement with the goal of investigating how EnGE can be employed as a 
means of self-regulation, it leaves open the question of whether the neural model developed 
here reflects EnGE is ecologically valid. For instance, to the degree that EnGE is involved in 
instrumental forms of emotion management, it is likely that its role is not that of consciously 
generating emotional states like in the RAGE. Rather, it is probable that EnGE abilities play a 
role in colouring projections and simulations of the future (or past) in a manner that enhances 
their accuracy (Szpunar, 2010; S. E. Taylor & Schneider, 1989; S. E. Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & 
Armor, 1998). While Chapter 7 found that volitional emotion generation abilities did predict 
this form of emotion management, it could be that spontaneous tendencies to generate 
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emotion more accurately predict this ability. Similarly, while the proposed three-network, 
three-process structure of EnGE appears to hold for goal-directed self-generation of emotion, 
it is still an open question to what degree this holds for spontaneous generation, or tasks 
where the generation of emotion is secondary to goal-achievement. For instance, while the 
current results suggest that FPCN coordinates SN and DMN in the directed generation of 
emotional states, this might be contingent on the goal-directed nature of the task (Spreng et 
al., 2010), congruent with the known role of the FPCN in implementing cognitive control 
(Banich et al., 2009). On the other hand, recent models suggest that cooperation of DMN and 
FPCN is a key feature of all internally generated mentation (Smallwood et al., 2012; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2015), suggesting that the three-network structure should be 
applicable to the spontaneous case as well. One way this question could be addressed is to 
investigate the neural implementation of spontaneously occurring emotional experiences 
during e.g. resting state scans. While traditionally thought of as a kind of blank or default 
mode of processing (Raichle & Snyder, 2007), recent evidence suggests that the 
phenomenology of being subjected to a resting state scan is characterised by vivid internally 
generated experiences (Delamillieure et al., 2010; Kühn, Fernyhough, Alderson-Day, & 
Hurlburt, 2014a), that often have affective qualities (Tusche, Smallwood, Bernhardt, & 
Singer, 2014). In addition to resolving the question of the generalisability of the three-
network structure, comparing the neural underpinnings of spontaneous and volitional EnGE 
could be a useful individual differences measure to investigate the behavioural and neural 
bases of affective intrusive thoughts like seen in rumination (Kühn et al., 2012; Kühn, 
Vanderhasselt, De Raedt, & Gallinat, 2014b). 
 
9.2.2. What is a proper baseline for EnGE 
Closely related to the question of the relationship between volitional and spontaneous 
EnGE is the question of what constitutes a proper baseline to investigate EnGE. This series of 
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studies deliberately adopted a relatively loose baseline as the kind of processing that occurs in 
the absence of emotion-focused processing. For instance, Chapter 5 contrasted loving-
kindness meditation to a resting state where participants were instructed to refrain from 
meditation. Psychologically (and presumably neurally) these conditions are similar in as much 
as the task-free resting state has no clear emotional connotations. By contrasting active 
generation efforts with these purported states of neutrality one should be left with specifically 
the regions involved in EnGE, or so the reasoning goes. However, as mentioned above, there 
is no true resting state, if by resting state one means an absolute absence of brain activation. 
Rather, the experience of a resting state scan is rich, and highly variable between individuals 
(Delamillieure et al., 2010), meaning that any statistical comparison with this as a baseline 
will be noisy. Moreover, on a neural level, this problem is aggravated by the key role of 
precisely the networks thought to drive task-unrelated experiences proposed in EnGE 
(Smallwood et al., 2012). In addition to this causing a problem for the estimation of neural 
activation, this potentially has implications for the claim that the RAGE can provide an 
individual difference measure of EnGE abilities. For instance, in the RAGE paradigm 
participants were shown neutral pictures prior to the experiment and requested to adopt the 
emotional state these pictures elicited when requested to generate neutral emotional states. 
While this had the advantage of having participants actively attempt to achieve a specific 
level of emotionality in both neutral and generation conditions, this also meant that 
participants’ responses in the neutral condition is also a measure of the degree to which they 
were able to avoid experiencing emotion. Thus, the neutral condition could be thought of as 
an active regulation condition, which could challenge the validity of the psychological 
variables investigated here. Moreover, when considering the neural activation patterns this 
could mean that any differences seen were driven by deactivations induced by the regulation 
condition. In the current case, data-driven CPCA and model based temporal decomposition 
analyses (Figures 4.3 and 4.4) speak against this interpretation, showing that the neutral 
                                                                              Chapter 9: Limitations, implications, and future 
directions                                                                                                                 
 
214 
 
condition simply did not activate the relevant networks overall. Moreover, this critique is not 
applicable to the approach taken in Chapter 6, where the critical baseline was passive viewing 
of negative emotional stimuli. Despite this, there was a substantial overlap between 
activations seen here (mOFC/vmPFC, PCC, IFG, MFG, PMC, pre-SMA) and those reported 
in Chapters 4 and 5.  
However, one possibility not controlled for in the present set of studies is that the 
EnGE effects seen could be driven by a third variable, such as the ability to generate vivid 
internal representations in general (Zeman et al., 2015). Future research could address this by 
including active baseline conditions such as future simulation, varying the emotional content 
of the representations systematically (Szpunar & Schacter, 2013). In addition to possibly 
providing a better assay of EnGE abilities, this could enable the validation of the component-
process architecture here proposed by e.g. comparing neutral and emotional episodic imagery, 
with the assumption that DMN should be similarly activated for both, but SN only showing 
activation during emotional imagery (but see Benoit et al., 2014; Oosterwijk et al., 2012). 
 
9.2.3. Qualitative characteristics of emotion states 
In the current research a dimensional model of emotions was implicitly adopted by 
having participants report their emotional states on a sliding scale ranging from neutral to 
highly positive or negative. As such, participant reports were based on information that was 
abstracted from the concrete emotional states they generated. Possibly, better measures of 
EnGE abilities can be afforded by more nuanced measures of the emotional states generated. 
For instance, it is possible that investigating specific emotional states could provide a better 
differentiation of valence than the current results (but see K. A. Lindquist et al., 2016). 
Moreover, better insight into the contributions and efficacies of different modalities in EnGE 
could be investigated by implementing trial-wise qualitative report of the emotional states as 
they were generated. 
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9.2.4. Cause and effect of emotion management, trait affect, and generation skills 
Following on the preceding discussions, it should be noted that the extant results on 
the relationship between emotion management, trait affect, and emotion generation skills 
cannot rule out the existence of mediating variables such as imagery abilities, erudition, 
general g-factor of intelligence etc. Future research could investigate this by investigating 
how EnGE abilities correlates with individual differences in “classical” cognitive factors like 
working memory capacity, executive function, and general intelligence. In addition to 
providing a better understanding of what the constituent skills supporting EnGE are, this 
could provide an interesting avenue for tailoring interventions aimed at enhancing EnGE. For 
instance, it could be that the capacity to utilise different modalities to generate emotion is 
predicated on overall abilities, meaning that optimal generation training should aim at either 
compensating for deficient abilities or playing to one’s strengths. 
 
9.2.5. Meditation practice as a model of EnGE 
Finally, the use of loving-kindness and compassion meditators as expert models for 
EnGE should be scrutinised. While the current results suggest that both these practices rely on 
largely overlapping neural mechanisms as EnGE in the normal population, the fact remains 
that meditation practice — especially in highly trained experts — involves intensive training 
of attention and other functions perhaps not directly involved in EnGE. Indeed, Chapter 5 
found that the expert meditators had significant changes of brain morphology in regions 
involved in attentional and meta-cognitive processing that did not feature centrally in EnGE 
(Figure 5.3). This observation must be taken into account when drawing the conclusion that 
EnGE can be used for reactive forms of emotion regulation, such that this might not be a 
viable management approach for the untrained individual. Moreover, as Chapter 7 indicates 
(Figure 7.4), the ability to use EnGE to enable the sort of emotion-focused buffering enabled 
by compassion meditation does not appear to occur spontaneously. As discussed in the 
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previous chapter, one possibility is that such regulation requires directed training. Future 
research could address both the problem of generalising from meditation experts and test this 
hypothesis by investigating the neural and behavioural consequences of directed EnGE 
training (e.g. Holmes et al., 2006; 2009). 
 
9.3. Implications 
9.3.1. Exogenous versus endogenous emotion generation 
Perhaps the most theoretically interesting aspect of the current findings is the overlap 
between the neural bases of endogenous emotion and that identified by studies primarily 
investigating exogenously generated emotional states (Kober et al., 2008; K. A. Lindquist et 
al., 2012 compare Figure 9.1 A and B). As discussed in Chapter 2, these meta-analyses 
indicate that ExGE is supported by the coordinated activation of several functionally distinct 
groups of regions. Importantly, these largely overlap with the neural bases of EnGE as 
explored in the current thesis. The notable exception to this is the lack of visual association 
areas (Group VI in 9.1B) in the current data, a finding that is explainable the fact that the 
large majority of the studies included in the Kober (2008) meta-analysis used visual 
emotional stimuli. Supporting this interpretation, the Kober (2008) meta-analysis shows that 
visual regions form a functional grouping relatively distinct from core networks centred 
around medial PFC, and limbic and paralimbic regions (Groups I, II, IV, V in Figure 9.2B; 
Figure 9.2C). This aside, findings suggest that EnGE is largely similar in neural 
implementation to ExGE: Groups I and II in Figure 9.2B correspond roughly to the extended 
Salience Network (SN), including ventral cortical SN (i.e. insula and posterior OFC, Group I) 
and subcortical SN including amygdala, thalamus, basal ganglia and brainstem (Group II). On 
the other hand, groups IV and V together correspond roughly to the posterior and anterior 
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Figure 9.1: Comparison of current findings with previous meta-analysis. A) Synthesis of the current 
findings, with the suggested component process mapping of networks denoted. B) Functional neural 
components of emotion generation identified in previous meta-analyses. C) The functional connectivity 
space of these components. Shadings correspond to component colouring in B) and line length is inversely 
related to connectivity strength. Boxes denote three proposed functional domains of these groupings based 
on current results. Panels B and C adapted with permission from Kober et al. (2008). 
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portions of the DMN. This could suggest that there are two distinct neural routes of emotion 
generation: A bottom-up route requiring modal sensory association systems (e.g. group VI in 
Figure 9.1B) and a top-down route focused on cognitive control systems (i.e. group III in 
Figure 9.1 B; see Ochsner et al., 2009b for a similar distinction). Interestingly, strong 
evidence was found that a set of regions (left lateral PFC and pre-SMA) played a central role 
in enabling the effortful maintenance of EnGE (Figure 4.3), overlapping with the fronto-
lateral portion of the FPCN. This network is closely related to executive processing and 
cognitive control, suggesting it could be involved in setting large-scale neural configurations 
to facilitate internal or external mentation (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). Supporting this 
interpretation, these regions were involved in a pathway mediating usage of multiple 
modalities (Figure 4.6), in addition to being coupled to both DMN and SN to form functional 
networks whose activation predicted generation success (Figure 4.4). Moreover, this set of 
regions closely resembles the “cognitive-motor” group identified in the Kober meta-analysis 
(Group II in Figure 9.1B). Consistent with the present findings, co-activation analyses 
indicate that this group is closely coupled to the lateral paralimbic network (cyan and green 
fields in Figure 9.1C). Thus, it appears that top-down generation of emotion crucially involves 
left lateral and medial PFC (see Ochsner et al., 2009b for similar findings). 
The findings presented in the current thesis also provide information about what the 
psychological functions supported by these groupings are. For instance, Chapter 4 showed 
that the SN formed two distinct functional components during EnGE: Cortical SN (dorsal AI, 
dACC) together with PAG and SN/VTA both uniquely activated early in the EnGE process 
(Figure 4.3A) and showed a parametric relationship with experienced positive and negative 
affect. Thus, these regions appear to support the generation of the core affective properties of 
endogenous emotional states. Conversely, core limbic structures, most notably the nucleus 
accumbens (NACC) and amygdala (AMY), were in the current data found to be associated 
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with the extended elaboration of emotional states, and to co-activate with the DMN (Figure 
4.3C), consistent with them primarily supporting the elaboration of core affective sensations 
into representations of emotional experiences. One intriguing possibility hinted at by these 
results is that their involvement might reflect the degree to which the generation process 
involves focus on the bodily feeling aspects of emotion (Figure 4.6D). This is interesting 
because the limbic system is traditionally defined as including the hippocampus (Papez, 
1937), a structure known to be heavily implicated in mnemonic processes, particularly in the 
context of episodic memory (Martinelli et al., 2013) and navigation (Buzsáki & Moser, 2013), 
a process that centrally involves creating simulations of the world. Moreover, both NACC (Ito 
et al., 2008) and AMY (LaLumiere et al., 2005) are known to be involved in emotional 
memory processes and to be strongly coupled to the hippocampus. Thus, the reactivation seen 
here might reflect their involvement in the process of recalling emotional memories in an 
embodied fashion. Interestingly, while the overall engagement of structures in the data 
presented here overlaps with the Kober study, the precise patterns of co-activation differ, such 
that brainstem systems (in the Kober(2008) study assigned to the core limbic group; II in 
Figure 9.1B) were found to co-activate with the lateral paralimbic group, which here included 
dorsal ACC. This could suggest that the coupling of brainstem to either limbic or to lateral 
paralimbic systems could be an essential configural difference between ExGE and EnGE.  
Summarising, it appears that exogenous and endogenous emotions are highly similar 
in terms of neural implementation. Moreover, they suggest that ExGE in large part relies on 
endogenous sources of information. Thus, these findings strongly support a constructivist 
model of emotion (Barrett, 2014; K. A. Lindquist & Barrett, 2012), in which the occurrence 
of emotional states depend on the interplay of events as they occur in the world and the 
subsequent interpretation of them as emotionally meaningful (J. J. Gross & Barrett, 2011; K. 
A. Lindquist & Barrett, 2012). Critically, such interpretation requires the integration of 
current sensory inputs with previous experiences. Moreover, this process is highly inferential, 
                                                                              Chapter 9: Limitations, implications, and future 
directions                                                                                                                 
 
220 
 
with the actual sensory datum only providing the initial impetus for the generation process. 
As such, one would on this theory expect a large degree of overlap between the processing of 
endogenous and exogenous emotions. 
 
9.3.2. The neural bases of endogenous positive and negative emotion 
Another interesting observation made in the current research is the large degree of 
overlap between the neural bases of positive and negative emotion (Figure 4.5). While 
initially surprising, given the strong subjective differences between negative and positive 
emotional states, this finding is largely in agreement with previous meta-analyses (K. A. 
Lindquist et al., 2016). One notable discrepancy with previous work is that little evidence was 
found for the involvement of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in the generation of emotional 
valences: Meta-analyses have revealed that this region appears to track with experienced 
affect (K. A. Lindquist et al., 2016). Moreover, it has convincingly been argued that the 
activation patterns and anatomical connectivity of this region makes it ideally suited to 
support the generation of affective meaning when such meaning is based on conceptual, or 
endogenous sources of information (Roy et al., 2012). As all of the current experiments 
involved such endogenous generation, one would have expected to see some relationship 
between activation of this region and the valence of experienced emotion, something not 
apparent in Chapter 4 (see Figure 4.5). One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that 
the current set of experiments did not require the integration of twin streams of information 
(sensory vs. conceptual), but rather the top-down entrainment of processing to facilitate 
EnGE. Supporting this, the strongest evidence for differentiation of positive and negative 
emotion was observed in evolutionarily old systems in the brainstem involved in core somatic 
regulation. Thus, it appears that the process of EnGE involves utilising top-down influences 
to generate a bottom-up signal at low levels of processing, which is subsequently elaborated 
into emotional experiences, a process which is supported by DMN (of which the VMPFC is 
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part) and ventral SN. It is interesting to note that an important distinction between EnGE and 
ExGE is that the latter necessarily requires some form of interpretation as sensory information 
is always ambiguous and context dependent (Barrett & Bar, 2009). Conversely, endogenously 
generated states are, by necessity, not subject to such uncertainty, especially in the context of 
goal-directed generation like that investigated here. Evidence suggests an involvement of the 
VMPFC in uncertainty processing, specifically relating to subjective confidence in one’s 
decisions (White, N. H. Engen, Sørensen, Overgaard, & Shergill, 2014). Thus, the data 
presented here suggests that endogenous emotion is centrally differentiable into positive and 
negative qualities at early levels of processing. However, it is unlikely that this is unique to 
endogenous emotion, suggesting that future research aimed at differentiating positive and 
negative emotion should attempt to do so by investigating relatively basic processing, related 
to fundamental approach and withdrawal behaviours. 
 
9.3.3. The relationship of emotion generation and regulation 
The results presented here also provide an interesting insight into the relationship 
between emotion generation and emotion regulation, a topic of some debate in current 
affective science (J. J. Gross et al., 2011; J. J. Gross & Barrett, 2011). Chapter 7 investigated 
the neural and behavioural effects of emotion-regulation using compassion meditation (CM), 
and compared this with reappraisal (RE) – perhaps the most investigated "classical" cognitive 
emotion regulation strategy (Buhle et al., 2014). Evidence strongly suggested a clear 
differentiation of the two: Behaviourally, CM lead primarily to increases in positive affect and 
only secondarily decreases in experienced negative affect. Conversely, RE primarily 
decreased negative affect and only increased positive affect to a level comparable to being 
exposed to neutral emotional stimuli (Figure 7.1). Neurally, this difference was equally 
pronounced, with CM showing stronger activation in activating classical emotion regions, 
including midline PFC, the basal ganglia, and insular regions. RE, on the other hand, showed  
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Figure 9.2: Shared circuits of compassion and reappraisal. Results from Chapter 6, showing the contrast of 
Compassion and Reappraisal versus the passive-viewing baseline. Note the overlap of activations in dorsal PFC 
and TPJ. 
 
stronger activation of the lateral PFC and parietal regions known to be associated with 
cognitive control and inhibitory processes. These results, then, suggest that there is a clear 
distinction between the generation and regulation of emotion, both in terms of behavioural 
consequences and neural activation patterns. However, when comparing both CM and RE to 
passively viewing negative stimuli, marked degree of neural overlap was observed, most 
notably in left ventral and dorsal lateral PFC (Figure 9.2). Thus, this suggests a degree of 
similarity between, at least on a neural level. 
 
Interestingly, recent evidence suggests that the left lateralised PFC activation might be 
unique to reappraisal when compared to other emotion regulation strategies (Dörfel et al., 
2014). Notably, RE involves inventing alternate constraints to one’s interpretations of stimuli 
(Barrett, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007b). As such, RE has a clear generative aspect that sets it 
aside from other forms of emotion regulation, like distraction, distancing or expressive 
suppression, that to varying degrees primarily involve neutralising one’s emotional reactions 
and attaining some form of neutral equanimity. Supporting this notion, extant evidence 
suggests that reappraisal efficacy is primarily supported by the ability to effortfully generate 
cognitive contents (Gyurak, Goodkind, Kramer, Miller, & Levenson, 2012). Thus, the results 
in Chapter 7 could point at a neural (and psychological) basis for distinguishing between the 
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generation and regulation of emotion, with the critical distinction being the occurrence of 
active efforts to elicit in oneself emotional contents, contrasted with efforts to achieve states 
of equanimity.  
While this fits the working operationalisation proposed in Chapter 2 of the difference 
between EnGE and emotion regulation, one important caveat is that the current evidence only 
pertains to the voluntary generation of emotion. This is clearly a boundary case, as the 
majority of emotion generation and regulation is implicit (Gyurak et al., 2011), happening 
without conscious effort. As such, it is an empirical question whether this distinction holds for 
the neural implementation of implicit regulatory efforts. A larger problem, however, is that 
without reference to an eliciting event and conscious goal to modulate emotion the distinction 
is also blurred on a theoretical level: As pointed out by Gross and Barrett (2011), drawing a 
distinction between generation and regulation relies on one’s admission of the existence of 
clear emotion-eliciting events. In the case of implicit, or spontaneous, regulation and 
generation of emotion specifying such events are difficult since any event resulting in the 
ostensive generation of emotion, can equally be seen as an act of regulating one’s previous 
emotional state to something more appropriate for one’s ongoing behaviours. To my 
knowledge, there is no obvious way of resolving the issue aside from the somewhat 
unsatisfactory, and ultimately pragmatic, operationalisation adopted in the present work. 
 
9.3.4. The utility of emotion generation as a means of emotion management 
Further blurring the issue of distinguishing emotion generation from emotion 
regulation, the current work also indicates that, while neurally distinct from inhibitory modes 
of emotion regulation, emotion generation can in fact be used to counteract exogenous 
stressors. Traditional accounts of coping and emotion regulation tend to pivot on notions of 
adaptive regulation as a means of diffusing the emotional impact of external stressors (J. J. 
Gross, 2007b; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Central to this diffusion process is, in some way or 
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another, denying the emotional reality of the stressor. Take a situation like the experiment 
used in Chapter 6, where participants were confronted with film depictions of individuals 
clearly suffering, evoking a negative emotional reaction known as empathic distress (Singer & 
Klimecki, 2014). To implement successful reappraisal of such stimuli it is necessary to 
somehow question the depicted situation, either in terms of the seriousness of the 
consequences of the issue at hand or, alternately, whether the situation is real and not just 
staged for camera. Similarly, most other strategies described in the literature rely on some sort 
of denial of a given aspect of a situation, involving either one’s own engagement to the 
situation (as in the techniques of distancing and perspective taking), or whether the situation 
is worth paying attention to (as in distraction). Thus, these strategies essentially involve the 
transformation of aspects of one’s relationship to the emotional stimuli. While such 
transformative strategies are effective in many situations where emotional reactions somehow 
interfere with e.g. goal-achievement or immediate well-being (Webb et al., 2012), there are 
situations where such cognitive transformation might be less effective, or even 
counterproductive. 
Consider, for instance, a situation where one encounters such suffering in real life and 
instead of merely observing, one is responsible to provide care for this person, as is the case 
for health professionals and caretakers. In such situations, transformative strategies that 
emphasise down-regulating one’s negative reactions can be inimical to one’s goal or 
obligation of providing care, at least to the degree that such care requires being attuned to the 
actual causes and experiences of suffering. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that reappraising 
the suffering of others could have an increased tendency towards callousness as a side-effect 
(Cameron & Payne, 2012). Thus, these strategies appear unsuited to dealing with negative 
emotions in contexts such as healthcare, where retaining an empathic link with patients is 
essential to providing quality care. However, these situations still require a degree of emotion 
regulation on the hand of the healthcare provider: Constant exposure to the suffering of 
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others, often without positive outcomes, is a substantial stress factor, which could contribute 
to the high rates of burnout in both lower and higher status members of such professions 
(Adriaenssens et al., 2014; Dyrbye et al., 2014; Gundersen, 2001). 
Using EnGE to regulate one’s emotion offers a mean to circumvent several of the 
issues with inhibition based emotion regulation. For one, neural and behavioural data indicate 
that emotion generation does not require the inhibition of ongoing emotional states, but can be 
used to elicit mixed emotional states including both positive and negative elements, as is the 
case with the compassion meditation technique investigated in Chapter 6. Possibly, this 
positive emotional state could counter empathic distress reactions, preventing them from 
becoming overwhelming (Singer & Klimecki, 2014). Outside of chronic exposure to negative 
events, it could facilitate long term resilience and coping by enabling one to remain in a 
positive emotional state, in effect allowing one to endure the impact of stressors by providing 
a buffer against persistent negative emotion. Importantly, while the work presented here 
suggests that such buffering can be a highly effective means of emotion regulation, it also 
suggests that some degree of training is required to enable this. Future intervention studies 
could investigate this, promising to not only deepen the understanding of EnGE as a 
phenomenon, but also potentially offer an avenue by which to increase resilience and coping 
in both normal (Fredrickson, 2013; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004) and pathological (Holmes et 
al., 2006; 2009) populations. 
 
9.3.5. Designing interventions to train EnGE 
The work presented here also provides important pointers on how to optimise such 
interventions. First, current evidence suggests that capacity to generate emotions in general is 
a better predictor of beneficial emotion management than the capacity to generate specifically 
positive emotion. This is in line with recent theoretical developments arguing for the 
importance of fluency with negative emotions in enabling psychological and affective 
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flexibility (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). One possible mechanism for this is that the 
capacity to generate emotional states enables better emotion differentiation or granularity, 
thereby giving more leverage for regulatory efforts (Kashdan et al., 2015). Thus, training 
programs should aim to improve the capacity to generate both positive and negative emotion. 
As the current work suggests, such training should emphasise multiple modalities, yet centre 
around training the capacity to generate episodic mental imagery. One source of inspiration 
for such trainings could be the meditation practices of loving-kindness and compassion 
meditation, as these centrally involve the generation of mental imagery (e.g. anchored on 
thinking about a loved one), that is supplemented by focus on bodily sensations of warmth 
and caring and verbal mantras (Goetz et al., 2010). As such, these practices are essentially 
multimodal EnGE practices around which there exists an extensive tradition of pedagogy 
(Singer et al., 2016). However, as these practices are focused on training the capacity to 
generate a specific form of positive emotion (i.e. loving-kindness and compassion), some 
modification might be needed to enhance emotional fluency in general (Kashdan et al., 2015; 
Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). However, a key consideration in such an intervention would 
be to maximise adherence to the training regime in order to enable generalisation of such 
skills to daily life (H. G. Engen & Kanske, 2013). Thus, focusing on the (arguably more 
appetitive) training of positive emotion generation might be an overall more effective 
protocol. Ultimately, this is an empirical question and future research should investigate the 
benefits of both generalised fluency-based interventions and specifically positive generation 
training. 
 
9.4. Future directions 
9.4.1. Neural signatures of emotion 
One promising avenue for future research into EnGE is utilising machine learning 
methods to identify the signatures of different affective phenomena. Recently, Chang et al. 
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(2015) presented a signature of neural activation patterns to picture-based emotional 
reactions. Moreover, this pattern was clearly distinguishable from activation patterns 
associated with pain processing (Wager et al., 2013), suggesting that this pattern specifically 
represented processing of emotional information. Interestingly, this pattern included several 
regions overlapping with the current work, including amygdala, periaqueductal grey (PAG), 
dorsal AI, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, pre-SMA, ventromedial temporal lobe, and posterior 
cingulate cortex. However, it also included ventral occipital cortex, most likely reflecting 
visual processing. As such, it is unclear whether the contributions of these different systems 
are key to the generation of emotional states or, for instance, interpretation of stimuli. By 
comparing endogenously and exogenously elicited emotion it would be possible to clarify 
this, and differentiate the neural systems involved in EnGE and ExGE. This comparison 
would allow one to test the hypothesis proposed above of two routes of emotion generation. 
Moreover, by investigating similarities between the two, it would be possible to identify the 
neural core of emotion generation in general, a topic of high importance for affective science. 
 
9.4.2. Towards an integrated model of emotion control 
Taking this approach would also allow one to deepen the understanding of the 
generation/regulation distinction. Based on sensitive and specific signatures of emotion 
generation, it would then be possible to differentiate neural mechanisms of emotion 
generation from active efforts to regulate them by establishing discrete, predictive signatures 
of emotion regulation. Thus it would be possible to extend this line of research into 
developing an integrated neural model of emotion control. On a theoretical level, this could 
provide a unified approach to understanding the relationship between different modes or 
techniques for emotion management (Webb et al., 2012). Importantly, this could provide an 
understanding of the mechanistic foundations of emotion management in general, 
differentiating neural networks supporting domain-general goal-directed regulatory efforts (J. 
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J. Gross, 2015a), from those supporting the specific implementation of those efforts (McRae, 
Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012a). 
 
9.4.3. Pathological endogenous emotion generation 
Furthermore, as machine learning models are essentially predictive, establishing and 
validating such signatures would allow one to move beyond theory-crafting and enhance our 
understanding of the neural mechanisms of pathology. This is of some importance because 
current diagnostic systems are relatively agnostic regarding the underlying mechanisms of 
affective disorders, a problem compounded by the substantial heterogeneity in 
symptomatology (Lieblich et al., 2015; Nitschke & Heller, 2005; X. Wang, Zhang, Chaim, 
Zanetti, & Davatzikos, 2015) and underlying genetics (Ripke et al., 2012). Importantly, at the 
heart of most, if not all, affective disorders are disturbances in the generation and regulation 
of emotion (D. A. Clark & Beck, 2010; McLaughlin, Mennin, & Farach, 2007). By 
investigating how such signatures differ in populations with affective disorders it would be 
possible to establish the relative ætiological role of differences in neural mechanisms 
supporting emotion generation and regulation mechanisms. Moreover, such investigations 
could form the basis for the development of brain-based classification and diagnoses systems 
that are both mechanistically informed and capable of accounting for heterogeneity of these 
disorders. This could allow understanding the underlying neural mechanisms of such 
disorders, on both a population and an individual level. Thus, signature-based diagnostics 
could potentially enable tailoring of interventions, possibly allowing enhanced treatment of 
some of the most debilitating and socio-economically costly mental disorders in existence. 
 
9.4.4. Training emotion generation to regulate emotion 
Finally, such a mechanistic understanding could further the understanding of how to 
formulate appropriate interventions to alleviate these disorders. Critically, the findings 
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described here indicate that such interventions could benefit from teaching skills at both 
endogenously generating emotional states, as well how to regulate or manage negative 
stressors. Thus, interventions could fruitfully be devised aimed at increasing general affective 
flexibility (Kashdan et al., 2015; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010) and the ability to actively use 
emotions in the service of goal-achievement. 
 
9.5. Concluding remarks 
It is common to think of emotions as things that happen to us, as essentially external 
influences perturbing our thoughts (Nussbaum, 2008). However, as the current data indicates, 
emotions also have volitional aspects, such that we can, if we are so inclined, instil in 
ourselves vivid and real emotional states. This ability to harness the fire of our passions can 
be used both to counter the emotional vagaries of the external world and to predict our 
emotional reactions to future, unlived events. As such, the capacity to endogenously generate 
emotional states appears to be an oft overlooked, but highly important, part of our self-
regulatory toolkit. 
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A1.1.1. ReSource eligibility criteria 
Eligibility to participate in the study was determined using a comprehensive screening 
procedure, culminating in full SCID-I and II interviews performed by trained clinical 
psychologists, ensuring no ongoing mental health issues, and no life-time occurrence of 
psychotic disorders or schizophrenia, or any Axis-II disorders. Furthermore, participants were 
screened for alexithymia as measured by the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Kupfer, Brosig, & 
Brähler, 2000 cutoff 60), and trait anxiety as measured by the State Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Laux, L., Glanzmann, P.S., Schaffner, P., & Spielberger, C.D., 1981 cutoff 56). 
 
 
A1.1.2. Training procedure 
A1.1.2.1. Experiment 1 
Before scanning, participants underwent a supervised automated training session. In 
order to ensure that participants had a homogenous representation of the affective states they 
were requested to generate, they first underwent a multimodal affect induction procedure 
combining emotional music (adopted from the norms in Eerola & Vuoskoski, 2010) and 
affectively charged pictures, preceded by verbal descriptions of the bodily and affective 
sensations associated with these states. The inductions aimed at inducing states of sadness, 
happiness or neutrality in the participants. Each emotional state was induced twice. The 
participants were then instructed to identify what means they themselves thought would be 
the most efficient at eliciting similar emotional states in themselves. No constraints were 
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given as to how they should do this, as long as it was possible to do so while in the scanner 
environment, avoiding overt movement.  
Participants then underwent three Generation trials identical to the experimental 
procedure generating both positive, negative emotional states, as well as the neutral baseline 
state. Subjects were then asked to identify means by which they could regulate the emotional 
states they generated, so as to attain a state of neutrality, and performed seven training trials 
corresponding to the full set of conditions (i.e. 3 (Modulation; Maintain, Cease, Regulate) X 2 
(Emotion; Positive, Negative) + 1(Baseline; Neutral). 
 
A1.1.2.2. Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, participants underwent the same training procedure as Experiment 1, 
with the exception that they were given the option to generate either high or low arousal 
exemplars of positive (e.g. joy vs. tenderness) and negative (e.g. fear vs. sadness) emotion in 
order to enhance ecological validity, and that they were constrained in their use of strategies 
based on feedback from the participants from Experiment 1 and theoretical considerations. 
Two key alterations of the training procedure was thus performed. First, the emotion 
induction procedure was changed by including both high and low arousal inductions (with no 
repetitions). Second, rather than being given free choice to select strategies, following the 
induction phase, immediately before generation training, participants were presented with a 
list of four emotion generation technique (Verbal, Visual, Auditory, Bodily) with short 
descriptions detailing how to implement each technique and descriptions of each technique 
(see Pre-Scan Training Instructions below for details). Participants were then given the 
option of which arousal level to generate (High/Low) for each emotion, and asked to select 
one or more techniques to employ.  
Participants then underwent three Generation trials identical to the experimental procedure 
(see fMRI experimental procedure and Figure 1) generating both positive and negative 
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emotional states, as well as the neutral baseline state. After this, subjects were given the 
option to change their initial selection of strategies and arousal levels, in case they discovered 
the unsuitability of employed strategy and/or arousal level during training.  
Finally, subjects were presented a list of six emotion regulation techniques and their 
descriptions, and again asked to select one or more of these techniques to employ to down-
regulate their self-generated emotions according their own preference. The regulation 
condition and the strategies employed are the focus of a future study. They then trained 
regulating two Regulation trials (see Figure 6.1), in which they both generated and down-
regulated positive and negative affect. Participants were instructed to use only the techniques 
they chose during the experiment, and to employ them in equal measure to generate and 
regulate both positive and negative affect. 
 
A1.1.3. Psychophysiological data acquisition and preprocessing 
In Experiment 2 only, skin conductance responses were recorded during scanning 
using a BrainVision setup (BrainAmp ExG MR; Brain Products, Munich, Germany). 
Ag/AgCl electrodes with applied isotonic electrode paste as a conductance medium were 
attached to the index and middle finger of the left hand for each subject. The acquired data 
was filtered using a Butterworth 0.15 Hz low-pass filter of order 3 using custom MATLAB 
scripts. Overall time-courses were then visually inspected, excluding data-sets where overall 
data quality was noisy, showing evidence of scanner artefacts after filtering, or lack of 
variance for the entire time series.  Of the 293 data sets passing the fMRI preprocessing 
quality control, 225 also passed these criteria, forming the subset used for our 
psychophysiological analyses. The remaining data was analysed using the Ledalab toolbox 
(www.ledalab.de). After downsampling the data to 250 Hz, continuous decomposition 
analysis (Benedek & Kaernbach, 2010a) was performed to identify task-related modulations 
of skin conductance levels. 
  A1. Supplemental methods 
 
234 
 
A1.1.4. Generation strategy descriptions 
In the following the description of the different generation modalities that were 
presented to the participants are reproduced, translated from the original German. Presentation 
order of the modalities were randomised in the actual experiment. 
 
Verbal8: Internal monologue. E.g. telling yourself things that you believe will make you feel 
different things. Instead of statements you can also tell yourself short stories. The important 
thing is that you use verbal abilities.  
Visual9: Using visual imagery to imagine real or hypothetical situations or events that are 
emotional. Importantly, this technique is associated with a visual experience and not just e.g. 
retelling a story like in the Verbal).  
Auditory10: As Visual, but with a focus on sounds, such as voices, music or other emotionally 
evocative sounds. Again, the important thing is that emotions should be elicited through 
auditory means.  
Bodily11: Creating and/or amplifying bodily manifestations of emotions, such as breathing, 
facial expressions, muscular tension, heart rate, thereby changing one’s emotional experience.  
Other: If you will be using a technique (either alone, or in combination with the others) that 
is not similar to any of the above, please indicate this by selecting E. You will be asked to 
describe this in writing. 
  
                                                
8 Corresponds to the Semantic Analysis modality 
9 Corresponds to the Episodic Imagery modality 
10 Corresponds to the Auditory Imagery modality 
11 Corresponds to the Bodily Interoception modality 
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A1.1.5. Assessing the effect of fatigue on emotion generation 
 In our SCL analyses we included trial number in order to control for potential fatigue 
or habituation effects in the relationship between ratings and SCL reactivity. As we wanted to 
ensure that our analyses were not confounded with these effects, we performed additional 
analyses investigating the effect of fatigue on the current results, using a similar trial-wise 
analysis with random intercepts as in the main analyses. 
As expected given the effortful nature of the task, we found effects of time-on-task on 
reported ratings [F(11017.96)=34.099, p<.001], that took the form of less extreme ratings 
with time for both Positive [t(4272.97) = -12.86; p<.001] and Negative [t(4272.97) = -4.40, 
p<.001] conditions. This was also the case for SCL levels [F(11012.142) = 474.05, p<.001], 
with the effects manifesting as lower SCL with time for both positive [t(4271.97) = -11.80, 
p<.001], negative [t(4271.85) = -12.39, p<.001] and neutral [t(2022.41) = -13.54, p<.001] 
conditions. Thus, these results suggest that efficacy of emotion generation diminishes with 
time on task, in terms of both subjective and physiological indices of emotion. This is 
consistent with a general fatigue/habituation effect. In an extended model, we investigated 
whether this effect was moderated by modality usage, and found no interaction between time 
on task and reported modality usage. Thus, it appears that all modalities were equally 
fatiguing.  
Next, we investigated what the effect of fatigue/habituation on neural activation 
patterns in Experiment 2, by including a centered condition-wise parametric modulator coding 
the trial number in the first level models. Overall, this regressor had little effect on the main 
findings. Investigating the neural activation patterns associated with time on task revealed 
increased activation of dorsal attention regions with time, and correspondingly decreased 
activation of DMN, SN, and FPCN (see Figure S3). Notably, this decreased activation was 
observable in the Generation condition and not the Neutral condition, suggesting a selective 
task-dependent decrease of activation in largely overlapping regions to those found in the 
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main analyses. Importantly, we did not find any differential effects of time-on-task for 
modalities, nor did we find any strong differential effects of time-on-task in either Generation 
or Modulation phases, with the exception of a stronger effect of time on task on DMN (mOFC 
and PCC) in the generation part of the trials. Importantly, while the Neutral baseline condition 
showed similar increases of activation with time as the active conditions, corresponding 
deactivation patterns were not observed. Thus, in line with the behavioral and 
psychophysiological results, it appears that time on task decreased the activation of emotion 
generation networks in a condition-specific manner. However, as the activation and 
deactivation patterns were as would be expected based on the main results, main analyses 
omitted the temporal regressor, to avoid interpretation issues stemming from serial 
orthogonalisation of multiple parametric modulators, or alternately, the interpretation of the 
main rating parametric modulator in a model including a highly correlated regressor coding 
time. 
 
A1.2. Supplemental methods: Chapter 6  
A1.2.1: ROI selection procedure 
While often associated with positive and negative affect respectively, the VS/NAC 
and amygdala are known to be functionally heterogeneous. To ensure that the time courses as 
closely as possible reflected subjective affect we used a three-step procedure ensuring the 
specificity of our ROIs to subjective affect: First, the NACC/VS ROI was defined 
anatomically using the Oxford-GSK-Imanova Structural Striatal Atlas (Tziortzi et al., 2011), 
encompassing NACC and its junction with medial caudate and rostro-ventral putamen, while 
the amygdala ROI was defined using the amygdala template from the Anatomy toolbox. We 
then identified voxels within these regions where BOLD amplitude parametrically varied as a 
function of subjective affect across all conditions at a threshold of p < .005 uncorrected. This 
step ensured that our ROIs did not reflect condition specific mechanisms associated with e.g. 
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the generation of positive and negative affect, but rather general activity correlated with 
subjective affect. This procedure allowed us to identify three regions associated with negative 
and positive affect. Negative affect subjective affect ratings were found to be correlated with 
activity in the left (peak MNIxyz = -18 0 -20) and right (peak MNIxyz = 21 -6 -16) central 
amygdala, while positive ratings were correlated with a region in the left VS/NAC (MNIxyz = -
10 18 -4). Using the MarsBaR toolbox, median, condition and run specific time courses were 
extracted from a 5 mm sphere centred on the peak voxel of each region, corrected for serial 
autocorrelation using an AR(1) process, converted to percent signal change, and submitted to 
separate analyses using LMM modelling.  
 
A1.3. Supplemental Methods: Chapter 7 
A1.3.1. Training procedure 
 Before scanning, participants underwent a supervised, automated training procedure. 
In order to ensure that participants had a homogenous representation of the affective states 
they were requested to generate, they first underwent a multimodal affect induction procedure 
combining emotional music, affectively charged pictures and verbal descriptions of bodily 
and psychological sensations associated with the different emotion states, ensuring that 
participants were not biased towards any particular information modality. Inductions aimed at 
inducing positive and negative emotional states of both high (e.g. happiness and fear) and low 
(e.g tenderness and sadness) arousal as well as give subjects an example of a neutral state by 
presenting them with emotionally neutral visual stimuli (neutral induction).  
 Participants were then presented with a list of four emotion generation modalities with 
short descriptions. Briefly, semantic analysis was specified as a form of non-imagery based 
inner monologue, episodic imagery as imagining hypothetical or real situations or events of 
an emotional nature, auditory imagery as imagining emotionally evocative sounds, like music 
or the timbre of voices, while bodily sensations was specified as generating or amplifying 
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bodily sensations associated with emotional states. The order of descriptions was 
counterbalanced. Participants were also given the option of using techniques or modalities 
that were not specified and asked to describe this in writing. Participants then chose which 
arousal level to generate (High/Low) separately for positive and negative emotion, and asked 
to select one or more techniques to employ. Three Generation trials identical to the 
experimental procedure followed in which participants generated positive, negative and 
neutral emotional states. After this, they were given the option to revise their initial selection 
of strategies in case they discovered the unsuitability of employed strategy and/or arousal 
level during training.  
A1.3.2. Assessment of trait affectivity 
 As part of the ReSource study, participants completed a comprehensive package of 
questionnaires. To generate a nuanced measure of trait affectivity we combined scales that 
where participants judge their own positive and negative affect. In the following the scales 
used and the rational for their inclusion will be provided.  
 
A1.3.2.1. Positive and Negative Affect Schedule  
 The PANAS (PANAS; Krohne et al., 1996) is a very frequently used questionnaire 
that measures the tendency to experience positive and negative forms of affect. Importantly, 
studies indicate that the measure is stable over time (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), 
suggesting that it measures differences in emotional traits. Moreover, positive and negative 
affectivity as measured by the PANAS are largely independent constructs. 
 
A1.3.2.2. The State-Trait Anxiety inventory  
 Another very frequently used measure, the STAI  (STAI; Laux et al., 1981) indicates 
to what degree an individual endorses feeling anxiety (i.e. a high-arousal negative emotional 
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state) either in the moment (state) or on a regular basis (trait version). Here we focused on the 
trait measure of anxiety. 
 
A1.3.2.3. Beck’s Depression Inventory II  
 The BDI-II (BDI-II; Hautzinger et al., 2009) is perhaps the most frequently used 
measure of depressive symptoms (i.e. a low-arousal negative state), both in clinical and 
research settings. While the scale provided measures of both somatic and affective symptoms, 
we here combine these. 
 
A1.3.2.4. The Types of Positive Affect Scale 
 TTPAS (TTPAS; P. Gilbert et al., 2008) is a relatively new scale that measures 
positive affect in a nuanced way, providing measures of high (active) and low (relaxation, 
compassionate warmth) arousal emotional states characteristic to different individuals that are 
typically not captured by traditional valence-focused measurements.  
 
A1.3.2.5. NEO-Five Factor Inventory: Positive and Negative subscales 
 The NEO-FFI (NEO-FFI; Borkenau & Ostendorf, 2008) is perhaps the predominant 
measure of personality traits used in research. In addition to providing overall measurement of 
broad personality traits, the FFI includes a number of facets measuring specific personality 
characteristics (McCrae & Costa, 1992). Here we opted to focus on the subscales measuring 
the tendency to experience positive and negative affect rather than the main parent factors of 
extraversion and neuroticism. We elected to focus on subscales because the extraversion and 
neuroticism measure a wide range of behaviours not necessarily affective in nature. 
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A1.3.2.6. Adult Temperament Questionnaire 
 Finally, we included the negative affect and extraversion subscales from the ATQ 
(ATQ; Wiltink et al., 2006). Emotional reactivity is a defining feature of temperament and can 
be thought of as being the physiological base of personality. The ATQ provides measures of 
the tendency to react to positive and negative emotion, including both high and low arousal 
exemplars.  
 
A1.3.2.7.. PCA procedure: Trait affect 
 To get a measure of trait affectivity we combined these scales using principal 
components analysis (PCA). Scree plotting (see Appendix: Figure A2.3.1) indicated that these 
scales could be combined into a single component explaining 40.08% of the variance in 
reports. Scales measuring positive affect (PANAS Positive, the three TTPAS subscales, the 
Positive affect subscale of the NEO-FFI and the extraversion subscale of the ATQ) loaded 
negatively on this component, while the remainder scales measuring negative affect loaded 
positively (see Appendix: Figure A2.3.1). For subsequent analyses, individual loadings on this 
component served as our measure of trait affectivity. For ease of interpretation loadings were 
inverted, such that positive loadings corresponded to relative tendency to experience positive 
emotion and vice versa.  
 
A1.3.3. Assessment of coping styles  
 In addition to trait affect, we sought to measure individual differences in emotion 
management styles. To this end, we focused on scales measuring the tendency to use different 
coping and emotion regulation strategies, as well as general measures of self-regulation 
tendencies. 
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A1.3.3.1. Brief COPE  
 The brief COPE  (Knoll et al., 2005) inventory measures the degree to which an 
individual engages in different behaviours to cope with emotional stressors, and includes both 
adaptive and counterproductive coping strategies (e.g. self-blame or drug-use). Extensively 
used, the brief COPE has been shown to be associated with mental fortitude in the face of 
numerous challenges ranging from health issues to natural disasters. As such, the brief COPE 
provides a nuanced measure of the individual coping styles in applied settings. In the current 
study, all scales were included with the exception of the subscale measuring the tendency to 
find comfort in spiritual or religious practices, on account of the poor communality (< .2) of 
this subscale.   
A1.3.3.2. Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire  
 Like the COPE, the CERQ (CERQ; Loch et al., 2011) measures the tendency to use 
different strategies in the face of negative emotional stressors. However, as the name 
suggests, it focuses on cognitive approaches to emotion management, i.e. those that involve 
thinking or attending to specific aspects of an emotional situation, thereby altering its 
emotional quality. The CERQ includes subscales measuring both adaptive (i.e. those that 
reduce or transform negative emotions) and dysfunctional (i.e. those that tend to intensify the 
negative emotion) strategies of varying cognitive complexity. Importantly, usage of these 
strategies have been shown to have an appropriate developmental trajectory, while the relative 
balance of adaptive and dysfunctional strategy use has been shown to be predictive of 
psychopathology (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006).  
 
A1.3.3.3. Emotion Regulation of Self and Other scale 
 Unlike the COPE and CERQ, the EROS (EROS; Niven et al., 2011) measures 
individual differences in the goal of emotion regulation (i.e. worsening or improving), and 
differentiates between intrinsic and extrinsic means of regulation. As such, the EROS 
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provides a more abstract measure of emotion management across numerous specific strategies 
and behaviours, and critically include a social dimension frequently overlooked in the 
literature at large. 
 
A1.3.3.4. Adult Temperament Questionnaire: Effortful Control subscale 
 Finally, we included the Effortful Control subscale of the ATQ. Effortful control is 
thought to be at the centre of both cognitive and behavioural self-regulation, and has been 
shown to be inversely related to both negative affect, interpersonal problems , psychiatric 
symptoms and general distress (Wiltink et al., 2006). The effortful control subscale of the 
ATQ can be thought of as measuring the core dispositional ability to override emotional 
impulses and achieve behaviours in the face of e.g. inherent avoidance tendencies.  
 
A1.3.3.5. PCA procedure: Emotion management styles 
 We combined these scales using PCA to create composite measures of emotion 
management using the scree criterion. Our analyses revealed a three component structure to 
emotion management styles explaining a total of 37% of variance in reports (see Appendix: 
Figure A2.3.1). Based on the loading structures and extant coping and emotion regulation 
theory, we interpreted these as reflecting Emotion-focused (16.90% variance explained), 
Maladaptive (12.11% variance explained), and Instrumental (8.61% variance explained) 
emotion management. Characteristic of the Emotion-focused component was positive 
loadings on scales pertaining to cognitively altering emotional states or taking different 
perspectives, notably with the aim of improving one’s emotional states. The Maladaptive 
component had strong loadings on scales including self-blame, catastrophising and 
rumination, notably with an emphasis on worsening one’s emotional states, and negatively 
loading on effortful control. Finally, the Instrumental component had loadings on scales 
measuring the tendency to take an active, instrumental approach to managing emotions, 
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seeking emotional support and having active plans, aimed at improving one’s own and others 
emotional states. 
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A2. Supplemental figures 
 
 
A2.1 Supplemental figures: Chapter 4 
 
Figure A2.1.1. Previous studies of endogenous emotion generation 
 
 
 
Figure A2.1.1: Previous studies of endogenous emotion generation. Related to Introduction 
An overview of previous studies of emotion generation (Damasio et al., 2000; Gemar et al., 1996; George et 
al., 1996; Kimbrell et al., 1999; Liotti et al., 2000; Mayberg et al., 1999; Reiman et al., 1997), derived from 
the GingerALE meta-analysis software package (Eickhoff et al., 2009), thresholded at p < .05, uncorrected. 
Note: Figure is presented for descriptive purposes only. See Phan et al. (2002) for a quantitative summary of 
differences between exogenous and endogenous emotion elicitation 
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Figure A2.1.2. Main contrasts for model-based decomposition analyses. 
 
 
Figure A2.1.2: Main contrasts for model-based decomposition analyses. Related to Figure 6.3; Model-based 
component process mapping. The constituent contrasts were used in the model-based component process 
decomposition analysis adopted in Experiment 1. Results were thresholded at T > 2.74, p < .005 and k > 20.  
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Figure A2.1.3. Effect of fatigue/habituation on neural signatures of EGE 
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A2.2 Supplemental figures: Chapter 6 
 
Figure A2.2.1. Reappraisal-related activations 
 
Figure A2.2.1: Reappraisal-related activations. Results from the whole brain contrast of Compassion>Watch-
negative presented separately for the Preparation and Implementation phases. All results thresholded at FWEc α 
< .05 as determined by AFNI’s Alphasim (p < .001, extent threshold = 30 voxels). 
 
 
A2.3 Supplemental figures: Chapter 7 
 
Figure A2.3.1. Scree plots from the two PCA analyses performed 
 
 
Figure A2.3.1: Scree plots from the two PCA analyses performed. A) Scree plot from the analysis of scales 
measuring trait affect, indicating the optimality of a single component solution. See Appendix: Table A3.3.1 for 
scale loadings. B) Scree plot from the analysis of scales measuring emotion management styles, indicating the 
optimality of a three-component solution. See Appendix: Table A3.3.2 for scale loadings. 
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Figure A2.3.2. Correlation of emotion generation ability and affective traits 
 
Figure A2.3.2: Correlation of emotion generation ability and affective traits. Scatterplots of the relationships 
between the composite scores calculated for average and relative trait-specific generation ability and the PCA 
components measuring trait affectivity (see Appendix: Table A3.3.1) and emotion management styles (see 
Appendix: Table A3.3.2). A) Relationship between average generation efficacy and trait affectivity. B) 
Relationship between average generation efficacy and three emotion management styles. C) Relationship 
between the relative ability to generate positive and negative emotion and trait affect. D) Relationship between 
relative ability to generation positive and negative emotion and emotion management styles. Lines indicate linear 
regression lines of best and are provided for reference only (see Table 7.3 for correlation analyses). 
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A3. Supplemental tables 
 
A3.1. Supplemental tables: Chapter 4 
 
Table A3.1.1. Core networks of emotion generation 
 
Region Label/BA 
 MNI     Extent 
t-
value 
t-
value 
Side x y z (voxel (max (avg 
         
Experiment 1 (N=32) 
Activations         
Medial Frontal Gyrus  32 L -11 11 47 696 8.27 4.27 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  32 L -11 11 47 125 8.27 4.64 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  11 L -7 51 -13 105 6.89 4.97 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  10 L -10 37 -11 40 5.45 4.24 
Anterior Cingulate  33 R 0 33 4 108 5.42 4.13 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  11 R 4 42 -15 83 5.37 4.29 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  10 L -12 58 6 127 5.06 3.89 
Anterior Cingulate  24 R 3 27 21 61 4.89 3.89 
Posterior Cingulate  29 L -6 -45 17 2031 7.89 4.24 
Posterior Cingulate  29 L -6 -45 17 135 7.89 5.49 
Globus Pallidus Lateral R 25 -9 -1 58 6.90 4.17 
Cerebellum Culmen R 11 -34 -13 128 6.78 4.19 
Midbrain 
Mammilary/Red 
Nucleus L 0 -13 -6 104 6.17 4.31 
Cerebellum Lingual R 0 -47 -19 72 6.15 4.31 
Hippocampus Posterior L -33 -27 -8 72 6.12 4.14 
Cerebellum Lingual R 3 -42 -8 146 6.07 4.32 
Putamen Lentiform L -26 7 5 81 5.96 4.43 
Midbrain Substantia Nigra/VTA L -14 -20 -6 93 5.87 4.15 
Retrosplenial Cortex 30 L -12 -37 6 97 5.82 4.63 
Midbrain Substantia Nigra R 14 -24 -10 42 5.79 3.86 
Caudate  Head L -9 7 -2 60 5.79 4.18 
Thalamus  Anterior L -3 -2 4 77 5.78 4.10 
Thalamus  Anterior R 6 -3 0 46 5.68 4.18 
Putamen Lentiform R 22 0 1 61 5.60 3.97 
Cerebellum Anterior Lobe R 16 -37 -30 60 6.53 4.48 
Lentiform Nucleus  Pallidus L -24 -13 -7 59 5.41 4.06 
Posterior Cingulate  23 R 6 -50 22 98 5.30 4.28 
Midbrain Red Nucleus L -5 -23 -3 114 5.14 3.97 
Posterior Cingulate  30 L -13 -55 16 48 4.99 4.00 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  30 L -14 -31 -7 86 4.91 3.91 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  30 R 15 -14 -7 59 4.69 3.92 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  27 R 9 -37 4 74 4.60 3.90 
Cerebellum Culmen L -6 -42 -1 51 4.50 3.88 
Cerebellum Culmen L -17 -45 -18 46 4.15 3.69 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 L -62 -8 -9 66 5.49 4.21 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  13 L -41 27 7 63 5.14 3.87 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 L -50 -71 20 42 4.32 3.66 
         
Deactivations         
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 Inferior Parietal Lobule  7 R 36 -57 42 1674 -11.98 -5.05 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  7 R 36 -57 42 440 -11.98 -5.94 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 45 -40 40 321 -11.36 -5.77 
 Precuneus  7 R 9 -64 47 108 -8.95 -4.39 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 R 27 -87 10 64 -8.37 -4.77 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 50 -28 46 115 -7.67 -5.10 
 Cingulate Gyrus  31 R 7 -26 38 134 -7.31 -4.60 
 Precuneus  7 R 9 -63 37 56 -6.46 -4.62 
 Cingulate Gyrus  31 R 13 -37 38 56 -5.75 -4.14 
 Cuneus  17 R 11 -97 0 67 -5.51 -4.20 
 Supramarginal Gyrus  40 R 59 -49 26 106 -5.39 -4.08 
 Superior Occipital Gyrus  39 R 31 -72 29 78 -5.06 -4.14 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 61 -25 33 80 -4.72 -3.78 
 Cuneus  7 R 19 -74 31 42 -3.96 -3.63 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -43 -42 49 762 -7.60 -4.31 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -43 -42 49 420 -7.60 -4.65 
 Postcentral Gyrus  2 L -54 -29 39 161 -5.10 -4.08 
 Insula  40 L -47 -27 19 75 -4.84 -3.81 
 Precuneus  7 L -19 -70 35 50 -4.50 -3.79 
 Angular Gyrus  39 L -28 -55 36 40 -3.95 -3.65 
Cerebellum Inf. Semi-lunar L -43 -68 -42 110 -7.46 -4.62 
 Precentral Gyrus  9 R 46 19 35 620 -7.04 -4.29 
 Precentral Gyrus  9 R 46 19 35 124 -7.04 -4.33 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  46 R 53 39 16 128 -6.92 -4.59 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  10 R 48 51 -6 90 -6.10 -4.48 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  10 R 42 53 1 122 -5.59 -4.22 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  8 R 40 17 49 93 -5.42 -4.16 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  11 R 29 52 -17 47 -4.76 -3.74 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 L -25 -88 11 756 -6.99 -4.27 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 L -25 -88 11 77 -6.99 -4.71 
 Inferior Temporal Gyrus  20 L -53 -45 -13 97 -6.82 -4.23 
 Lingual Gyrus  17 L -7 -95 -9 98 -6.27 -4.80 
Cerebellum Declive L -9 -71 -21 50 -5.49 -4.27 
 Fusiform Gyrus  19 L -43 -66 -6 89 -5.44 -4.09 
 Fusiform Gyrus  19 L -35 -74 -9 80 -5.30 -4.09 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  37 L -51 -63 -8 101 -5.09 -4.18 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 L -13 -84 -8 60 -5.03 -3.98 
 Fusiform Gyrus  37 L -43 -57 -12 53 -5.00 -4.06 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 L -26 -77 -6 50 -4.86 -4.06 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 R 31 -73 -7 322 -6.69 -4.30 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 R 31 -73 -7 114 -6.69 -4.40 
 Fusiform Gyrus  37 R 56 -50 -13 100 -6.07 -4.24 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  37 R 58 -45 -5 108 -5.87 -4.23 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  11 L -45 46 -11 40 -4.79 -3.80 
         
Experiment 2 (N=293) 
Activations         
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 R 3 8 58 9887 20.42 7.51 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 R 3 8 58 294 20.42 10.90 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 L -4 11 49 184 20.25 11.40 
 Cingulate Gyrus  32 L -8 21 37 375 18.99 9.11 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  6 R 3 14 44 193 16.15 10.17 
 Insula  13 L -47 9 6 229 15.11 8.74 
Cerebellum Tuber R 37 -60 -23 355 15.07 8.83 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45 L -46 21 5 271 14.79 9.11 
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 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 L -40 0 52 355 14.12 8.55 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45 L -31 25 6 94 14.04 10.48 
Cerebellum Culmen L -27 -52 -20 166 14.01 8.15 
Cerebellum Declive L -15 -55 -14 246 13.91 8.93 
Midbrain 
Substantia Nigra 
VTA 
PAG 
L 0 -18 -4 147 13.64 8.17 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  9 L -40 18 28 306 13.23 7.01 
Cerebellum Declive R 21 -58 -17 242 13.14 9.41 
Basal Ganglia Caudate Body L -20 5 19 63 12.88 8.92 
 Posterior Cingulate  31 L -6 -52 20 320 12.87 7.24 
Basal Ganglia Caudate Body  R 19 4 19 95 12.78 9.54 
Basal Ganglia Putamen L -22 2 12 80 12.52 9.06 
Basal Ganglia Putamen R 26 3 13 143 12.47 7.80 
Thalamus Anterior L -3 -4 8 173 12.24 7.60 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  9 L -12 55 29 214 12.23 8.59 
Cerebellum Declive L 0 -58 -11 321 12.23 8.82 
Basal Ganglia Putamen L -32 4 5 284 12.17 8.17 
Basal Ganglia Caudate Body L -16 -9 23 38 11.93 8.50 
Midbrain Substantia Nigra L -11 -20 -5 75 11.68 7.46 
 Insula  13 R 47 7 6 161 11.68 7.21 
Cerebellum Declive L -44 -61 -22 109 11.59 7.12 
Hippocampus Anterior L -18 -18 -6 184 11.47 6.56 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 R 55 -4 42 87 10.86 6.74 
Cerebellum Pyramis R 10 -79 -26 210 10.67 6.77 
Cerebellum Lingual R 6 -42 -8 229 10.64 8.03 
Basal Ganglia Caudate Head R 3 1 6 35 10.40 7.10 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  11 L -4 54 -11 224 10.14 6.83 
Cerebellum Tonsil R 34 -59 -42 247 10.00 6.08 
 Posterior Cingulate  29 L -6 -47 10 135 9.50 6.89 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  10 L -35 48 22 239 9.03 6.54 
Cerebellum Declive R 29 -82 -22 268 8.94 6.69 
Basal Ganglia Lateral Globus Pallidus R 22 -6 -1 123 8.76 6.01 
Basal Ganglia Caudate Body  R 13 4 10 43 8.73 6.11 
Hypothalamus Anterior L -9 -5 -3 64 8.66 5.82 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  8 L -22 34 42 196 8.60 6.07 
Cerebellum Culmen L 0 -33 2 49 8.29 5.19 
Cerebellum Culmen R 17 -37 -17 101 8.12 6.45 
Basal Ganglia Lateral Globus Pallidus R 13 6 0 86 7.97 5.44 
Hippocampus Head R 18 -17 -5 112 7.73 5.47 
Cerebellum Anterior Lobe R 3 -47 -26 167 7.69 5.76 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 L -27 2 60 135 7.59 5.66 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  13 R 43 23 5 175 7.53 5.61 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 R 63 2 21 42 7.47 5.22 
Cerebellum Tonsil R 37 -53 -33 82 7.06 5.27 
Basal Ganglia Caudate Tail R 30 -38 6 20 6.99 5.53 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45 R 54 21 6 55 6.91 5.53 
 Cuneus  17 L -17 -78 9 113 6.82 4.99 
 Thalamus  Pulvinar L -12 -28 13 56 6.80 5.45 
 Cuneus  17 R 22 -77 8 79 6.78 4.99 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  11 R 4 48 -16 47 6.63 5.09 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  10 L -29 63 5 105 6.49 5.08 
Basal Ganglia Caudate Tail  R 36 -35 -1 14 6.44 5.17 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  30 R 28 -54 8 14 6.37 5.06 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 L -34 30 -5 18 6.32 5.04 
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 Posterior Cingulate  29 R 6 -40 6 18 6.16 4.90 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 R 44 -7 55 20 6.14 4.80 
 Posterior Cingulate  30 L -26 -67 9 47 6.13 4.74 
 Precentral Gyrus  4 L -45 -12 37 62 6.08 4.77 
Cerebellum Anterior Lobe L -7 -47 -25 19 6.07 5.04 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  8 L -8 37 48 24 6.04 5.44 
 Posterior Cingulate  30 R 6 -51 6 29 6.03 4.69 
 Postcentral Gyrus  3 R 23 -25 58 30 6.01 5.00 
Basal Ganglia Caudate Body L -10 20 3 40 5.96 4.75 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 R 43 -14 35 33 5.83 4.96 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  18 L -25 -55 8 26 5.71 4.68 
 Thalamus  Pulvinar  R 15 -35 8 13 5.70 4.91 
Basal Ganglia Putamen L -28 -18 9 10 5.64 4.86 
Basal Ganglia Caudate Tail L -28 -36 8 27 5.60 4.60 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 R 20 -10 71 25 5.39 4.49 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 R 32 -11 64 15 5.12 4.45 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 L -20 -15 59 53 5.05 4.53 
Cerebellum  Inf. Semi-Lunar   R 8 -60 -49 37 4.99 4.42 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  28 L -21 -10 -20 21 4.93 4.37 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  28 R 27 -14 -20 27 4.89 4.24 
 Inferior Temporal Gyrus  20 R 39 -16 -29 11 4.62 4.20 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  36 L -29 -15 -24 10 4.49 4.22 
 Inferior Occipital Gyrus  18 R 30 -94 -5 96 12.68 7.54 
 Inferior Occipital Gyrus  18 L -28 -93 -3 88 10.24 6.76 
Cerebellum Tonsil L -27 -59 -42 86 8.55 5.57 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 L -40 -61 23 152 7.78 5.35 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 L -40 -61 23 85 7.78 5.59 
 Angular Gyrus  39 L -50 -68 29 67 6.23 5.06 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 L -56 -11 -9 72 7.51 5.23 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 R 45 -37 2 54 7.50 5.41 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  10 R 4 57 17 37 7.02 5.12 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 L -46 8 -25 36 5.94 4.66 
 Precentral Gyrus  4 L -19 -23 59 22 5.61 4.86 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 R 26 -13 53 10 5.01 4.33 
         
Deactivations         
 Precuneus  19 R 34 -69 32 7336 -18.26 -7.42 
 Precuneus  19 R 34 -69 32 286 -18.26 -11.55 
 Inferior Temporal Gyrus  37 L -53 -57 -3 484 -17.70 -8.73 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  37 R 58 -51 -3 443 -16.90 -8.47 
 Cingulate Gyrus  31 R 6 -36 38 491 -16.56 -8.00 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 39 -54 42 378 -15.62 -10.58 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 47 -45 45 567 -15.32 -9.55 
 Cuneus  18 R 14 -95 9 92 -13.66 -7.85 
 Cuneus  18 L -13 -99 8 49 -13.54 -8.34 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 L -19 -93 10 146 -13.36 -7.87 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 L -23 -79 -6 97 -12.79 -7.64 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 R 34 -73 -7 179 -12.72 -7.17 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 R 27 -90 12 155 -12.51 -7.12 
 Inferior Occipital Gyrus  19 L -35 -74 -7 201 -11.96 -6.79 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 R 12 -86 -4 57 -11.80 -6.65 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -54 -32 39 225 -11.30 -7.12 
 Superior Occipital Gyrus  19 L -31 -77 25 243 -11.08 -7.20 
 Precuneus  7 L -28 -67 28 33 -11.04 -9.74 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 R 21 -81 -4 62 -10.98 -7.38 
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 Precuneus  7 R 12 -70 43 398 -10.60 -6.88 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 R 42 -74 24 251 -10.56 -6.25 
 Cuneus  17 L -13 -93 6 32 -10.05 -6.05 
 Precuneus  7 L -25 -67 38 154 -10.01 -6.67 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 61 -28 -2 286 -9.99 -6.04 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 L -10 -85 -6 71 -9.86 -6.04 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -44 -43 41 218 -9.51 -6.30 
 Fusiform Gyrus  37 L -31 -47 -7 142 -9.50 -5.65 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  42 L -58 -27 12 200 -8.82 -6.16 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  42 R 56 -30 13 289 -8.70 -5.62 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 50 -38 30 67 -8.64 -5.56 
 Transverse Temporal 
Gyrus  42 L -62 -15 8 89 -8.64 -6.15 
 Insula  13 L -40 -14 2 128 -8.41 -5.52 
Cerebellum Pyranus L -12 -71 -24 67 -8.40 -5.63 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  36 R 30 -39 -8 110 -7.94 -5.39 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -49 -46 36 81 -7.48 -5.66 
Cerebellum Declive R 33 -52 -9 87 -7.43 -5.20 
 Superior Parietal Lobule  7 L -25 -58 41 35 -6.58 -4.99 
 Paracentral Lobule  5 R 7 -39 60 92 -6.45 -5.02 
 Posterior Cingulate  23 R 6 -32 24 24 -6.28 -4.97 
 Postcentral Gyrus  1 L -64 -16 22 42 -6.01 -4.82 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  41 L -42 -35 16 79 -5.85 -4.75 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus      22 R 63 -5 1 43 -5.68 -4.75 
 Paracentral Lobule  5 L -3 -38 57 29 -5.54 -4.64 
 Precuneus  7 L -25 -49 41 33 -5.34 -4.66 
 Postcentral Gyrus  5 L -13 -41 66 21 -5.32 -4.40 
 Insula  13 L -34 -25 16 52 -5.03 -4.46 
 Precuneus  7 L -9 -53 56 26 -4.60 -4.18 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus    46 R 53 36 16 1326 -12.81 -7.32 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus 46 R 53 36 16 217 -12.81 -8.07 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  47 R 48 45 -6 257 -12.77 -8.69 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  8 R 41 29 40 333 -11.47 -7.36 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  8 R 34 18 50 230 -10.73 -7.45 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  10 R 32 60 8 149 -8.66 -5.91 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  11 R 24 35 -15 63 -6.65 -5.03 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  8 R 8 38 39 47 -6.61 -4.77 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  11 R 18 47 -20 30 -4.91 -4.28 
Cerebellum Tonsil L -32 -66 -34 223 -9.76 -6.22 
 Insula  13 R 40 -13 3 62 -6.64 -4.94 
Cerebellum Tonsil L -38 -41 -33 16 -6.02 -4.74 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  11 L -17 41 -22 21 -5.67 -4.65 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  47 L -48 46 -8 19 -5.13 -4.35 
Table A3.1.1: Brain regions activated in the Maintain condition for both positive and negative valence 
relative to the Neutral baseline in Experiment 1 (N=32) and 2 (N=293). Cluster maxima are reported in 
bold. Italicised entries denote local maxima of subclusters within a cluster found to be not connected to 
the already considered (central) mass in a higher-values-first watershed searching algorithm 
implemented in NeuroElf (i.e. the splitclustercoords function).  Multiple comparisons were controlled 
for using cluster-level FWE correction at α<.05 using AFNIs alphasim procedure (Experiment 1: 
T>3.38, p<.001, k>38; Experiment 2: T>3.95, p<.00005, k>10). 
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Table A3.1.2. Main contrasts: model based component process deconstruction  
Region Label/BA 
 MNI     Extent 
t-
value 
t-
value 
Side x y z (voxel) (max) (avg) 
         
Generate (Positive & Negative)> Neutral 
Activations         
 Posterior Cingulate  29 L -3 -44 13 3878 9.04 3.84 
 Posterior Cingulate  29 L -3 -44 13 292 9.04 4.99 
Midbrain Red nucleus L 0 -16 -4 190 8.87 4.91 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  32 L -11 11 47 114 7.81 4.86 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  11 L -7 48 -13 135 6.94 4.78 
Basal Ganglia Putamen  L -27 -15 -7 74 6.60 4.01 
Cerebellum Culmen L -8 -36 -9 132 6.16 3.82 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  11 R 4 45 -16 109 6.11 3.97 
Hippocampus Anterior/Mid L -33 -27 -8 91 6.07 4.10 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  35 L -17 -34 -8 78 5.94 3.84 
 Thalamus  Posterior L -3 -25 1 162 5.93 3.93 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  10 L -12 60 3 132 5.84 3.91 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  35 L -20 -26 -11 60 5.79 3.80 
Thalamus Anterior L -3 -7 6 70 5.69 3.75 
Thalamus 
Ventral Lateral 
Nucleus R 18 -11 4 50 5.43 3.66 
Parahippocampal Gyrus Uncus L -30 -6 -22 95 5.43 3.65 
Hippocampus Anterior/Mid R 36 -26 -10 33 5.42 3.64 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  30 R 12 -38 8 76 5.33 3.56 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  10 L -8 63 17 47 5.33 3.77 
Midbrain Substantia Nigra R 12 -11 -9 96 5.29 3.92 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  28 L -15 -13 -8 112 5.26 4.00 
 Precuneus  31 L -13 -59 20 129 5.24 3.61 
 Lentiform Nucleus  Putamen L -16 10 0 69 5.09 3.50 
 Lentiform Nucleus  
Lateral Globus 
Pallidus R 16 3 1 41 5.07 3.48 
 Anterior Cingulate  24 R 0 36 3 109 5.04 3.68 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 L -32 13 -30 93 4.95 3.48 
Cerebellum Anterior Lobe R 1 -45 -23 54 4.89 3.51 
Basal Ganglia Putamen R 25 -6 -4 42 4.87 3.54 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  6 R 3 14 47 38 4.81 3.47 
 Anterior Cingulate  24 L 0 29 -4 53 4.77 3.33 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 L -32 13 -19 30 4.75 3.31 
 Uncus  20 L -33 -6 -30 70 4.74 3.51 
 Anterior Cingulate  32 R 7 27 21 72 4.68 3.39 
 Uncus  28 L -23 -10 -31 40 4.66 3.51 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  28 R 20 -29 -9 33 4.43 3.16 
Basal Ganglia Caudate Tail  R 37 -14 -12 38 4.42 3.31 
 Cingulate Gyrus  32 L -15 21 32 53 4.41 3.56 
Amygdala Centromedial L -24 -7 -9 39 4.40 3.28 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 L -27 24 -18 32 4.39 3.25 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 L -22 10 -19 28 4.36 3.22 
Basal Ganglia Nucleus Accumbens L -9 1 -1 32 4.33 3.23 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  34 R 29 3 -15 45 4.32 3.20 
 Cingulate Gyrus  32 R 14 20 31 33 4.30 3.41 
 Anterior Cingulate  32 L -4 36 17 58 4.27 3.40 
 Cingulate Gyrus  32 R 3 21 37 45 4.25 3.39 
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Cerebellum Anterior Lobe R 16 -34 -29 37 4.44 3.44 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  10 R 4 57 0 49 4.06 3.29 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 L -43 10 -21 35 4.04 3.22 
Cerebellum Lingual R 0 -48 -15 55 4.00 3.27 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  27 R 27 -28 -5 40 3.99 3.33 
Cerebellum Culmen L -17 -48 -16 35 3.94 3.13 
Hippocampus Anterior R 31 -9 -11 41 3.92 3.15 
 Thalamus  Posterior R 14 -29 -2 49 3.90 3.14 
Parahippocampal Gyrus Posterior R 27 -20 -4 25 3.80 3.20 
Cerebellum Culmen R 11 -34 -13 34 3.59 3.14 
Cerebellum Declive R 18 -61 -19 35 3.39 2.95 
 Lingual Gyrus  17 R 24 -89 -2 142 6.66 3.99 
 Inferior Occipital Gyrus  18 L -29 -93 -6 55 6.38 3.78 
Cerebellum Culmen R 37 -54 -20 112 4.63 3.22 
Cerebellum Culmen R 37 -54 -20 76 4.63 3.31 
Cerebellum Culmen R 32 -44 -24 29 3.84 3.06 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 L -62 -8 -9 56 4.46 3.37 
Cerebellum Anterior Lobe L -15 -34 -30 45 4.39 3.54 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 R 54 -7 -8 50 4.32 3.31 
 Insula  13 L -34 25 9 79 4.20 3.21 
 Insula  13 L -34 25 9 39 4.20 3.39 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  44 L -42 15 13 32 3.48 3.08 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 L -48 -68 20 81 3.73 3.12 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  8 L -25 29 40 29 3.47 3.08 
         
Deactivations         
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 47 -37 40 1964 -11.68 -4.43 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 47 -37 40 429 -11.68 -5.13 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 42 -52 37 304 -10.04 -5.87 
 Superior Parietal Lobule  7 R 27 -64 46 129 -8.73 -3.98 
 Supramarginal Gyrus  40 R 53 -52 26 194 -7.47 -4.58 
 Precuneus  19 R 31 -63 39 163 -6.59 -4.40 
 Precuneus  7 R 9 -65 39 108 -5.90 -3.68 
 Transverse Temporal 
Gyrus  41 R 45 -23 12 131 -5.12 -3.81 
 Cuneus  19 R 12 -76 36 89 -4.63 -3.42 
 Cuneus  7 R 24 -79 30 103 -4.60 -3.40 
 Transverse Temporal 
Gyrus  42 R 59 -15 8 108 -4.38 -3.36 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 61 -25 33 135 -4.13 -3.34 
 Insula  13 R 37 -13 12 49 -3.82 -3.18 
 Insula  13 R 56 -36 17 21 -3.29 -2.95 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  9 R 48 15 35 1168 -8.65 -4.03 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  9 R 48 15 35 212 -8.65 -4.48 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  46 R 50 40 18 188 -7.25 -4.37 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  11 R 25 50 -17 117 -6.68 -3.82 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  47 R 48 45 -8 151 -6.04 -4.32 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 R 40 14 47 157 -5.57 -3.94 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  44 R 55 8 23 44 -5.55 -3.52 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  44 R 53 12 16 37 -5.26 -3.65 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  9 R 55 5 30 34 -5.05 -3.65 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  10 R 32 60 13 52 -4.92 -3.48 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  10 R 42 56 7 86 -4.35 -3.58 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 R 25 24 54 68 -4.25 -3.52 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 R 55 30 -9 22 -3.85 -3.33 
 Paracentral Lobule  31 R 3 -20 41 463 -7.26 -3.84 
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 Paracentral Lobule  31 R 3 -20 41 369 -7.26 -3.99 
 Paracentral Lobule  5 R 10 -36 54 60 -4.16 -3.38 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  6 R 3 -26 64 32 -3.74 -3.10 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  8 R 11 34 46 102 -6.94 -3.70 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  8 R 11 34 46 74 -6.94 -3.82 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  9 R 8 41 25 28 -4.08 -3.39 
 Inferior Temporal Gyrus  20 R 56 -12 -23 64 -6.70 -3.96 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  41 L -37 -31 14 2091 -6.70 -3.81 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  41 L -37 -31 14 139 -6.70 -4.19 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 L -63 -38 10 179 -6.53 -3.83 
 Transverse Temporal 
Gyrus  42 L -59 -10 10 132 -6.17 -3.84 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  41 L -53 -26 9 170 -6.01 -4.09 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -38 -53 50 97 -5.92 -3.79 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  41 L -45 -35 14 67 -5.84 -4.27 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -49 -46 43 166 -5.79 -4.34 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -57 -35 36 75 -5.59 -4.25 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -44 -32 34 62 -5.40 -3.92 
 Supramarginal Gyrus  40 L -55 -49 28 118 -5.25 -4.07 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -46 -31 54 68 -5.13 -3.66 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -63 -32 26 53 -5.11 -3.49 
 Postcentral Gyrus  1 L -61 -16 29 65 -5.08 -3.60 
 Fusiform Gyrus  37 L -48 -57 -14 103 -4.94 -3.47 
 Fusiform Gyrus  37 L -37 -57 -12 58 -4.94 -3.69 
 Superior Parietal Lobule  7 L -35 -61 50 60 -4.89 -3.48 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -36 -34 37 36 -4.69 -3.85 
 Postcentral Gyrus  2 L -55 -24 36 107 -4.68 -3.75 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -33 -36 45 88 -4.62 -3.44 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 L -29 -71 -7 59 -4.30 -3.33 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  20 L -52 -37 -10 51 -4.10 -3.24 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 L -63 -41 18 30 -3.85 -3.30 
Cerebellum Declive L -35 -69 -15 23 -3.78 -3.34 
 Inferior Temporal Gyrus  20 L -58 -45 -12 32 -3.55 -3.06 
 Postcentral Gyrus  3 L -36 -30 63 23 -3.21 -2.96 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 61 -43 0 296 -6.47 -3.53 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 61 -43 0 55 -6.47 -3.58 
 Inferior Temporal Gyrus  20 R 53 -50 -13 73 -6.16 -3.49 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 67 -23 -2 33 -5.48 -3.39 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  20 R 58 -39 -12 51 -5.06 -3.76 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 61 -34 0 46 -4.69 -3.48 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 58 -31 -7 36 -4.56 -3.47 
Cerebellum Pyramis L -12 -71 -24 347 -6.46 -3.65 
Cerebellum Pyramis L -12 -71 -24 103 -6.46 -3.93 
Cerebellum  Inf. Semi-Lunar L -34 -78 -39 116 -6.31 -3.86 
Cerebellum Tonsil L -38 -61 -42 37 -4.45 -3.28 
Cerebellum Inf. Semi-Lunar L -48 -62 -38 31 -4.40 -3.45 
Cerebellum Tuber L -42 -85 -30 34 -4.37 -3.07 
Cerebellum Inf. Semi-Lunar L -15 -69 -41 23 -3.63 -3.09 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  47 L -48 46 -8 108 -6.13 -3.59 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 L -4 -93 -8 153 -6.02 -3.68 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 L -4 -93 -8 68 -6.02 -3.89 
 Cuneus  18 L -16 -99 6 60 -5.65 -3.56 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 L -16 -99 15 21 -4.45 -3.47 
Cerebellum Inf. Semi-Lunar R 30 -79 -39 20 -4.23 -3.22 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  46 L -47 41 13 21 -4.05 -3.20 
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Maintain (Positive & Negative)> Cease 
Activations         
 Precentral Gyrus  4 L -48 -6 45 108 7.49 3.93 
 Precentral Gyrus  4 L -48 -6 45 87 7.49 4.11 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 L -37 -2 50 21 3.84 3.16 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 L -4 6 58 315 6.10 3.62 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 L -4 6 58 131 6.10 3.88 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 R 11 8 60 55 5.53 3.58 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 L -7 -3 67 20 5.07 3.52 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 R 3 8 49 40 4.59 3.47 
 Cingulate Gyrus  32 L 0 15 36 68 4.21 3.26 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  19 L -43 -61 11 835 5.78 3.38 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  19 L -43 -61 11 54 5.78 3.83 
Cerebellum Culmen L -30 -50 -15 54 5.58 3.58 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 L -53 -68 12 74 5.13 3.72 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 L -45 -71 18 39 4.86 3.47 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  36 L -24 -37 -6 60 4.80 3.36 
 Fusiform Gyrus  37 L -29 -35 -13 63 4.79 3.42 
 Precuneus  31 L -22 -80 29 72 4.50 3.30 
Cerebellum Declive L -35 -63 -10 55 4.45 3.33 
 Posterior Cingulate  29 L -6 -50 6 61 4.26 3.39 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 L -45 -76 11 71 4.25 3.35 
 Posterior Cingulate  30 L 0 -48 15 56 4.23 3.17 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  37 L -43 -60 -4 31 4.09 3.19 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  27 L -11 -36 1 32 4.07 3.18 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 L -36 -85 17 47 3.76 3.11 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 L -28 -75 20 34 3.75 3.20 
Cerebellum Culmen L -14 -42 -13 23 3.66 3.11 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 R 42 -58 9 454 5.65 3.46 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  19 R 40 -61 13 1 2.76 2.76 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 R 11 -97 13 83 5.53 3.75 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 R 42 -58 9 100 5.65 3.37 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 R 39 -85 21 48 5.45 3.58 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 R 27 -87 14 36 5.06 3.65 
 Cuneus  19 R 8 -86 27 48 4.90 3.33 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 R 20 -90 14 24 4.79 3.61 
 Cuneus  7 R 21 -77 33 57 4.39 3.36 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 R 45 -79 10 28 3.84 3.11 
 Precentral Gyrus  4 R 48 -12 40 91 5.46 3.30 
 Precentral Gyrus  4 R 48 -12 40 61 5.46 3.42 
 Postcentral Gyrus  4 R 37 -18 45 21 3.70 3.06 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 L -54 2 16 69 4.87 3.33 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 L -54 2 16 44 4.87 3.34 
 Precentral Gyrus  44 L -52 5 9 25 4.13 3.32 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  9 L -8 52 32 40 4.41 3.32 
 Anterior Cingulate  24 L -6 29 -1 24 3.97 3.15 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 L -49 23 3 21 3.92 3.09 
 Cuneus  18 L -10 -99 8 28 3.84 3.14 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  11 L 0 34 -14 20 3.63 3.04 
Fusiform Gyrus 37 R 28 -68 -2 21 3.43 2.98 
         
Deactivations         
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  39 R 45 -55 34 921 -6.04 -3.86 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  39 R 45 -55 34 182 -6.04 -4.59 
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 Precuneus  7 R 9 -63 35 55 -5.91 -3.82 
 Supramarginal Gyrus  40 R 56 -52 31 116 -5.58 -4.05 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  7 R 39 -60 42 160 -5.54 -4.08 
 Superior Parietal Lobule  7 R 25 -62 42 46 -5.09 -3.65 
 Cingulate Gyrus  31 R 3 -30 41 62 -4.72 -3.56 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 47 -42 50 81 -4.37 -3.51 
 Precuneus  7 R 3 -62 42 46 -4.28 -3.41 
 Supramarginal Gyrus  40 R 53 -50 22 43 -4.25 -3.45 
 Cingulate Gyrus  31 R 13 -34 35 26 -3.88 -3.14 
 Superior Parietal Lobule  7 R 36 -58 51 31 -3.79 -3.18 
 Precuneus  7 L -9 -59 35 26 -3.76 -3.17 
 Precuneus  31 R 13 -47 35 32 -3.45 -3.10 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  9 R 46 19 33 413 -5.88 -3.69 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  9 R 46 19 33 155 -5.88 -3.76 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 R 43 13 49 79 -5.61 -3.99 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  8 R 28 18 50 92 -4.98 -3.59 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  46 R 44 38 16 86 -4.74 -3.40 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -36 -49 39 496 -5.85 -3.59 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -36 -49 39 151 -5.85 -4.07 
 Superior Parietal Lobule  7 L -22 -66 43 34 -5.41 -3.38 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -41 -34 39 67 -4.74 -3.59 
 Supramarginal Gyrus  40 L -47 -49 33 82 -4.65 -3.41 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -46 -31 47 76 -4.49 -3.33 
 Precuneus  39 L -31 -64 36 84 -3.85 -3.26 
 Inferior Occipital Gyrus  18 R 30 -92 -2 118 -5.56 -3.98 
 Inferior Occipital Gyrus  18 R 30 -92 -2 76 -5.56 -4.17 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 R 34 -81 -7 42 -4.92 -3.64 
Cerebellum Tuber L -43 -70 -25 111 -5.35 -3.18 
Cerebellum Tuber L -43 -70 -25 33 -5.35 -3.36 
Cerebellum Tonsil L -48 -62 -41 49 -3.68 -3.12 
Cerebellum Tuber L -41 -61 -30 24 -3.68 -3.14 
Cerebellum Declive L -6 -68 -21 84 -5.10 -3.60 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  10 L -41 42 18 53 -4.79 -3.37 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  11 R 35 53 -10 162 -4.66 -3.20 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  11 R 35 53 -10 74 -4.66 -3.43 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  47 R 51 45 -5 27 -3.44 -3.05 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  10 R 35 56 1 35 -3.41 -3.02 
 Sub-Gyral  10 R 42 44 -1 26 -3.15 -2.95 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  8 R 7 32 39 54 -4.52 -3.38 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 61 -25 -7 52 -4.27 -3.20 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 61 -25 -7 26 -4.27 -3.27 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 64 -29 0 26 -3.77 -3.13 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 L -58 -37 -7 43 -4.09 -3.18 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 L -29 -87 -3 67 -4.03 -3.16 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  10 R 29 52 22 21 -3.58 -3.00 
         
Maintain & Cease (Positive & Negative)> Regulate 
Activations         
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  8 L -26 34 39 3972 12.76 4.13 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  8 L -26 34 39 216 12.76 5.11 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  10 L -8 63 3 126 9.77 4.62 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  10 L -3 48 -10 203 9.46 5.74 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  10 R 12 52 10 164 8.48 4.69 
 Posterior Cingulate  29 L -6 -50 6 123 8.21 4.50 
 Posterior Cingulate  23 L -6 -55 18 151 7.77 4.84 
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 Medial Frontal Gyrus  10 L -10 40 -12 167 7.76 5.07 
 Cingulate Gyrus  31 L -6 -35 30 113 7.72 4.82 
 Precuneus  31 L -12 -49 25 45 7.43 4.98 
 Anterior Cingulate  32 L -4 47 1 180 7.29 4.82 
 Posterior Cingulate  29 R 6 -46 17 111 6.94 4.50 
 Posterior Cingulate  29 L -6 -42 20 26 6.94 5.86 
 Cingulate Gyrus  31 L -9 -36 38 53 6.70 4.10 
Thalamus Anterior L -3 -7 6 55 6.44 4.36 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  9 L -12 52 35 95 6.43 4.09 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  8 L -25 20 37 69 6.29 4.50 
 Sub-lobarAmygdala   L -24 -10 -9 212 6.04 3.60 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  9 L -8 57 26 90 5.91 4.20 
Basal Ganglia N. Accumbens R 6 10 2 54 5.72 3.71 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 L -62 -8 -4 98 5.45 3.81 
 Anterior Cingulate  32 R 11 44 -1 119 5.26 4.26 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  41 L -45 -32 9 56 5.14 3.43 
Cerebellum Culmen L 0 -51 -11 146 5.12 3.50 
 Thalamus  Medial L -3 -11 16 58 4.82 3.62 
Cerebellum Culmen L -8 -48 -9 132 4.65 3.40 
 Thalamus  Medial L -6 -15 4 24 4.65 3.20 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 L -61 -22 -9 42 4.65 3.62 
 Thalamus  Lateral R 3 -4 12 27 4.64 3.58 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 L -53 -14 -7 76 4.57 3.53 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  9 R 4 49 32 61 4.57 3.45 
Cerebellum Culmen R 3 -42 -5 83 4.48 3.25 
 Anterior Cingulate  25 R 3 3 -3 43 4.44 3.40 
 Anterior Cingulate  25 L -3 16 -6 70 4.43 3.24 
Hippocampus Posterior L -33 -30 -6 23 4.42 3.40 
Insula Ventral Anterior L -19 4 -7 33 4.39 3.19 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 L -28 7 -13 82 4.24 3.23 
Basal Ganglia Putamen L -31 -13 0 22 4.19 3.25 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 L -54 -1 -16 76 4.18 3.28 
 Anterior Cingulate  24 L 0 33 15 94 4.12 3.36 
 Anterior Cingulate  33 R 7 21 21 21 4.03 3.25 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 L -37 29 -13 68 3.98 3.17 
Hippocampus Posterior L -29 -26 -13 51 3.80 3.17 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  13 L -45 -20 7 40 3.74 3.14 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  41 L -56 -24 10 45 3.66 3.18 
 Thalamus  Pulvinar R 15 -32 8 68 3.66 3.10 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 L -47 16 -20 24 3.37 3.04 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 L -36 -6 -28 22 3.34 3.02 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 R 53 -69 17 349 8.21 3.93 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 R 53 -69 17 96 8.21 4.93 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 R 59 -63 11 40 6.01 3.96 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 R 48 -76 6 53 5.62 3.91 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 R 51 -71 24 42 5.15 3.51 
 Inferior Temporal Gyrus  37 R 51 -68 1 54 4.50 3.37 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 R 40 -67 17 42 4.29 3.16 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  37 R 45 -60 1 22 3.86 3.17 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 L -39 -71 27 400 7.42 4.30 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 L -39 -71 27 372 7.42 4.36 
 Superior Occipital Gyrus  19 L -36 -84 26 28 4.41 3.49 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  8 R 26 31 40 65 5.68 3.52 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 R 36 11 -19 322 5.60 3.44 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 R 36 11 -19 132 5.60 3.65 
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 Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 R 45 17 -21 54 5.03 3.62 
Hippocampus Anterior R 28 -11 -11 78 4.92 3.30 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 R 41 31 -13 20 3.43 3.03 
Superior Temporal Gyrus 38 R 26 -3 -24 31 3.18 2.95 
 Sub-Gyral  40 R 28 -41 51 62 5.37 3.26 
 Insula  13 R 43 -14 6 382 5.03 3.33 
 Insula  13 R 43 -14 6 78 5.03 3.59 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 62 -16 -11 38 4.79 3.53 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 R 63 -6 4 78 4.49 3.30 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  41 R 51 -20 7 102 4.36 3.31 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 63 -5 -6 24 3.76 3.25 
Transverse Gyrus 41 R 42 -31 13 23 3.64 3.04 
 Insula  13 R 43 -17 19 34 3.63 2.99 
 Postcentral Gyrus  3 R 34 -21 45 148 4.77 3.29 
 Postcentral Gyrus  3 R 34 -21 45 43 4.77 3.46 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 R 35 -8 58 69 4.39 3.28 
 Postcentral Gyrus  3 R 43 -16 52 34 3.58 3.11 
Cerebellum Uvula R 16 -76 -34 92 4.64 3.37 
Cerebellum Uvula R 16 -76 -34 52 4.64 3.50 
Cerebellum Pyramis R 26 -73 -28 40 3.77 3.19 
 Cingulate Gyrus  24 L 0 -8 35 78 4.63 3.26 
Cerebellum Tonsil R 13 -43 -42 33 4.59 3.13 
 Postcentral Gyrus  3 R 57 -12 42 23 4.19 3.12 
 Precentral Gyrus  4 R 23 -22 68 38 4.14 3.24 
Cerebellum Tonsil L -16 -46 -41 37 4.02 3.04 
 Paracentral Lobule  6 R 7 -27 52 49 3.63 3.00 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  6 R 3 -23 52 1 2.76 2.76 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  6 L -7 -17 59 20 3.46 2.99 
         
Deactivations         
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 39 -45 40 2208 -11.02 -4.85 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 39 -45 40 589 -11.02 -5.57 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -39 -49 36 238 -10.09 -5.46 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -43 -42 49 249 -8.53 -4.65 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 53 -44 27 144 -8.13 -4.63 
 Precuneus  7 R 9 -65 39 235 -7.92 -4.24 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 53 -35 43 177 -7.64 -5.07 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  7 L -33 -57 46 236 -7.53 -4.58 
 Supramarginal Gyrus  40 R 56 -38 27 94 -6.54 -4.48 
 Precuneus  7 L -6 -67 42 140 -5.71 -3.86 
 Precuneus  7 L -6 -62 52 78 -4.85 -3.61 
 Precuneus  31 L -25 -67 25 28 -3.80 -3.29 
Cerebellum Declive L -35 -66 -12 1262 -7.30 -3.86 
Cerebellum Declive L -35 -66 -12 118 -7.30 -4.65 
 Cuneus  17 R 14 -95 7 82 -7.22 -4.23 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 R 25 -75 -7 113 -7.15 -3.87 
 Cuneus  18 L -16 -99 4 111 -6.83 -4.17 
Cerebellum Declive L -34 -57 -12 82 -6.66 -4.35 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 L -32 -71 -4 85 -6.38 -3.86 
 Fusiform Gyrus  37 R 33 -48 -14 40 -6.05 -3.57 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 R 5 -86 -1 110 -5.39 -3.63 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 L -10 -84 -8 119 -5.39 -3.70 
Cerebellum Uvula L -32 -65 -23 54 -5.19 -3.68 
Cerebellum Declive L -41 -63 -20 68 -5.15 -3.97 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 R 20 -98 9 23 -5.10 -3.67 
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 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 L -28 -85 11 29 -4.85 -3.50 
 Fusiform Gyrus  37 R 37 -58 -12 64 -4.35 -3.27 
 Inferior Temporal Gyrus  20 L -51 -54 -13 59 -4.33 -3.45 
 Fusiform Gyrus  37 L -43 -54 -6 50 -4.13 -3.44 
Cerebellum Culmen L -29 -46 -26 20 -3.47 -3.10 
Cerebellum Culmen L -42 -48 -26 27 -3.42 -3.07 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  46 R 55 33 22 936 -7.16 -3.76 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  46 R 55 33 22 46 -7.16 -4.65 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  9 R 44 35 29 141 -6.53 -4.50 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 R 37 14 52 94 -6.03 -3.72 
 Precentral Gyrus  44 R 53 9 9 89 -5.46 -3.54 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  46 R 44 38 16 63 -5.34 -3.94 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  9 R 53 5 28 63 -5.28 -3.61 
 Precentral Gyrus  9 R 42 7 33 62 -5.27 -3.74 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  9 R 36 51 25 69 -4.89 -3.68 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 R 50 6 40 57 -4.52 -3.29 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  46 R 53 42 1 51 -4.39 -3.49 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 R 25 7 58 68 -4.35 -3.36 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  10 R 48 51 -6 28 -4.29 -3.38 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  46 R 51 46 8 54 -4.26 -3.55 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 R 15 17 54 26 -4.02 -3.15 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  9 R 61 14 23 25 -3.94 -3.20 
Cerebellum Inf. Semi-Lunar L -26 -71 -42 152 -7.14 -3.59 
Cerebellum Inf. Semi-Lunar L -26 -71 -42 47 -7.14 -3.62 
Cerebellum Inf. Semi-Lunar L -36 -67 -49 62 -6.87 -3.68 
Cerebellum Tonsil L -39 -51 -44 43 -4.73 -3.43 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  46 L -44 41 18 270 -6.25 -3.85 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  46 L -44 41 18 172 -6.25 -3.87 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  9 L -46 35 32 98 -5.43 -3.82 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  11 L -28 53 -14 62 -5.47 -3.35 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  11 L -28 53 -14 34 -5.47 -3.46 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  10 L -38 56 -10 25 -4.32 -3.25 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 L -47 5 35 46 -4.58 -3.28 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 L -32 -2 48 20 -3.90 -3.20 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 58 -37 -5 33 -3.86 -3.20 
Table A3.1.2: Main contrasts for the model based component process deconstruction analyses 
(Experiment 1 only). Cluster maxima are reported in bold. Italicised entries denote local maxima of 
subclusters within a cluster found to be not connected to the already considered (central) mass in a 
higher-values-first watershed searching algorithm implemented in NeuroElf (i.e. the 
splitclustercoords function). Results were thresholded at p<.005 and k>20. 
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Table A3.1.3. Results from contrast-based decomposition approach 
 
Region 
  MNI     Extent t-value t-value 
Label/BA Side x y z (voxel) (max) (avg) 
         
Generation 
Midbrain Red Nucleus L 0 -16 -4 1591 8.87 3.75 
Midbrain Red Nucleus L 0 -16 -4 169 8.87 5.03 
Cerbellum Culmen L -8 -36 -9 54 6.16 4.07 
Hippcampus Mid L -33 -21 -8 48 6.08 4.18 
 Thalamus  Pulvinar L -3 -25 1 100 5.93 4.06 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  35 L -17 -26 -9 65 5.46 3.69 
Thalamus Ventral Lateral R 18 -11 4 51 5.43 3.70 
Hippcampus Mid R 36 -26 -10 31 5.42 3.62 
Midbrain Substantia Nigra R 12 -11 -9 90 5.29 3.99 
Midbrain Substantia Nigra L -12 -13 -7 60 5.25 4.11 
Thalamus Pulvinar L -5 -36 2 32 5.19 3.93 
Basal Ganglia Putamen L -16 10 0 52 5.09 3.49 
Basal Ganglia Lat. Globus Pallidus  R 16 3 1 22 5.07 3.55 
 Thalamus  Anterior L -3 -8 2 27 5.03 3.48 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 L -32 13 -30 88 4.95 3.48 
 Thalamus  Pulvinar L -12 -34 8 20 4.91 3.52 
 Lentiform Nucleus  Putamen R 25 -6 -4 37 4.87 3.54 
Parahippocampal Gyrus 36 L -27 -4 -27 142 4.84 3.53 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 L -32 13 -19 18 4.75 3.31 
Cerebellum Anterior Lobe L -8 -50 -25 20 4.71 3.59 
Midbrain Periaqueductal grey L 0 -36 -9 41 4.65 3.52 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  27 L -24 -32 -3 28 4.55 3.52 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  28 R 20 -29 -9 25 4.43 3.19 
Basal Ganglia Caudate Tail  R 37 -14 -12 22 4.42 3.34 
Cerebellum Tonsil R 3 -45 -36 19 4.34 3.33 
Basal Ganglia Med. Globus Pallidus L -9 1 -1 15 4.33 3.28 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  30 R 6 -37 8 17 4.30 3.32 
Cerebellum Anterior Lobe R 1 -45 -26 24 4.06 3.24 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 L -43 10 -21 27 4.04 3.27 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  13 R 29 9 -11 21 4.01 3.26 
Cerebellum Lingual R 0 -48 -15 16 4.00 3.51 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  27 R 27 -28 -5 38 3.99 3.34 
 Thalamus  Pulvinar R 14 -29 -2 45 3.90 3.16 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 L -39 -3 -30 27 3.90 3.36 
Basal Ganglia Lat. Globus Pallidus  R 27 -20 -4 23 3.80 3.21 
Cerebellum Culmen R 14 -43 -13 15 3.70 2.99 
Cerebellum Culmen R 11 -34 -13 25 3.59 3.15 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 R 35 3 -15 14 3.46 3.04 
Amygdala Centromedial R 28 -6 -16 16 3.18 2.94 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  32 L -11 11 47 225 7.81 3.68 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  32 L -11 11 47 37 7.81 5.04 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  6 R 3 14 47 21 4.81 3.40 
 Cingulate Gyrus  32 L -15 21 32 43 4.41 3.60 
 Cingulate Gyrus  32 R 14 20 31 36 4.30 3.45 
 Cingulate Gyrus  32 R 3 21 37 27 4.25 3.36 
 Anterior Cingulate  32 L -4 33 20 46 4.13 3.31 
 Anterior Cingulate  33 L -4 18 21 15 3.89 3.14 
 Lingual Gyrus  17 R 24 -89 -2 142 6.66 3.99 
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 Inferior Occipital Gyrus  18 L -29 -93 -6 55 6.38 3.78 
Cerebellum Culmen R 37 -54 -20 110 4.63 3.22 
Cerebellum Culmen R 37 -54 -20 62 4.63 3.39 
Cerebellum Culmen R 32 -44 -24 27 3.84 3.07 
Cerebellum Tuber R 51 -65 -25 18 3.14 2.93 
Cerebellum Anterior Lobe R 16 -34 -29 15 4.44 3.40 
Cerebellum Anterior Lobe L -15 -34 -30 36 4.39 3.51 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 L -27 24 -18 20 4.39 3.27 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 R 54 -7 -8 28 4.32 3.35 
 Insula  13 L -34 25 9 71 4.20 3.22 
 Insula  13 L -34 25 9 36 4.20 3.39 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  44 L -42 15 13 33 3.48 3.05 
 Posterior Cingulate  30 L -19 -51 8 15 4.09 3.24 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  10 L -19 63 15 18 4.08 3.32 
 Precuneus  31 L -13 -62 23 11 3.99 3.32 
Cerebellum Declive R 18 -61 -19 28 3.39 3.00 
         
Maintenance 
 Precentral Gyrus  4 L -48 -6 45 108 7.49 3.93 
 Precentral Gyrus  4 L -48 -6 45 79 7.49 4.21 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 L -37 -2 50 18 3.84 3.22 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 L -37 -8 43 11 3.52 3.02 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 L -4 6 58 315 6.10 3.62 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 L -4 6 58 131 6.10 3.88 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 R 11 8 60 55 5.53 3.58 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 L -7 -3 67 20 5.07 3.52 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 R 3 8 49 40 4.59 3.47 
 Cingulate Gyrus  32 L 0 15 36 57 4.21 3.31 
 Cingulate Gyrus  32 R 14 14 34 11 3.32 3.01 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 R 42 -58 9 391 5.65 3.52 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 R 42 -58 9 17 5.65 3.57 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 R 11 -97 13 83 5.53 3.75 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  37 R 45 -66 8 29 5.48 3.59 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 R 39 -85 21 41 5.45 3.66 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 R 27 -87 14 36 5.06 3.65 
 Cuneus  19 R 8 -86 27 48 4.90 3.33 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 R 20 -90 14 24 4.79 3.61 
 Cuneus  7 R 21 -77 33 57 4.39 3.36 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 R 37 -77 10 18 3.94 3.18 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 R 45 -79 10 13 3.84 3.18 
 Precuneus  31 R 28 -75 21 25 3.79 3.21 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 L -45 -61 9 309 5.62 3.39 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 L -45 -61 9 28 5.62 3.75 
Cerebellum Culmen L -30 -50 -15 52 5.58 3.59 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  36 L -24 -37 -6 46 4.80 3.42 
 Fusiform Gyrus  37 L -29 -35 -13 47 4.79 3.50 
Cerebellum Declive L -35 -63 -10 42 4.45 3.36 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  37 L -43 -60 -4 31 4.09 3.19 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  27 L -11 -36 1 15 4.07 3.06 
 Lingual Gyrus  18 L -26 -71 -9 19 3.64 3.12 
Cerebellum Culmen L -16 -39 -15 18 3.61 3.02 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 L -56 -60 14 10 3.52 3.06 
 Precentral Gyrus  4 R 48 -12 40 62 5.46 3.39 
 Precentral Gyrus  4 R 48 -12 40 38 5.46 3.61 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 R 38 -7 45 10 3.85 3.05 
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 Precentral Gyrus  6 R 55 -4 42 14 3.29 3.03 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 L -54 2 16 69 4.87 3.33 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 L -54 2 16 44 4.87 3.34 
 Precentral Gyrus  44 L -52 5 9 25 4.13 3.32 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 L -51 -73 14 242 4.63 3.30 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 L -51 -73 14 44 4.63 3.54 
 Precuneus  31 L -22 -80 29 70 4.50 3.31 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 L -31 -80 9 14 4.04 3.31 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 L -40 -84 9 32 3.94 3.33 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 L -36 -85 17 48 3.76 3.11 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 L -28 -75 20 34 3.75 3.20 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 L -49 23 3 21 3.92 3.09 
 Cuneus  18 L -10 -99 8 28 3.84 3.14 
 Anterior Cingulate  24 R 7 29 -1 11 3.54 3.11 
Cerebellum Lingual R 28 -68 -2 21 3.43 2.98 
         
Representation 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  8 L -26 34 39 3730 12.76 4.08 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  8 L -26 34 39 207 12.76 5.15 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  10 L -8 63 3 119 9.77 4.63 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  10 L -3 48 -10 199 9.46 5.72 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  10 R 12 52 10 164 8.48 4.69 
 Posterior Cingulate  23 L -6 -55 18 112 7.77 4.40 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  10 L -10 40 -12 148 7.76 5.03 
 Cingulate Gyrus  31 L -6 -35 30 113 7.72 4.82 
 Precuneus  31 L -12 -49 25 45 7.43 4.98 
 Anterior Cingulate  32 L -4 47 1 169 7.29 4.85 
 Posterior Cingulate  29 R 6 -46 17 67 6.94 4.56 
 Posterior Cingulate  29 L -6 -42 20 30 6.94 5.77 
 Cingulate Gyrus  31 L -9 -36 38 53 6.70 4.10 
 Thalamus Anterior L -3 -7 6 55 6.44 4.36 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  8 L -25 20 37 69 6.29 4.50 
Amygdala Laterobasal L -24 -10 -9 169 6.04 3.72 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  8 L -12 49 35 88 6.00 3.85 
Basal Ganglia Caudate Head R 6 10 2 51 5.72 3.69 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 L -62 -8 -4 83 5.45 3.93 
 Anterior Cingulate  32 R 11 44 -1 119 5.26 4.26 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  41 L -45 -32 9 48 5.14 3.50 
Cerebellum Culmen L 0 -51 -11 146 5.12 3.50 
 Posterior Cingulate  29 R 3 -48 10 42 5.07 3.60 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  10 L -4 55 20 85 5.04 4.01 
Cerebellum Culmen L -9 -50 4 29 5.03 3.37 
Thalamus Medial Dorsal L -3 -11 16 55 4.82 3.66 
Cerebellum Culmen L -8 -48 -9 111 4.65 3.41 
 Thalamus  Medial Dorsal L -6 -15 4 17 4.65 3.31 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 L -61 -22 -9 42 4.65 3.62 
 Thalamus  Medial Dorsal R 3 -4 12 27 4.64 3.58 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 L -53 -14 -7 76 4.57 3.53 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  9 R 4 49 32 61 4.57 3.45 
Cerebellum Culmen R 3 -42 -5 78 4.48 3.27 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  30 L -9 -37 6 19 4.48 3.45 
 Anterior Cingulate  25 R 3 3 -3 43 4.44 3.40 
 Anterior Cingulate  25 L -3 16 -6 63 4.43 3.24 
Basal Ganglia Putamen L -19 4 -7 32 4.39 3.20 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 L -28 7 -13 82 4.24 3.23 
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Basal Ganglia Putamen L -31 -13 0 21 4.19 3.28 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 L -54 -1 -16 58 4.18 3.35 
 Anterior Cingulate  24 L 0 33 15 93 4.12 3.37 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 L -52 0 -2 17 4.11 3.15 
 Anterior Cingulate  33 R 7 21 21 21 4.03 3.25 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 L -37 29 -13 68 3.98 3.17 
Amygdala Laterobasal L -8 -20 -5 17 3.96 3.08 
Parahippocampal Gyrus 28 L -23 -12 -28 10 3.92 3.28 
Hippocampus Posterior L -33 -33 -6 47 4.06 3.18 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  13 L -45 -20 7 36 3.74 3.18 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  41 L -56 -24 10 45 3.66 3.18 
 Thalamus  Pulvinar R 15 -32 8 41 3.66 3.14 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 L -55 10 -17 18 3.51 3.02 
Hippocampus Posterior L -30 -32 -6 13 3.82 3.15 
Basal Ganglia Caudate Tail  R 33 -41 1 12 3.40 3.05 
 Thalamus  Pulvinar R 24 -33 2 11 3.38 3.01 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 L -47 16 -20 24 3.37 3.04 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 L -36 -6 -28 22 3.34 3.02 
 Insula  13 L -37 -17 14 16 3.14 2.88 
Parahippocampal Gyrus 34 L -21 -4 -23 13 3.11 2.87 
Basal Ganglia Putamen L -25 -2 0 10 3.09 2.89 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 R 53 -69 15 286 7.70 3.90 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 R 53 -69 15 97 7.70 4.75 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 R 48 -76 6 37 5.62 4.00 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 R 51 -71 24 45 5.15 3.55 
 Inferior Temporal Gyrus  37 R 51 -68 1 46 4.50 3.35 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 R 40 -67 17 42 4.29 3.16 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  37 R 45 -60 1 19 3.86 3.20 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 L -39 -71 27 286 7.42 4.54 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 L -39 -71 27 260 7.42 4.64 
 Superior Occipital Gyrus  19 L -36 -84 26 26 4.41 3.54 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  8 R 26 31 40 65 5.68 3.52 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 R 36 11 -19 322 5.60 3.44 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 R 36 11 -19 122 5.60 3.71 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 R 45 17 -21 54 5.03 3.62 
Amygdala Laterobasal R 28 -11 -11 78 4.92 3.30 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 R 41 31 -13 15 3.43 3.01 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 R 40 22 -15 10 3.32 3.03 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  38 R 35 1 -28 12 3.22 2.92 
Parahippocampal Gyrus 38 R 26 -3 -24 31 3.18 2.95 
Parietal Lobe 40 R 28 -41 51 62 5.37 3.26 
Parietal Lobe 40 R 28 -41 51 43 5.37 3.41 
 Superior Parietal Lobule  7 R 28 -49 61 19 3.35 2.91 
 Insula  13 R 43 -14 6 382 5.03 3.33 
 Insula  13 R 43 -14 6 78 5.03 3.59 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 62 -16 -11 24 4.79 3.68 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 R 63 -6 4 78 4.49 3.30 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  41 R 51 -20 7 102 4.36 3.31 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 54 -10 -11 19 4.12 3.14 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 63 -5 -6 24 3.76 3.25 
 Transverse Temporal Gyrus  41 R 42 -31 13 23 3.64 3.04 
 Insula  13 R 43 -17 19 34 3.63 2.99 
Cerebellum Uvula R 16 -76 -34 92 4.64 3.37 
Cerebellum Uvula R 16 -76 -34 52 4.64 3.50 
Cerebellum Pyramis R 26 -73 -28 40 3.77 3.19 
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 Cingulate Gyrus  24 L 0 -8 35 78 4.63 3.26 
 Cingulate Gyrus  24 L 0 -8 35 65 4.63 3.32 
 Cingulate Gyrus  24 R 10 -6 44 11 3.56 2.97 
Cerebellum Tonsil R 13 -43 -42 33 4.59 3.13 
Cerebellum Tonsil R 13 -43 -42 15 4.59 3.33 
Cerebellum Anterior Lobe R 8 -42 -30 16 3.18 2.97 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 R 35 -8 58 126 4.39 3.22 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 R 35 -8 58 53 4.39 3.27 
 Postcentral Gyrus  3 R 37 -24 50 26 4.02 3.23 
 Precentral Gyrus  4 R 40 -18 63 18 3.86 3.27 
 Postcentral Gyrus  3 R 43 -16 52 27 3.58 3.12 
 Postcentral Gyrus  3 R 57 -12 42 16 4.19 3.17 
 Precentral Gyrus  4 R 23 -22 68 38 4.14 3.24 
Cerebellum Tonsil L -16 -46 -41 37 4.02 3.04 
 Paracentral Lobule  6 R 7 -27 52 49 3.63 3.00 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  6 L -7 -17 59 20 3.46 2.99 
         
Overlap between Representation and Maintenance 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 R 56 -68 11 48 N/A N/A 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 R 48 -77 15 13 N/A N/A 
 Precentral Gyrus  4 R 43 -16 45 21 N/A N/A 
 Posterior Cingulate  29 R 6 -45 15 130 N/A N/A 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  11 R 7 39 -15 20 N/A N/A 
 Anterior Cingulate  25 L 0 17 1 11 N/A N/A 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  9 L -4 49 37 40 N/A N/A 
Cerebellum Culmen L -8 -51 -11 15 N/A N/A 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  35 L -23 -29 -10 23 N/A N/A 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  19 L -40 -64 11 108 N/A N/A 
Table A3.1.3: Results from the contrast-based decomposition approach taken in Experiment 1 (N=32) to 
identify regions with temporal response profiles corresponding to hypothesised component processes of 
endogenous emotion generation. See text for details on the masking approach adopted. Cluster maxima are 
reported in bold. Unbolded entries denote local maxima of subclusters within a cluster found to be not 
connected to the already considered (central) mass in a higher-values-first watershed searching algorithm 
implemented in NeuroElf (i.e. the splitclustercoords function). Component contrasts are reported in Table 
S2. Size threshold k>10. 
 
Table A3.1.4. Results from the data-driven decomposition 
Region 
  MNI    
 
Extent Loading Loading 
Label/BA Side x y z (voxel) (max) (avg) 
Component 1 
Posterior Cingulate 23 L -3 -52 17 6085 0.26 0.19 
Posterior Cingulate 23 L -3 -52 17 1096 0.26 0.20 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 8 L -29 28 42 539 0.25 0.20 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 L 0 8 60 403 0.25 0.20 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 9 L 0 57 26 585 0.24 0.19 
Precentral Gyrus 4 R 26 -25 61 298 0.23 0.20 
Paracentral Lobule 5 L 0 -41 57 387 0.23 0.19 
Paracentral Lobule 31 L 0 -29 47 341 0.23 0.19 
Medial Frontal Gyrus 10 L 0 51 -8 416 0.22 0.19 
Cingulate Gyrus (Middle) 24 L 0 -8 35 228 0.22 0.19 
Medial Frontal Gyrus 6 R 3 -12 65 328 0.22 0.20 
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Precentral Gyrus 4 R 43 -17 40 233 0.22 0.19 
Posterior Cingulate 29 R 6 -40 6 228 0.21 0.19 
Precentral Gyrus 4 L -16 -26 59 127 0.21 0.18 
Paracentral Lobule 6 L -6 -32 67 124 0.21 0.19 
Paracentral Lobule 6 R 7 -30 67 154 0.21 0.19 
Cingulate Gyrus 32 L 0 21 31 246 0.21 0.18 
Postcentral Gyrus 2 R 26 -37 63 112 0.20 0.18 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 6 L -41 3 50 88 0.19 0.18 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 10 L -32 60 8 140 0.19 0.18 
Angular Gyrus 39 L -45 -68 27 422 0.24 0.20 
Thalamus Dorsal L 0 -7 12 327 0.21 0.18 
Thalamus Dorsal L 0 -7 12 154 0.21 0.19 
Caudate Head/NACC L -13 2 12 87 0.20 0.18 
Caudate Head/NACC R 13 1 12 74 0.19 0.18 
Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 L -55 6 4 787 0.21 0.18 
Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 L -55 6 4 156 0.21 0.19 
Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 L -53 15 -2 152 0.21 0.18 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45/47 L -49 29 15 246 0.19 0.18 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 L -56 -11 -7 102 0.19 0.18 
Transverse Temporal Gyrus 41 L -56 -21 10 117 0.18 0.18 
Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 R 60 -3 9 483 0.21 0.18 
Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 R 60 -3 9 323 0.21 0.19 
Transverse Temporal Gyrus 41 R 51 -26 11 141 0.19 0.18 
Precentral Gyrus 4 L -42 -15 35 64 0.20 0.18 
Hippocampus Head L -24 -18 -9 39 0.19 0.18 
Cerebellum Declive L -15 -55 -12 48 0.19 0.18 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 19 R 53 -63 17 30 0.18 0.18 
         
Component 2 
Positive loading         
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45/47 L -53 17 1 386 0.15 0.10 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  32 L 0 17 44 400 0.13 0.10 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  32 L 0 17 44 153 0.13 0.10 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 L -1 17 57 247 0.12 0.10 
Lingual Gyrus  18 L -4 -83 -3 1252 0.12 0.09 
Lingual Gyrus  18 L -4 -83 -3 296 0.12 0.10 
Lingual Gyrus  18 R 6 -80 -4 432 0.12 0.10 
Cerebellum Declive R 37 -60 -20 94 0.11 0.09 
Cerebellum Declive R 28 -69 -15 238 0.10 0.09 
Cerebellum Declive R 51 -71 -20 74 0.10 0.09 
Lingual Gyrus  18 L -23 -74 -9 105 0.09 0.09 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 R 56 15 4 148 0.12 0.09 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 L -40 0 54 90 0.10 0.09 
Thalamus  Pulvinar L -3 -33 6 50 0.09 0.09 
         
Negative loading         
Postcentral gyrus 40 R 23 -37 57 1333 -0.13 -0.09 
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Postcentral gyrus 40 R 23 -37 57 749 -0.13 -0.10 
Postcentral gyrus 40 L -19 -38 58 308 -0.12 -0.09 
Precuneus 7 R 7 -30 44 273 -0.10 -0.09 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  8 R 32 27 40 163 -0.10 -0.09 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  3 R 45 -69 24 48 -0.09 -0.08 
         
Conjunction of both components 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6/pre-SMA R 11 14 63 218 N/A N/A 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47/45 L -43 27 5 163 N/A N/A 
 Precentral Gyrus  44 R 61 9 7 69 N/A N/A 
 Thalamus  Pulvinar R 6 -34 6 43 N/A N/A 
 Cingulate Gyrus  32 R 3 14 39 36 N/A N/A 
Table A3.1.4: Results from the data-driven decomposition approach taken in Experiment 2 
(N=293), using constrained principle components analysis (CPCA), showing the regions 
corresponding to the two components shown to correlate with individual differences in emotion 
generation ability, as well as their conjunction. Cluster maxima for the main components are 
reported in bold, while conjunction results report the centroid for each cluster. Italicised entries 
denote local maxima of subclusters within a cluster found to be not connected to the already 
considered (central) mass in a higher-values-first watershed searching algorithm implemented in 
NeuroElf (i.e. the splitclustercoords function). Results were thresholded to the 10% strongest 
loadings of each component and k>30. 
 
 
 
Table A3.1.5. Parametric modulation by subjective affect. 
Region 
  MNI     Extent 
t-
value 
t-
value 
Label/BA Side x y z (voxel) (max) (avg) 
Experiment 1 (N=32)  
         
Parametric modulation: Generate Positive  
Caudate Head R 13 16 4 39 5.49 3.89 
         
Parametric modulation: Generate Negative  
Putamen Anterior L -25 4 -2 79 -5.39 -4.05 
Putamen Anterior R 19 6 3 30 -4.79 -3.78 
Putamen Anterior R 19 6 3 12 -4.79 -3.92 
Putamen Posterior R 29 5 3 18 -4.02 -3.70 
         
Conjunction: positive and negative parametric modulation  
(NB! MNI = Center coordinate) 
Putamen Anterior  21 15 -3 1 N/A N/A 
         
Experiment 2 (N=293) 
         
Parametric modulation by affect ratings:  Positive Generation 
Putamen Anterior L -26 7 0 1443 7.84 5.07 
Putamen Anterior L -26 7 0 170 7.84 5.44 
Thalamus Anterior L -3 -10 10 87 7.76 5.84 
Putamen Anterior R 26 9 3 206 7.24 5.28 
Caudate Head/NAC L -16 10 2 125 6.99 5.35 
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Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 L -48 17 30 171 6.82 4.80 
Caudate Body R 20 13 14 76 6.81 5.41 
Thalamus Posterior L -3 -19 11 80 6.73 5.01 
Caudate Body R 19 4 19 59 6.66 5.32 
Caudate Body L -19 -1 19 26 6.47 5.22 
Caudate Head R 3 1 6 45 6.38 4.91 
Caudate Body L -9 -1 12 15 6.00 5.18 
Caudate Body L -17 11 19 36 5.97 5.18 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45 L -46 21 5 100 5.52 4.54 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 46 L -47 38 6 94 5.41 4.54 
Putamen Posterior Lateral R 31 -15 8 23 5.34 4.49 
Insula Dorsal Anterior L -47 12 6 59 5.26 4.50 
Thalamus Pulvinar L -9 -31 8 15 5.17 4.33 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 46 L -50 46 5 20 5.02 4.44 
Hippocampus Posterior L -21 -15 -6 25 4.95 4.29 
Medial Frontal Gyrus Pre-SMA R 7 5 55 65 6.97 5.29 
Medial Frontal Gyrus Pre-SMA L -4 8 57 56 6.52 4.94 
Midbrain Red Nucleus Substantia Nigra L -6 -16 -4 121 6.31 4.67 
Midbrain Red Nucleus Substantia Nigra L -6 -16 -4 31 6.31 5.03 
Midbrain Substantia Nigra Ventral tegmentum R 3 -18 -2 26 5.96 4.80 
Midbrain Substantia Nigra Ventral tegmentum L -5 -28 -8 27 5.36 4.61 
Hippocampus Anterior R 21 -14 -3 25 5.01 4.35 
Midbrain Substantia Nigra Ventral tegmentum R 11 -23 -3 12 4.66 4.24 
Cerebellum Declive R 34 -57 -20 147 5.88 4.47 
Cerebellum Declive R 34 -57 -20 67 5.88 4.64 
Cerebellum Inferior Semi-Lunar R 38 -63 -37 47 5.30 4.41 
Cerebellum Inferior Semi-Lunar R 38 -63 -46 12 4.76 4.26 
Cerebellum Tuber R 42 -73 -23 21 4.42 4.16 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 6 L -43 3 47 61 5.31 4.43 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 6 L -43 3 47 48 5.31 4.45 
Middle Frontal Gyrus Premotor cortex L -36 9 54 13 5.08 4.35 
Cingulate Gyrus 32 L -4 20 39 45 5.29 4.49 
Caudate Tail R 27 -35 11 12 4.96 4.46 
Superior Frontal 
Gyrus 10 L -22 58 10 32 4.81 4.32 
         
Parametric modulation by affect ratings:  Negative Generation 
Caudate Body L -16 5 14 774 -7.06 -4.88 
Caudate Body L -16 5 14 97 -7.06 -5.25 
Putamen Anterior L -23 13 4 70 -6.46 -5.24 
Putamen Anterior R 22 3 12 66 -6.27 -5.08 
Putamen Lateral L -32 4 3 70 -6.18 -5.09 
Thalamus Dorslal L 0 -7 10 72 -6.02 -4.81 
Caudate Body R 19 4 19 40 -5.96 -4.86 
Caudate Body L -17 14 14 34 -5.86 -5.01 
Putamen Lateral R 28 2 -2 90 -5.83 -4.62 
Putamen Lateral L -25 -7 -2 45 -5.70 -4.67 
Putamen Anterior L -22 7 -3 47 -5.69 -4.88 
Putamen Posterior R 31 -12 3 29 -5.47 -4.53 
Putamen Lateral R 28 -9 12 16 -5.38 -4.59 
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Caudate Head R 16 10 7 70 -5.30 -4.49 
Insula Dorsal Anterior L -33 13 2 13 -5.24 -4.39 
Caudate Body L -16 -9 19 13 -5.02 -4.43 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45 L -46 23 8 523 -6.42 -4.62 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45 L -46 23 8 74 -6.42 -4.88 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 44 L -50 14 13 83 -5.88 -4.72 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 9 L -53 19 23 45 -5.72 -4.66 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 L -48 17 30 69 -5.50 -4.64 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 6 L -47 5 47 40 -5.47 -4.56 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 L -56 22 11 36 -5.45 -4.51 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 8 L -47 8 40 56 -5.44 -4.71 
Precentral Gyrus Premotor cortex L -36 6 33 24 -5.22 -4.55 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 L -55 31 -1 63 -4.84 -4.32 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 L -54 23 -5 33 -4.79 -4.34 
Cerebellum  Declive R 25 -65 -20 190 -5.36 -4.45 
Cerebellum  Declive R 25 -65 -20 58 -5.36 -4.52 
Cerebellum  Uvula R 16 -74 -24 72 -5.26 -4.51 
Cerebellum  Culmen R 33 -53 -25 29 -4.97 -4.36 
Cerebellum  Inferior Semi-Lunar  R 29 -73 -36 17 -4.85 -4.32 
Cerebellum  Declive R 35 -75 -18 14 -4.61 -4.12 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 39 L -47 -66 27 50 -5.16 -4.36 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 R 3 11 55 22 -5.04 -4.38 
Cerebellum  Culmen L -19 -34 -17 22 -4.96 -4.21 
Cerebellum  Culmen L -19 -34 -17 12 -4.96 -4.20 
Cerebellum  Culmen L -17 -45 -14 10 -4.50 -4.22 
Medial Frontal Gyrus 8 L -4 23 44 38 -4.79 -4.28 
Cerebellum  Declive L -27 -56 -18 20 -4.76 -4.19 
Cerebellum  Culmen  L 0 -33 -9 14 -4.52 -4.25 
Superior Frontal 
Gyrus 9 L -8 52 26 14 -4.36 -4.15 
         
Conjunction: positive and negative parametric modulation  
(NB! MNI = Center coordinate) 
Caudate Body L -1 4 7 618 N/A N/A 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 L -47 16 30 114 N/A N/A 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45 L -47 19 6 109 N/A N/A 
Cerbellum Declive R 30 -60 -20 36 N/A N/A 
Middle Premotor Cortex L -43 5 46 23 N/A N/A 
Cingulate Gyrus 32 L -6 22 41 20 N/A N/A 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 L -49 34 6 19 N/A N/A 
Superior Frontal 
Gyrus Pre-SMA R 5 10 57 18 N/A N/A 
Table A3.1.5: Brain regions showing significant parametric modulation by affect ratings in 
positive and negative generation conditions as well as their conjunction, for both experiments. 
Cluster maxima are reported in bold for main contrasts, while conjunction results report 
coordinates of the cluster centroid. I entries denote local maxima of subclusters within a cluster 
found to be not connected to the already considered (central) mass in a higher-values-first 
watershed searching algorithm implemented in NeuroElf (i.e. the splitclustercoords function). 
Multiple comparisons were controlled for using cluster-level FWE correction using AFNIs 
alphasim procedure at α<.05 (Experiment 1: T>3.38, p<.001, k>24; Experiment 2, T>3.95, 
p<.00005, k>10). 
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Table A3.1.6. Modality-specific activations. 
Region 
  MNI     Extent t-value t-value 
Label/BA Side x y z (voxel) (max) (avg) 
Semantic Analysis 
Positive correlation         
Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 22/Wernicke L -52 -41 8 80 4.69 3.81 
Precentral Gyrus 6 L -47 -1 45 56 5.08 3.93 
         
Negative correlation         
Inferior Temporal Gyrus 37 L -55 -60 -4 42 -4.18 -3.65 
         
Episodic Imagery 
Posterior Cingulate 23 L -6 -57 24 86 3.89 3.51 
         
Bodily Interoception 
Anterior Insula 13 L -44 9 3 72 4.36 3.69 
Anterior Insula 13 R 44 7 4 95 4.31 3.62 
Table A3.1.6: Results from robust regression analysis of the main Maintain (Positive & 
Negative) > Neutral contrast, showing regions whose activation correlated with post-scanning 
reports of generation modality usage. Multiple comparisons were controlled for using cluster-
level FWE correction using AFNIs alphasim procedure at α<.05 (T>3.32, p<.0005, k>38). 
 
Table A3.1.7. Results from mediation analyses 
Region 
  MNI     Extent 
z-
value 
z-
value 
Label/BA Side x y z (voxel) (max) (avg) 
         
         
Mediated pathway for Semantic Analysis 
 Insula  13 L -34 -22 14 328 4.18 3.69 
 Insula  13 L -34 -22 14 40 4.18 3.82 
 Insula  13 L -42 -32 19 42 4.05 3.77 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 L -49 10 -12 44 3.92 3.71 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  42 L -58 -29 12 33 3.70 3.57 
Putamen  Posterior L -31 -2 -2 139 4.17 3.77 
Putamen Anterior L -19 7 2 31 3.99 3.83 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 L -37 -13 61 62 4.11 3.78 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  13 R 48 -44 18 68 4.06 3.69 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 R 41 32 -5 97 4.05 3.74 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45 R 49 22 5 32 4.02 3.76 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 52 5 -9 74 4.04 3.68 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 52 5 -9 64 4.04 3.67 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  21 R 60 -8 -3 10 3.79 3.71 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 L -38 0 38 72 4.00 3.67 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  8 L -26 40 39 133 3.96 3.66 
 Posterior Cingulate  23 R 6 -57 20 66 3.94 3.63 
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 Posterior Cingulate  23 R 6 -57 20 30 3.94 3.69 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 L -51 -2 25 98 3.93 3.69 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  44 L -48 14 13 32 3.92 3.71 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  6 L -11 3 52 60 3.88 3.66 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  6 L -11 3 52 30 3.88 3.64 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  8 L -45 14 45 65 3.74 3.62 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  8 L -45 14 45 51 3.74 3.62 
         
Mediated pathway for Visual Imagery 
Thalamus Pulvinar L 0 -25 1 168 3.97 3.69 
Thalamus Pulvinar L 0 -25 1 84 3.97 3.71 
Hippocampus Posterior L -27 -35 -1 31 3.93 3.69 
Thalamus Medial Dorsal  R 9 -15 10 40 3.87 3.65 
Fusiform Gyrus 37 R 48 -49 -16 30 3.95 3.72 
Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 R 59 -55 17 231 3.95 3.70 
Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 R 59 -55 17 34 3.95 3.73 
Superior Temporal Gyrus 39 R 53 -58 31 40 3.91 3.71 
Supramarginal Gyrus 40 R 51 -52 20 32 3.89 3.70 
Angular Gyrus 39 R 45 -74 31 55 3.85 3.70 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 39 R 48 -69 19 32 3.83 3.70 
Angular Gyrus 39 R 45 -60 34 37 3.78 3.68 
Cerebellum Pyramis R 16 -71 -27 130 3.95 3.70 
Cerebellum Pyramis R 16 -71 -27 72 3.95 3.71 
Cerebellum Uvula R 29 -70 -25 57 3.90 3.70 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 22 R 58 -34 2 55 3.94 3.76 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 R 18 22 54 1025 3.94 3.68 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 R 18 22 54 66 3.94 3.78 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 8 R 40 20 47 73 3.92 3.73 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 10 R 23 54 21 74 3.91 3.68 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 10 L -29 63 8 104 3.90 3.68 
Anterior Cingulate 25 R 4 16 -6 55 3.90 3.68 
Anterior Cingulate 24 L -3 23 -3 79 3.87 3.67 
Medial Frontal Gyrus 10 L -11 52 7 82 3.85 3.70 
Medial Frontal Gyrus 11 L -7 59 -14 65 3.84 3.64 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 R 32 25 35 53 3.84 3.67 
Anterior Cingulate 32 L -10 41 0 91 3.83 3.70 
Anterior Cingulate 32 R 11 46 -7 58 3.82 3.68 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 10 L -39 54 9 30 3.81 3.67 
Medial Frontal Gyrus 11 R 8 59 -17 30 3.80 3.63 
Medial Frontal Gyrus 10 R 11 54 1 30 3.78 3.65 
Anterior Insula 13/Ventral R 35 2 1 30 3.78 3.64 
Caudate Head/NACC L -6 7 -2 33 3.76 3.63 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 39 L -48 -73 20 267 3.92 3.68 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 39 L -53 -68 25 1 3.54 3.54 
Superior Temporal Gyrus 39 L -45 -58 33 108 3.87 3.70 
Supramarginal Gyrus 40 L -55 -54 28 54 3.87 3.69 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 39 L -48 -73 20 54 3.92 3.68 
Precuneus 31 R 19 -61 25 433 3.90 3.68 
Precuneus 31 R 19 -61 25 82 3.90 3.72 
Lingual Gyrus 18 R 12 -51 4 43 3.89 3.66 
Cingulate Gyrus 23 L -3 -25 24 59 3.87 3.69 
Cingulate Gyrus 31 L -6 -39 44 33 3.86 3.71 
Precuneus 7 R 13 -50 38 53 3.85 3.68 
Precuneus 7 R 6 -62 42 31 3.82 3.68 
Cingulate Gyrus 31 L -3 -26 38 56 3.78 3.66 
A3.1. Supplemental tables: Chapter 4 
 
273 
 
Cingulate Gyrus 31 R 6 -36 32 60 3.76 3.66 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 22 L -58 -37 5 102 3.90 3.71 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 22 L -58 -37 5 35 3.90 3.78 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 L -63 -28 -11 60 3.88 3.68 
Cuneus 17 R 11 -97 0 38 3.88 3.68 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 L -48 -1 -15 33 3.88 3.68 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 L -48 20 35 97 3.85 3.65 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 L -48 20 35 33 3.85 3.68 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 L -35 28 35 62 3.81 3.64 
Cuneus 17 L -13 -96 -1 32 3.83 3.64 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 R 59 -22 -4 30 3.83 3.68 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 L -29 16 -12 42 3.79 3.68 
         
Mediated pathway for Bodily Interoception 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  9 R 32 42 36 634 4.98 3.74 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  9 R 32 42 36 101 4.98 3.86 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  9 R 32 34 27 87 4.45 3.84 
 Precentral Gyrus  9 R 39 11 33 79 4.36 3.82 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  9 R 48 12 35 100 4.36 3.76 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  9 R 41 23 33 44 4.27 3.73 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 R 48 -15 29 30 4.20 3.72 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  10 R 39 45 12 82 3.93 3.64 
 Precentral Gyrus  6 R 52 -1 25 49 3.86 3.61 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  44 R 56 17 18 43 3.75 3.56 
 Postcentral Gyrus  43 L -62 -10 15 442 4.96 3.67 
 Postcentral Gyrus  43 L -62 -10 15 76 4.96 3.80 
 Transverse Temporal Gyrus  42 L -59 -18 10 65 4.37 3.74 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -63 -30 26 31 3.98 3.65 
 Transverse Temporal Gyrus  41 L -48 -18 10 57 3.90 3.64 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  42 L -53 -30 16 63 3.83 3.64 
 Insula  13 L -40 -11 15 65 3.83 3.60 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 L -58 -24 29 33 3.81 3.65 
 Supramarginal Gyrus  40 L -57 -43 30 40 3.73 3.56 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  9 R 8 41 28 326 4.84 3.67 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  9 R 8 41 28 44 4.84 3.82 
 Cingulate Gyrus  24 R 3 -6 47 95 4.23 3.66 
 Cingulate Gyrus  24 L 0 -11 41 54 4.07 3.70 
 Anterior Cingulate  32 R 4 47 7 44 4.05 3.67 
 Anterior Cingulate  32 L -8 33 23 49 3.65 3.56 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 R 62 -12 6 494 4.50 3.68 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 R 62 -12 6 135 4.50 3.79 
 Postcentral Gyrus  43 R 65 -16 17 38 4.28 3.70 
 Postcentral Gyrus  2 R 65 -22 28 37 4.25 3.67 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  41 R 53 -30 13 83 4.24 3.65 
 Insula  13 R 42 -26 14 51 4.06 3.63 
 Claustrum   R 37 -13 10 45 3.88 3.65 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 56 -33 30 64 3.76 3.61 
 Insula  13 R 40 -10 -2 37 3.75 3.60 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 R 30 -5 45 222 4.21 3.67 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 R 30 -5 45 104 4.21 3.69 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 R 27 -8 53 57 4.20 3.71 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 R 22 13 60 52 3.89 3.62 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  9 L -29 43 36 113 4.14 3.59 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  9 L -29 43 36 46 4.14 3.62 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  9 L -43 26 35 30 3.96 3.60 
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 Middle Frontal Gyrus  9 L -41 39 34 36 3.62 3.54 
Cerebellum  Culmen R 36 -45 -19 58 4.08 3.69 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 L -23 -9 50 188 4.07 3.64 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 L -23 -9 50 74 4.07 3.69 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 L -26 -7 61 61 3.91 3.61 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 L -37 -5 45 43 3.75 3.61 
 Fusiform Gyrus  19 L -25 -56 -10 94 3.90 3.63 
 Fusiform Gyrus  19 L -25 -56 -10 41 3.90 3.62 
 Fusiform Gyrus  37 L -33 -44 -12 50 3.81 3.65 
 Precuneus  31 L -7 -74 29 93 3.89 3.66 
 Precuneus  31 L -7 -74 29 48 3.89 3.67 
 Precuneus  7 L -3 -57 50 40 3.82 3.64 
 Inferior Temporal Gyrus  20 R 50 -29 -14 57 3.88 3.63 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  40 R 50 -47 24 55 3.81 3.59 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  46 L -50 46 8 68 3.79 3.57 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  46 L -50 46 8 33 3.79 3.56 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  46 L -47 35 11 34 3.64 3.57 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  9 L -46 2 23 86 3.71 3.56 
         
Shared mediated pathway for all modalities (Conjunction) 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 R 59 -19 -4 25 N/A N/A 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45 R 57 24 6 37 N/A N/A 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 R 42 17 -11 8 N/A N/A 
 Caudate  Body R 19 4 17 38 N/A N/A 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  9 R 12 44 19 6 N/A N/A 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  8 R 7 17 54 5 N/A N/A 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  8 R 4 37 44 6 N/A N/A 
 Cingulate Gyrus  24 R 3 -8 35 33 N/A N/A 
 Anterior Cingulate  24 R 3 24 21 7 N/A N/A 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  8 L -4 28 51 15 N/A N/A 
 Caudate  Body L -6 11 9 24 N/A N/A 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 L -12 11 57 6 N/A N/A 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 L -36 24 -12 28 N/A N/A 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 L -44 29 1 10 N/A N/A 
Table A3.1.7: Results from the mediation analysis, showing regions where the relationship 
between their Maintain>Neutral contrast value and reported modality usage was mediated by 
the contrast values in the modality-specific regions identified above, identifying the extended 
networks supporting modality-specific usage. To identify regions unique to each modality, the 
statistical map for each modality was thresholded at Z>3.5, p>.00005 and k>40 and exclusively 
masked with the maps for the other modalities. To identify shared regions, the thresholded maps 
were conjoined.  Cluster maxima are reported in bold for main contrasts, while conjunction 
results report coordinates of the cluster centroid. Italicised entries denote local maxima of 
subclusters within a cluster found to be not connected to the already considered (central) mass 
in a higher-values-first watershed searching algorithm implemented in NeuroElf (i.e. the 
splitclustercoords function). 
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Table A3.2.1. Reappraisal results 
Region Side 
Extent t t MNI  
(voxel) (max) (avg) x     y      z Label/BA 
Reappraisal>       
Watch-Negative       
       
Preparation phase       
Cerebellum R 376 7.88 3.75 44 -64 -20  Declive 
Cerebellum R 65 7.88 4.35 44 -64 -20  Declive 
Cerebellum R 49 6.52 4.12 9 -80 -21  Declive 
Cerebellum R 31 5.75 3.64 33 -47 -24  Declive 
Cerebellum R 94 5.14 3.67 9 -67 -14  Declive 
Cerebellum R 49 4.49 3.15 21 -64 -20  Declive 
Cerebellum L 245 6.88 3.81 -45 -73 -20  Declive 
Cerebellum L 49 6.88 4.14 -45 -73 -20  Declive 
Cerebellum L 47 6.31 4.01 -47 -61 -19  Declive 
Cerebellum L 57 5.72 3.72 -26 -79 -17  Declive 
Posterior Cingulate R 150 6.85 3.72 0 -41 15 29 
Posterior Cingulate R 88 6.85 4.19 0 -41 15 29 
Lingual Gyrus L 35 4.44 3.01 -9 -61 6 18 
Precentral Gyrus R 66 6.46 3.62 37 -17 61 4 
Precentral Gyrus R 34 6.46 3.64 37 -17 61 4 
Postcentral Gyrus R 32 6.37 3.60 45 -19 54 3 
Middle Temporal Gyrus L 104 6.17 3.82 -58 -32 3 22 
Middle Temporal Gyrus L 66 6.17 4.13 -58 -32 3 22 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 79 6.11 3.58 -55 34 -6 47 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 45 6.11 3.62 -55 34 -6 47 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 34 5.31 3.53 -50 46 3 46 
Middle Frontal Gyrus L 74 5.91 3.63 -53 13 30 9 
Middle Frontal Gyrus L 50 5.91 3.87 -53 13 30 9 
Middle Frontal Gyrus L 66 5.76 3.76 -47 5 43 6 
Inferior Parietal Lobule L 77 5.26 3.55 -33 -61 38 39 
       
Implementation phase       
Cerebellum L 137 11.02 4.74 -43 -76 -22 Declive 
Cerebellum L 146 11.02 6.02 -43 -76 -22 Declive 
Cerebellum R 112 9.87 6.05 41 -64 -20 Declive 
Cerebellum R 70 9.44 5.34 13 -82 -26 Uvula 
Cerebellum R 92 9.05 5.09 36 -50 -25 Culmen 
Cerebellum R 65 8.03 4.69 36 -81 -25 Uvula 
Cerebellum R 192 7.48 4.88 19 -70 -20 Declive 
Cerebellum L 111 7.03 4.76 -40 -57 -22 Declive 
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Cerebellum L 116 6.84 4.65 -25 -64 -23 Uvula 
Cerebellum L 34 6.14 4.04 -20 -83 -29 Tuber 
Cerebellum L 53 6.05 4.03 -27 -82 -19 Declive 
Cerebellum R 35 5.81 4.24 46 -67 -31 Pyramis 
Cerebellum R 37 5.41 3.90 19 -77 -35 Inferior Semi-Lunar Lobule 
Cerebellum R 90 5.21 3.75 3 -60 -14 Declive 
Cerebellum L 53 5.20 3.73 -42 -61 -36 Tonsil 
Cerebellum R 36 4.26 3.29 9 -52 -11 Culmen 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L 524 10.73 4.95 -48 46 3 46 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L 159 10.73 5.98 -48 46 3 46 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L 47 8.26 4.70 -55 31 -6 47 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  L 88 7.80 5.12 -32 57 13 10 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L 55 7.76 4.38 -46 29 -9 47 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 33 7.57 4.57 -53 17 1 47 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  L 65 6.85 3.99 -29 46 1 10 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 77 6.18 4.18 -29 41 20 10 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 478 9.44 4.57 -47 5 43 6 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 139 9.44 5.49 -47 5 43 6 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 63 7.71 4.01 -35 1 55 6 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L 98 6.64 4.43 -45 11 28 9 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 73 6.43 4.11 -49 29 27 46 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 68 5.99 4.51 -50 13 35 9 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  L 149 8.55 4.79 -61 -34 0 21 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  L 75 8.55 5.19 -61 -34 0 21 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  L 59 7.26 4.72 -50 -37 0 22 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R 139 7.12 4.08 42 50 -1 10 
Supramarginal Gyrus  L 470 7.11 4.34 -52 -57 35 40 
Supramarginal Gyrus  L 187 7.11 4.75 -52 -57 35 40 
Inferior Parietal Lobule  L 149 6.69 4.45 -49 -49 41 40 
Precuneus  L 42 5.37 3.41 -35 -73 42 19 
Supramarginal Gyrus  L 92 4.86 3.73 -58 -49 25 40 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 159 6.19 3.72 49 25 25 46 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 47 6.19 3.94 49 25 25 46 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 72 5.56 3.60 43 16 33 9 
Inferior Parietal Lobule  R 171 6.03 4.15 53 -52 39 40 
Inferior Parietal Lobule  R 89 6.03 4.30 53 -52 39 40 
Supramarginal Gyrus  R 55 5.25 4.02 48 -49 29 40 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  L 169 5.66 3.64 -1 28 54 6 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  L 39 5.66 3.90 -1 28 54 6 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 45 5.18 3.57 -4 26 39 8 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  L 50 4.95 3.69 -4 17 49 8 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  R 71 5.51 3.48 61 -23 -2 21 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 58 4.81 3.08 36 42 13 10 
       
Watch-Negative>       
Reappraisal       
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Preparation phase       
Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 798 -13.92 -5.29 -10 30 -15 25 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 172 -13.92 -6.61 -10 30 -15 25 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  R 162 -13.14 -6.38 11 30 -15 25 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  R 42 -10.00 -5.32 21 39 -14 11 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 59 -9.17 -4.80 -14 42 -12 10 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R 48 -8.59 -3.92 41 31 -10 47 
Anterior Cingulate  R 102 -7.27 -4.01 0 44 5 32 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  R 84 -7.10 -4.66 15 55 4 10 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  R 36 -6.95 -4.29 22 57 7 10 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 43 -6.67 -4.44 -8 57 3 10 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 50 -6.25 -4.31 -11 47 7 10 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L 50 -8.17 -4.00 -39 18 -17 47 
Thalamus  L 89 -7.20 -4.43 -3 -8 2 0 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  R 283 -6.08 -3.44 23 43 31 9 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  R 71 -6.08 -3.80 23 43 31 9 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 55 -5.84 -3.62 -4 44 33 9 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 48 -4.48 -3.11 38 30 37 9 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 76 -4.46 -3.30 22 34 42 8 
Precuneus  R 67 -5.51 -3.56 10 -54 58 7 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 224 -5.49 -3.74 -29 34 34 9 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 111 -5.49 -3.77 -29 34 34 9 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 68 -5.48 -3.75 -25 31 47 8 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 45 -5.32 -3.64 -32 25 32 9 
Lentiform Nucleus  R 104 -5.31 -3.52 19 -9 -3 Medial Globus Pallidus 
Lentiform Nucleus  R 22 -5.31 -3.70 19 -9 -3 Medial Globus Pallidus 
Amygdala R 35 -5.02 -3.42 25 -9 -11 Superficial 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  R 41 -4.93 -3.64 24 -22 -13 35 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  R 50 -4.81 -3.37 15 19 52 6 
       
Implentation phase       
Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 642 -16.55 -5.88 -10 28 -15 25 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 184 -16.55 -7.26 -10 28 -15 25 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  R 173 -15.40 -7.31 11 33 -16 25 
Anterior Cingulate  R 67 -7.20 -4.36 0 44 5 32 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  R 90 -6.04 -4.25 15 52 4 10 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R 63 -5.39 -3.46 30 30 -6 47 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 37 -4.79 -3.33 -4 55 1 10 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  L 55 -8.58 -4.69 -35 13 -19 38 
Precuneus  R 997 -8.50 -4.12 9 -60 54 7 
Precuneus  R 127 -8.50 -4.51 9 -60 54 7 
Precuneus  R 45 -7.68 -4.56 12 -71 50 7 
Precuneus  L 155 -7.54 -4.33 -12 -53 56 7 
Precuneus  R 159 -6.58 -4.66 19 -52 53 7 
Precuneus  R 88 -6.57 -4.08 24 -76 43 7 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  R 100 -5.98 -3.98 39 -80 17 19 
Inferior Parietal Lobule  R 88 -5.78 -4.02 34 -44 51 40 
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Precuneus  R 47 -5.57 -3.70 9 -80 40 19 
Cingulate Gyrus  R 38 -5.00 -3.41 6 -43 38 31 
Superior Occipital Gyrus  R 68 -4.99 -3.69 33 -82 25 19 
Superior Parietal Lobule  L 33 -4.60 -3.14 -24 -47 59 7 
Hypothalamus  R 86 -8.21 -4.89 0 -8 4 Hypothalamus 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  L 149 -7.66 -4.50 -30 -32 -11 36 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  L 84 -7.66 -4.71 -30 -32 -11 36 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  L 65 -6.18 -4.23 -24 -46 -9 37 
Superior Occipital Gyrus  L 90 -6.36 -3.77 -33 -82 31 19 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  R 196 -6.33 -3.98 30 -33 -10 36 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  R 123 -6.33 -4.10 30 -33 -10 36 
Hypothalamus R 31 -6.11 -3.86 11 -28 0 Hypothalamus 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  R 42 -5.68 -3.70 23 -24 -13 35 
Amygdala R 271 -6.30 -3.84 25 -9 -11 Central 
Amygdala R 129 -6.30 -4.10 25 -9 -11 Central 
Insula  R 100 -6.01 -3.74 44 1 1 13 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  R 42 -5.11 -3.31 51 -8 -1 22 
Posterior Cingulate  R 74 -6.12 -3.43 16 -57 17 30 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  L 75 -6.02 -3.65 -58 -32 21 42 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  L 40 -6.02 -3.92 -58 -32 21 42 
Inferior Parietal Lobule  L 35 -5.12 -3.33 -52 -27 31 40 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  L 139 -5.47 -3.66 -46 1 -5 22 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  L 52 -5.47 -4.03 -46 1 -5 22 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  L 40 -4.87 -3.30 -52 0 3 22 
Table A3.2.1. Reappraisal results. Brain regions activated and deactivated by Reappraisal relative to the 
Watch Negative condition. Cluster maxima are reported in bold. Local maxima (italicised) denote 
subclusters within a cluster found to be not connected to the already considered (central) mass in a higher-
values-first watershed searching algorithm implemented in NeuroElf (i.e. the splitclustercoords function). 
Multiple comparisons were controlled for using cluster-level FWE correction at α < .05 (T > 3.36, p < .001, 
k > 30) as determined by AFNI’s Alphasim Monte Carlo simulation method. For consistency, subclusters 
smaller than the respective cluster thresholds are not reported. 
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Table A3.2.2. Emotion induction validation contrasts 
Region Side 
 Extent t  t  MNI     
(voxel) (max) (avg)  x     y      z Label/BA 
Watch-Negative>       
Watch-Neutral       
 Thalamus L 1217 12.32 5.21   -3   -5    4   Ventral Anterior 
 Thalamus L 169 12.32 5.92   -3   -5    4  Ventral Anterior 
 Midbrain R 120 11.68 5.99   12   -9   -3  Subthalamic Nucleus  
 Midbrain L 132 9.15 5.28   -8  -25   -8  Substania Nigra  
 Midbrain R 68 8.84 5.63    9  -16   -4  Subthalamic Nucleus  
 Thalamus  R 60 8.67 5.38   12  -23   -1  Mammillary Body  
Cerebellum R 112 8.50 5.21   14  -37  -12   Culmen 
 Thalamus  L 102 8.48 5.07    0  -19   11  Pulvinar 
Thalamus R 76 7.94 4.99   21  -22   -4  Lateral Geniculum Body  
Cerebellum L 69 7.16 4.89   -2  -45  -12   Cerebellar Lingual 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  R 58 5.24 4.20   50   13   -2  22 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  L 153 11.80 5.29  -55    9    4   22 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  L 116 11.80 5.48  -55    9    4  22 
Precuneus R 448 10.53 5.78   22  -52   53   7 
Precuneus R 194 10.53 5.98   22  -52   53  7 
 Superior Parietal Lobule  R 96 9.10 5.83   34  -47   53  7 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  R 81 8.41 5.57   31  -38   46  40 
 Postcentral Gyrus  R 77 8.37 5.44    7  -47   64  7 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  L 1740 10.36 4.79  -49  -74   -6   19 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  L 75 10.36 5.44  -49  -74   -6  19 
 Cuneus  R 64 8.48 5.52   21  -84   32  19 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  L 77 8.37 5.62  -48  -76    2  19 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  L 174 8.24 5.26  -40  -77   11  19 
 Cuneus  R 77 7.72 5.12   12  -81   35  19 
 Posterior Cingulate  L 226 7.59 4.95    0  -49   20  30 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  L 175 7.47 5.02  -50  -60   12  39 
 Cuneus  L 178 7.08 4.82   -3  -68   32  7 
 Precuneus  R 91 7.03 4.69   24  -80   23  31 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  L 145 6.33 4.47  -22  -88   15  18 
 Posterior Cingulate  L 59 5.44 4.21   -3  -28   22  23 
 Cuneus  L 59 5.39 4.06  -19  -80   29  18 
 Lingual Gyrus  R 86 5.27 4.16    9  -74    4  18 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  R 53 4.36 3.86   24  -87   10  18 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  R 542 10.13 5.78   45  -62   -1   37 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  R 240 10.13 6.47   45  -62   -1  37 
 Middle Occipital Gyrus  R 81 9.71 6.91   53  -68   -4  19 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  R 86 6.62 4.75   51  -76    8  39 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  R 63 5.83 4.71   58  -60    7  21 
 Inferior Occipital Gyrus  R 57 5.83 4.47   43  -84   -7  18 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  R 70 10.11 5.21   15    2   67   6 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  R 172 10.08 5.95    7   45  -16   11 
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 Insula  R 271 9.66 5.14   53  -33   20   13 
 Superior Parietal Lobule  L 331 9.26 4.47  -27  -53   56   7 
 Superior Parietal Lobule  L 102 9.26 5.19  -27  -53   56  7 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  L 66 5.49 4.25  -41  -59   45  40 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  L 53 4.89 4.07  -34  -52   36  40 
 Sub-Gyral  L 51 4.55 3.95  -30  -42   52  40 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  R 85 7.89 4.68   42  -35  -10   36 
Cerebellum L 159 7.89 4.74    0  -64  -29    Uvula 
Cerebellum L 71 7.89 5.23    0  -64  -29   Uvula 
 Postcentral Gyrus  L 72 5.73 4.17  -58  -27   23   40 
       
Watch-Neutral>       
Watch-Negative       
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 9880 15.10 5.26   35   53   -5   10 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 234 15.10 8.16   35   53   -5  10 
Cerebellum L 158 14.11 8.85  -46  -68  -30   Tuber 
 Postcentral Gyrus  R 151 12.95 6.66   45  -16   54  3 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus R 153 12.93 7.84   45   52    2  46 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 118 12.80 6.36  -48   46    0  46 
 Precentral Gyrus  R 154 12.23 6.48   29  -22   67  4 
 Precentral Gyrus  L 120 11.46 6.20  -28  -24   67  4 
 Anterior Cingulate  L 102 11.17 5.76   -3    7   -4  25 
Cerebellum L 82 11.16 7.19  -43  -73  -23   Tuber 
 Precentral Gyrus  R 222 10.53 6.04   17  -24   67  4 
 Fusiform Gyrus  L 70 10.36 5.47  -23  -84  -14  19 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L 92 10.18 5.50  -17   31  -12  47 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  R 270 10.00 6.02   23   52   13  10 
 Posterior Cingulate  R 207 9.97 5.14   22  -57   15  30 
Cerebellum L 158 9.80 5.90   -4  -43  -43   Cerebellar Tonsil  
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 142 9.61 6.01  -32   48   -5  10 
 Postcentral Gyrus  L 56 9.56 5.18  -44  -22   55  3 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  R 175 9.41 5.71   12   44   19  9 
Cerebellum L 165 9.38 5.92  -25  -64  -23   Uvula 
Anterior Cingulate L 58 9.25 5.29  -13   16   -9  25 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R 100 9.21 5.44   50   12   19  44 
Middle Frontal Gyrus L 231 9.17 5.76  -28   40    1  10 
Cerebellum R 132 9.09 5.51    3  -43  -46   Cerebellar Tonsil  
Cerebellum R 49 9.04 5.55   46  -67  -28   Tuber 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 57 8.87 6.33   51   42   -8  47 
Cerebellum R 85 8.86 4.83   36  -47  -29   Culmen 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  R 83 8.82 5.16   50  -45   47  40 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 167 8.73 5.10   46   16   30  9 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  R 51 8.60 5.51    7   34   49  8 
Cerebellum R 48 8.30 5.62   41  -64  -20   Declive 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus  R 122 8.28 5.30   11   25   54  6 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 145 8.14 5.18  -10  -20   56  6 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R 174 8.08 5.36   46   25   15  46 
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 Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 179 8.02 5.43   41   33   22  46 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 162 7.93 5.39    0   42   25  9 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 208 7.89 4.86   31   18   35  8 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 155 7.82 5.19   34    9   47  6 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  R 97 7.67 5.20   52  -34   48  40 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 195 7.61 4.68  -26    2   37  6 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 169 7.52 5.17  -15   41   20  9 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 116 7.40 4.83  -28   17   35  8 
 Anterior Cingulate  R 114 7.35 4.55   14   17   21  32 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  L 96 7.32 4.91  -27  -44   -9  37 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  R 72 7.28 4.62   30  -43   -6  19 
 Insula  L 74 7.27 4.77  -34   22   17  13 
Cerebellum L 69 7.19 4.82  -32  -47  -27   Anterior Lobe 
 Postcentral Gyrus  L 115 7.17 4.56  -28  -24   40  3 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  R 153 7.13 4.84    7   35   41  8 
 Inferior Parietal Lobule  R 74 7.13 4.86   53  -41   37  40 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  R 84 7.12 4.89   21  -43    6  30 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 91 7.11 4.72  -30   13   25  9 
 Anterior Cingulate  L 114 7.05 5.03  -22   29   19  32 
 Supramarginal Gyrus  R 111 7.03 4.97   40  -46   30  40 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 122 6.95 4.89   29   39   39  8 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus  L 152 6.94 4.61  -15   32   37  8 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 144 6.91 4.85   24    7   42  6 
Cerebellum L 63 6.84 4.84  -23  -76  -38   Inferior Semi-Lunar Lobule 
 Cingulate Gyrus  R 68 6.67 4.64   20   -4   44  24 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  R 119 6.64 4.43   29   32   24  9 
 Paracentral Lobule  L 99 6.54 4.75  -10  -32   52  5 
Cerebellum R 57 6.21 4.51   18  -66  -25   Anterior Lobe 
 Insula  L 53 6.16 4.39  -42  -18   17  13 
 Precentral Gyrus  L 88 6.14 4.78  -16  -23   65  4 
 Insula  L 52 6.11 4.40  -34  -25   19  13 
Cerebellum L 63 6.02 4.48  -23  -40  -18   Culmen 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  R 105 6.01 4.40   42  -49   15  22 
 Paracentral Lobule  R 122 5.98 4.63   10  -33   55  5 
 Precentral Gyrus  R 48 5.94 4.21   59  -13   36  4 
 Caudate  R 98 5.86 4.39   20   -4   31  Caudate Body  
 Paracentral Lobule  L 85 5.86 4.29   -4  -11   47  31 
 Posterior Cingulate  L 75 5.80 4.38  -19  -58   11  30 
 Anterior Cingulate  R 51 5.76 4.36    7   52   -2  10 
Cerebellum L 62 5.73 4.34  -21  -55  -12   Declive 
 Supramarginal Gyrus  R 78 5.67 4.51   45  -46   37  40 
Cerebellum L 48 5.65 4.25  -27  -59  -42   Cerebellar Tonsil 
 Caudate  L 67 5.63 4.28  -14   21   16  Caudate Body  
 Anterior Cingulate  R 67 5.27 4.12    7   31   -7  24 
 Insula  L 74 5.20 4.04  -34  -34   24  13 
 Anterior Cingulate  R 135 4.94 4.05   17   32    7  32 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus  L 63 4.85 4.00  -35   34   27  9 
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 Postcentral Gyrus  R 67 4.61 3.90   31  -23   42  3 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R 49 4.47 3.95   50    3   33  9 
 Postcentral Gyrus  L 58 4.38 3.86  -33  -30   47  3 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  R 75 10.31 5.34   62  -17   -4   21 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus  L 72 9.65 4.60  -59   -5   -4   21 
 Superior Occipital Gyrus  R 79 7.32 4.29   42  -77   33   19 
Table A3.2.2. Emotion induction validation contrasts. Brain regions activated by negative stimuli (watch-
negative > watch- neutral contrast) Cluster maxima are reported in bold. Local maxima (italicised) denote 
subclusters within a cluster found to be not connected to the already considered (central) mass in a higher-
values-first watershed searching algorithm implemented in NeuroElf (i.e. the splitclustercoords function). 
Multiple comparisons were controlled for using cluster-level FWE correction at α < .05 (T > 3.36, p < .001, 
k > 30) as determined by AFNI’s Alphasim Monte Carlo simulation method. For consistency, subclusters 
smaller than the respective cluster thresholds are not reported. 
 
 
Table A3.2.3. Compassion-related deactivations. 
Region Side 
 Extent t  t  MNI     
(voxel) (max) (avg)  x     y      z Label/BA 
Watch-Negative>       
Compassion       
       
Preparation phase       
Cerebellum L 242 9.55 4.18   -2  -54  -51    Cerebellar Tonsil  
Cerebellum L 71 9.55 5.40   -2  -54  -51   Cerebellar Tonsil  
Cerebellum R 87 5.75 3.56   20  -48  -36   Cerebellar Tonsil 
Brainstem L 50 5.10 3.43    3  -30  -33  Pons 
Mid/Inferior Frontal Gyrus R 539 7.09 3.82   51   12   38    6/44 
Mid/Inferior Frontal Gyrus R 57 7.09 4.16   51   12   38   6/44 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus R 84 7.04 4.41   52   24   25   45/44 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus R 53 6.44 3.87   53   33   17  45 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R 105 5.72 3.97   44    0   18  9 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R 69 4.99 3.74   50   12   16  44 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R 73 4.79 3.41   40   20   13  45 
Cerebellum R 231 6.57 3.55    8  -33   -9    Culmen  
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  R 55 5.44 3.62   20  -24  -15  Subicular 
Supramarginal gyrus R 168 5.94 3.99   48  -44   29   40 
Calcarine gyrus R 173 5.56 3.43   19  -57   17   30 
       
Implementation phase       
Precuneus R 784 9.85 4.18   12  -44    6   29 
Precuneus R 102 9.85 5.28   12  -44    6  29 
Hippocampus R 116 8.02 4.34   11  -37   -7  Subicular 
Lingual Gyrus L 126 7.75 4.61   -9  -46    1   18/Hipp 
Lingual Gyrus L 55 7.16 4.29  -14  -26  -11   18/Hipp 
Hippocampus L 52 6.63 3.87   -8  -33   -9  Subicular 
Fusiform Gyrus R 61 6.39 3.92   23  -41  -15  37 
 Parahippocampal Gyrus  R 57 5.83 3.90   17  -22  -14  Subicular 
 Lingual Gyrus  R 67 5.72 3.73   15  -54   -1   17/18 
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 Posterior Cingulate  R 47 4.76 3.34   28  -63    6  30 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus R 375 8.10 4.03   53   33   17   45 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus R 79 8.10 4.45   53   33   17  45 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R 61 6.98 4.13   53   33   -9  45 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus R 61 6.17 4.14   49   28   27  45 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R 92 5.18 3.82   37   29   -5  47 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R 52 4.72 3.45   59   15   14  44 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  R 256 7.77 4.02   44   11  -16   38 
 Superior Temporal Gyrus  R 133 7.77 4.21   44   11  -16  38 
 Insula  R 65 5.56 3.49   43  -10    3  13 
 Insula  R 58 5.43 4.18   43   -1   -4  13 
Table A3.2.3. Compassion-related deactivation. .Brain regions deactivated during Compassion (Watch-
Negative > Compassion) Cluster maxima are reported in bold. Local maxima (italicised) denote subclusters 
within a cluster found to be not connected to the already considered (central) mass in a higher-values-first 
watershed searching algorithm implemented in NeuroElf (i.e. the splitclustercoords function). Multiple 
comparisons were controlled for using cluster-level FWE correction at α < .05 (T > 3.36, p < .001, k > 30) 
as determined by AFNI’s Alphasim Monte Carlo simulation method.  For consistency, subclusters smaller 
than the respective cluster thresholds are not reported. 
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A3.2. Supplemental tables: Chapter 7 
 
Table A3.3.1. Dimension of trait affect. PCA results 
 
Scale Loading 
PANAS_NEG 0.646 
PANAS_POS -0.702 
TTPAS_Active -0.418 
TTPAS_Relaxed -0.393 
TTPAS_Warmth -0.667 
STAI_ta 0.867 
bdi_total 0.577 
atq_negative_affect 0.636 
atq_extraversion -0.531 
NEO_NEG_AFF 0.742 
NEO_POS_AFF -0.635 
 
Table A3.3.1. Dimension of trait affect. PCA results. Loadings of scales on the single trait affect component 
revealed by PCA analysis (see Appendix: Figure A2.3.1A). PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Scale, 
TTPAS = Types of Positive Affect Scale, STAI_ta = State Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait affect version, 
bdi_total = Beck’s Depression Inventory II – full scale score, atq= Adult Temperament Questionnaire, 
NEO_NEG_AFF/ NEO_POS_AFF = NEO Five Factor Inventory, Positive and Negative affect subscales. 
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Table A3.3.2. Dimensions of emotion management: PCA results.  
Scale 
Emotion-
focused Maladaptive Instrumental 
CERQ.SelfBlame 0.254 0.337 0.11 
CERQ.Acceptance 0.64 0.043 -0.106 
CERQ.Rumination 0.101 0.492 0.319 
CERQ.PosRefocus 0.584 0.024 0.044 
CERQ.PlanningRefocus 0.437 -0.209 0.52 
CERQ.PosReappraisal 0.707 -0.161 0.266 
CERQ.Perspective 0.665 -0.121 0.089 
CERQ.Catastrophizing -0.153 0.647 0.146 
CERQ.OtherBlame 0.186 0.492 0.016 
COPE_Distraction 0.355 0.15 0.003 
COPE_Denial -0.032 0.393 -0.067 
COPE_EmotionalSup -0.068 0.1 0.697 
COPE_Withdrawal 0.28 0.279 -0.353 
COPE_PosReinterp 0.68 -0.211 0.197 
COPE_Humor 0.556 0.088 -0.089 
COPE_Active 0.266 -0.283 0.634 
COPE_Drugs 0.013 0.47 0.027 
COPE_InstrumentalSup -0.134 0.094 0.718 
COPE_ActOut -0.005 0.311 0.426 
COPE_Plan 0.259 -0.104 0.597 
COPE_Accept 0.581 -0.17 0.037 
COPE_SelfBlame 0.043 0.596 -0.115 
EROS.ExtImprov 0.314 0.098 0.393 
EROS.ExtWorse -0.078 0.551 0.053 
EROS.IntWorse -0.136 0.684 0.001 
EROS.IntImprov 0.493 0.206 0.347 
atq_effortful_control 0.092 -0.539 0.221 
 
Table A3.3.2. Dimensions of emotion management: PCA results. Loadings on the three components 
revealed by PCA analysis of scales measuring different emotion management styles (see Appendix: Figure 
A2.3.1B). Varimax rotation applied. Bolded items denote items loading more than .2. CERQ = Cognitive 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, COPE = Cope inventory, EROS = Emotion Regulation of Others and 
Self, ATQ = Adult Temperament Questionnaire.  
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Table A3.3.3. Assignment of non-described generation modalities. 
Description Assigned 
Recalling past or future situations Episodic Imagery 
Optically imagining situations Episodic Imagery 
Memories Episodic Imagery 
Flying dream- Imagination is a mix of visual and bodily, and mostly 
mixed together 
Episodic Imagery/ 
Bodily Interoception 
Tactile memories Bodily Interoception 
Breathing Bodily Interoception 
Good and bad memories Episodic Imagery 
Memories of good and bad feelings Episodic Imagery 
Rekindling memories Episodic Imagery 
Going into the feeling Not assignable 
Concentrated on generating the feeling (feeling happy, positive, 
excited).  
Tried to amplify feelings, memories and images that were evoked. 
Episodic Imagery 
Recalling memories, mentally playing guitar Episodic Imagery/ 
Auditory Imagery 
I thought of stories or events in my own past. Episodic Imagery 
Memories of feelings Episodic Imagery 
Table A3.3.3. Assignment of non-described generation modalities. Translated descriptions for each of 
the 14 participants reporting using "Other" modalities is reported, together with their assignment 
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A4. List of abbreviations  
 
µS     microsiemens 
AC/PC     Anterior Commissure/Posterior Commissure 
AI     Anterior insula 
ALFF     Amplitude of low frequency fluctuations 
AMY     Amygdala 
AUC     Area-under-the-curve 
BA     Broca’s area 
BDI-2     Beck’s depression inventory 
BOLD     Blood-oxygen level dependent 
CM     Compassion meditation 
CPCA     constrained principle component analysis 
CSF     Cerebrospinal fluid 
dACC     dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
dlPFC     Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
DMN     Default mode network 
dmPFC    Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 
EEG     Electroencephalogram 
EnGE     Endogenous generation of emotion 
EPN     Early posterior negativity 
ERP     Event-related potential 
ExGE     Exogenous generation of emotion 
FIR     Finite impulse response 
fMRI     Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
FOV     Field of view 
FPCN     The Frontoparietal Control Network 
FWEc     Family wise error rate 
GLM     General Linear Model 
pgACC    Perigenual anterior cingulate cortex 
GSR     Galvanic skin response 
HC     Hippocampus 
HRF     hemodynamic response function 
Hz     Hertz 
ICN     Intrinsic Connectivity Network 
IFG     Inferior frontal gyrus 
iPat     Integrated parallel acquisition 
IQ     Intelligence quotient 
ITG     Inferior temporal gyrus 
LKM     Loving-kindness meditation 
LMM     Linear mixed modelling 
LPP     Late positive potential 
LTM     Long-term meditation practitioners 
MCC     Mid cingulate cortex 
MEPM    Mediation effect parametric mapping 
MFG     Middle frontal gyrus 
mm     Millimeter 
mOFC     Medial orbitofrontal cortex 
ms     millisecond 
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MTG     Middle temporal gyrus 
NACC     Nucleus accumbens 
p     p-value 
PAG     Periaqueductal gray 
PCA     Principal component analysis 
PCC     Posterior Cingulate Cortex 
PCC     Posterior cingulate cortex 
PET     Positron emission tomography 
PFC     Prefrontal cortex 
PMC     Premotor cortex 
Pre-SMA    Presupplemental motor area 
RAGE     The Regulation and Generation of Emotion 
RE     Reappraisal 
ROI     Region of interest 
rs-fMRI    Resting state fMRI 
s     second 
SCID     Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV 
SCL     Skin conductance level 
SD     Standard deviation 
SFG     Superior frontal gyrus 
sgACC    Subgenual anterior cingulate cortex 
SGT     Self-generated thought 
SMG     Supramarginal gyrus 
SN     The Salience Network 
SN/VTA    Substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area 
SoVT     Socio-affective Video Task 
STAI-T    Spielberger trait anxiety scale 
STG     Superior temporal gyrus 
TRANS    Transversal Gyrus 
TE     Echo time 
TI     Inversion time 
TPJ     Temporoparietal junction 
TR     Repetition time 
VAS     Visual analogue scale 
VLPFC    Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
VMPFC    Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
VS     Ventral striatum 
WM     White matter 
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The thesis investigates the endogenous generation of emotion (EnGE). Two main 
questions were pursued: 1) How is the volitional generation of emotion neurally and 
behaviourally implemented? and 2) How can this ability be used for emotional self-
regulation? This was investigated in two projects: In the first project, neural, 
psychophysiological, and behavioural indices of EnGE were investigated in a large, 
representative sample. The second project investigated the behavioural, functional and 
structural correlates of meditation practices involving endogenous generation of positive 
emotion, in a sample of expert meditators. 
Answering the first question, the first project indicated that EnGE is neurally 
supported by the cooperation of nodes of the Default Mode (DMN), extended Salience (SN), 
and left Frontoparietal Control (FPCN) Networks. Results suggest dissociable functional 
component processes were implemented by these networks, with DMN supporting the 
generation of simulated representations, while SN supported the generation of core affective 
qualities of self-generated emotional experiences. FPCN co-activation patterns suggested it 
supports the coordination of the generation process. The second project showed similar 
activations during loving-kindness and compassion meditation. Moreover, expert meditators 
showed increased cortical thickness in, primarily, the left FPCN. This suggests endogenous 
emotion generation is neurally effected by left FPCN, entraining core affective processes 
supported by SN and simulation construction supported by DMN. 
EnGE-based emotional self-regulation was investigated in a second set of studies. 
Neural and behavioural measures indicated that expert meditators could successfully regulate 
their emotional reactions to negative external stressors. Comparing compassion with 
reappraisal-based emotion regulation, regulatory effects differed, with compassion-based 
regulation primarily increasing positive emotion while reappraisal primarily decreased 
negative emotion. Moreover, in the large, representative sample, EnGE-abilities were 
associated with trait affect and emotion management styles. Moreover, evidence was found 
that EnGE-abilities partially mediate the relationship between positive trait affect and 
adaptive, instrumental emotion management styles. These results suggest that EnGE can be 
used in a reactive fashion to regulate emotional reactions to negative stressors, and that 
EnGE-abilities support emotion management in the normal population. 
Referat. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die endogene Generation von Emotionen 
(EnGE). Zwei Hauptfragen wurde verfolgt: 1) Wie die willentliche Erzeugung von Emotionen 
neuronal oder im Verhalten implementiert ist, und 2) wie diese Fähigkeit für die emotionale 
Selbstregulation verwendet werden kann. Dies wurde in zwei Projekten genauer untersucht: 
Im ersten Projekt wurden neuronale und psychophysiologische Mechanismen sowie 
Verhaltensweisen in Bezug auf EnGE in einer großen und repräsentativen Stichprobe 
untersucht. Das zweite Projekt untersuchte die verhaltensbedingten, funktionellen, und 
strukturellen Korrelate von bestimmten Meditationsübungen, die die endogene Erzeugung 
von positiven Emotionen beinhalten, in einer Stichprobe von Meditationsexperten.  
 In Bezug auf die erste Forschungsfrage, haben wir im ersten Projekt Daten erhoben, 
die nahelegen, dass EnGE auf neuronaler Ebene durch die Kooperation von wichtigen 
Arealen des Default Mode Netzwerks (DMN), sowie des erweiterten Salience (SN) und des 
linken Frontoparietal Control (FPCN) Netzwerks unterstützt wird. Ergebnisse legen nahe, 
dass unterscheidbare funktionelle Komponenten-Prozesse durch diese Netzwerke 
implementiert werden. Das DMN unterstützt dabei die Erzeugung von simulierten 
Repräsentationen, während das SN die Generation der „core“ affektive Qualitäten von 
selbstgenerierten emotionalen Erfahrungen unterstützt. Das FPCN Ko-Aktivierungsmuster 
legt eine Rolle bei der Koordination von Erzeugungsprozessen nahe. Das zweite Projekt 
zeigte ähnliche Aktivierungen durch Loving-kindness und Mitgefühls-Meditation. Weiterhin 
zeigten Meditationsexperten eine erhöhte kortikale Dicke vor allem im linken FPCN. Diese 
Ergebnisse lassen vermuten, dass eine endogene Emotionsgeneration neuronal vom linken 
FPCN beeinflusst wird, dass eine SN Aktivierung „core“ affektive Prozesse unterstützt, und 
dass die Simulationskonstruktion vom DMN gesteuert wird.  
 EnGE-basierte emotionale Selbstregulation wurde mittels dem zweiten Set von 
Experimenten genauer untersucht. Neuronale- und Verhaltensmaße weisen darauf hin, dass 
Meditationsexperten ihre eigenen emotionalen Reaktionen auf negative externe Stressoren 
erfolgreich regulieren konnten. Ein Vergleich von Mitgefühlsmeditation und Neubewertungs-
basierter (reappraisal) Emotionsregulation zeigte, dass die Regulationseffekte insofern 
unterschiedlich sind, dass Mitgefühl-basierte Regulation zunächst positive Emotionen erhöht, 
während eine Neubewertungsstrategie hauptsächlich negative Emotionen reduziert. 
Außerdem wurden in der großen und repräsentativen Stichprobe EnGE-Fähigkeiten mit 
habituellem Affekt (trait affect) und Emotionsmanagement-Stilen assoziiert. EnGE-
Fähigkeiten wurden teilweise durch die Beziehung zwischen positiven habituellem Affekt und 
adaptiven instrumentellen Emotionsmanagement-Stilen vermittelt. Diese Ergebnisse legen 
nahe, dass EnGE in einer reaktiven Weise für eine Regulation von Emotionsreaktionen auf 
negative Stressoren verwendet werden kann und das EnGE Fähigkeiten das 
Emotionsmanagement in einer normalen Population unterstützen.  
 English Summary 
Emotional states are commonly thought of as being reflex-like behaviours consequent on 
exogenous stimuli, enabling the individual to effectively and rapidly adapt to and react to 
evolutionarily important challenges. Extensive evidence supports this general model, 
demonstrating that emotional states effectively optimise the ability of the individual to deal 
with environmental challenges. However, a significant portion of what we term emotional 
experience does not have clear exogenous elicitors, such as emotional reactions to memories, 
or the perambulations of our streams of thought. Assuming that we can exercise control about 
what to remember and think about, this implies that we can volitionally generate emotional 
states. Moreover, this opens for the possibility that emotional states can be used 
instrumentally in the service of goal achievement and self-regulation.  
Despite this, the behavioural and neural mechanisms supporting the endogenous 
generation of emotion (EnGE) has received relatively little empirical attention. The current 
thesis used a combination of functional and structural magnetic resonance imaging, 
psychophysiological measurements, and novel behavioural paradigms to redress this.  
Moreover, EnGE was investigated in both large representative samples and an expert sample 
of meditators with extensive experience in meditation practices requiring the generation of 
positive emotion. 
Part I: Theoretical and empirical background  
The first part of the thesis (Chapters 1 and 2) introduces the theoretical and empirical 
background of current research on endogenous emotion generation, culminating in the 
development of working models for 1) how endogenous emotion is generated in terms of 
psychological component processes and neural implementation and 2) how such 
endogenously generated emotion can be used for purposes of emotional self-regulation. 
  Chapter 1 discusses the philosophical inspiration for the current research. The chapter 
starts with a discussion of how emotions have traditionally been thought of as mental events 
that happens to the individual. The chapter next presents an alternative account of emotion as 
something that can be actively used in the service of goal-achievement and self-regulation, 
rooted in a brief overview of the philosophical treatment of emotion and emotion 
management in Descartes, Sartre, and Solomon. This forms the philosophical framework 
guiding the current research. Briefly, the position held by the current research is that 
emotional states should not just be thought of as reactions to external events, but also actions 
by which the individual actively manipulates their environment. It is argued that this account 
is particularly apt for endogenously generated emotions, as these are fundamentally connected 
to the ability to volitionally access emotion-eliciting information in memory.  It is argued this 
suggests that the capacity to generate endogenous emotional states might be an important 
means of regulating oneself and ones’ environment.  
Based on this understanding of emotion, Chapter 2 presents the current state of 
empirical knowledge on the behavioural and neural bases of EnGE. The chapter first presents 
an operationalisation of EnGE as the process by which emotions are elicited based primarily 
on endogenous sources of information, such as memories, thoughts, imagery, or 
interospection on bodily sensations. The chapter next discusses how this understanding of 
EnGE is related to other theoretical constructs, specifically exogenous emotion generation, 
emotion regulation, mood generation, and constructive memory. Guided by this 
operationalisation, the chapter next seeks to develop a more detailed understanding of EnGE 
as a psychological phenomenon. Based on a review of extant behavioural and 
psychophysiological work, it is proposed that EnGE should be construed of as a process that 
can have multiple modes of implementation (e.g. forms of mental imagery, verbal self-speak, 
or bodily interoception), resulting in emotional states with clear subjective and physiological 
components. As such, it is argued that EnGE should be conceptualized as a form of embodied 
 simulation. Next, the chapter reviews literature on the neural bases of EnGE, with previous 
evidence suggesting that EnGE involves activation of nodes of Default Mode (DMN), 
Salience (SN) and Frontoparietal Control Networks (FPCN). Based on these reviews, the 
chapter next proposes a theoretical understanding of the psychological processes involved in 
EnGE culminating in a neural component process model, that guided the current research. 
Specifically, it is proposed that DMN supports the multimodal integration of information into 
elaborated experiential representations, or simulations.  The SN is proposed to support the 
generation of physiological concomitants of emotional states. Finally, the FPCN is proposed 
to coordinate the generation process in general by serving as an intermediary between SN and 
DMN, and further to specifically support goal-directed retrieval of information. The chapter 
next discusses how EnGE can be used as a technique for emotion management, based on 
James Gross’ process model of emotion regulation. Specifically, two complementary EnGE-
based regulation modes are proposed: 1) a reactive, buffering based mode, by which 
individuals can generate positive emotion to counteract negative emotion and 2) a pre-
emptive, simulation-based mode, by which individuals can use EnGE to create simulations of 
the emotional outcomes of future events, and instrumentally act accordingly to enhance or 
diminish the likelihood of those outcomes.  Finally, the chapter reports the specific 
hypotheses formulated to guide the current research in testing the working models.  
Part II: Empirical studies 
Chapters 3-7 compose the second part of the thesis and details four empirical studies 
performed to test the hypotheses proposed in the end of Chapter 2. The empirical body of 
work (Chapters 4-7) is previously published or currently under review in peer-reviewed 
journals. As the article format does not allow space for in-depth discussion of methods, 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of samples, behavioural paradigms, and experimental, and 
analytical methods employed.  
 The first main question of the thesis was to establish the neural component process of 
EnGE. Chapters 4 and 5 reports studies performed to directly answer this question. Chapter 4 
presents a study aimed at investigating the neural basis of of EnGE. Special emphasis was put 
on distinguishing neural systems supporting the generation of emotional experiences in 
general, from those supporting the representation of the contents of emotional experiences 
(e.g. information modality or valence). Using fMRI, combined with psychophysiological 
measurements, and a novel behavioural paradigm, this study aimed to test the neural 
component process model proposed in Chapter 2. In two experiments (N=32/293) participants 
generated positive and negative emotional states using freely chosen methods of generation. 
As expected, EnGE activated nodes of SN, DMN and left FPCN. Component processes 
implemented by these networks were established by investigating their functional 
associations, activation dynamics and integration during EnGE. SN activation on the whole 
correlated with subjective affect, with its midbrain nodes selectively correlating with positive 
and negative affect intensity. Furthermore, SN as a whole showed dynamics consistent with it 
supporting the generation of core affect. Dorsomedial DMN, together with ventral anterior 
insula, was shown to mediate usage of multiple generation methods. Furthermore, its 
activation dynamics were consistent with its involvement in the experiential representation of 
emotion. Finally, left ventrolateral frontal portions of the FPCN was found to both correlate 
with intensity of subjective affect, and support usage of generation methods, suggesting it 
supported controlled retrieval processes. Moreover, FPCN was shown to couple to both DMN 
and SN, consistent with it supporting executive coordination of the generation process. 
Overall, these results provided support for the neural component process mapping proposed in 
Chapter 2. 
Chapter 5 expands on this by investigating the neural correlates of EnGE expertise, in 
a sample of meditators (N=17) with expertise in practices that emphasize the generation of 
positive emotions of loving-kindness and compassion. Using structural MRI this chapter 
 shows that meditation-based EnGE expertise is associated with increased cortical thickness in 
right frontal pole, left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, and left anterior insula. In a second step, 
activation patterns associated with loving-kindness meditation relative to rest were 
established. In line with Chapter 4, this revealed increased activation in frontal DMN, left 
FPCN, and left anterior insula. Importantly, overlap between these two measures were 
observed in left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and ventral anterior insula, key nodes of SN 
and FPCN respectively – regions also found to play domain general role for EnGE in Chapter 
4. Together Chapters 4 and 5 answer the question of how EnGE occurs and afford the 
specification of the neural underpinnings of EnGE.  
The second main question of the thesis was how, EnGE can be employed for 
emotional self-regulation, which is the topic for Chapters 6 and 7. In a subset of the sample of 
expert meditators in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 reports a study in which 15 expert practitioners 
underwent fMRI scanning while using Compassion-meditation (CM) either passively 
viewing, or using CM or Reappraisal to modulate their emotional reactions to film clips 
depicting people in distress. Both strategies effectively, but differentially regulated 
experienced affect, with CM primarily increasing positive and Reappraisal primarily 
decreasing negative affect. Imaging results showed that CM, relative to both passive-viewing 
and Reappraisal increased activation in regions involved in affiliation, positive affect and 
reward processing including ventral striatum and medial OFC. This network was shown to be 
active prior to stimulus presentation, suggesting that the regulatory mechanism of 
Compassion is the stimulus-independent endogenous generation of positive affect, consistent 
with CM enabling a buffering mode of emotion management, as described above.  
Having established that EnGE can indeed be used for emotional self-regulation in an 
expert population, Chapter 7 explores whether this replicates in the normal population using a 
subset of the sample used in Chapter 4 (n=288). Specifically, the relationship between EnGE 
abilities, trait affect, and the tendency to use different emotion regulation and coping 
 techniques was investigated. The capacity to generate emotion was found to correlate 
positively with both trait affect, and usage of adaptive emotion management techniques. 
Interestingly, this held for emotion generation ability in general, and for valence specific 
generation ability (positive more than negative). However, only general generation ability was 
found to causally mediate the known relationship between adaptive emotion management and 
trait affect. Moreover, this effect was only apparent for instrumental techniques for emotion 
management. Such techniques aim at enabling the individual to deal with emotional events by 
changing the emotional situation, suggesting that EnGE can be used for pre-emptive, 
simulation-based mode of emotion management proposed in Chapter 2. Together, Chapters 6 
and 7 demonstrate that EnGE is indeed related to emotional self-regulation, and that both 
buffering and pre-emptive modes can be effective techniques to deal with emotional events.   
 
Part III: General Discussion 
The final part of the thesis summarises and discusses the current findings, evaluating 
the component process model of EnGE, and the validity of the model for EnGE-based 
emotion management proposed in Chapter 2. Chapter 8 summarises the current findings and 
updates the working model according to the current findings. Finally, Chapter 9 provides a 
critique of the current investigations, discusses the theoretical implications of the current 
findings and potential future directions for the investigation of EnGE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
Emotionale Zustände werden üblicherweise als reflexartiges Verhalten auf exogene 
Reize verstanden, dies es dem Individuum gestatten, sich effektiv und schnell 
evolutionsbasierten Herausforderungen anzupassen und auf diese zu reagieren. Umfangreiche 
Befunde unterstützen dieses allgemeine Modell und zeigen, dass emotionale Zustände die 
Fähigkeit von Individuen umweltbedingte Herausforderungen zu bewältigen, effektiv 
optimieren können. Ein	wesentlicher	Teil	dessen	was	wir	emotionale	Erfahrung	nennen	hat	jedoch	keine	klaren	exogenen	Auslöser,	wie	z.	B.	emotionale	Reaktionen	auf	Erinnerungen	oder	das	Verfolgen	unserer	Gedankenströme.	Weiterhin	wird	angenommen,	dass	wir	Gedanken	und	Erinnerungen	teilweise	kontrollieren	können,	was	impliziert,	dass	endogene	Emotionen	bewusst	generiert	werden	können.	Dies	eröffnet	die	Möglichkeit,	dass	emotionale	Zustände	willentlich	und	instrumentell	für	das	Erreichen	von	Zielen	und	einer	Selbstregulation	verwendet	werden	können.			
Trotzdem	haben	die	verhaltensbedingten	und	neuronalen	Mechanismen,	die	der	endogenen	Generation	von	Emotionen	(EnGE)	zugrunde	liegen,	bislang	relativ	wenige	empirische	Aufmerksamkeit	erhalten.	Die vorliegenden Studien verwendeten verschiedene 
Methoden, wie funktionelle und strukturelle Magnetresonanztomographie (MRT), 
psychophysiologische Messungen und neue Verhaltensparadigmen, um dieser Frage 
nachzugehen. EnGE wurde sowohl in einer großen repräsentativen Stichprobe als auch in 
einer Expertenstichprobe, die umfangreiche Erfahrung mit einer Meditationspraxis hat, bei 
der positive Emotionen erzeugt werden, untersucht.  
 
 
 
 Teil I: Theoretischer und empirischer Hintergrund  
Der erste Teil der vorliegenden Dissertation (Kapitel 1 und 2) stellt den theoretischen 
und empirischen Hintergrund des gegenwärtigen Forschungsstandes zu endogener 
Emotionsgeneration vor. Dies ergab die zwei folgenden Arbeitsmodelle, die in dieser 
Dissertation behandelt werden: 1) Welche psychologischen Komponentenprozesse und 
neuronalen Aktivierungen liegen der endogenen Erzeugung von Emotionen zu Grunde. 2) 
Wie beeinflussen endogen erzeugte Emotionen die emotionale Selbstregulation.  
Kapitel 1 erörtert die philosophische Inspiration für die vorliegende Forschungsarbeit. 
Das Kapitel beginnt mit einer Diskussion darüber das Emotionen traditionell als mentale 
Ereignisse angesehen wurden, welche einem Individuum wiederfahren. Das Kapitel erörtert 
anschließend eine alternative Darstellung von Emotionen welche auf einer Übersicht über die 
philosophische Behandlung von Emotionen und Emotionsmanagement bei Descartes, Sartre 
und Solomon basiert. In dieser Darstellung sind Emotionen etwas, das man aktiv verwenden 
kann, um bestimmte Ziele zu erreichen oder Selbstkontrolle auszuüben. Dies spannt den 
philosophischen Rahmen der vorliegenden Forschungsarbeit. Kurz gesagt sind emotionale 
Zustände nicht nur Reaktionen auf externe Ereignisse, sondern können möglicherweise auch 
als Aktionen verstanden werden, mit denen man als Individuum aktiv die Umwelt 
manipulieren kann. Es wird argumentiert, dass diese Annahme besonders für die endogen 
erzeugten Emotionen zutrifft, welche grundsätzlich mit der Fähigkeit verbunden sind, 
willentlich auf emotionsauslösende Informationen aus dem Gedächtnis zuzugreifen. Dies legt 
nahe, dass die Fähigkeit endogene Emotionszustände zu erzeugen wahrscheinlich ein 
wichtiges Mittel für die Selbstregulation oder die Regulierung der Umwelt ist.  
Basierend auf diesem gerade beschriebenen Verständnis von Emotionen, wird in 
Kapitel 2 der gegenwärtige empirische Forschungsstand zur Generation von endogenen 
Emotionen hinsichtlich Verhaltensdaten und neuronalen Mechanismen dargestellt. Das 
 Kapitel erörtert zunächst die Operationalisierung von EnGE als einen Prozess, bei dem 
Emotionen primär durch endogene Informationsquellen ausgelöst werden, wie z. B. 
Erinnerungen, Gedanken, Bilder und Interozeption auf Körperempfindungen. Als nächstes 
wird diskutiert, wie dieses Verständnis von EnGE zu anderen theoretischen Konstrukten steht, 
wie der exogenen Emotionsgeneration, Emotionsregulation, Stimmungserzeugung, und 
konstruktives Gedächtnis. Davon ausgehend wird in dem Kapitel weiterhin versucht, ein 
detaillierteres Verständnis von EnGE als ein psychologisches Phänomen zu entwickeln. 
Basierend auf einer Literaturübersicht über vorhandene verhaltensbasierte und 
psychophysiologische Forschungsarbeiten, wird angenommen, dass EnGE als Prozess 
verstanden werden sollte, bei dem man mehrere Arten der Implementierung haben kann (z. B. 
durch mentale Bilder, verbale Selbstgespräche, oder körperliche Interozeption), und das diese 
in emotionale Zustände mit klaren subjektiven und physiologischen Komponenten führen 
können. Es	wird	daher	argumentiert,	dass	EnGE	als	eine	Form	der	verkörperten	Simulation	(embodied	simulation)	konzipiert	werden	sollte. Als nächstes befasst sich das 
Kapitel mit einer Literaturübersicht über die neuronalen Grundlagen von EnGE und erörtert 
bisherige Belege für eine EnGE Aktivierung in umfassenden Teilen des Default Mode 
(DMN), des Salience (SN), und des Frontoparietal Control Netzwerks (FPCN). Weiterhin 
werden in diesem Kapitel der theoretische Hintergrund für die psychologischen Prozesse, die 
bei EnGE involviert sind, diskutiert, um dann ein neuronales Komponentenprozessmodell, 
welches den Studien der vorliegenden Dissertationsarbeit zugrunde liegt, vorzuschlagen. Es 
wird angenommen, dass das DMN die multi-modale Integration von Informationen in 
elaborierte erfahrungsmäßige Repräsentationen oder Simulationen unterstützt. Man nimmt an, 
dass das SN die Erzeugung von physiologischen Begleitumständen der Emotionszustände 
unterstützt. Schließlich schlägt man vor, dass das FPCN die Erzeugungsprozesse koordiniert 
und die gezielte Informationswiederherstellung unterstützt. Anschließend wird in dem Kapitel 
diskutiert, wie EnGE als eine Technik des Emotionsmanagements verwendet werden kann, 
 welche auf James Gross‘ Prozessmodell der Emotionsregulation basiert. Genauer gesagt, 
werden zwei komplementäre EnGE-basierte Regulationsarten vorgeschlagen: 1) Eine 
reaktive, puffer-basierte Art, bei welcher das Individuum positive Emotionen erzeugen kann, 
um negativen Emotionen entgegenzuwirken. 2) Eine präventive, simulations-basierte Art, bei 
welcher das Individuum EnGE einsetzt, um zukünftige emotionale Ergebnisse zu simulieren 
und so aktiv die Wahrscheinlichkeit solcher Ergebnisse zu erhöhen bzw. zu verringern. 
Schließlich werden in dem Kapitel die spezifischen Hypothesen aufgeführt, die der 
vorliegenden Forschungsarbeit zugrunde liegen.  
 
Teil II: Empirische Studien 
Kapitel 3 bis 7 umfassen den zweiten Teil der Dissertation und führen nacheinander 
vier empirische Studien auf, um die Hypothesen aus Kapitel 2 zu testen. Der empirische Teil 
der Arbeit (Kapitel 4-7) wurde entweder bereits publiziert oder befindet sich momentan im 
Begutachtungsprozess von peer-reviewed Journalen. Da das Artikelformat keine umfassende 
Beschreibung der Methoden gestattet, werden in Kapitel 3 die Stichproben, die 
Verhaltensparadigmen, die experimentellen Methoden und die Analysen detaillierter 
beschrieben.  
Das erste Hauptthema der Dissertation ist, die neuronalen Komponentenprozesse von 
EnGE zu etablieren. In Kapitel 4 und 5 werden die Studien, die diese Frage direkt 
beantworten, vorgestellt. Kapitel 4 beschreibt eine Studie, die die neuronalen Grundlagen von 
EnGE untersucht. Wichtig war hierbei die Unterscheidung der Netzwerke, die die Erzeugung 
von emotionalen Erfahrungen im allgemeinen unterstützen, von den Netzwerken, die die 
Inhaltsrepräsentationen von emotionalen Erfahrungen (z. B. Informationsmodalität oder 
Valenz) unterstützen. Mittels funktioneller Bildgebung (fMRT) und psychophysiologischen 
Messungen sowie einem neuen Verhaltensparadigma, wurde das neuronale 
 Komponentenprozessmodell aus Kapitel 2 getestet. In jeweils zwei Experimenten (N = 
32/293) erzeugten Teilnehmer positive und negative emotionale Zustände unter Verwendung 
von frei wählbaren Methoden der Erzeugung. Wie erwartet aktivierte EnGE große Teile des 
SN, des DMN und des linken FPCN. Komponentenprozesse, die durch diese Netzwerke 
implementiert werden, wurden anhand ihrer funktionellen Assoziationen, 
Aktivierungsdynamiken und Integration während EnGE identifiziert. Die SN Aktivierung als 
Ganzes korrelierte mit subjektivem Affekt, und ihren Mittelhirnarealen, welche ausschließlich 
zwischen positiver und negativer Affektintensität unterscheiden. Weiterhin zeigte das SN 
Dynamiken, die konsistent sind mit einer Unterstützung der Generierung des „Core-Affect“. 
Es konnte gezeigt werden, dass das dorsomediale DMN, zusammen mit der ventralen 
anterioren Insel, für die Verarbeitung von multiplen Generationsmethoden zuständig war, und 
dass es eine Aktivierungsdynamik aufwies, die die Beteiligung der erfahrungsmäßigen 
Repräsentation von Emotionen nahelegt. Schließlich konnte gezeigt werden, dass die 
ventrolateralen frontalen Teile des FPCN sowohl mit der Intensität von subjektivem Affekt 
als auch mit der Verwendung von Erzeugungsmethoden korrelierte. Dies legt nahe, dass es 
eine Rolle bei den kontrollierten Abrufungsprozessen von Erinnerungen spielt. Weiterhin war 
das FPCN mit dem DMN und dem SN gekoppelt. Dies ist konsistent mit der Annahme, dass 
das FPCN die exekutive Koordination des Erzeugungsprozesses unterstützt. 
Zusammenfassend unterstützen diese Ergebnisse die neuronalen Grundlagen der 
Komponentenprozesse, die in Kapitel 2 erörtert wurden.    
In Kapitel 5 werden diese Ergebnisse ergänzt durch Untersuchungen der neuronalen 
Korrelate bei EnGE-Expertise in einer Stichprobe von Meditationsexperten (N = 17). Die 
Experten weisen Erfahrungen in Meditationspraxen auf, welche auf die Erzeugung von 
positiven Emotionen wie Liebende-Güte und Mitgefühl ausgerichtet sind.  Hier wird mit Hilfe 
von struktureller Magnetresonanztomographie gezeigt, dass eine Meditations-basierte EnGE-
Expertise mit einer erhöhten kortikalen Dicke im rechten anterioren und im linken 
 ventrolateralen prefrontalen Kortex und in der linken anterioren Insel einhergeht. In einem 
zweiten Schritt konnte gezeigt werden, dass die Aktivierungsmuster auftraten, die mit 
Liebender-Güte Meditation im Vergleich zu Ruhezuständen assoziiert sind. Dies zeigte sich 
durch eine erhöhte Aktivierung im frontalen DMN, im linken FPCN, und der linken 
anterioren Insel, welches mit den Ergebnissen aus Kapitel 4 übereinstimmt. Maßgeblich 
hierbei ist, dass die Überlappung bei beiden Messungen in Regionen des linken 
ventrolateralen prefrontalen Kortex und der ventralen anterioren Insel auftraten, welche 
Schlüsselareale des SN beziehungsweise des FPCN sind. Bereits in Kapitel 4 wurde 
dargestellt, dass diese Regionen eine wichtige bereichsübergreifende Rolle bei EnGE spielen. 
Zusammenfassend beantworten Kapitel 4 und 5 die Frage, wie EnGE entsteht und gestatten 
eine Spezifikation der neuronalen Grundlangen von EnGE.  
 
Die zweite Hauptfrage der Dissertation ist, wie EnGE für die emotionale 
Selbstregulation angewendet werden kann. Die ist das Thema von Kapitel 6 und 7. Anhand 
eines Teils der Stichprobe von Meditationsexperten aus Kapitel 5 (n = 15) wird in Kapitel 6 
eine Studie beschrieben, in welcher 15 Meditationsexperten an einem fMRT Experiment 
teilnahmen. In diesem Experiment haben die Versuchsteilnehmer entweder passiv einen 
emotionalen Filmclip, der Menschen in Not zeigt, angeschaut oder sie praktizierten 
währenddessen eine Mitgefühlsmeditation, beziehungsweise nutzten die kognitive 
Emotionsregulationsstrategie der „Neubewertung“ (Reappraisal), um ihre emotionale 
Reaktion zu modulieren. Beide Strategien konnten erfolgreich, aber in unterschiedlicher 
Weise, den erlebten negativen Affekt regulieren. Durch Mitgefühl wurde hauptsächlich 
positiver Affekt erhöht und durch Neubewertung hauptsächlich negativer Affekt verringert. 
Die Ergebnisse aus der Bildgebung zeigen, dass bei Mitgefühl, im Vergleich zum passiven 
Anschauen oder bei Neubewertung, eine erhöhte Aktivierung in Regionen vorkommt, die 
relevant für Affiliation, positiven Affekt und bei Belohnungsprozessen sind, wie das ventrale 
 Striatum und der mediale prefrontale Kortex. Dieses Netzwerk war schon vor der Stimulus-
Präsentation aktiv und legt nahe, dass der regulatorische Mechanismus von Mitgefühl die 
Stimulus-unabhängige Erzeugung von endogenem positiven Affekt ist. Dies stimmt mit der 
oben erwähnten Annahme überein, dass somit ein Puffer-Mechanismus aktiviert wird.  
Nach der Darstellung das EnGE eine mögliche Form einer emotionalen 
Selbstregulation in einer Expertenpopulation ist, wurde dies in einer normalen Population 
repliziert (Kapitel 7). In einer Teilstichprobe aus der Stichprobe von Kapitel 4 (n = 288) 
wurden die Zusammenhänge von EnGE Fähigkeiten, habituellem Affekt (trait affect) und 
Tendenzen für die Anwendung von verschiedenen Emotionsregulations- und 
Bewältigungsstrategien untersucht. Es konnte gezeigt werden, dass die Fähigkeit Emotionen 
zu generieren mit habituellem Affekt und der Verwendung von adaptiven 
Emotionsmanagementtechniken positiv korrelierte. Interessanterweise war dies für sowohl die 
generelle Erzeugungsfähigkeit als auch die valenzspezifische Erzeugungsfähigkeit (eher 
positiv als negativ) gegeben. Jedoch konnte nur die generelle Erzeugungsfähigkeit die 
bekannte Beziehung zwischen adaptivem Emotionsmanagement und habituellem Affekt 
kausal vermitteln. Diese Vermittlung war spezifisch für die instrumentellen Arten des 
Emotionsmanagements. Diese beinhalten vor allem Techniken, die es dem Individuum 
gestatten mit emotionalen Ereignissen verhaltensbasiert umzugehen. Dies stimmt mit der 
Annahme überein, dass dies eine präventive simulationsbasierte Art des 
Emotionsmanagements ist, wie es in Kapitel 2 erörtert wurde. Zusammenfassend wurde in 
Kapitel 6 und 7 gezeigt, dass EnGE tatsächlich mit emotionaler Selbstregulation verknüpft ist, 
und dass dies sowohl als Puffer als auch als ein präventiver Mechanismus funktioniert und 
daher effektiv verwendet werden kann, um auf emotionale Ereignisse zu reagieren.  
 
 
 
 Teil III: Generelle Diskussion 
Der letzte Teil der Arbeit fasst die Ergebnisse zusammen und diskutiert sie. Das 
Komponentenprozessmodell von EnGE und das Modell für EnGE-basiertes 
Emotionsmanagement wie in Kapitel 2 vorgeschlagen, werden evaluiert. Kapitel 8 fasst die 
vorliegenden Ergebnisse zusammen und adaptiert das Arbeitsmodell basierend auf diesen 
Ergebnissen. Letztlich wird in Kapitel 9 eine kritische Analyse der vorliegenden 
Untersuchungen durchgeführt und die theoretischen Implikationen der Ergebnisse und 
mögliche zukünftigen Richtungen für die weitere Erforschung von EnGE erörtert.  
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